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ABSTRACT 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance support to counterinsurgency 
operations is significantly different from the support necessary for conventional, major 
theater warfare based upon the command levels of planning and execution, the 
developing nature of “wicked” problems within a counterinsurgency, and the competing 
needs for highly limited resources.   The U.S. Air Force, however, maintains an 
organizational structure optimized for conventional warfare at the expense of the 
responsiveness and flexibility necessary to conduct ISR operations in coordination with 
supported maneuver elements.  This thesis identifies the problems encountered by the 
ISR community in supporting counterinsurgency operations and makes several 
recommendations for mitigating those problems, among them the development of a 
dynamic organizational design, a request and tasking process that manages both ISR and 
operations assets with a focus on the disparate needs of responsible commanders, and the 
transition to a doctrine focused on real-time ISR integration with, rather than preliminary 
support to, operations.  The doctrine proposed by this thesis is exportable to non-military 
operations to include disaster recovery and humanitarian relief operations. 
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I. ORGANIZATIONAL RE-DESIGN AND THE PROBLEM OF 
CFACC ISR SUPPORT TO COIN OPERATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Given the state of the world today, and the acceptance by most senior leadership 
in the U.S. military that future operations will, in many respects, reflect the day-to-day 
realities of the current counterinsurgency (COIN) fight, the U.S. Air Force needs to 
develop (or co-opt) a more responsive system for the employment of intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.  As our military continues to foresee 
“intelligence driving operations,” the need for timely, applicable ISR support will 
continue to grow.   
Unfortunately, as Combined Forces Air Component Commander’s (CFACC) ISR 
assets continue to be added to the Iraqi and Afghan Theaters of Operation at an 
increasing rate, their utility is hampered by the requirements of a 
planning/tasking/execution process largely developed for a conventional force-on-force 
engagement.  Careful analysis of the CFACC ISR process must be conducted to 
determine the conditions under which ISR responsiveness can be improved.  In recent 
years, a number of efforts have been undertaken to improve CFACC ISR integration, yet 
these current endeavors provide primarily temporary fixes to an institutional problem 
rather than actually re-inventing the process in whole to formalize the procedures.  So 
long as ISR support to COIN is treated as a temporary diversion from the intended large-
scale war doctrine, such solutions will continue to rely on “out of hide” manning, limited 
funding pulled from assorted projects, and be subject to the whims of personality-driven 
decisions that can easily reverse the considerable gains made thus far. 
The current debate over CFACC ISR support to counter insurgency operations 
features three broadly defined arguments:  The Air Force Way, the Army Way, and the 
Close Air Support (CAS) Way.  The first two theories are, as the naming convention 
suggest, parochial in nature.  Not only does each theory ascribe control of the ISR assets 
to the proposing service, it promotes that service’s views of how best to employ assets.   
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The “Air Force Way” of providing ISR support is efficient, allowing for more 
targets to be collected per sensor and providing assets for longer periods of time (both in 
terms of single mission “dwell” times as well as per month number of sorties).  
Unfortunately, the long lead times required for planning and coordination of ISR assets in 
this process often result in targets being collected that are no longer of importance 
(“overcome by events”) and an inability to shift from lower priority, pre-planned targets 
to newly developed, high priority targets.   
The “Army Way” of providing ISR support is more responsive, giving ground 
commanders greater control over asset usage and therefore able to collect on targets of 
immediate significance.  Adhering to this process, however, will reduce the number of 
overall sorties available (thus reducing the number of opportunities to employ the asset) 
and will limit the ability to share assets among different commanders (thus leading to 
“down times” in which the asset is underutilized).1   
The “CAS Way” provides a balance of these two options in which a greater 
number of commanders can have their requests satisfied while ensuring that the targets 
collected are of the most importance to the supported commander.  Although this method 
will not be as efficient as the “Air Force Way,” it will limit the underutilization of assets 
while ensuring commanders are able to task the asset against the most pressing, fleeting 
targets they require.  Using the “CAS Way” as the basis, this thesis develops the formal 
structures, procedures, and plan for executing an ISR strategy that cares for the force 
(maintenance, crews, and logistics) while providing substantial increases in flexibility 
with regards to timing and target redirects.   
This model emphasizes the doctrinal notion of centralized control and 
decentralized execution with a focus on joint integration via empowered command and 
control nodes and liaison officers.  To improve this method of ISR utilization, this thesis 
examines the variables within the planning, tasking and execution stages of ISR 
                                                 
1 For a more in-depth discussion of the differences between the “Air Force” and “Army” ways of 
managing and conducting ISR, see Julian C. Cheater’s  Master’s thesis for the School of Advanced Air and 
Space Studies, “The War Over Warrior: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Adaptive Joint Command and 
Control,” completed in June 2008. 
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employment.  The thesis is organized into seven chapters.  The first two chapters identify 
the problems currently afflicting the ISR constellation, specifically the reorganization of 
the U.S. Army beginning in 2005 and the “wicked” nature of ISR problems as they 
pertain to counterinsurgency campaigns.  Chapters III, IV, and V summarize current 
changes made to improve ISR planning, tasking, and execution, and provide the 
formalized structure necessary to ensure continuity of operations in seamless integration.  
Chapter VI examines the requirements for a flexible, “dynamic” doctrine that permits 
future employment of the hard-won lessons of ISR employment in the current war.  
Finally, Chapter VII summarizes the recommendations of this thesis and brings it all 
together. 
This thesis is developed based upon the personal experiences of the author and 
those of the men and women of the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army who conducted ISR 
operations in the Iraqi theater of operations.  The end result is a proposed doctrinal 
construct that emphasizes integration of joint and coalition forces through integrated 
planning based upon horizontal linkages and expert liaison support, predictability in 
tasking that allows for high levels of responsiveness during dynamic situations and in 
engaging fleeting targets, and flexibility in execution based upon decentralized decision 
making and seamless integration of ISR and operations elements.  The intent is not to 
replace the current ISR tasking and execution structure, but to augment it with an 
adaptive capability more applicable to decentralized operations such as those currently 
experienced in counterinsurgency campaigns. 
1. What Is ISR? 
In recent years, many studies, articles and academic papers have proposed 
changes to current ISR processes.  Unfortunately, most of these endeavors have largely 
made their recommendations without a detailed analysis of the underlying causes of the 
contemporary problems.   This chapter, along with Chapter II, seeks to provide insight 
into the problems that have necessitated a change in the ISR doctrine and processes. 
Military commanders are decision makers.  Their decisions affect life and death, 
and they are often responsible for the survival of entire populations.  Therefore, their 
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decisions must be carefully informed and must take into consideration the enemy, terrain, 
weather and even civilian aspects of the terrain (particularly within a counterinsurgency 
campaign in which the population is the “center of gravity”).  This latter category can 
include areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE)2 that 
define the society in which the commander and his or her forces must operate.  Such 
information must be accurate, it must be timely, and it must be relevant to the decisions 
to be made. 
 Acquiring this information is the purpose of intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) operations.  ISR must be aggressively and continuously planned 
and synchronized to integrate the sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and 
dissemination (PED) systems to directly support these decision makers.  Such planning 
and integration must be functions not only of the intelligence community (the “2” in 
military staff parlance) but also of the operations community (the “3”).3 
 More specifically, intelligence is defined as the product that results from ISR 
operations.  It is the information that fuels the decision maker’s understanding of his 
operational environment.4  Surveillance provides information to be refined into 
intelligence through persistent observation via long dwell times with a continuous 
collection capability oriented not on a specific target but often as a sustained and passive 
process.5  Reconnaissance, on the other hand, is generally used to provide short duration 




                                                 
2 Field Manual Interim (FMI) 2–01, ISR Synchronization, November 2008, vi. 
3 Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2–9, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Operations, 
17 Jul 2007, 1. 
4 David A. Deptula and Greg Brown, “A House Divided: The Indivisibility of Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance,” Air and Space Power Journal, Summer 2008, 2. 
5 Ibid., 3. 
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operation.6When effectively combined to provide specific, analyzed information gathered 
through persistent and focused coverage, ISR operations provide the “lifeblood of 
effective decision making.”7 
2. What Has Changed? 
The nature of warfare has changed.  A shift from industrial aged massed forces 
slugging it out over terrain to information age forces that maneuver to seize key nodes 
and influence the battlespace as much as dominate it has driven intelligence away from 
counting forces to a focus on precision, from detailed analysis over extend periods of 
time to “actionable intelligence” within a compressed time frame, and from single service 
focus to a highly integrated network of joint and coalition agencies.8 
Specifically, in a counterinsurgency campaign, the role of ISR is to develop an 
understanding of the issues that drive the insurgency.  This requires a focus on the local 
populace, an integration of intelligence collected at all echelons, and an understanding of 
the insurgents’ ability to operate in complex terrain spanning both the geophysical and 
human dimensions.9 
Furthermore, intelligence has grown beyond a “supporting role” and now 
represents an integrated part of operations.  As the commander now drives intelligence, 
intelligence drives maneuver operations, which in turn feed more intelligence.10  In an 
environment in which Brigade Combat Team (BCT) commanders are tasked with solving 
the problems that lead to insurgencies, the fight is now determined from the bottom-up.  
Where the Corps and Division used to provide intelligence to their subordinates to 
accomplish the missions assigned to them by the Corps and the Division, the BCT 
commander now develops his team’s mission and identifies the intelligence he requires to 
                                                 
6 Deptula and Brown, “A House Divided,”  2. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid.,  3. 
9 Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency, December 15, 2006, para 3–121. 
10 Z. Tenay Guvendiren and Scott Downey, “Putting the PRIORITY Back into PIR: PIR Development 
in a COIN Environment,” Small Wars Journal, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/04/pir-development-
in-a-coin-envi/, (accessed October 15, 2009). 
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accomplish the mission.  When the Corps and the Division become force providers, the 
bottom-fed intelligence process requires greater access to ISR capabilities at a much 
lower level than previously and largely indicates that higher echelon intelligence sections 
are unable to provide additional resolution to subordinate information requirements.11 
In short, ISR is in greater demand by a greater number of customers.  
Furthermore, it is expected to be more responsive, more timely, and more applicable.  
ISR must be able to adapt as the mission changes, to support operations in real time and 
to meet needs beyond the targeting of enemy forces. 
B. THE MACHINE BUREAUCRACY 
The U.S. military is an excellent example of the Machine Bureaucracy as defined 
by Henry Mintzberg.  It is identified by a very formal structure focused on the 
development and implementation of rules (known within military circles as “doctrine” 
and “tactics, techniques, and procedures”) and an extensive use of a technostructure to 
develop and enforce those rules in standards (in the form of “inspector generals” and 
“standards and evaluations teams.”).  (See Figure 1, Mintzberg's Machine Bureaucracy).  
Standardization of work is the ideal as each Soldier, Sailor, Airman, or Marine is 
expected to be relatively interchangeable within his/her organization (by which is meant, 
any infantry company should operate like any other infantry company because each 
soldier is trained to the same standards and taught the same tactics).  There are very 
formal vertical structures in place regarding the “chain of command,” and 
decentralization of command authority is limited to very specific instances or scope.  The 
purpose of this Machine Bureaucracy is to operate within a stable and simple 
environment with high efficiency.12 
                                                 
11 Scott A. Downey and Z. Tenay Guvendiren, “Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
Collection Management in the Brigade Combat Team during COIN:  Three Assumptions and Ten “A-Ha!” 
Moments on the Path to Battlefield Awareness,” Small Wars Journal,  
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/11/intelligence-surveillance-and/ (accessed October 15, 2009). 
12 Henry Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?”  Harvard Business Review (January-
February 1981), 108–109. 
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Figure 1. Mintzberg's Machine Bureaucracy13  
 
To assert that the modern battlefield is stable and simple may seem unusual, but it 
must be taken into consideration within the context of engagements with a similar 
Machine Bureaucracy, namely any standing military.  (See Figure 2, Militaries as 
Machine Bureaucracies.)  When encountering another organization with strict 
formalization and limited decentralization of command, the tactical battlefield may 
indeed appear considerably more complex or unstable, but the strategic nature of the 
conflict is markedly less so.  Although deception is a common part of warfare, it is more 
a factor of buying time than of truly doing something unexpected.  There are simply a 
limited number of ways in which organized militaries are able to go to war, and their 
ability to succeed is based more on the speed with which they are able to act and 
transition than on their creativity.  The United States’ superiority in intelligence gathering 
and command and control allows the U.S. military to more accurately observe the 
battlespace and to adapt their efforts to those changes.  Therefore, the key to military 
organization is the ability to apply a limited number of forces to the right place at the 
                                                 
13 After:  Mintzberg, "Organization Design," Harvard Business Review, Jan-Feb 1981, 105. 
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right time (known in the U.S. military as “economy of force”).  The efficiency and “unity 
of command” of a machine bureaucracy provide the ideal structure for this type of 
endeavor. 
 
Figure 2. Militaries as Machine Bureaucracies 
 
1. Basic Structure 
The Machine Bureaucracy embraces formalization.  The concept of the 
bureaucracy (though largely derided in present organizations) stems from efforts by Max 
Weber to stem the tide of unjust and corrupt managerial practices.14  As such, the 
bureaucracy assures effectiveness by adherence to a universal standard, not subject to 
individual whim, charismatic personalities, or varying levels of skill.  Each division is 
highly specialized with routine operating tasks, grouped by function and governed by a 
proliferation of rules and regulations.  Formalized communication is used throughout the 
organization, emphasizing vertical linkages in which superiors make decisions and then 
                                                 
14 Robert H. Waterman, Jr., Adhocracy, (New York:  W. W. Norton & Company, 1990), 26. 
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distribute those decisions down to subordinates in parallel.   Power is highly centralized, 
and there is a clear distinction between the elaborate administrative staff (“combat 
support” such as intelligence, logistics and similar elements) and the operating core15 
(maneuver units to include infantry and armor elements). 
Standardization of procedure and systems is the key to efficiency of the Machine 
Bureaucracy.  Effectiveness is often a measure of efficiency in which the ability to 
produce is balanced against the costs to do so.  To ensure the greatest level of 
standardization and, in turn, efficiency, the Machine Bureaucracy relies heavily upon a 
technocratic staff that regulates, manages, and provides quality control over the Machine 
Bureaucracy’s functions.  Due to this level of responsibility, the technocratic staff often 
possesses a level of informal authority far beyond what might be immediately observable 
from the centralized nature of the Machine Bureaucracy.16 
2. Context for Effectiveness 
Machine Bureaucracies thrive in stable and simple environments.  The 
standardized nature of the work produced by the Machine Bureaucracy combined with 
the formal communication of its centralized decision making dictate that the Machine 
Bureaucracy operate most efficiently in situations for which it was specifically 
designed.17  Mature Machine Bureaucracies that have had time to establish their 
standardized procedures tend to be more efficient than their competitors in the 
environments in which they developed.  Challenging a Machine Bureaucracy in such a 
stable condition is likely to be unsuccessful as routinized functions are easily managed 
and efficiency can promote effectiveness. 
                                                 
15 Henry Mintzberg, Structures in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations (Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1993), 164. 
16 Ibid., 165. 
17 Ibid., 171 
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3. Limitations 
A significant limitation of the Machine Bureaucracy, particularly as it applies to 
military operations, is the need for centralized authority figures to deal with all decisions.  
The formalized communications, the very discreet divisions in function, rely heavily on a 
central figure to resolve all issues and then disseminate the proper guidance to all 
concerned.  This can lead to a few central leaders becoming overwhelmed with decisions 
that may be more effectively made at lower echelons.  Furthermore, by requiring 
decisions to be made at echelons far removed from the decision itself, such top managers 
are often possessed of inadequate, superficial information that does not reflect the 
“tangible detail” of the situation to be resolved.18 
C. JOINT PLANNING IN A CONVENTIONAL CAMPAIGN 
1. 21–25 March 2003—Campaign Planning and the “Dust Storm”19 
21 March 2003:  This was the type of organization that executed Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.  The highest fielded echelon of the U.S. Army, the Corps, was responsible for 
developing the land component’s strategy and overall objectives.  Such planning is 
typically focused on operations to begin after 96 hours.20  This was the first day of 
combat operations and V Corps, designated as the main effort of coalition forces, had 
identified the axis of advance toward Baghdad and designated the 3rd Infantry Division 
(3ID) as its Main Effort (ME).21  Through the use of a warning order, the Corps typically 
provides its intentions to its Divisions so that they in turn can begin the planning 
necessary to achieve the objectives assigned to them by the Corps.22  In preparation for 
                                                 
18 Mintzberg, Structures in Fives, 185. 
19 The mission described is based on historical events over the given dates.  Specific details have been 
altered to preserve operational security and to refine the narrative for ease of understanding. 
20 Field Manual 6–20–30, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Corps and 
Division Operations, October 18, 1989, Chapter 2. 
21 Dr. Charles Kirkpatrick, “16 Days to Baghdad,” V Corps Public Affairs, 2, 
http://www.vcorps.army.mil/references/16_days_to_baghdad_pamphlet_onscreen_version.pdf,  (accessed  
May 15, 2009). 
22 Field Manual 5–0, Army Planning and Orders Production, January 2005, 1–24. 
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seizing the key terrain of the Karbala Gap, which would give access to Baghdad,23 3ID 
was tasked with seizing Objective Chargers.  (See Figure 3, Objective CHARGERS in 
Vicinity of Karbala.) 
 
Figure 3. Objective CHARGERS in Vicinity of Karbala24 
 
At the same time, the Corps’ strategy is provided to the Combined Air Operations 
Center (CAOC), the senior command element of the air component.  This allows the 
Strategy Division of the CAOC, also focused on events 96 hours in the future, to 
integrate the land component’s operations and targets with the air component’s 
operations and targets.25  In developing the strategic air plan, the Strategy Division, 
                                                 
23 Kirkpatrick, “16 Days to Baghdad,” 3. 
24 After:  Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David Tohn, “On Point—the United States Army in 
Operations Iraqi Freedom,” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Studies Institute Press, 2004), 30 and 244, 
http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/OnPointI.pdf, (accessed October 15, 2009). 
25 Air Force Tactics Techniques and Procedures (AFTTP) 3–3, AOC Operational Employment—Air 
and Space Operations Center, 1 November 2007, pp. 3–1 to 3–2. 
 12
supported by a number of intelligence representatives, identifies gaps in intelligence, 
targets that need to be imaged, or future enemy movements that must be determined.   
These gaps become the Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR).26  
These requests for information (RFIs) are forwarded to the Analysis, Correlation, and 
Fusion (ACF) team of the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division 
(ISRD).  Information that can be gleaned from available databases or previous ISR 
missions is returned to the Strategy Division to continue planning.  Any remaining 
requirements that must be filled by ISR operations are submitted as collection requests to 
the ISR Operations team to be added to the Air Component Command’s prioritized 
collection list of all other collection requests.27 
Similarly, as part of its mission planning process, the V Corps Headquarters 
pushed a request for information through the collection manager (CM) for an updated 
order of battle (OB) for the 2nd Medina Division of the Republican Guard that was dug-
in28 in vicinity of OBJ Chargers just north of the city of Karbala.  The intelligence on the 
disposition of the Medina Division and its battalions was incomplete, complicating 
planning for the 3ID and its supporting attack aviation elements.29 The RFI could be 
answered with historical data but for current OB data, the RFI needed to be transformed 
into a collection request to task intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to 
provide the latest information available. 
As of 2003, the U.S. Army still had few organic ISR assets capable of providing 
such information.  Long Range Surveillance Teams (LRSTs) could be tasked by the 
Division Military Intelligence Battalion to scout the area or the Combat Aviation Brigade 
could be similarly employed to identify forces currently on OBJ Chargers.   The push for 
OBJ Chargers, however, was still three days in advance (the typical Corps planning 
focus) and those assets were required by the Division for planning and executing 
                                                 
26 AFTTTP  3–8. 
27 AFTTP 3–3, 6–35. 
28 Carlo Kopp, “Iraqi Freedom—The Hammer & Anvil,” Australian Aviation, May 2003, 34. 
29 Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, “On Point,” 180. 
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operations in the next 24 to 48 hours, to include seizing Objective Rams, the city of An 
Najaf.30  For this reason, the collection request was forwarded by the Corps CM to 
Central Command.   
22 March 2003:  The collection request was compiled as part of the Land 
Component Command’s prioritized collection list along with all other collection requests 
submitted by V Corps and by the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) that was 
advancing toward Baghdad along V Corps’ eastern flank.  This component list was then 
combined with the lists produced by the Maritime Component Command and the Air 
Component Command (ACC).  Together, these lists were reviewed by the Joint 
Collection Management Board, which then produced a single Joint Integrated Prioritized 
Collection List (JIPCL) of all component requests, prioritized based on the Joint Forces 
Commander’s established priorities.31  The list was then forwarded to the ISRD of the 
CAOC located at Al Udied AB, Qatar.   
The ISRD received the collection requests and collection managers specializing in 
specific intelligence disciplines32 such as imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals 
intelligence (SIGINT), and measures and signatures intelligence (MASINT) reviewed the 
requests for appropriateness with regards to the systems capabilities to answer the 
requestor’s question.33  V Corps’ request for current OB on OBJ Chargers could be 
initially satisfied by IMINT, possibly from a U-2 or unmanned RQ-4 Global Hawk (GH) 
(See Figure 4, Left: U-2S, Right: RQ-4 Global Hawk),34 both of which are capable of 
imaging a target area using electro-optical, infrared, or radar imaging systems.  To 
continue to provide updated OB over the next 72 hours, however, would require either 
 
 
                                                 
30 Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, “On Point,” 101. 
31 AFTTP 3–3, 6–106. 
32 For further information on the intelligence disciplines discussed throughout this thesis, see 
Appendix A. 
33 AFTTP 3–3, 6–100. 
34 For further information on all ISR platforms discussed in this paper, see Appendix B. 
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numerous imagery passes over that time frame, images that might be better used to 
answer other requests, or once a baseline had been established, to simply track any 
additional vehicles that moved onto the objective.   
 
Figure 4. Left: U-2S, Right: RQ-4 Global Hawk35 
 
This latter consideration resulted in the ISRD tasking a GH to image the target 
initially and then to task the E-8 Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System 
(JSTARS) (See Figure 5, Left: E-8C JSTARS; Right: MQ-1 Predator.) to monitor the 
objective area with its radar.  The JSTARS radar is a ground moving target indicator 
(GMTI) allowing it to observe vehicles moving through an area.36, 37  Its ability to 
provide precision locations is limited, but the ability to count individual vehicles and their 
general movements into and out of the objective area was sufficient to meet the needs of 
V Corps. 
As 3ID continued to advance toward Objective Chargers, it began to plan its 
operations out for the next 72 hours and submited further collection requests through its 
division CM to the Corps CM to provide refined data on OBJ Chargers.  These updates 
                                                 
35 After: United States Air Force, “CENTAF Air Power Summary for April 3,2007,” (photograph), 
http://www.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/030411-F-0000J-222.jpg, (accessed November 20, 2009) 
and Jason Tudor, “Global Hawk, Global Mission,” (photograph), 
http://www.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/061003-F-7441T-333.jpg (accessed November 20, 2009).  
36 John Michael Loh, “Fly More Joint-STARS,” Army Times, paragraph six, 
http://www.armytimes.com/community/opinion/airforce_backtalk_stars_060208/, (accessed May 15, 
2009). 
37 As of 2009, North Grumman, which supports the JSTARS, has begun advertising a “Dismount 
Moving Target Indicator (DMTI) capability that can track non-vehicular, slow moving entities—even 
individuals.”  For an example, see Air Force Times, October 5, 2009, 11. 
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were forwarded to the ISRD which provided these more precise Essential Elements of 
Information (EEIs) to the JSTARS mission planning cell (a mixture of both Air Force and 
Army air crew)38 to ensure that when they began their mission, they knew exactly what 
the Army required from their surveillance.  Mission planning is often refined in this 
fashion as requirements from higher echelons provide a general concept of operations, 
where to focus attention, and the type of mission to be supported and then is updated by 
subordinate echelons as they are able to clarify their specific areas of focus and targets.  
In the meantime, the JSTARS was flying daily missions collecting against other target 
areas, providing overwatch for engaged Army and Marine Corps units to let them know 
about enemy tactical maneuvers and reinforcements.  It also supported the “SCUD hunt” 
in the Western desert where the JSTARS radar was used to redirect RQ-1 Predator 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (See Figure 5, Left: E-8C JSTARS; Right: MQ-1 
Predator) and special operations forces (SOF) on the ground to suspicious “tracks” that 
may or may not be one of the many mobile missile launchers used by the Iraqi military.  
 




                                                 
38 Loh, “Joint-STARS,” paragraph seven. 
39 After: Shane Cuomo, “JSTARS,” (photograph), 
http://www.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/021220-F-2034C-014.jpg (accessed November 20, 2009) 
and United States Air Force, “Dec. 17 airpower summary: Predators strike enemy forces,” (photograph), 
http://www.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/030813-F-8888W-206.jpg (accessed November 20, 2009). 
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23 March 2003:  48 hours prior to the assault on Objective Chargers, 3ID 
provided its plan and objectives to the Brigades to allow them to begin their own 
planning with the intention of achieving the Division’s assigned objectives.40 (See Figure 
6, Joint Campaign Planning Timelines.) 
 
Figure 6. Joint Campaign Planning Timelines 
 
The Military Intelligence Battalion, which in 2003 was attached to the Division, 
provided the intelligence necessary for the Brigades to conduct their planning, as the 
Brigades are subordinate to the Division and are attacking objectives assigned to them by 
the Division.  It is important to understand the manner in which intelligence flowed from 
the Corps and Division down to the Brigades.  At the start of Operation IRAQI 
FREEDOM (OIF), in 2003, the Brigade had very limited organic ISR capability.  The 
Brigade S2 (intelligence staff), had no top secret/sensitive compartmented information 
communications, was inadequately staffed to conduct intelligence analysis, had limited 
human intelligence capabilities (both in terms of training and resources), and no properly 
                                                 
40 FM 5–0, 1–24. 
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equipped signals intelligence (SIGINT) platoons.41 At this phase of OIF, these limitations 
were not excessive and did not impact mission accomplishment because the intelligence 
information was provided from above to support missions directed from above.  
As the Brigades planned their next 48 hours, the Combat Plans Division (CPD) of 
the CAOC developed the 48-hour air plan as well.  To do so, the CPD built the Master 
Air Attack Plan (MAAP) that identified all the targets that must be struck to achieve the 
effects planned for by the Strategy Division.  Strike packages were built, combining 
fighter and bomber aircraft with aircraft designed to defeat enemy air defenses, allowing 
for synergistic improvements in each element’s mission.  These packages were then 
aligned against specific groupings of targets, based largely on geographic proximity and 
the Joint Forces Commander’s designated priorities.  In conjunction with the CPD, the 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division (ISRD) of the CAOC (See 
Figure 7, Divisions and Teams of the Combined Air And Space Operations Center 
[CAOC]) began developing the intelligence necessary to support these operations 
including both pre-strike intelligence (target photos, assessments of enemy air defenses, 
etc.) and post-strike intelligence to determine overall effectiveness of the strikes and 
whether the targets would need to be struck again or if the Strategy Division’s envisioned 
effects were created.  All of these intelligence requirements, as prioritized by the Joint 
Collection Management Board (JCMB), would be planned for, to include aligning 
specific ISR assets against the targets.42 
                                                 
41 Raymond T. Odierno, Nichole E. Brooks and Franco P. Mastracchio, “ISR Evolution in the Iraqi 
Theater,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 3 (50) (2008): 54. 
42 AFTTP 3–3, 4–37. 
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Figure 7. Divisions and Teams of the Combined Air And Space Operations 
Center (CAOC)43 
 
The Brigades, during their planning, would identify targets that would need to be 
struck beyond the fire support coordination line (FSCL), which would be conducted by 
the air component as “air interdiction” missions as well as likely areas in which close air 
support would need to be coordinated by the Brigade or Battalion “joint terminal attack 
controllers” (JTACs).   The CPD would add these targets and these CAS sorties to the air 
plan.   
24 March 2003:  As the BCTs finalized their plans, in coordination with their 
subordinate Battalions, additional targets or CAS requirements were be identified and 
forwarded up through the chain of command.  The ISR plan, along with the plan for the 
                                                 
43 U.S. Air Forces Central, “Combined Air and Space Operations,” 
http://www.centraf.af.mil/units/caoc/index.asp (accessed October 23, 2009). 
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fighters, bombers, and other support aircraft, was combined into an Air Tasking Order 
(ATO).  At 12 hours prior to execution, to the start of the “ATO day” (the 24 hours 
covered by each ATO), the air tasking order was sufficiently finalized to be passed to the 
Wings that owned the aircraft and pilots who would be flying the missions.  The Wings 
would then begin planning their missions against the assigned targets.44  These 12 hours 
allowed the individual aircrews to mission plan, determining specific routing, altitudes, 
and other considerations to best employ their aircraft. 
During this final planning, as 3ID prepared to launch their assault on Objective 
Chargers, the “mother of all sand storms” struck, reducing visibility to 100 meters, which 
brought the Army advance to a stand-still and grounded the Division’s aviation assets.45 
(See Figure 8, Sandstorm Impedes Operations.)  Not only did this leave 3ID without the 
ability to prosecute targets on OBJ Chargers,46 but it was unable to use its own scout 
helicopters to monitor the Iraqi forces on OBJ Chargers.  Concerned that the Iraqi Army 
might attempt to use the cover provided by the sandstorm to reposition its forces, or 
worse, to initiate a pre-emptive attack against 3ID, the Division requested an immediate 
collection requirement for monitoring of the Iraqi forces. 
 
                                                 
44 AFTTP 3–3, 4–31. 
45 Kirkpatrick, “16 Days to Baghdad,” 3. 
46 Steve Call, Danger Close: Tactical Air Controllers in Afghanistan and Iraq, (College Station, TX: 
Texas A&M University Press, 2007), 153. 
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Figure 8. Sandstorm Impedes Operations47 
 
The JSTARS was already tasked to monitor the movement of the forces on OBJ 
Chargers, but its precision was insufficient to allow 3ID artillery assets to begin engaging 
targets or for ACC aircraft to be targeted against the Iraqi vehicles.  The ad hoc (Latin 
“for this purpose,” used to identify collection requests that occur after the air tasking 
order has already been issued) request was submitted by the V Corps CM directly to the 
Intelligence Surveillance And Reconnaissance Cell (ISARC) of the Combat Operations 
Division (COD).  The COD is the division of the CAOC that monitors and adjusts the air 




                                                 
47 Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, “On Point,”  204. 
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period.  The ISARC specifically monitors the execution of the ISR plan, adjusting the 
plan for delays in take-off, weather, maintenance problems, or as in this case, urgent 
requests for assistance.48 
The ISR Operations Duty Officer (ISRODO), who leads the team of liaisons 
located in the ISARC, recognized that with less than 12 hours before the ATO was to 
begin execution, there was not enough time for the request to be passed to the collection 
managers of the ISRD to conduct their routine planning.49  Instead, the ISRODO sent the 
request to the ISR Operations Cell in the ISRD which reviewed the list of available 
assets, the requirement of 3ID, and consulted with liaison officers from the various ISR 
platforms to establish the best possible solution to the Army’s need.  In this case, the ISR 
Ops team determined that the Global Hawk could be directed by the JSTARS crew to 
image specific parts of OBJ Chargers to provide highly precise coordinates, a more 
refined counting of the number of vehicles on the objective (whether moving or 
otherwise), and the massing of personnel (the JSTARS radar cannot detect people) either 
in encampments or possibly in some form of militarily relevant formations.  This plan 
was returned to the ISRODO who along with the liaison officers conducts a “risk/gain” 
assessment50 to determine what collection targets would be missed if the GH was 
diverted to this mission and whether any of those missed targets were of a higher priority 
than the 3ID request.  Having established that such losses were acceptable, based on the 
Joint Force Commander (JFC)’s priorities, the ISRODO then forwarded this request to 
the Senior Intelligence Duty Officer (SIDO) on the COD floor who coordinated with the 
Senior Operations Duty Officer (SODO) who controlled all of the fighter and bomber 
aircraft and the Chief of Combat Operations (CCO) who represented the CFACC in day-
to-day operations and decision making.51 
                                                 
48 AFTTP 3–3, 5–45.  (Note:  Although the ISARC is specifically identified as a place and not a team 
according to this document, the ISARC is often referenced as a team.) 
49 Ibid., 5–66. 
50 Ibid. 
51 AFTTP 3–3. 
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The GH is a long endurance aircraft that is unhampered by crew rest issues that 
afflict aircraft with pilots and aircrew onboard.  This allows the aircraft to remain aloft 
for many hours, often spanning more than one ATO day.  In this case, the GH was 
already airborne, collecting on other targets when the mission crew located at Beale Air 
Force Base, California was notified of the ATO change from the COD.  Although the GH 
had been tasked to image targets in support of future air interdiction missions and to 
provide Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) of previously struck targets, the GH crew was 
informed that the SIDO/CCO had established that the new targets were a higher priority 
and should be collected instead. 
25 March 2003: The GH crew chatted directly with the JSTARS crew as they 
began surveying Objective Chargers.  The JSTARS crew reported a large column of 
approximately 40 armored vehicles advancing on 3ID lead elements from An Najaf.52 
The JSTARS crew also identified locations along the roads where additional Iraqi 
vehicles from the north, rumored to be as many as 1,000, had left the roads and appeared 
to be attempting to move through the desert to surprise the 3ID located several miles to 
the south.53  (For an example of GMTI, see Figure 9, Example GMTI Display.) The GH 
was rapidly directed to these locations and began taking infrared images that were 
unaffected by the sandstorm.54  These images were forwarded to the Multi-Int 
Exploitation Cell (MEC) in the ISRD, made up of the Imagery Support Element (ISE) 
and the Air Force National Tactical Integration (AFNTI) team.55  The ISE exploited the 
imagery and provided the SIDO with the coordinates of all imaged vehicles.  The SIDO 
coordinated with the SODO for the tasking of fighter and bomber aircraft.  
Simultaneously, the images were delivered by the Battlefield Coordination Detachment 
(BCD), the Land Component Commander’s representatives to the CAOC,56 to the 3ID 
                                                 
52 Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, “On Point,” 159. 
53 Ibid., 164 and 167. 
54 John P. Jumper, (speech to the Air Force Association National Symposium on November 21, 2003 
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tactical operations center (TOC) where the Division commander and his staff were able 
to quickly readjust their defensive positions and prepare to engage the maneuvering Iraqi 
forces.  When the weather lifted, the battlespace had been sufficiently shaped for V 
Corps’ final assault on Baghdad.57 
 
Figure 9. Example GMTI display58 
 
2. CFACC ISR Adaptability within Design 
The success of this organizational structure was clearly demonstrated during 
Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom.  When facing other Machine Bureaucracies, 
                                                 
57 Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, “On Point,”   174. 
58 From: Unknown source, “GMTI JSTARS,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:GMTI_JSTARS.jpg 
(accessed November 20, 2009), Yellow and pink diamonds indicate moving vehicles 
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in both cases the Iraqi Army, the U.S. military was able to plan and adapt faster than its 
opponents and coordinate more effectively prior to and during the execution of 
operations.  It is likely that despite the weak capabilities of the Iraqi Army itself, the U.S. 
military (and its coalition partners) would achieve similar successes against any formally 
organized military structure. 
CFACC ISR can be responsive.  It can support the Army when used in the manner 
for which it was designed.  By 24 March 2003, the U.S. military had advanced an 
incredible 220 miles,59 much further than operational planning had suggested and 
overcame the previous benchmark of maneuver warfare success, the Nazi blitzkrieg of 
the Low Countries and France in 1940.60  The U.S. Air Force and its ISR capabilities 
were able to adapt to this rapid advance and continued to support the U.S. Army.  This 
was possible because the structure of the joint forces, and their planning, accounted for 
missions assigned from a central command authority, which were pushed down to direct 
actions against objectives prioritized by the Joint Forces Commander.  Planning was 
conducted in parallel with refinements of those plans occurring as necessary when 
improved data was made available from subordinates.  But even with subordinate input, 
the overall campaign plan changed very little. 
As this scenario illustrates, there are processes in place that acknowledge the 
dynamic nature of warfare and the need to dynamically request and task assets as the 
situation develops.   These processes, however, are intended to represent “the exception 
to the rule,” allowing the machine bureaucracy to continue to function in a previously 
established pattern.  When the pattern becomes interrupted and the organizational design 
is no longer appropriate to the given situation, such assumptions must be re-evaluated and 
the processes themselves redesigned to meet the realities of the situation. 
  
                                                 
59 Kirkpatrick, “16 Days to Baghdad,” 3. 
60 Kopp, “Hammer and Anvil,” 26. 
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D. U.S. ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL RE-DESIGN 
1. Impetus for Change 
Unfortunately, as Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom progressed, 
the U.S. military was no longer matched against similar Machine Bureaucracies.  Instead, 
it found itself facing an increasing number of disparate organizations that were most 
likely organized as “simple” or “adhocracy” structures61 depending on the specific nature 
of the “cell” and its affiliations (highly trained Saddam Fedayeen compared to poorly 
trained Jaish Al Mahdi or improvised explosive device (IED) cells vs. ambush teams).  
Most importantly, however, was the fact that there was no unified control structure 
(regardless of how decentralized it might be).  There was simply more than one enemy at 
any given time, operating with its own objectives and doctrine, often in competition with 
other insurgent groups.62 (See Figure 10, U.S. Army Faces Insurgent Forces.) 
 
Figure 10. U.S. Army Faces Insurgent Forces 
                                                 
61 Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fit or Fashion?” 107. 
62 Odierno, Brooks, and Mastracchio, “ISR Evolution,” 52. 
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2. Transition from Division to BCT 
In order to meet the more flexible and dynamic nature of these smaller 
organizations, the U.S. Army chose to shift the organization of its own components into 
one less like a Machine Bureaucracy and more along the lines of an Adhocracy.  To this 
end, the Army began adapting the Army structure in 2005 to create modular “brigade 
based” units that were more responsive, better able to employ joint capabilities, enabled 
force packaging, and capable of fighting as a self-contained unit in non-linear, non-
contiguous battlespace.63  The Army intended to move away from units providing 
specific capabilities to ones that were able to create effects across a broader spectrum.64 
Command and planning functions were decentralized as much as possible to the 
lowest level with Brigade Combat Teams being the “land owners” and companies often 
operating as independent organizations.65  To help this structure survive, the U.S. Army 
pushed as many assets as possible down to the Brigade Combat Team level, most 
notably, re-assigning elements of the Division Military Intelligence Battalion to the 
Brigade Combat Team level or lower.  This increased the BCT’s analytic capability three 
fold and added twice as much human intelligence (HUMINT) capability.   Each BCT was 
assigned an organic tactical UAV (Shadow) platoon to provide as much as 18 hours of 
full motion video (FMV) coverage a day.   The SIGINT platoon in each BCT was better 
equipped and trained and further augmented by theater-level cryptologic support and 
SIGINT terminal guidance teams allowing them to tap into national capabilities.  
Furthermore, the bandwidth available to handle internal communications and to provide 
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put imagery analysts, signals intelligence analysts, and other technical  
experts “closer to the fight;” it also provided each BCT with its own unmanned aerial 
reconnaissance systems for conducting operations.67 
3. Impact 
Most importantly, however, the manner in which operations were planned 
changed significantly.  As noted above, during conventional operations, missions and 
objectives were pushed down from above with the Corps deciding where the fight was 
going to take place and against which elements of the enemy.  In the subsequent scheme 
of operations, the Corps commander recognized that each insurgent group had to be dealt 
with individually and that without a central controlling authority unifying their efforts, 
the Army was hard pressed to control the action from above the BCT level.  The Brigade 
Combat Team commanders were the experts on what needed to be done to defeat the 
enemy in their area of operations and they were given as much authority as possible to 
conduct those operations as they saw fit. 
E. THE ADHOCRACY 
The U.S. Army, in effect, created an adhocracy, an organizational structure 
optimized for innovation and the integration of experts from different specialties.68  In 
the business world, the adhocracy serves as a temporary organization built around a 
specific project.  When the project is completed, the members of the adhocracy return to 
their own organizations or become a part of a new project team.  The Army, however, has 
chosen to institutionalize this structure by permanently assigning experts from within its 
own functional specialties and then adding in a temporary fashion, experts/liaisons from 
the joint, coalition, and interagency partners. 
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1. Basic Structure 
 The adhocracy has little formalization both in communications and the division of 
the organization.  Job specialization is based on formal training and such specialists are 
not grouped together in functional areas but rather deployed throughout as parts of multi-
disciplinary teams.69   This type of task organizing (focused on a particular mission rather 
than a capability) allows different disciplines to be brought together to leverage one 
another’s strengths and to mitigate one another’s weaknesses.70  Liaisons are highly 
integrated to insure mutual adjustment of processes, maintaining a balance throughout the 
organizational structure.  Central authority is lacking as selective decentralization within 
teams throughout the organization is used to allow the teams, and the organization as a 
whole, to adjust more rapidly and efficiently to environmental changes.71  
Communication is key within an adhocracy as it allows team members to monitor 
implementation and ensure that plans are executed as they were agreed upon rather than 
relying on an external quality control process or guidance from leadership.72  The 
adhocracy relies heavily on the specialized skills of experts that have been developed in 
training programs; however, adhocracies benefit from “team thinking” rather than 
reliance on a few individuals.  In this fashion, multiple ideas can be generated, improved 
upon, and implemented, particularly in environments of such complexity that no one 
individual has the depth of knowledge or experience to solve the problem alone.73  
Adhocracies are designed to be temporary structures74 to be re-created when the assigned 
mission ends and a new one begins. 
                                                 
69 Mintzberg, Structure in Fives, 254. 
70 Waterman, Adhocracy, 19. 
71 Mintzberg, Structure in Fives, 254. 
72 Waternman, Adhocracy, 20. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Mintzberg, Structure in Fives, 267. 
 29
2. Context for Effectiveness 
 Adhocracies are designed for situations that are dynamic and complex.75  Such 
environments often feature problems that are unpredictable and not easily resolved by 
previously established and standardized solutions.  Sophisticated technical systems, 
especially those that automate routine tasks, can be important conditions for the existence 
of the adhocracy.76  Given that adhocracies do not adhere to the traditional hierarchical 
standard most in the military are familiar with, leadership is essential to seeing that they 
succeed.  For any task force to be effective, it must be clear that the senior leaders 
recognize the importance of the adhocracy structure and empower it to operate with 
authority.77  This has been crucial to the success of the U.S. Army’s new BCT structure 
as each echelon of command understands that it is the BCT Commander’s battlespace 
and the insurgency fight in that battlespace is his to win. 
3. Limitations 
 The very nature of the adhocracy detracts from the possibility for unity of 
command.78  For this reason, adhocracies tend to be inefficient as it is difficult to 
effectively coordinate singular purpose from the variety of multi-disciplinary teams.79  
Designed to deal with dynamic problems that do not have previously established 
solutions, each team within an adhocracy is likely to come up with its own unique 
solution to the problem.  This may prevent identifying a priority solution and result in the 
expenditure of more resources across a variety of solutions rather than choosing one 
“best” solution and applying it across the board.  Due to the informal nature of 
communication, and the use of vertical and horizontal links, adhocracies require more 
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communication80 than a Machine Bureaucracy, increasing the potential for 
miscommunication, conflicting messages, or misinterpretation. 
F. JOINT PLANNING IN 2007 
1. 12 June 2007—Chasing Black Marketers81 
 9 June 2007:  2–82 BCT has developed intelligence indicating there is a black 
market petrol stand operating within its area of operations. (See Figure 11, Red Circle 
Indicates 2–82 BCT's Area of Operations in June 2007.)  Although it is suspected that 
based on the location of the stand and events in the area that the funds from the operation 
are being funneled to Jaish al Mahdi (JAM) operations, there is no concrete evidence of 
such ties.  Rather, the black marketers represent a threat to the Government of Iraq’s 
(GOI’s) ability to provide basic services for the population.  The black marketers are 
providing an alternative source for basic necessities, and in order for them to acquire the 
petrol they are either tapping into the oil pipelines or hijacking the fuel from GOI tankers.  
In either case, they are also limiting GOI’s ability to meet these basic needs.  This does 
not appear to be a considerable threat to coalition forces in the area but the effect, when 
combined with other service related grievances in the area, is gradual deterioration of 
GOI legitimacy in the area, continued fanning of local grievances, and an environment of 
distrust for legal authorities. 
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Figure 11. Red Circle Indicates 2–82 BCT's Area of Operations in June 200782 
 
 The commander of 2–82 BCT determines that the petrol peddlers must be 
apprehended.  If there is a tie to insurgent activities, their capture could provide further access 
to the network that could result in further operations resulting in the defeat of the local 
insurgency and the improvement of the lives of the locals.  Such operations, though not as 
glamorous as high value individual (HVI) raids, represent the fundamental aspect of 
                                                 
82 Institute for the Study of War, “Map of Baghdad Neighborhoods,” 
www.understandingwar.org/files/Baghdad.jpg, (accessed October 23, 2009). 
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counterinsurgency operations:  restoring government legitimacy, increasing government 
capabilities, reducing counter-government capacity, and interdicting the flow of resources to 
the insurgents.  Additionally, as security is improved and grievances are resolved in an area, 
the available information necessary for stopping the insurgency generally improves.83 
 For this raid, the BCT would like to have full motion video (FMV) support to 
provide overwatch of the raiding force.  Such overwatch would alert the soldiers to 
potential ambush locations, could follow any suspects that attempt to flee the objective 
area, and can help coordinate immediate fire support from either attack aviation or close 
air support assets.  Unfortunately, it is understood that while these actions will help defeat 
the insurgency in this area, arresting black marketers is not one of the JFC’s priorities, 
which means that FMV assets (in the form of either manned or unmanned aerial vehicles) 
from higher echelons are unlikely to be provided.  The BCT therefore decides to task its 
own organic RQ-7B Shadow 200 UAV (See Figure 12, RQ-7B Shadow 200), despite its 
many known limitations, most notably, an audible signature that can often compromise 
missions.  
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Figure 12. RQ-7B Shadow 20084 
 
 Understanding the importance of getting the right asset to support the mission, the 
BCT S2 requests higher echelon FMV support.  Since two assets cannot be tasked against 
the same mission, and recognizing that this mission profile would not be of a high enough 
priority to get the asset, the S2 CM submits the request for FMV support for a counter-
improvised explosive device (C-IED) mission.  In 2007, C-IED was one of the highest 
priority missions as it was deemed necessary to protect the troops by finding the device 
before it could be detonated.   The S2 CM, however, plans on swapping the Shadow for 
the higher echelon FMV asset to allow it to support the raid while the Shadow conducts 
the C-IED mission.  The BCT commander, like many others, believes that eliminating the 
insurgency in the AO will eliminate the IED threat and that the reverse is not true.  For 
this BCT, C-IED is a lower priority than taking actions that increase local support of the 
government and reduce their support for the insurgents. 
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 10 June 2007:  The collection request is submitted through the proper channels 
and the Division and Corps collection managers approve the use of the Predator for the 
C-IED mission.  The Predator would be available for the requested block of time.  Prior 
to that, the Predator would be supporting a mission in another BCT area of operations and 
after the designated block of time, would transfer to a different mission in support of yet 
another BCT.  The S2 for 2–82 is notified of this approval and begins to draw up plans 
for using the Predator to support the raid on the black marketers. 
 11 June 2007:  Each day, the 1st Cavalry (CAV) Division hosts a daily “effects 
synchronization meeting” that ensures that requests for fire support and ISR coverage 
have been met and are to be effectively used.  The meeting reviews requests for attack 
aviation, close air support, and full motion video coverage and compares the requests 
against planned and predicted missions over the next two days.  The meeting often 
requires a shifting of assets from one BCT to another as missions are completed early, are 
canceled because of a lack of intelligence or other required support, or new missions are 
added on short notice. 
 On this particular day, 1–1 CAV requests FMV support for monitoring of a 
threatened mosque in its area of operations.  Since the mission does not require a 
particular amount of subtlety, and in fact may benefit from an unmistakable presence, the 
request is made for a Shadow UAV.  1–1 CAV’s Shadow is tasked against another 
mission and cannot be spared for this surveillance.  In reviewing the C-IED mission 
timeline (for which the Shadow is going to be swapped for the Predator), the 2–82 liaison 
realizes that their Shadow will not be needed for the full time of the mission (since it will 
be used in support of a route clearance team) and can be spared. 
 The Division CM agrees to the change and the 2–82 Shadow is tasked to support 
1–1 CAV.  When the 1–1 CAV mission is over, it will return to 2–82 to support the raid 
(though in actuality, the 2–82 liaison knows that it will support the C-IED mission and 
not the raid). 
 12 June 2007:  When the Predator shows up on-station to support the C-IED 
mission, the Predator pilot (actually flying the aircraft remotely from Nellis AFB in Las 
 35
Vegas, Nevada) checks in with the BCT Joint Terminal Attack Controller, an Air Force 
airmen typically responsible for controlling Close Air Support aircraft, who confirms the  
Predator’s altitude and that the airspace is clear of any other aircraft.   The JTAC also 
informs the Predator pilot of the change in mission and that he will in fact be supporting a 
raid. 
 As the Predator pilot is briefed the new mission, he checks the distance of the 
target from the route that was supposed to be observed for IEDs and discovers that the 
new target is between 10–15 miles from the original location.  Due to the slow speed of 
the Predator and the fact that this new distance will impact his ability to get to his next 
tasking and loiter time there, the Predator pilot requests that an ad hoc request be filed for 
the new target.  Mission planning to this point had prepared the Predator crew for a 
different timeline and the new distances may prevent the Predator from supporting other 
units. 
 The JTAC coordinates with the S2 CM to get the ad hoc submitted.  The ad hoc is 
sent to the Division, which recognizes the problem and chastises the S2 for not accurately 
portraying the Predator mission but forwards the request to the Corps.  Likewise, the 
Corps critiques the misuse of the asset for a mission other than the one it was tasked for 
but also passes the request to the ISARC at the CAOC. 
 The ISRODO reviews the change in mission and the distance to the new target.  
Based on coordination with the Predator liaison, it becomes apparent that the new target 
area will delay the asset’s availability to its follow-on tasking and will limit the amount 
of time it can spend supporting that next mission.  For this reason, the ISRODO denies 
the ad hoc request and the Predator is pulled to support another higher priority mission 
(based on the JFC’s priorities). 
 In losing the Predator, the 2–82 S2 is unable to use its own organic Shadow UAV 
because it is already supporting 1–1 CAV at this point.  The amount of time that has 
transpired in getting the request through the chain of command prevents the Shadow from 
making it to the raid even if it was released by 1–1 CAV.  The 2–82 Chief of Operations 
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(CHOPS) who is responsible for overseeing daily operations as the representative for the 
BCT commander, approves the mission going ahead without FMV support. 
 The raid succeeds and four black marketers are captured on the objective with 
little resistance.  During tactical questioning, it is revealed that the black marketers 
provide their funds to a local financier who is known to be supporting an IED cell in the 
local area.  The captives indicate that while he changes residences on a regular basis, they 
know the financier’s location for that night.  CHOPS directs the raiding team to 
immediately conduct a raid on the next target. 
 Without FMV support, however, they are unable to effectively plan the mission.  
At the very least, they need to know how many vehicles are in the compound where the 
financier is staying, whether there are any obstacles along the road to the compound, and 
if there are any observable ambush positions along the route.  Having FMV support 
would allow them to sweep the route to the target and the target area prior to the raid. 
 At approximately this same time, the JTAC is contacted by DRAGOON 21, the 
pilot of a U-2 as it enters the 2–82 battlespace.  The U-2 pilot provides a quick summary 
of his capabilities explaining that he is equipped with a radar for the night, giving him the 
ability to take images of the area at night and through the weather if necessary.  The 
imagery is not ideal but it could still answer most of the raiding team’s questions.  The S2 
CM asks the JTAC to request an image from the U-2.  The U-2 pilot, who does not 
actually control the radar, forwards the request to his Mission Operations Controller 
located at Distributed Ground Station One (DGS-1) at Langley AFB, Virginia. 
 The Mission Operations Commander (MOC) is able to contact the JTAC via chat 
on the Secure Internet Protocol Network (SIPRnet) allowing them to pass classified 
information back and forth regarding the requested image.  The MOC says the target can 
be collected without adversely impacting the target deck of the U-2, so long as the BCT 
or Division imagery analysts can “exploit” the image instead of the DGS-1 analysts.   
Officially, an ad hoc request must be submitted for administrative purposes. 
 The ad hoc request is forwarded to the Division, which agrees to exploit the 
image when it is received.  The Division forwards the request to the Corps, which 
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recommends denying the request, fearing that the U-2 can only take so many images and 
adding this image may cause it to drop other targets.  Still, the Corps CM forwards the 
request to the CAOC to ensure that the image will not drop other targets.  The ISARC 
chief receives the request and asks the DGS liaison officer if the image would adversely 
impact the target deck.   
 The DGS liaison officer calls the MOC at DGS-1 to ask about the “risk/gain” 
assessment to confirm that no targets will be lost for this new image.  The MOC (who is 
already in contact with the JTAC) explains that since the Army will exploit the image and 
not the DGS analysts, the target will not impact the U-2 mission.  The DGS liaison 
provides this information to the ISRODO who informs the SIDO.  The SIDO, therefore, 
recommends to the CCO that the target be added to the collection deck.  The CCO agrees 
and the MOC and the Corps CM are notified simultaneously that the image has been 
approved. 
 Unfortunately, during the time that the request was pushed up the chain-of-
command and discussed at each level, the U-2 continued its mission and left the 2–82 
airspace.  The MOC notifies the JTAC that the target had been approved but that the 
aircraft was no longer available.  “Wish we could have helped.”85 
2. What Went Wrong and Why? 
This mission in particular highlights the shortcomings of the Air Component 
Command’s ability to rapidly adjust to the dynamics of the counterinsurgency campaign.  
While the Army had specifically transitioned to a more streamlined organizational 
structure, the CFACC maintained a machine bureaucracy that dictated a request and 
coordination process that was extremely hierarchical and heavily reliant on vertical 
linkages.  Furthermore, the fundamental assumptions of the CFACC process (priorities  
 
                                                 
85 In reality, the image was taken before the ad hoc was submitted.  By the time the approval had been 
provided, the image had already been exploited revealing a vehicle blocking the route of travel but no 
vehicles observable within the compound.  The BCT was very thankful for the support provided by the 
DGS through its violation of established and formalized procedures and all recognized that the process 
could have prevented the mission from occurring. 
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established by the JFC, 72 hour planning cycle in parallel with the Army, ad hoc as 
exception rather than rule) were often incorrect, impacting the effectiveness of the 
support that the CFACC provided. 
One of the key points highlighted by the June 2007 mission was the inability of 
the collection process to align itself with counterinsurgency doctrine.  While each BCT 
commander was given responsibility for dealing with the roots of the insurgency within 
their own area of operations (AO), the collection process still relied on priorities pushed 
from the top down.  In this case, C-IED missions were prioritized Corps-wide over those 
missions that the BCT commander thought would have a greater impact on the 
insurgency in his area of operations (which would likely be different from the priorities 
of other BCT commanders in their AOs). 
Although not specified in this example, the Predator ad hoc had to be approved by 
the CAOC regardless of what units were involved.  For example, had the subsequent 
BCT that would have received the Predator support also been subordinate to the 1st 
Cavalry Division, the Division still would not have the authority to approve the mission, 
even if it believed the 2–82 mission was of a higher priority within its Division AO.  Had 
the follow-on BCT belonged to another Division, the Corps would not have had the 
authority to approve the change despite the Corps Commander’s priorities.  This 
highlights the need for ad hoc approval authority to be assigned to the lowest applicable 
level with the CAOC monitoring all changes to allow for management of finite resources. 
The fact that the BCT had been assigned the Predator was not as important as the 
fact that the Predator had been assigned a target in the BCT area of operations.  In other 
words, the Predator was not there to support the BCT but rather to collect on a specific 
target.  This emphasizes the difference in how the CFACC approaches the COIN 
campaign and how the Army approaches it.  The BCT commander is given the 
responsibility of dealing with the insurgency in his area of operations and to that end, the 
Corps and the Division provide the assets necessary to support the BCT commander.  The 
Corps and Division understand that the needs of each BCT commander will likely be 
different from one another and that a BCT mission may change dynamically as the 
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battlespace or the BCT commander’s understanding of it changes.  The CFACC views 
the campaign as a series of targets, the successful “servicing” of which is the metric upon 
which effectiveness is determined. 
Overall, the process is too extended to be effective.  Too many unnecessary 
echelons are required to sign off on changes to the plan.  The mechanisms by which such 
changes are made (primarily through e-mail and phone calls) are too limited to permit 
rapid understanding and situational awareness development to occur among multiple 
echelons simultaneously.  The fact that the DGS MOC was the de facto decision maker 
but had to be coordinated with after all other echelons had been consulted significantly 
delayed the process.  Putting the right people in touch with one another via carefully 
crafted horizontal linkages and giving them the authority to act on these interactions 
would have more effectively and efficiently resolved the issues involved. 
Additionally, the Army’s transition affected not only real time execution but the 
very nature of how planning was conducted between joint partners.  Under the new 
paradigm, the Division and, in turn, the Corps, became little more than force providers.  
Rather than tell the Brigade Combat Teams how to use the forces they pushed to them, 
the Division awaited requests from the BCT and then provided assets as necessary 
(assuming those assets were not already “organic” to the BCTs based on the previous 
realignment of forces).  If the Division was unable to meet the needs of the BCT, a 
request was forwarded to the Crops commander to provide additional support.   Should 
they be unable to fill those requirements, the request was pushed to the Air and Space 
Operations Center. (See Figure 13, BCT Focused Joint Planning.) 
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Figure 13. BCT Focused Joint Planning 
 
It is apparent that what was once a “parallel” planning and execution cycle 
between the land and air components became a “sequential” process.  The air component 
was largely unable to predict what targets needed to be struck or collected (in the case of 
ISR assets) until the Brigade Combat Teams had already formalized their plans and sent 
their requests up channel.  Previously, the BCTs benefitted from an air plan that was 
largely complete and needed only minor refinements from the BCT’s specific 
information.  Now, the BCTs were the starting point for the planning and, in their 
opinion, the air component was unforgivably behind the planning curve. 
Per doctrine, the air component has a 72 hour Air Tasking Order cycle based upon 
the need to identify targets to be struck/influenced/collected upon, develop those targets 
sufficiently to understand what munitions/sensors are required to accomplish the mission, 
and to begin assigning assets to each target. (See Figure 14, Air Tasking Order (ATO) 
Cycle.)  In turn, these assets belong to units that must assign actual aircraft to the 
mission, aircrew to fly the mission, and conduct their own mission planning to get to and 
from the target safely and with the support necessary to survive.  When conducted in 
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parallel with Corps, Division, and Brigade Combat Team planning cycles, the 72-hour 
ATO cycle is largely transparent to the BCTs.  When they requested air support in some 
fashion or another, such support was readily available because it had been anticipated 
based upon the planning of higher echelons.  In the subsequent counterinsurgency fight, 
focused on the BCT as the lead element, the 72-hour ATO cycle was unable to begin 
until the BCT was able to provide its plans.  The BCTs had been designed to, and had 
always, focused on operations to occur within the next 24 to 48 hours.  In fact, many of 
the operations carried out during counterinsurgency operations were planned and 
executed in as little as 12 hours, which was significantly shorter than what the CAOC 
was capable of planning for given the unmodified nature of its organization.  
 
 
Figure 14. Air Tasking Order (ATO) Cycle86 
                                                 
86 Joint Publication 3–56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, November 14, 1994, 
Chap. 4. 
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The air component remains a Machine Bureaucracy explicitly for the benefits of 
efficiency.  As the CAOC is responsible for air operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the 
Horn of Africa (See Figure 15, U.S. AFCENT Area of Responsibility), it must carefully 
balance a number of “high demand, low density” assets to include air refueling assets, 
bombers, and certain ISR assets that must support all three theaters of operation.   The 
limited number of resources largely negates the concept of pushing assets down to lower 
levels as the Army was able to do with Corps and Division assets.  (Although, this has 
occurred to a large extent with the more numerous Predator UAVs, which are able to be 
tasked down to the Division if not BCT level.)  This balancing of assets takes 
considerable time and planning and accounts for the 72 hours that an ATO takes to 
produce.  The Air Force simply cannot satisfy all three theaters at the same time, and it 
relies on guidance from the Joint Forces Commander to establish priority for support.  
This leads to a “time share” situation in which certain assets are sent to Iraq for a number 
of days, then to Afghanistan for a few days, and then to the Horn of Africa for a few 
days.  Planners must also take into account maintenance stand-down days in which the 
aircraft cannot fly to allow them to be properly inspected and repaired as necessary.  Of 
course, which days the aircraft flies in which theater depends on the requirements of 
those that are being supported.  The air component must know in advance which ground 
components are going to be launching operations in the near future so that the right assets 
can be overhead in preparation for or during those operations.  Failure to provide 
sufficient lead time for planning often resulted in the desired asset (the U-2, Global 




Figure 15. U.S. AFCENT Area of Responsibility87 
 
In order to operate in a more responsive manner, the air component needs the 
ability to anticipate land component requirements in sufficient time to conduct planning 
in parallel with (as opposed to sequentially after) the Brigade Combat Team planning 
staff.  Additionally, the air component needs a way to decentralize authority as much as 
possible to allow flexibility in operations once execution has commenced.  Again, 
because of the limited number of air assets available, decentralization of authority over 
such assets was a significant obstacle.  Each asset would be required to service the needs 
of multiple BCTs and decisions made by one BCT would likely have catastrophic 
impacts on other Brigade Combat Teams. 
                                                 
87After:   Norm Eckert, “Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association,” Presentation 
for AF Forces/A6 Deputy Director, May 28, 2008. 
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G. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Fortunately, many of the organizational problems highlighted in this chapter have 
already been addressed.  Various solutions have been enacted at different echelons, 
credited to the many hard working junior officers in all services as they attempt to 
overcome the inertia of their organizations and the restrictions of their doctrine.  But 
these solutions are largely piece-meal affairs that lack formalization and are susceptible 
to personality-based disruptions.  Despite the glowing praise from the U.S. Army with 
regards to some of these changes and the Air Force’s continued adaptation to the COIN 
environment, the overall Air Force structure is poorly designed, an ill-fit, for the 
counterinsurgency campaign.  Though limited by resource availability and a requirement 
to support three theaters of operations simultaneously, the Air Force has yet to make the 
significant steps necessary to adopt an adhocracy type organizational structure.  Without 
such a development, the USAF, and in particular its ISR community, is unable to provide 
the flexibility and diversity required to support on-going operations as seen today. 
What this chapter has highlighted is a requirement for better organizational 
design.  This design should focus on integration with joint and coalition partners to 
improve integration.  This integration will be most beneficial in the planning and tasking 
process in order to reverse the trend towards sequential planning between the supported 
commander and the CFACC.  Finally, the re-organized ISR structure must shorten the 
approval process to account for the abbreviated planning timelines dictated by the 
decentralized authority of low-echelon commanders. 
Chapter II will further analyze the problems associated with ISR conducted in 
support of counterinsurgency operations.  While the Army’s reorganization and the 
resultant disconnect between the land and air component commanders needs to be 
addressed, solving that problem alone will not be sufficient for improving overall ISR 
effectiveness.  Chapter II will explain how differences between conventional and 
counterinsurgency operations significantly complicate the employment of ISR. 
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II. COIN ISR AS A WICKED PROBLEM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in the first chapter, organizational re-structuring is a necessary 
component of meeting the needs of counterinsurgency (COIN) intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (ISR) planning, tasking, and execution, but it is not sufficient for 
alleviating many of the current problems complicating the employment of Combined 
Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) ISR in support of COIN operations.  In 
response to the de-synchronization of the joint planning cycle created by the U.S. Army’s 
2005 transformation, some authors have proposed delegating planning and command 
functions of air component assets to subordinate levels, such as the Air Component 
Coordination Element (ACCE), to improve timeliness.   This recommendation, however, 
fails to address the greater problems of ISR within a COIN campaign.  While it may be 
possible to reduce the planning timelines by changing the level of planning and tasking 
authority, it is unlikely to significantly increase the effectiveness or more importantly (at 
least in the eyes of the U.S. Air Force), increase the efficiencies of the limited number of 
available ISR assets.   
The CFACC may tolerate a certain amount of inefficiency, but to be effective the 
CFACC must move beyond simply pushing decision making lower.  Making decisions 
faster improves the responsiveness of ISR, but making the right decisions makes ISR 
effective.  Re-organizing alone could simply lead to making the wrong decisions faster 
and with frequent, incorrect, course changes.  To be both responsive and effective, 
organizational redesign must be accompanied with increased interaction in all efforts to 
resolve ISR problems. 
This chapter will identify the problems associated with the use of assets, doctrine, 
and processes developed for conventional operations when dealing with a COIN 
campaign.  By explaining the differences between ISR requirements for a conventional 
conflict and those for a COIN environment, this chapter will highlight the problems that 
true reorganization will need to address to be effective. 
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B. WICKED ISR PROBLEMS 
The limiting factor to success through simple organizational structure changes is 
the current inability to recognize ISR problems in counterinsurgency as being different 
from ISR problems in a conventional situation.  In a conventional fight, decisions tend to 
be straightforward with clear/measurable results.  But decisions in a COIN campaign are 
considerably more difficult as there is rarely a “right” solution.  Instead, solutions must 
balance competing interests, limited resources, and conflicting objectives.  While the 
same ISR assets are going to be tasked and generally the same ISR effects will be 
requested, the similarities end there.  To understand the differing contexts, one must be 
familiar with the notion of “wicked problems.” 
“Tame” problems represent those problems with which scientists and engineers 
have usually dealt88 through a process of gathering data, analyzing the available data, 
developing a solution to a defined problem, and then implementing that solution.89  The 
key to the tame problem is that the mission of the problem (the goal of solving it) is clear.  
Likewise, it is equally clear when the problem has been solved.  It must be understood 
that the term “tame” is not meant to imply that a problem is “simple” as tame problems 
can be very technically complex in their solution.90  For example, putting a man on the 
moon would essentially be a “tame” problem as the goal was clear (landing a man safely 
on the moon) and there was a clear point of success (the astronaut returned from having 
landed on the moon to safely splashing down on earth), yet the process of getting the man 
to the moon and back was incredibly complex and technically demanding.91  In fact, most 
 
 
                                                 
88 Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy of 
Sciences 4 (1973): 160. 
89 Jeff Conklin, “The Age of Design,” Cognexus Institute, 2001, 9, www.cognexus.org, (accessed 
April 01, 2009). 
90 Jeff Conklin, “Wicked Problems and Social Complexity,”  Dialogue Mapping: Building Shared 
Understanding of Wicked Problems, (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 11. 
91 Ibid., 11. 
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people understand that the more complex a tame problem is, the more important it 
becomes to follow the orderly flow of gathering and analyzing data, formulating the 
solution and the implementing it.92 
Such a method for solving ISR problems is clearly illustrated in the Theater ISR 
CONOPS in discussions of ISR Operational Art and the Design Method for Joint ISR 
planning.  The intent of this guidance is to help ISR planners to convert Strategy into 
specific ISR Objectives that will achieve clearly worded ISR Effects broken out into 
quantifiable ISR Tasks and Actions.93  This logical progression helps to ensure the proper 
weight of effort is applied to higher priority ISR problems and that at the end of 
execution, effectiveness can be objectively measured.  Such an approach is ideally suited 
to a conventional ISR problem that can be easily defined and solved (despite the 
complexity of that solution) and is driven from the top down. 
In contrast, a wicked problem is one that lacks either of these clear-cut issues: a 
desired solution and the ability to know when that solution has been reached.94  Wicked 
problems tend to be present in any policy issue specifically because there will be different 
needs to be satisfied, and it is often difficult to “please everyone.”  More importantly, 
however, is the fact that all of these different “stakeholders,” individuals or “group[s] 
within or outside an organization that has a stake in the organizations’ performance”95 
and who will be affected by this problem’s resolution, may not agree on what the actual 
problem is or that the solution that is reached is the solution to the problem or simply a 
solution to an associated problem or symptom.  While wicked problems are also often 
technically complex, it is the fact that they are also socially complex96 that makes them 
difficult, if not impossible, to tame and therefore establish a clear goal that can be 
identified has having been solved.  It should be noted that wicked and tame are not binary 
                                                 
92 Conklin, “Wicked Problems and Social Complexity,” 5. 
93 Theater ISR CONOPS, (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Air Force/A2CP), 2007. 
94 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas,” 160. 
95 Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory and Design, 64. 
96 Conklin, “Age of Design,” 11. 
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labels.  Rather, problems tend to have a degree of wickedness that indicates the level of 
difficulty in establishing clear goals and the requirement for increased social integration 
in the resolution of such problems.97   
Unlike the “Strategy to Task” model espoused by the Theater ISR CONOPS, a 
wicked problem (such as those ISR problems encountered during COIN operations) is 
often described in terms of “solution elements.”  The understanding of the problem only 
develops from creating possible solutions and evaluating how they will work, what 
additional problems they may cause, or what previously unobserved issues become 
highlighted with each possible solution.  In such cases, understanding of the problem will 
continue well into the execution of the solution, requiring the ability to adjust the solution 
to the new understandings of the problem during implementation.98 
C. ISR AS TAME AND WICKED PROBLEMS 
With an understanding that few problems are entirely “tame,” in comparing the 
requirements for conducting intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions in 
support of conventional and counter insurgency campaigns, the former is likely to be 
“tamer” than the latter.  This can be made apparent by the comparison of the ten criteria 
typically used to define wicked problems.99   
1. Formulation 
Tame problems are most easily characterized by the fact that one can provide a 
comprehensive definition of the problem.  If there are multiple interested parties in a 
problem, all agree that the problem definition is accurate. 
Conventional ISR is typically tasked with finding the enemy.100  In March 2003, 
CFACC ISR was tasked with two primary missions: locate Iraq’s mobile missile 
                                                 
97 Conklin, “Wicked Problems and Social Complexity,” 11. 
98 Ibid., 6. 
99 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas,” 160. 
100 Downey and Guvendiren, “Collection Management,” 12. 
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launchers (the SCUD, see Figure 16, SCUD Transporter Erector and Launcher [TEL]) 
and, as illustrated in the example in Chapter I, find the 2nd Medina Division of the 
Republican Guard.  This problem, in and of itself, is simple: find a specific enemy unit.  
Finding a SCUD missile transporter, erector and launcher (TEL) in the western deserts of 
Iraq during Operation Desert Storm was a tame problem, though more complex and 
difficult than finding the Medina Division located at Objective CHARGERS.  A tame 
problem allows planners to move directly from the problem recognition (find the 2nd 
Medina Division) directly to resolution (task the JSTARS to monitor Obj 
CHARGERS).101 
                                                 
101 Matthijs Hisschemoller and Robe Hoppe, “Coping with Intractable Controversies: the Case for 
Problem Structuring in Policy Design and Analysis,” Knowledge and Policy: The International Journal of 
Knowledge Transfer and Utilization 8 (4) (Winter 1995-1996): 51. 
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Figure 16. SCUD Transporter Erector and Launcher (TEL)102 
 
For wicked problems, there is no clear-cut definition of the problem.  In fact, 
understanding the problem requires solutions be developed so that further understanding 
of the problem can begin.  Each solution will require additional information and this 
information will highlight problems with the solution.  “The formulation of the wicked 
problem IS the problem!”103 
In its broadest terms, the use of ISR in a COIN campaign highlights this inability 
to define the problem.  Using the June 2007 example from Chapter I, the ISR problem in 
supporting COIN operations lends itself to considerably more wickedness.  Finding the 
                                                 
102 From:  BBC, “Behind the Fence,” 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/cumbria/content/image_galleries/spadeadam_20050824_gallery.shtml?18, (accessed 
October 25, 2009). 
103 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas,” 161. 
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black marketers was a simple problem, but was doing so the solution to the Brigade 
Combat Team (BCT)’s insurgency problem?  The 2–82 BCT commander did not think 
so, he believed the solution to his insurgency was in restoring the legitimacy of the 
Government of Iraq (GOI) in providing basic services to the people within his area of 
operations (AO).  To this end, finding the black marketers was a step in the right 
direction, but then going after the financier to whom they provided their ill-gotten money 
was the next step.  The problem’s wickedness is defined by the constant series of “next 
steps” (taking down the financier leads to intelligence on the improvised explosive cell 
that he funds, which leads to information on the insurgent leadership in the area, which, 
when eliminated, creates a power vacuum to be filled by new insurgent groups, which 
leads to “turf wars” in the neighborhood.)  As each step is taken, the BCT commander 
and his staff must constantly reassess what effects (intentional and otherwise) their efforts 
are having and how they must adapt their plan based on new information.  Developing a 
long-term campaign plan, as is done for conventional operations, is extremely difficult if 
not impossible to do specifically because of these unforeseen consequences.  This 
requires a constant dialogue between the BCT commander and his staff as well as with 
the ISR assets and analysts that are updating his understanding of the AO.   
A wicked problem can actually get worse as attempts are made to solve it.  This 
becomes increasingly likely if forced to adhere to an inflexible long-term plan.  All 
attempts to solve a wicked problem must, by their very nature, be seen as interim steps to 
a better solution.  This requires the ability to adapt and change in the process, despite 
previously established plans. 
2. Stopping Rules 
For a tame problem, there are criteria that establish when the problem solvers (in 
this case, the CFACC’s ISR elements) have successfully accomplished their mission.  




Conventional ISR either finds the 2nd Medina Division before it engages 3ID or it 
does not.  In the case of the SCUD TELs, ISR very often did not find them until after 
they had already fired their missiles.  Whether successful or not, it is clear when the 
problem has reached its conclusion. 
A wicked problem has no prescribed stopping point.  Given that understanding 
the problem is improved as the solution is developed, the closer the solution gets to being 
finished, the more the solver understands the problem and realizes the solution is 
insufficient.  There are no clear criteria that establish when all the stakeholders in a 
problem have been satisfied, the problem solver can always attempt to do better to please 
more of the stakeholders.104 
When will ISR in the 2–82 Commander’s COIN campaign be considered 
effective?  When it has identified all of the black market gas stations in the AO?  When it 
has found all of the supported financiers?  When it has been sufficiently planned and 
scheduled to provide “unblinking” coverage of a particular neighborhood? 
In the tame problem, the ISR mission was done when it found the Medina 
Division or when the last SCUD had been targeted.  Even if it were to take several years 
for that to happen, it was possible for the ISR mission to one day be considered complete.  
Not so with ISR in COIN when the more planners understand about the problem, the 
more they realize they have to continually “massage” their strategy to incorporate new 
information or shifting goals. 
3. Test for Correctness 
Similarly, it is possible to identify whether the “tame” mission was successful or 
not because criteria can be assigned for assessment purposes.  One can therefore 
objectively decide whether the offered solution is correct or false.105  Such criteria may 
have to be refined to limit “gray areas” but ultimately, such criteria can in fact be 
developed. 
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The ground commander requesting ISR support typically provides a last time 
information of value (LTIOV) date that establishes when ISR must determine the location 
of the Medina Division or the SCUD TEL.  This time may be when 3ID is prepared to 
launch its offensive on Obj CHARGERS or may be more flexible and limited simply to 
“prior to launch” with regards to the SCUD TEL.  If the LTIOV has passed and ISR has 
been unable to provide the location for the Medina Division or the SCUD TEL, then the 
mission has failed.  If the location has been provided prior to the LTIOV, the mission 
succeeds.  In the event that the SCUD TEL was located prior to it launching but not in 
sufficient time for strike aircraft to target it before it launched, ISR may be considered to 
have successfully fulfilled its mission but future criteria will be refined to include finding 
the SCUD TEL before it reaches a launch site or before elevating its missile into launch 
position in order for strike aircraft to have sufficient time to reach the target before 
launch.  While this may add some “wickedness” to the SCUD hunt problem, there is a 
clear criteria that can eventually be developed for this problem, suggesting that it is 
generally tame. 
There is not likely to be a solution that is judged by all to be the “correct” solution 
when dealing with wicked problems.  There will be compromises made between all 
parties.  Some stakeholders will feel that their problems were addressed, even 
insufficiently so, while others will believe that their considerations were completely 
marginalized.  Each stakeholder will have his or her own criteria for judging if the 
solution was successful or not and the inability to identify a clear problem suggests that 
all stakeholders will have equally valid reasons to assert their criteria.  For example, the 
Iraqi police may be satisfied that the black market cell was captured, reducing crime in 
the neighborhood, but the Iraqi people who depended on them for oil are suffering 
because of their reduced access to fuel.   
The Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination team in the Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division (ISRD) at the Combined Air and Space 
Operations Center (CAOC) is responsible for evaluating the successfulness of ISR 
missions.  Often, this success is tied to a certain quantifiable number such as the number 
of hours flown or the number of images taken.  But most recognize this as being ill-suited 
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for judging the mission’s success.  So efforts are made to confirm that the ISR assets 
answer all of the essential elements of information (EEIs), the questions asked by the 
requestor that the ISR asset is expected to answer.  But when these EEIs are answered but 
the customer claims to still not be satisfied, it becomes apparent that this too fails to 
effectively asses the effectiveness of the mission. 
4. Solution Types 
Not only can criteria be established as to when the tame solution has been reached 
(based on an established timeline or some other criteria) and the solution can be 
objectively evaluated, but the solution can be determined to be clearly the “right” or 
“wrong” solution. 
The current propagation of full-motion video (FMV) assets such as the U.S. Air 
Force’s unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) the Predator is due in large part to the inability 
to find the SCUD TELs during Desert Storm.  It was determined based on established, 
objective criteria, that imagery intelligence (IMINT) for example was the “wrong” 
answer.  It was unable to locate SCUD TELs in sufficient time for strike aircraft to be 
effective.  Similarly, signals intelligence (SIGINT) based either on the ability to detect 
radar emissions that were associated with pre-launch operations or communications 
intercepted directing the launch were also “wrong” in that they did not provide consistent 
detection of the SCUD TEL or its location. 
In the run up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the continued threat of SCUD launches 
forced the U.S. Air Force, working with its joint and coalition partners, to develop a 
“right” solution for the problem.  This involved the development of tactics, techniques, 
and procedures for combining SIGINT, specialized IMINT, and FMV with search 
techniques used by U.S. Air Force strike aircraft and joint/coalition special operations to 
find the SCUD TELs before they launched. 
Tame problems reflect the notion of a bureaucratic direction of problem solving 
based on “unambiguous distribution of competence.”106  The intelligence community has 
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spent decades perfecting the ability to “bean count,” that is to track large numbers of 
tanks and associated equipment.  But counterinsurgency operations are considerably less 
well-studied and even in the study of COIN in general, there are few “experts” with 
regards to a particular insurgency in a specific country.  This adds to the wickedness of 
the problem and complicates finding the “right” solution to the problem.  At best, a 
solution to a wicked problem can be judged as being better than or worse than other 
solutions.  Or it might simply be “good enough” given the circumstances.  It is not 
possible for a wicked problem to have a “right” answer for the simple fact that not all 
stakeholders agree to the same problem statement. 
For COIN ISR, there is a constant attempt to balance the land component’s 
request for more ISR and more flexible tasking processes with the air component’s need 
to manage the fleet of ISR assets and ensure that they are being used as efficiently as 
possible.  Yet neither side is happy with the results, driving the Land Component 
Commander (LCC) to purchase its own FMV assets and distributing them as organic 
assets to the brigades and the Air Component Command (ACC) pushing back against 
what it feels to be ineffectual uses of its ISR assets. 
5. Trial and Error 
Devising a solution to a tame problem, depending on its level of complexity, may 
involve a considerable amount of trial and error.  Whether these trial runs are conducted 
in training/experimental situations or against real world cases, there are few if any 
repercussions for the trial aside from the consequences of failure. 
In searching for the SCUD TEL in western Iraq, the U.S. intelligence community 
could take as many images of the desert as it deemed necessary to locate the SCUD.  
Although this limited the ability to image other targets (and was therefore a “cost”), the 
fact that imagery succeeded or failed to find the SCUD TEL did not impact its ability 
later to find the SCUD or for other solutions to be similarly attempted.  There was no 
impact to the target, the SCUD itself, when the image was taken and therefore, did not 
alter the chances of finding the SCUD. 
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Every solution to a wicked problem is a “one-shot operation” and every attempt 
counts significantly as it will have repercussions on the problem.  Every attempt at a 
solution will leave a “trace” which is irreparable.  Furthermore, the consequences are 
likely to be long term, which means that solutions must be weighed carefully before 
being implemented.107  Unfortunately, because the problem definition cannot be refined 
without looking at the available solutions, failure to implement a solution can stunt the 
learning process with regards to the problem.   
In capturing the black market oil smugglers, 2–82 was able to gain valuable 
intelligence with regards to the network that the oil sales funded to include the location of 
an insurgent financier.  Unfortunately, because 2–82 was unable to capture the financier 
the same night that the black marketers were captured, he was able to change his sleeping 
locations in the future and to discard his cell phone, which he would have suspected of 
being compromised by the capture of his associates.  So by solving one problem, 
capturing illegal oil sellers, the BCT made their ability to capture the financier harder.  In 
order to survive in the future, the financier is likely to increase his vigilance, change 
locations more frequently, and rely less on regular communications with his subordinates.   
6. Exhaustible Set of Solutions 
Tame problems can be solved by one or more of a limited number of available 
options or some combination of those options.  There are a finite set of rules, tools, or 
options that can be accounted for, more or less rigorously depending on the specific 
discipline.108 
As is made abundantly clear by the air component, there is a “low density” of 
“high demand” ISR assets.  Therefore, there are only so many available options available 
for the solving of a problem.  While these assets can be combined to increase their 
effectiveness, they are still limited in numbers, available aircrew, and acceptable usage 
times (based on times of day, weather, or required maintenance). 
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Furthermore, there are “rules” which limit the problem itself such as the impact of 
terrain on mobility.  An intelligence analyst, given the last known location of the 2nd 
Medina Division of the Republican Guard, can predict its rate of travel over a given 
terrain and then plan for the optimal positioning of ISR assets to confirm the progress of 
the Division.109  While other factors, such as air interdiction attacks against the Medina 
Division, unexpected maintenance problems, or a particularly motivated unit could alter 
the rate of travel to some degree, the overall bounds of the problem are manageable.  
While the SCUD TEL is also bounded by rates of travel, it is further hampered by the 
requirement to launch only from very specific launch areas based upon the inclination of 
the launch area and the level of surface porousness to support the weight of the SCUD 
TEL. 
As it is difficult for all to agree on the definition of the wicked problem, it is not 
possible to assess all of the available solutions to the problem.  As the understanding of 
the problem increases, the number of available solutions increases.  But it is unlikely, 
when dealing with a wicked problem, that all possible solutions will be identified for the 
simple fact that the problem cannot be sufficiently understood to be bounded.  Even with 
the available list of solutions available, a judgment call must still be made with regards to 
the ability of the solution to satisfy the most number of stakeholders and the possible 
consequences of the solutions as to which solution should be enacted. 
With regards to the black marketers, if the problem is understood as simply 
capturing the criminals, using FMV from a Shadow is a good solution.  But if the 
problem is expanded to include taking down the network, the requirement for ISR may 
expand to include multi-night observations of the smuggling routine to observe via 
JSTARS ground moving target indications (GMTI) what locations the smugglers go to 
and from (likely to include where they hide their oil supplies and to whom they give their 
money) and to listen to their communications with other insurgent cell members requiring 
SIGINT support.  If the problem is then further expanded to include restoring GOI 
capability to provide needed fuel to the community, GMTI may be further tasked to 
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identify the best place for fuel stations based on high traffic areas and measurements and 
signatures intelligence (MASINT) in the form of multi-spectral imagery may be required 
to identify locations of leaks in the oil pipelines to establish where smugglers were 
stealing their fuel and where repairs need to be made.  Further problem refinement will 
increase the number of ISR capabilities that may be required or might be sufficient for 
meeting the needs of the BCT. 
7. Unique 
Tame problems lend themselves to templating.  The solution for one problem may 
be used to solve other problems of a similar nature.  Therefore, “principles of solution” 
can be developed to fit a particular problem class.110  Standardized tactics, techniques, 
and procedures (TTPs) can be developed for dealing with all problems in that associated 
class. 
For the 2nd Medina Division, there is an established template based on Iraqi 
doctrine that provides for the number of vehicles in the Division, their spacing within the 
column, and the location of certain key assets within the Division to include command 
vehicles and air defense assets.  (See Figure 17, Example Template of an Iraqi Army 
Division, Highlighting the Advanced Guard.)  Understanding the template for a Republic 
Guard Division allows the intelligence analyst to plan for effective and efficient ISR 
missions.  It is not necessary to have FMV coverage and IMINT and SIGINT of the 
Medina Division as it moves toward Objective CHARGERS.  Rather, if a SIGINT asset 
reports the location of some of the Division’s air defense equipment, the analyst can 
essentially map out where the rest of the Division is located on the map using the air 
defense locations as starting points for the template.  Or, if an imagery asset captures a 
picture of lead vehicles from the Division passing through a choke point at a known time, 
the analyst can then work forward in time based on the typical rate of movement of Iraqi 
Republican Guard divisions and predict where the key targets of the 2nd Medina Division 
 
                                                 
110 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas,” 164. 
 59
will be located at any future point in time.  This has the effect of limiting the number of 
ISR assets that must be tasked against the same problem while still answering the 
required question. 
 
Figure 17. Example Template of an Iraqi Army Division, Highlighting the 
Advanced Guard111 
 
Learning to search for SCUD TELs in Iraq allows for the development of TTPs 
for finding any highly mobile target.  This particular process was codified in joint 
doctrine as “the dynamic targeting process” and is made up of six steps:  Find, Fix, 
Track, Target, Engage and Assess (F2T2EA).112  This process has been used to find 
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SCUD TELs, SA-6s, and even maritime threats.  The templates and the TTPs are 
modified based on the different “rules” that affect each target set but the classes of targets 
are still the same. 
Unlike a tame problem that lends itself to “problem classes” and therefore the 
development of templates and TTPs, each wicked problem is essentially unique despite 
any similarities to other problems.113  The unique characteristics of each problem make it 
difficult to be certain114 that the similarities are sufficient to warrant the use of similar 
TTPs or the application of a particular template. 
ISR problems in a COIN campaign may appear similar such as the case of the 
black marketer cell.  Each insurgent cell is likely to have a financier, a leader, and a team 
of operators but how those “nodes” are interconnected, how they communicate with one 
another, how they transfer assets between one another is unique to each cell.  Some cells 
may appear to be more similar to others because they are of the same sect, live in the 
same general neighborhoods or because they share the same financier, but such 
similarities are not enough to allow assumptions that would result in the development of a 
template or the recycling of a successful TTP. 
8. Symptom or Problem 
For tame problems, it is possible to establish a root cause or contributing factor to 
the problem.  This root cause can then be addressed in order to develop a solution to the 
problem.  A problem can also be described as having a “natural level” at which it must be 
addressed.  By focusing on addressing a “higher” level of the problem, the solution is 
likely to be too broad for the solution to be effective.115  
The ground commander requesting ISR support is typically dealing with his 
comparable counterpart.  Therefore, the U.S. Army 3rd Infantry Division commander is 
looking for the 2nd Medina Division.  ISR assets that report back having found the Iraqi 
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Corps headquarters have not met the intent of the ground commander’s request because 
knowing where the Corps is located does not provide enough granularity to find the 
opposing division. 
There may be cases where different solutions are required to address problems at 
different levels but that is exactly what they are, different problems.  Stopping the SCUD 
TEL before it launches is one problem, preventing the order to be sent out to the SCUD 
TELs to go to their launch sites is a different problem.  While solving the individual 
SCUD TEL problem may appear to be less efficient than targeting the higher 
headquarters issuing the orders, if the SCUD elements are operating based on pre-
planned operations orders that require no further guidance, attacking the headquarters 
element, a problem at a “higher” level, does not solve the problem at the individual 
SCUD TEL level. 
Each wicked problem can be assessed to be the symptom of a larger more 
complex problem.  Furthermore, additional assessment reveals that each higher level 
problem is the symptom of yet another problem.  Yet, the higher one attempts to solve the 
problem, the broader the solution must be and therefore the less effective it becomes.116 
The improvised explosive device (IED) defeat effort is a perfect example of this 
wickedness.  Many have decried the attempts to detect only the device, suggesting that it 
would be far more effective to track the IED emplacement teams.  Yet these teams 
operate infrequently and may not be made up of permanent members.  Therefore, it is 
suggested that to defeat the IED problem, one must tackle the network of bomb makers, 
material suppliers, and financiers.   The ingenuity of the adversary, however, has 
demonstrated an ability to make bombs from readily available chemicals, to find new 
bomb makers quickly after old ones have been captured or killed, and to tap into a variety 
of financial resources to off-set the loss of a single financier. 
Others have argued that the IED problem is just a symptom of the much larger 
insurgency and that to focus on the IED or even its associated networks is to only treat 
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the symptom which will continue to reappear until the insurgency is crushed.117  Students 
of contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine are quick to point out that all insurgencies 
are local and that counterinsurgents cannot hunt down and kill every insurgent.  Rather, 
one must tackle the underlying causes of the insurgency to eliminate that problem which 
leads to a population-centric campaign. 
For this reason, each ground commander will have his own perspective as to 
where he needs ISR and what he wants it to do.  Some will require ISR to search the 
roads in front of his convoys to warn them of emplaced IEDs.  Others will layer ISR in an 
effort to find emplacement teams and then follow them back to their networks.  Still 
others, such as 2–82 BCT’s commander, will use ISR to monitor the security of the 
population, attempting to secure their confidence in the psychological campaign against 
the insurgents by improving their lives and the capacity of the GOI.  None of these 
requests is “wrong” or “right,” and some are only “better” within the specific context of 
that ground commander’s particular area of operations. 
9. Discrepancy 
A single causal explanation for a tame problem can be identified.  Addressing this 
cause will end the problem.  The inability to solve a problem can be traced back to a 
particular limitation. 
Although the U.S. military has developed the F2T2EA process for dealing with 
the problem class of highly mobile targets, the inability to successfully find SCUD TELs 
or SA-6s can be traced back to the inability to get target information to strike assets in a 
timely enough manner.  Additionally, the lack of FMV assets during Desert Storm 
limited the ability of ISR to search areas in real time versus image them hours prior to the 
information being required.  When SA-6s (See Figure 18, SA-6 Surface to Air Missile 
Launcher) in Kosovo went untargeted, it was largely because assets that had identified 
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the location of the SA-6 were unable to transmit the information directly to strike assets.  
By the time the information was made available, the mobile air defense missile system 
had already departed the area. 
 
Figure 18. SA-6 Surface to Air Missile Launcher118 
 
Again, simply because a problem is tame does not mean it is not technically 
complex or that all of the available elements required for the solution are available.  It is 
simply means that a solution can be identified and can be judged successful when 
executed. 
There are likely many causes for a particular wicked problem.  Depending on 
which cause is identified will indicate the preferred solution.  In fact, the reverse is also 
true.  Based on the particular capabilities available, the cause of the problem may be 
defined as something for which there is an available solution.  The perspective of a 
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particular stakeholder, largely based on their own capabilities, will determine how they 
explain the cause of the problem and this in turn will influence the solution they expect to 
see in answer to the problem.119 
The CFACC has been pushing early in the campaign to focus on the IED 
networks.  Justified as “getting left of boom,” meaning to take actions before an IED is 
detonated rather than reactively after, the CFACC is entirely sincere in his interest in 
defeating the IED problem.120  But seeing the IED network as the cause of the IED 
problem is largely contingent upon the fact that the CFACC’s ISR assets are optimized 
for tracking and taking down networks versus locating a single IED in an urban 
environment or supporting the security requirements of a population-centric COIN 
campaign.  Since the solution that the CFACC is able to provide is the answer to the IED 
network problem, then the IED defeat problem must be defined as eliminating the 
network.  This is not wrong, it is simply one perspective and therefore one solution to the 
problem. 
10. Right to Be Wrong 
In the scientific realm, which is the basis for the solutions of all tame problems, 
researchers are allowed to be wrong.  In fact, it is considered equally valuable to prove a 
hypothesis wrong as to prove it right.121 
With regards to the Medina Division, an intelligence analyst makes multiple 
predictions of the Division’s location referred to as courses of action (COAs).  ISR is 
then used to confirm the location of the Division at one or more of those COAs.  Proving 
that the Division is not executing COA 1 strengthens the case that it is following COA 2 
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and therefore in a different location.  It is therefore acceptable for the ISR assets to “fail” 
to find the Division at one location because doing so indicates that it is at another 
location. 
Issues arise when there are too many COAs available and insufficient ISR assets 
to address them.  While the Medina Division may be limited to three routes along which 
to travel and the air component may only have enough ISR to check two of those COAs, 
the inability of ISR to detect the Division along those two routes indicates that the 
Division must be along the third route.  Unfortunately, when searching for SCUD TELs, 
the absence of a SCUD TEL at one site means it could be at any one of hundreds of other 
sites.  Therefore, failing to find the SCUD TEL in this case does not significantly 
improve the chances of finding the SCUD TEL.  This does not make it a wicked problem, 
however, as the problem of finding the SCUD TEL is still sufficiently defined.  It is 
simply a resource problem (a matter of “technical complexity”) that prevents failures 
from being useful. 
Dealing with wicked problems means suffering the consequence of every attempt 
to solve the problem.  Furthermore, since there is no “right” answer to the problem, the 
ability to satisfy the greatest number of stakeholders is the driving factor.  Therefore, 
there is no opportunity to be wrong because the consequences created by a poor solution 
will impact different stakeholders and possibly eliminate other solutions. 
In requesting a Predator, 2–82 was denying the use of that asset to other BCT 
commanders.  When the Predator was then re-tasked by 2–82 to perform a mission other 
than the one for which it had been tasked, the Predator was pulled and given to another 
unit that had a higher priority mission.  That higher priority mission may not have been 
possible to execute because in being denied the Predator originally, the BCT had turned 
away other assets such as Close Air Support (CAS) and attack aviation.  When the 
Predator is given to the unit after it is taken from 2–82, the receiving BCT no longer has 
the CAS and attack aviation assets it required for its mission.  Therefore, incorrectly 
(from the Corps/CAOC perspective) assigning the Predator to 2–82 eliminated a solution 
for another BCT.   
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Table 1, Comparison of Characteristics of Wicked and Tame Problems, 
summarizes the differences between wicked and tame problems. 
Table 1. Comparison of Characteristics of Wicked and Tame Problems122 
Characteristic Tame Problem Wicked Problem 
Formulation 
Definitive –An exhaustive 
description of the problem can be 
made such that a solution can be 
formulated. 
Not Definitive –Each solution requires 
more information or information from a 
different perspective.   The formulation 
of the problem IS the problem. 
Stopping Rules Yes –The problem solver knows when a tame problem is complete. 
No –The process of solving the problem 
helps understand its nature.  There may 
always be a "better" solution. 
Test for Correctness Yes –Can be evaluated on how good the solution is. 
No –Generates waves of consequences 
over an extended period of time that can 
never be fully understood. 
Solution Types True/False Right/Wrong 
Good/Bad/Better/Worse/Good Enough –
Solution  may be a result of limited time 
/ assets (the best that can be done). 
Trial and Error 
Encouraged –Multiple attempts at 
solutions can be tried without 
penalty. 
Discouraged –Every solution attempt 
has irreversible effects on some group or 
persons.  Compromises sources or tips 
off the target. 
Exhaustible set of 
solutions 
Yes –All solutions may be 
described and attempted. 
No –Nor is there a well-described set of 
permissible operations that may be 
incorporated into the plan. 
Unique 
No –Problem "classes" exist with 
solution principles for the class.  It 
is possible to build "templates" of 
the problem / solution. 
Yes –There are no problem "classes."  
Solution principles cannot be developed 
to fit all members of the class. 
Symptom or Problem Problem –There are natural levels of a problem. 
Symptom –There is no natural level.  
The higher the level of a problem's 
formulation, the broader and more 
general it becomes. 
Discrepancy One causal explanation. 
Multiple explanations –The choice of 
explanation determines the nature of the 
problem's resolution. 
Right to be Wrong 
Yes–To prove a hypothesis wrong 
is just as valuable information as 
proving a theory right. 
No –The aim is not to find the truth but 
to improve some community 
characteristic.  Wrong answers have 
consequences within the affected 
community. 
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D. TAMING THE ISR PROBLEM? 
Due to the difficulties in “solving” a wicked problem, many people and 
organizations, when they encounter a wicked problem, simply attempt to “tame it,” that is 
make it into a tame problem based on a number of different techniques or approaches.  
The most common of these within the military is to “appeal to higher authority” as in the 
case of basing ISR objectives on the Joint Force Commander (JFC)’s guidance and 
intent.123   As noted in Chapter I, however, the BCT commander is in fact the customer 
who must establish guidance.  But there is only one JFC and there are many BCT 
commanders.  This can also allow individuals or organizations to avoid trying to solve 
the problem by allowing them to simply follow higher authority orders124 or even 
explaining that they answered all of the EEIs, the latter displaces blame because the EEIs 
were not accurate reflections of the customer’s needs rather than working directly with 
the customer to establish actual needs versus capabilities.  Such a strategy reduces the 
number of stakeholders involved in the decision-making process and therefore decreases 
the complexity of the problem.  Typically, this results in authorities and “experts” 
looking for solutions only within their own experiences and capabilities, possibly 
overlooking much more effective solutions.125 
Other tactics for taming a wicked problem include locking down the problem 
definition or specifying parameters by which to judge success.126  In both of these cases, 
the intent is to focus on those parts of the problem that can be easily defined and for 
which an easily measured solution can be applied.  This, of course, ignores the fact that 
the new “problem” to be solved is only one small part or symptom of the actual problem.  
Lastly, solution options can be limited to a very few which in turn leads to reframing the 
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problem as “either/or” problems such as either providing persistent surveillance of high 
priority targets or simply reacting inefficiently to every ad hoc request that is submitted. 
Ultimately, taming a wicked problem fails.  Short-term solutions may be possible 
and limited duration success can be experienced, but the problem does not go away and 
may actually worsen in the long run.127  It is therefore necessary to recognize that a 
wicked problem exists and that the key to solving it is to deal with the social complexity 
of the problem.  This will require the collaboration of many distinct and sometimes 
competing groups in order to reach a resolution of the problem that satisfies as many 
concerns as possible.128 
E. RESOLVING WICKED PROBLEMS 
1. Create a Shared Understanding of the Problem 
With regards to “effectiveness approaches,” it is not sufficient to look at only 
“part of the story.”  Rather, contemporary approaches to measuring effectiveness use an 
integrative approach that includes stakeholders and competing values, acknowledging 
that because organizations tend to do many things, they have many different outcomes 
and therefore must be judged effective on not one but many different measures of 
effectiveness.129 To begin with, it is necessary to evaluate the organization’s 
effectiveness with regards to the needs and requirements of its stakeholders.  It therefore 
becomes essential to identify those groups who have needs or requirements to be met by 
the reorganization of the USAF ISR community for a COIN environment. 
Brigade Combat Team commanders:  The mission of a BCT engaged in 
counterinsurgency operations is considerably different from one engaged in conventional 
combat operations.  Less focused on engaging the enemy in order to accomplish higher-
headquarters directed objectives, the BCT commander in the COIN environment is forced 
                                                 
127 Conklin, “Wicked Problems and Social Complexity,” 13. 
128 Ibid., 14. 
129 Richard Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory and Design, (Cincinnati, OH: South-Western 
College Publishing, 1998), 64. 
 69
to deal with an array of military, civil, and political problems.  Such problems might 
include establishing clean water and power supplies to a community, providing security 
for a very important person (VIP) or resupply convoy moving through his battlespace, 
monitoring a demonstration or pilgrimage for threats to the marchers, or dealing with any 
number of different insurgent attacks (IEDs, artillery fire, troops in contact, etc.). Each of 
these missions require ISR coverage to a different degree, and the BCT commander on 
the ground needs to be able to make the decision on how best to allocate and employ 
those assets.130   (See Figure 19, BCT Commander Problem Sets.)  For the BCT 
commander, the “ISR problem” is one of responsiveness, having an ISR asset available 
when needed to look at the targets that will impact his decisions. 
 
Figure 19. BCT Commander Problem Sets 
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Corps C2:  The collection management team at the Corps level is responsible for 
“allocating” and “apportioning” limited numbers of ISR assets/sorties/collection 
targets.131  Understanding how to allocate or apportion such assets requires a thorough 
understanding of the commander’s priorities, the developing battlespace, and the needs of 
subordinate commanders.  This is accomplished by the Corps collection management 
team which is “manned by a mix of highly qualified personnel from all Services,” and 
works to achieve the balance required for meeting higher, adjacent, and lower 
headquarters requirements.   There is a particular emphasis placed on supporting 
subordinate Divisions and BCTs, providing the recommendations for the allocation of 
ISR assets, dynamically re-tasking assets as necessary in executing the commander’s 
guidance, and ensuring that ISR assets are being used appropriately and effectively.132 As 
the Corps C2 team envisions it, the “ISR problem” is a function of efficiency:  using the 
limited number of available ISR assets to support the greatest number of requirements. 
Brigade Combat Team S2:  Operations in a counterinsurgency fight often are 
dependent upon the available ISR support used to locate, identify, and track insurgent 
operations.133  Furthermore, these operations tend to be of long duration and tasked 
against “non-traditional” target sets as COIN is largely population–versus enemy-
centric.134  Instead of looking for an enemy tank battalion, ISR may be tasked with 
explaining the complex nature of the “human terrain” to include enhancing understanding 
of cultural issues, perceptions, values, and beliefs of the local population.135  ISR is 
therefore often used to provide 24-hour-a-day, seven-days-a-week persistent surveillance 
to build a pattern of life analysis for a particular neighborhood in a city such as 
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Baghdad.136  Therefore, the absence of dedicated ISR assets often prevents a BCT from 
being able to accomplish its mission.  To this end, the BCT S2 team is under considerable 
stress to acquire the intelligence necessary to execute the mission.  In the traditional 
planning and tasking construct, a BCT submitted a request for ISR support and then 
waited to find out if the limited number of echelons above division (EAD) assets (those 
ISR assets controlled by the Corps or the Air Force) would be available to support the 
mission.  At times, the BCT S2 would know that assets were available as much as 72 
hours in advance, allowing time to conduct the planning and coordination of the ISR 
asset into the mission.  Unfortunately, even in these ideal situations, the asset was often 
“pulled” or re-tasked to a high priority mission at the last minute, negating all of the 
previous planning and leaving the BCT unable to conduct its mission.137  For the BCT 
S2, the “ISR problem” is of generating the knowledge necessary to conduct operations 
over a long duration. 
CAOC ISRD:  The limited availability of ISR assets can be an insurmountable 
problem.  Weather effects, maintenance problems, and simply limited numbers of assets 
or crews prevent air component planners from supporting every requirement made by the 
ground component.  Compounding the problem is the fact that a single CAOC ISRD, and 
in particular its collection management team, was responsible for supporting three 
distinct theaters of operation.  With the exception of the Predator and non-traditional ISR 
assets, most, if not all, of the air component’s ISR assets are required to support all three 
theaters.  This is especially true of the U-2, JSTARS, and Global Hawk and results in 
scheduling alternating days or weeks in which an asset would be in one theater and then 
move on to the next.  Even for the Predator UAVs, which could not realistically be 
transferred from one theater or the other, such centralized control is necessary because it 
allows their satellite downlink frequencies to be transferred among the theaters as 
                                                 
136 Michael T. Flynn, Rich Juergens, and Thomas L. Cantrell, “Employing ISR SOF Best Practices,” 
Joint Forces Quarterly 50 (3) (2008): 58. 
137 Odierno, Brooks, and Mastracchio, “ISR Evolution,” 53. 
 72
necessary to increase the number of UAVs used in different locales.138  Therefore, the 
CAOC ISRD views the “ISR problem” as one of “airmanship,” keeping the fleet flying 
by managing maintenance downtimes, transit times into and out of theater, bed-down 
locations, sortie rates, communications between ISR assets and their exploitation/analysis 
support, and ensuring crews were properly rested and scheduled.139 
Division ISR Ops:  The apportionment of EAD assets to the Division level 
required that Division ISR operations personnel and collection management teams 
understood the priority of effort within the Division area, the capabilities of the 
apportioned assets (particularly as compared to the BCT’s organic assets) and how best to 
employ the ISR assets together.  Since BCT staffs were typically under-manned or under-
trained, they tended to be limited to requesting an “ISR effect” without fully appreciating 
how to achieve that effect.  Instead, Division ISR teams were expected to know which 
assets were best suited for the requirement and, most importantly, how to integrate the 
ISR asset into BCT plans.  This often required considerable mentoring as it would be up 
to the BCT S2 to execute the mission based on the plan that was at least partly developed 
at the Division level.  Unfortunately, the typical collection manager at the Division level 
is a Captain with perhaps one previous tour as a Military Intelligence company 
commander or an S2 staff officer.  While this gives them sufficient experience in working 
with and coordinating organic Army ISR assets (such as the Shadow UAV), few 
collection managers have ever worked with USAF assets such as the U-2, Global Hawk, 
or Predator and are  not fully trained on how such assets are requested.140  The “ISR 
problem” for the Division ISR Ops personnel is about using and integrating ISR in ways 
they had not been designed and for which few in the Army had any training.141 
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Air Force ISR units:  Despite their geographic distance from the battlefield, Air 
Force ISR units are eager to contribute to the fight.  Unfortunately, this physical 
separation from those elements that they support often precludes a sufficient 
understanding of what is required, how their products are being used, and most urgently, 
how they could improve their tactics or products to support their “customers.”  These 
units include the aircrews that plan and execute ISR missions with JSTARS, the RC-135 
Rivet Joint (RJ, a signals intelligence aircraft that can intercept and track radar and 
communications signals), the C-130 Scathe View (which has a full-motion video 
capability similar to the Predator), and P-3 (a U.S. Navy aircraft with versions equipped 
with a full-motion video like Predator) (see Figure 20, Left: RC-135V/W Rivet Joint 
(RJ); Center: C-130 Scathe View; Right: P-3 Orion) as well as the state-side intelligence 
organizations such as the 480th Intelligence Wing that runs the Distributed Common 
Ground System (DCGS) constituted with Distributed Ground Stations (DGS) that 
manage and analyze the video, signals, and imagery provided by the U-2, Global Hawk, 
and Predator.  Based only on the generic taskings they receive from the Air Force CAOC, 
these units were expected to be on time and to image or collect against a particular 
location.  Such instructions are sufficient for a conventional enemy but in a COIN 
campaign in which ISR is often used in efforts beyond targeting the enemy, such units 
require detailed integration with the units they support.142  The “ISR problem” is less 
about how to use the asset but rather why they are tasked or how that information will 
support the ground forces.143 
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Figure 20. Left: RC-135V/W Rivet Joint (RJ), Center: C-130 Scathe View, 
Right: P-3 Orion144 
 
Air Force JTAC/ALOs:  An Air Liaison Officer (ALO) is an aeronautically 
rated officer aligned with a ground maneuver unit who functions as the primary advisor 
to the ground commander on the capabilities and limitations of air and space power.  The 
backgrounds of ALOs are significantly varied despite the fact that all are “rated officers.”  
Though tasked primarily with supporting the integration of CAS with ground operations, 
ALOs can be navigators, electronic warfare officers, or pilots from aircraft such as the F-
15C (an air superiority fighter) that do not have an air-to-ground capability.145  On the 
other hand, the Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) is assigned to the ground 
component maneuver unit (down to the battalion level) to control aircraft in support of 
ground forces.146 JTACs have the authority to direct aircraft delivering ordnance to a 
specific target cleared by the ground commander.147  They also provide an essential role 
in deconflicting aircraft (including ISR platforms) in altitude and lateral separation to 
prevent mid-air collisions.148  Due to the fact that the ALO and the JTACs used to be the 
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only Air Force personnel readily available to ground component commanders, they were 
often asked about Air Force ISR capabilities and tasking.  Furthermore, the JTAC was 
often one of the few members of an Army command element with the capability to speak 
with airborne assets and was therefore often directed to request support from airborne 
ISR assets.  Unfortunately, the ISR knowledge and training of ALO/JTACs are extremely 
limited, and they are not part of the tasking process for ISR assets.149  This caused 
innumerable conflicts in the re-tasking of ISR assets and a considerable amount of 
confusion in understanding how such assets operated.  For the ALO and JTAC, the “ISR 
problem” is one of dynamically directing the assets to the most immediate needs of the 
commander without sufficiently understanding the process for doing such or the true 
capabilities of the assets they were redirecting. 
The Enemy:  In any insurgency, the asymmetric advantage possessed by the 
insurgent is that of information.  While the U.S. military has the capability to destroy any 
targets it can find and identify, the insurgent is able to survive through “concealment and 
mobility.”150 Thus, ISR is a key enabler in the counterinsurgency fight either through 
finding and tracking insurgent operations or by supporting those operations that do (for 
example, providing cuing for HUMINT and SIGINT operations).  So long as the enemy 
is able to exploit the seams in ISR coordination and execution, the U.S. military will 
remain hard-pressed to eliminate those key nodes that enable insurgent operations and 
threaten the safety and security of the targeted population.  The enemy views the “ISR 
problem” as being an obstacle to their operations that must be overcome, avoided, or 
deceived. 
Although this list of stakeholders is not exhaustive, it provides sufficient evidence 
to the number of, often contradictory, goals to be achieved by each.  In satisfying the 
efficiency of the Corps C2, the BCT commander loses flexibility.  By maintaining the 
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“health” of the ISR assets and crews, the CAOC ISRD is preventing the BCT S2 from 
achieving persistence over the battlefield.  All must work together to find the optimal 
resolution to this problem. 
2. Build a Collaborative Environment 
Getting the stakeholders to work together, however, is one of the foremost 
obstacles to be overcome.  This requires allowing the stakeholders to interact directly 
with one another, to develop an understanding for another’s perspectives with regards to 
the wicked problem, and to work together to find an optimal if not perfect solution.  Not 
only must stakeholders have a “shared understanding” of the problem, but they must also 
have a shared commitment to its solution,151 which again requires the ability for 
stakeholders to work directly with one another.  Unfortunately, the requirements of 
executing operations dictate that it is not possible to physically locate all stakeholders in 
the same geographic location. 
Though greatly maligned as “time wasters,” meetings are actually the best means 
by which wicked problems can be resolved.152  Meetings allow representatives of each of 
the stakeholders to come together to share their perspective of the problem and their 
expectations of the solution in such a way that all gain understanding of one another.  
Only through conversations can shared ownership and commitment be developed,153 
which means that the manner in which the stakeholders are brought together must 
encourage multi-partner dialogue rather than one-way direction.  E-mail is insufficient for 
such conversations as they are “discrete messages” intended to be efficient and allow 
more easily for “top down” direction than interacting conversations.154  Additionally, 
collaboration and knowledge management should be integrated with “flat” architectures 
that allow stakeholders access to one another’s work.  This prevents meetings from 
                                                 
151 Conklin, “Wicked Problems and Social Complexity,” 1. 
152 Conklin, “Age of Design,” 15. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid., 19. 
 77
becoming summaries of each stakeholder’s activities and allows them to become group 
brainstorming sessions to solve wicked problems.155  Furthermore, the quality of what 
could become information overload generally improves as representatives of different 
stakeholders are able to validate information and resolve discrepancies.156 
As will be discussed in later chapters, there are a variety of different meetings and 
technologies that can allow such conversations to occur, but no universal command and 
control or collaboration construct is the right fit for all situations.  The best form of 
collaboration will develop out of the unique needs of the particular situation.157  Ideally, 
the best people should be brought together in one location for face-to-face integration 
while orchestrating distributed operations support from geographically separated 
partners.  This can have the effect of decentralizing all interested stakeholders and allow 
them to fuse information in a flattened environment emphasizing horizontal rather than 
vertical communication.158 These conversations should lead to an “and” mentality with 
regards to the problem, recognizing that no one party holds the key to the problem but 
will require buy-in and support from other stakeholders.  Problems are not likely to be 
solved by choosing a best alternative but by combining multiple alternatives in a fashion 
that most capably resolves the problem to the satisfaction of the most stakeholders.159  
Without a robust collaborative network, low density assets such as ISR platforms are 
likely to be used reactively, minimizing their effectiveness.160 
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3. Develop the Ability to Learn and Adjust During Execution 
Whatever solution or plan is developed, it must be a living breathing, working 
product161 that allows modification to the plan in execution based on updated 
information.  Since problem understanding evolves as solutions are developed and 
executed, the solution must be malleable even during implementation to ensure that such 
learning can be applied.  Otherwise, CFACC ISR assets are likely to be wasted on targets 
that are overcome by events (OBE) or turn out to be of little consequence compared to 
other dynamic targets.  Therefore, execution itself must be conducted via an interactive 
process that allows decision making to occur at the lowest possible level, as close to the 
action as possible. 
F. CONCLUSION 
A mindset change is necessary to employ ISR effectively in a COIN campaign.  
ISR can no longer be viewed solely as the domain of the intelligence community but 
must represent an extension of the ops-intel fusion paradigm.  Though the Air Force has 
long promoted the notion of “effects” over targets, this philosophy must achieve full-
functionality by employing ISR assets in a manner that support BCT commanders and 
operations and does not simply “service targets.”   To do so requires the integration of 
ISR mission planners, intelligence analysts, command and control leadership, and 
operations personnel through all phases of the ISR mission from planning through tasking 
to execution as it is dynamically aligned with operational missions and effects. 
Reorganizing the CFACC ISR enterprise will help to align the right people with 
one another at the best echelons for control and execution, but simply putting 
organizations together is not enough.  ISR personnel must understand the importance of 
constant dialogue to the successful resolution of the wicked problems encountered in 
COIN campaigns.  These constant interactions, at all echelons, will promote a shared 
understanding of the problems faced and a recognition that because each commander is 
dealing with different problems, priority of effort cannot simply be based on problem 
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sets.  A paradigm change is required to address these concerns.  Chapter III focuses on 
the detailed planning necessary for ISR employment and “stakeholders” who must be 
involved in order to resolve the problems encountered during counterinsurgency 
execution. 
 80
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III. PLANNING ISR—SHARED UNDERSTANDINGS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Air Force must integrate Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(ISR) planning and execution with joint units to ensure the Combined Forces Air 
Component Command (CFACC) is represented as a stakeholder in bottom-up planning, 
to clarify the problems faced by that particular unit, and to allocate the necessary effort to 
satisfy the needs of the supported commander.  It therefore becomes necessary to identify 
at what level such integration should occur.  In the Close Air Support (CAS) realm, the 
Air Force maintains Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP, including Air Liaison Officers 
and enlisted Joint Terminal Attack Controllers) down to the battalion level.  Additionally, 
Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs) often go on patrol with platoon-sized units.  
Air Force intelligence manning levels and the technological requirements for 
coordinating ISR currently prohibits assigning personnel permanently to the battalion 
level or lower.162 
Rather than create permanent task force structures that support specific echelons, 
however, the Air Force should instead focus on assigning personnel and coordinating 
planning at the most appropriate level given the circumstances.  Instead of attaching to a 
specific force, the Air Force must develop the flexibility to integrate as necessary 
regardless of the organization.  While the U.S. military has a long history of joint 
integration, it may be necessary in some events to integrate ISR planning and execution 
with inter-agency task forces as well, many of which lack the formal structures of the 
U.S. military.  As an example, during the recovery efforts of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, 
U.S. Air Force intelligence personnel coordinated with local, state and federal law 
enforcement, recovery, and service organizations in an effort to provide the ISR support  
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that was required by all.163  These efforts, very much in the embryonic stages, 
represented the first employment of ISR liaison officers, to be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
In the case of Iraq by 2007, the U.S. Army established the Brigade Combat Team 
(BCT) as the lead organization.  The BCT becomes the appropriate level of focus for Air 
Force integration for two reasons.  First, by designating the BCT Commander the “land 
owner,” the Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) identified the 
BCT Commander as the “decision maker” for his area of operations.  The Division and 
Corps commanders provided oversight, but their primary focus was to enable the BCT 
Commanders to be able to execute the plans and enact the decisions made at the BCT 
level.  Second, by making the majority of Army ISR assets organic to the BCT level (to 
include human and signals intelligence teams and unmanned aerial vehicle platoons), the 
Army provided the necessary enabling technologies to the BCT to execute the BCT 
Commander’s operations.  All other enabling efforts were then delegated by higher 
headquarters to the BCTs as required.  When identifying the appropriate agencies or 
echelon for integrating Air Force efforts, CFACC leaders should identify the location of 
the designated “decision-maker” who possesses the most organic capabilities for 
executing their decisions.  In 2007, the CFLCC focused planning and execution of 
counterinsurgency operations at the BCT and therefore made the BCT the appropriate 
level to which U.S. Air Force planners and liaisons should be focused.  In other theaters 
or as the campaign develops, it may be necessary to shift integration higher or lower.   
For example, after the summer of 2009, the United States handed responsibility 
for security operations in Iraq to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and sequestered U.S. 
combat forces on their Forward Operating Bases (FOBs).  Unfortunately, despite the 
placement of ISRLOs as low as the BCT level, planning was now being conducted by the 
Iraqis with the resulting plans and requests for ISR being forwarded to U.S. forces, after 
the fact.  Once more, despite the improvements to the ISR process made with regard to 
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U.S. forces, the Corps CM team and the CAOC were forced to react to the Iraqi plans, 
relying extensively on ad hoc missions.164  Just as had been the case prior to 2007, the 
Joint planning process had been de-synchronized because liaisons were not appropriately 
integrated with the actual mission planners.  The CFACC must not focus on integrating 
with the Army but on being prepared to integrate as necessary where appropriate.   For 
ease of explaining the processes and to eliminate a need to educate on foreign 
organizational structures, this chapter focuses on the BCT as it was employed in Iraq 
2005–2008 as the defining model for CFACC ISR integration. 
B. EFFECTS WORKING GROUP 
To enable intelligence and operations personnel to more closely work together, 
commanders at all echelons have begun developing various forms of “fusion cells.”165  
Some variants were focused primarily on real time integration of intelligence and 
operations assets, optimized for High Value Individual (HVI) targeting.  Others were 
designed to conduct the necessary long term planning and coordination to facilitate the 
broader counterinsurgency strategy.  One example of such a coordinating body within the 
BCT is the Effects Working Group (EWG), which brings together the chiefs of each Line 
of Effort (LOE, the various efforts that work within the civil, political, security, judicial 
and other sectors of the community in order to meet the BCT commander’s mission 
objectives of building a secure, self-sustaining local community that is free of 
insurgency).166  At this level, the network is self-organizing as LOE chiefs or other 
members of the BCT join the EWG as necessary to coordinate support for their 
operations to include acquiring the information they need (via ISR) to accomplish their 
goals.  Although the primary LOE chiefs are likely to be permanent members of the 
network, along with the BCT intelligence officer (S2), the collection manager, and the 
BCT Operations officer (S3) to represent the commander and guide/steer the EWG to 
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accomplishing the BCT Commander’s objectives,167 other members of the BCT may join 
or leave the group as necessary depending on their own needs or contributions.  The 
EWG itself serves as the core group of knowledge management, providing an 
environment in which members can contribute, share, and explore ideas and reinforces 
continuous innovation.168 
It is at the EWG that the ISR problem is first identified, focused specifically (and 
almost exclusively) on what information is required.  It may not be possible at this point 
to determine how to collect the information.  To help formulate this question, and in 
particular to put it into a language that can be translated into specific ISR effects and 
tasks169 against which ISR missions can be assigned, requires an individual familiar with 
CFACC capabilities and limitations.  Although the Army collection manager is often able 
to make such translations with regards to organic ISR capabilities (such as human 
intelligence teams or signals intelligence units), they often lack the experience or training 
necessary to understand the full capabilities and requirements of CFACC ISR assets.170  
For this reason, the CFACC must be sufficiently represented at this level. 
Since the Army no longer directs actions from the Corps level down (as was the 
case in conventional planning and operations), the CFACC needs a means to coordinate 
planning from the bottom-up.  This will require placing CFACC planners at the BCT 
level to include ISR Liaison Officers (ISRLOs) who must maintain the CFACC’s vision 
of ISR employment while also managing the interaction of CFACC ISR asset 
employment with BCT operations.171  Additionally, while these ISRLOs act as the hub 
joining CFACC ISR agencies and asset liaisons to the planning and operations nodes of 
the Army BCT,172 they are not able to fully integrate the planning of BCT operations 
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with CFACC ISR operations.  For this reason, the Air Force Distributed Common 
Ground Station (DCGS) enterprise, which provides the control, processing and 
exploitation for the majority of CFACC ISR (to include the U-2, Global Hawk, and 
Predator), redesigned internally to create Distributed Ground Station (DGS) Analysis and 
Reporting Teams (DARTs) aligned with specific Land Component Command Divisions 
in theater.  This alignment of DARTs with each Division promoted habitual relationships 
which in turn created familiarity and through shared experiences, dealing with shared 
problems and celebrated shared successes, created trust.173  By placing the ISRLO at the 
BCT level (they currently operate primarily at the Division level) and by integrating the 
DART into the EWG’s planning process, the CFACC can now begin planning ISR 
missions in parallel with, rather than sequentially to, the BCT process.  Furthermore, such 
direct interaction will encourage transparency in the planning and tasking process and 
give each component direct insight into the decision-making process of the other.174 
C. ISR PLANNERS: BUILDING THE ADHOCRACY 
1. Improving Horizontal Linkages 
The EWG provides a collaborative environment that emphasizes “flat knowledge 
management architecture” to merge staff efforts into a single process that shares rather 
than “stove-pipes” information.175  The EWG is, in fact, more than just a daily meeting 
of key personnel.  It is a concept in which all members of the BCT have access to each 
element’s information, plans, and objectives.176  Such a format promotes ongoing 
collaboration and integrated planning, reserving the daily EWG meeting as a forum for 
finalizing plans and prioritizing resources. 
The introduction of the ISRLO and DART into this group, along with the Air 
Liaison Officer, will provide this same horizontal linkage or “flat structure” to the joint 
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effort beyond the boundaries of the BCT itself.  Such representation of the CFACC and 
ISR enterprise will improve coordination among all partners, enhance understanding of 
COIN problems, and promote trust and commitment to a shared solution to be enacted by 
all elements through close integration. 
2. Command and Staff Responsibilities 
Mintzberg points out that an adhocracy, like a professional bureaucracy, “relies 
on trained and specialized experts to get the bulk of the work done.”  Furthermore, the 
adhocracy relies on liaison devices (such as ISR liaison officers) to integrate various 
managers and task forces.  Unlike a professional bureaucracy where the experts tend to 
work in the operating core and therefore hold the power, an adhocracy tends to be more 
dispersed with experts/liaisons operating where the decisions need to be made.177   In the 
U.S. Army Brigade Combat Team, the Effects Working Group fills the role of the 
adhocracy as a formal part of a machine bureaucracy.  Members of the EWG will come 
together to develop plans, to coordinate actions, and to share resources and then will 
reform in part or whole as necessary at various locations and times to oversee execution 
of a myriad of different counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts. 
The Effects Working Group will require representation of many different 
elements within the BCT as well as from those external agencies that will be providing 
support to the BCT operations.  Despite the various organizational loyalties of these 
group members and their varied specialties, the detailed integration required for joint 
operations and particularly those requiring ISR support demand that these stakeholders 
work together as a unified team.178  The key attribute of the EWG is that horizontal 
linkages are emphasized over vertical hierarchies.  Rather than request support from 
higher headquarters, await a response, and then begin planning, integration within the 
EWG is the starting point as different capabilities are explored and developed.  From 
there, a coherent plan is forwarded to asset managers to ensure that capabilities can be 
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made ready when needed.  Although not every asset will be available and some requests 
will have to be denied in order to support higher taskings, the planning and integration 
that is conducted at the EWG will allow for a broader range of options that in turn will 
allow for the smoother integration of other, less desirable assets to be substituted into the 
plan.  Having planners conducting face-to-face, even if only virtually, meetings allows all 
stakeholders to appreciate the problem to be resolved and the varied perspectives of the 
different stakeholders involved.  The following list of stakeholders that should be 
involved in the EWG is based upon the typical mission planning cell as identified in Joint 
Publication 3–09.3179 and should be tailored as necessary for the given area of operations 
(AO). 
a. Supported Commander 
The BCT commander is the landowner and therefore the individual 
responsible for defeating the insurgency within his AO.  The BCT commander 
establishes the objective of all BCT operations and defines the rules of engagement that 
will promote successful accomplishment of the mission with regards to supporting the 
local population.  The BCT commander is represented at the EWG by the S3 Operations 
Officer who ensures that the EWG remains focused on the BCT mission and objectives.  
The S3 must not exert any undue influence in the name of the BCT commander in order 
to allow the EWG to conduct planning as necessary to ensure that the best possible 
solutions are developed in response to the complications of the counterinsurgency 
campaign.  The S3 is responsible for ensuring joint ISR is fully integrated into operations 
orders (OPORDs) and the collection management plan.180 
b. Intelligence Staff 
The S2 shop is typically represented by three distinct elements.  The first 
is the S2 who brings the enemy’s perspective to planning, focused on the enemy’s 
capabilities, doctrine, and limitations.  In this fashion, the S2 helps to promote an 
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understanding of how the enemy is likely to respond to the various plans, allowing BCT 
planners to think several “moves” into the future in order to minimize unintended 
consequences and to develop follow-on or alternative plans based on enemy reactions.   
The S2 plays the “devil’s advocate,” highlighting flaws or vulnerabilities in the plan.  As 
necessary, the S2 also provides targeting information for kinetic or non-kinetic 
operations.181 
The S2 ISR Operations personnel are the soldiers who will feed real time 
battlefield intelligence to the BCT Tactical Operations Center and relay that information 
to subordinate units.182  Although the S2 ISR Ops team will be supported by the Air 
Force ISR Liaison Team (to be discussed in detail in Chapter V), the S2 ISR Ops team is 
the most familiar with Army doctrine and tactics and will be key in ensuring that 
available intelligence is disseminated to the appropriate decision makers.  Most 
importantly, the S2 ISR Ops team will be responsible for integrating all organic ISR 
capabilities to include full-motion video assets (including both BCT level unmanned 
aerial vehicles and fixed cameras), human intelligence (HUMINT) teams, and signals 
intelligence (SIGINT) assets. 
Finally, the S2 Collection Manager will be essential in formalizing the 
requirements of the EWG for higher headquarters tasking.  Unfortunately, in most BCTs, 
the collection manager (CM) is not an official position,183 which requires that the CM 
simply be an additional duty for another member of the S2 staff.  In many cases, the CM 
is actually the senior ISR Operations soldier and, because of ISR Ops requirements and 
lack of formal CM training, is capable of little more than simply submitting requests for 
UAVs.184  While much of collection management is focused on maximizing the 
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effectiveness of a limited number of ISR assets, at the BCT level, the CM is primarily 
focused on converting intelligence requirements into collection requirements.185 
c. LOE Operations Officers 
The Line of Effort (LOE) Operations officers are the lead members of the 
EWG.  Although the S3 keeps the meeting on track and all LOEs focused on the BCT 
Commander’s strategy, the LOE Chiefs are the ones with the “mini-campaign plans” that 
working together achieve the BCT Commander’s vision for a sustainable local 
community.  The EWG serves to ensure that each LOE plan supports the others and none 
of them become counter-productive for the operation as a whole.186  Each LOE Chief 
will have established “lanes” that define their responsibilities regarding planning, 
execution, and evaluation of specific efforts.  LOEs will vary by BCT AO but common 
ones may include Security, Governance, Essential Services (to include infrastructure and 
medical services), Economics, and Information Operations (which deals with 
Psychological Operations and Public Affairs).  The LOE Chiefs will not only direct the 
BCT operations but will be the direct liaisons with their indigenous counterparts such as 
the Chief of Police, the local government (to include tribal councils), local contractors, 
and the chamber of commerce.187 
d. Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD) 
Although the majority of operations in a COIN campaign will be non-
kinetic, with an emphasis on improving the lives of the local population and protecting 
them from the insurgents, the employment of kinetic effects (close air support, artillery, 
and direct fire weapons) is an unavoidable reality of combat.  Such effects must be 
carefully weighed against the requirements of the COIN effort by the BCT to ensure that 
the use of “fires” enhances security without detracting from the safety of the population 
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or jeopardizing non-kinetic efforts.  Furthermore, such effects can be sufficiently 
orchestrated to enhance other COIN efforts by providing a “show of force” to reassure 
the local populace of the BCT’s presence, to intimidate insurgent forces, and to create 
effects that can be monitored by ISR (such as targeting a known abandoned building with 
the intent of getting nearby insurgents to react either through counter fire or by 
communicating via radios or telephones that can then be monitored).  Any employment 
of kinetic fires must also be carefully deconflicted with the presence of airborne assets to 
include attack aviation, close air support, and ISR assets. 
The FSCOORD is responsible for interlacing kinetic and non-kinetic 
effects to promote better understanding of second and third order effects.  The 
FSCOORD also provides the prioritization for subordinate battalions and their 
operations, using available intelligence, assigned assets, and an understanding of the 
operational momentum of each of the battalions to determine where BCT efforts should 
be focused.188 
e. Air Liaison Officer (ALO) 
The ALO advises the BCT commander and his staff regarding the 
capabilities and limitations of CAS and other air support platforms.  This requires a 
detailed knowledge of the allocation of air assets as provided by higher headquarters, 
most notably the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC), and the Division’s plan for 
sortie distribution.  The ALO is responsible for the specific planning of CAS missions 
and the development of the CAS requests and planning documentation.189   With regards 
to ISR planning, the ALO will be essential in identifying those close air support assets 
that might be able to provide a non-traditional ISR (NTISR) capability to include the use 
of fighter aircraft targeting pods to fill an absence of full-motion video capabilities. 
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f. Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) 
The increased use of the electromagnetic spectrum to attack and protect 
coalition forces has necessitated the need for experienced electronic warfare officers in 
the BCT to advise on the employment of the BCT’s organic electronic counter-measures 
and to request additional electronic warfare assets to support BCT operations.  Such EW 
systems may be used to jam the frequencies used to detonate IEDs or to scramble the 
communications of insurgent forces.   The EWO must make careful considerations of 
how such systems will impact friendly communications or operations, as well.   Jamming 
various frequencies can degrade friendly communications, could set off explosive devices 
when explosive ordnance team members are approaching the device to disarm it, or could 
negate the intelligence value of signals intelligence intercept capabilities by jamming the 
same signal ISR is attempting to track.  The BCT EWOs (from the Air Force, Navy, and 
increasingly from the Army) provide the expertise to maintain BCT organic equipment 
and to develop comprehensive strategies for employing a wide-array of organic and 
higher headquarter assigned EW assets to defeat adversary threats.190 
g. ISR Liaison Officer (ISRLO) 
As the newest member of the joint team, the ISRLO is still a developing 
position with shifting responsibilities from one unit to the next.  In order to improve 
Combined Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) support to a Counter Insurgency (COIN) campaign, the CFACC 
will need to rely upon a select group of highly talented liaison officers to “resolve” the 
wicked problems of balancing competing needs of the CFLCC and the CFACC.  
Specifically, this liaison officer will need to be able to act as an honest broker for the 
various land component personalities who require rapid and flexible support while 
simultaneously acting on behalf of the CFACC’s need to manage the health of the assets 
and personnel tasked with providing that support.   Traditionally, the CFACC has relied 
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upon the Air Liaison Officer to coordinate the air support needs of the CFLCC, providing 
advice on air component capabilities and planning expertise for the close integration of 
air and land operations.   
The ALO, however, is limited primarily to the employment of kinetic 
effects (Close Air Support) or mobility operations.  To date, ALOs have received very 
little training with regards to ISR operations to the severe detriment of CFACC support to 
COIN.  Most sources indicate that ISR is one of the essential, if not the primary, 
capabilities provided by the CFACC in a COIN campaign.  Therefore, the absence of 
such advisory or planning capability in the Army limited the ability of the CFACC to 
fully support such operations.  One of the first initiatives launched by the Air Force to 
improve coordination with the U.S. Army was the introduction of the ISRLOs.   
Beginning in the winter of 2006, the CFACC began to assign ISRLOs to 
each division in Iraq, followed by additional ISRLOs assigned in Afghanistan.  One 
ISRLO was assigned to each Division.191  The requirement for experts who could operate 
in such a fluid environment, moving throughout the organization as necessary to help 
make decisions created a tremendous obstacle for the Air Force in identifying the right 
individuals for such a tasking.  From the beginning, it was understood that while initial 
ISRLOs would be hand-picked based on recommendations of other ISRLOs and the 
leadership of the ISR Division (ISRD) of the CAOC, future ISRLOs would need to be 
properly trained to accomplish the task and could conceivably be pulled from any number 
of ISR units to accomplish the mission.  The task of identifying the required skill sets and 
appropriate personality types for the job was largely based upon the initial cadre of 
individually selected ISRLOs.  Since these pioneers were highly praised by their 
supported commanders and had achieved significant gains in ISR effectiveness, they 
seemed to be the ideal models upon which to choose their successors.  
(1)  Tasks.  Captain Mathew Castillo, the ISRLO for Multi-
National Division-Baghdad, described the role of the ISRLO in a manner that would be 
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considered high in variety based on “a large number of unexpected situations, with 
frequent problems.”192 As Castillo and other ISRLOs discovered, their job consisted of 
three distinct elements:  training, planning, and assessment.193 Many ISRLOs have added 
a fourth task in the form of “coordination,” to be discussed in greater deal in Chapter V. 
Due to the rapidly advancing nature of ISR sensors and 
capabilities, it is difficult for those who are not regularly involved with ISR assets to 
understand their full-range of options.  For U.S. Army soldiers who may know their own 
assets well, the Air Force assets are often misunderstood or under-utilized.  The ISRLOs 
typically have at least one ISR assignment in their career history and many maintain 
regular contacts within the Air Force ISR community.  This allows them to stay current 
on ISR capabilities and to become familiarized with the latest tactics, techniques, and 
procedures employed by the Air Force ISR community.  The ISRLOs then travel 
throughout their assigned battlespace educating soldiers and U.S. Air Force ALOs and 
JTACs about the available capabilities from both traditional and “non-traditional ISR” 
assets.194  
An ISRLO also works with the U.S. Army collection management 
soldiers to ensure that ISR assets are optimally employed.  By reviewing collection 
requests submitted by subordinate BCTs and comparing them to the commanding 
general’s priorities, the ISRLO is able to apply his/her extensive ISR background and 
training to ensuring that the right asset is requested and advises how best to employ it.195 
One of the most frequent Air Force complaints has been the lack of 
feedback from the Army.  Without knowing if or how their missions supported the Army, 
AF ISR units are unable to improve or at least replicate the techniques that worked.  
Often, these units will produce mission reports that claim to be successful, having met the 
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initial criteria provided by the Army, only to find out later and through unofficial 
channels that the Army has been unsatisfied with the missions.  The ISRLOs provide a 
link between the ground units they are supporting and the AF ISR units that provide the 
support to identify lessons learned,196 correct misperceptions about what occurred on the 
mission, and even to a large extent, translate Army jargon into something the Air Force 
ISR specialists can understand. 
(2)  Training and Selection.  ISR planners must be experts not only 
on the various systems employed by the CFACC but must also have a solid foundation in 
military doctrine and theory so that they are able to fully integrate ISR operations into the 
overall campaign.  Tactical expertise gained during operations in ISR units must be 
further cultivated through participation in major exercises, which in turn must be 
designed to accurately reflect the intelligence focused nature of modern warfare. 197  
While understanding a single asset’s capabilities and limitations is important for liaisons 
operating throughout the collection management architecture, it is the ISRLOs ability to 
integrate, layer, and synergize multiple ISR and NTISR assets that will bring success. 
Stateside training, prior to deployment into theater, was refined to 
provide some semblance of standardization.  ISRLOs graduated from the U.S. Air Force 
ISR Operators Course (IROC) and then visited various ISR units to be familiarized with 
how those agencies did business as well as to develop invaluable personal relationships 
with the ISR mission commanders with whom they would be in coordination.  
Additionally, ISRLOs began to attend training exercises with the Army units they would 
be supporting allowing them to begin developing organizational links and “face time” 
with the commanders.198   However, what could not be provided in training was the 
ISRLO’s need for great powers of persuasion, the stamina to see projects through to 
completion, and integrity of purpose199 in order to overcome the parochial biases of the 
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organizations to which the ISRLO is assigned and to provide effective coordination of air 
and land effects.  These traits would simply have to be found among the possible 
candidates. 
Complicating the training of ISRLOs was the inability to 
effectively analyze their required skills sets.  As Daft explains, “when the conversion 
process is analyzable, the work can be reduced to mechanical steps and participants can 
follow an objective, computational procedure to solve problems.”200  Unfortunately, the 
ISRLO tasks were not so easily broken down into mechanical steps.  The difference is 
one between being able to look up the solution to a problem (such as a checklist to be 
followed in a specified emergency) and having to develop a solution for a problem not 
previously encountered.  This, of course, requires not only a “subject matter’s expertise” 
level of understanding on the systems and capabilities available but also developed 
problem solving skills.  Given the diverse nature of the problems to be encountered in the 
COIN environment and that none of the Air Force’s ISR assets had specific tactics, 
techniques or procedures (TTPs) for such problems, the ISRLOs were expected to invent 
solutions to COIN problems.  This tended to require individuals with excellent problem 
solving skills regardless of their level of ISR expertise.  In fact, many of the ISRLOs had 
only limited ISR experience, but because they knew who to contact and when, they were 
able to develop effective solutions to the COIN dynamic. 
(3)  Speaking the Same Language.  Effective coordination of 
CFACC ISR with CFLCC ground operations required the ability to “speak the same 
language.”  Unfortunately, the absence of joint training for ISR personnel and only 
recently developed COIN doctrine in all services greatly impacted the ability to share 
stakeholder understandings of the problem and to develop coherent plans to which all 
could commit.  The ISRLOs helped to initially overcome these problems as 
representatives of the CFACC embedded with U.S. Army and Marine Corps units.  
Having trained and operated within Air Force units, ISRLOs could bring those 
experiences and service perspectives to their supported units where they gained first hand 
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observations about the needs and requirements of the ISR “customers.”  To be effective 
brokers for both components demanded that the ISRLOs immersed themselves in the 
organizational culture of their supported units.  
Organizational culture “is the set of values, guiding beliefs, 
understandings, and ways of thinking that is shared by members of an organization and is 
taught to new members as correct.”  These shared values and beliefs provide “members 
with a sense of organizational identity and generates a commitment to beliefs and values 
that are larger than themselves.”   Observing the “iceberg model” of organizational 
culture, one can see that there are two levels to culture: that which is visible and the 
underlying level. The visible level includes uniforms, symbols, observable ceremonies or 
traditions but also includes such things as slogans, stories, and organizational specific 
jargon.201  (See Figure 21, Iceberg Model of Organizational Culture.)  For the ISRLO, 
the most notable indication that they had become part of the Army culture was the fact 
that initially, they were authorized to wear the Army Combat Uniform (ACU) complete 
with right shoulder “combat” patches for having served with the unit for six months 
deployed.  The ISRLOs adopted Army phrases and acronyms and participated in various 
Army ceremonies.    The deeper level of organization culture includes the “underlying 
values, assumptions, beliefs, attitudes, and feelings” that are the “true culture” of the 
organization.202  There was considerable concern (sometimes openly acknowledged) that 
the ISRLOs were “going native” and “drinking the green kool-aid,” suggesting that they 
were no longer “honest brokers” of AF ISR support but had in fact adopted the Army 
attitude of taking as much ISR as they could manage whether they needed the support or 
not.  
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Figure 21. Iceberg Model of Organizational Culture203 
 
This culture was not limited to just the influence of the Army.  In 
fact, the driving force behind the initial ISRLO efforts was the direction by the CFACC 
A2 (chief of intelligence) to, “Make it like CAS.”  To this end, the ISRLOs developed a 
number of procedures to distance ISR support from the traditional collection management 
regime and force it to be more adaptable along the lines of the CAS infrastructure.  This 
effort continues to be an explanation for the ISRLO concept despite its many detractors.  
As explained in the Air Force Times, the intent of the ISRLO program is to provide 
ground commanders the same level of support and integration they can expect from Close 
Air Support.  The ISRLOs work to request and coordinate ISR assets, both manned and 
unmanned, in the same fashion that a JTAC plans and coordinates air strikes in support of 
Army operations.204 
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On the CFACC side, the ISRLOs developed a habitual relationship 
with many of the supporting ISR organizations.  This was a purely informal arrangement 
initially and ran counter to Air Force doctrine and structure.  Per doctrine, the “subject 
matter experts” reside at the CAOC in the form of the intelligence discipline specific 
collection managers in the ISRD and the platform liaison officers resident in the 
Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance Cell (ISARC) of the CAOC Combat 
Operations Division.   Many of the collection managers, however, were in their first ISR 
assignment having previously worked with fighter or bomber units.  Similarly, though the 
platform liaison officers were from the ISR organization they represented, their 
experience levels, work ethics, and general attitudes were sufficiently diverse to negate 
any assumption of a common level of expertise.  By working directly with the air/mission 
crews that were executing the ISR operations, the ISRLOs were able to tap into the true 
expertise and found willing partners who understood that the more they knew of the unit 
they were supporting, the easier it would be for them to execute their mission.  This 
coordination was made even easier by the reorganization of the DCGS community into 
regional and even Divisionally aligned units. 
h. DARTs and Regional Divisionalization 
A stable environment is one that remains the same over a period of months 
or years.205  Not only was this not the case in Iraq with regards to the changing nature of 
the insurgency, but instability in the Air Force ISR structure was worsened through a 
number of policy decisions.  The most important of these was the limited deployment of 
most Air Force personnel.  While the Army attempted to stabilize deployment schedules 
(and to increase the opportunity for units to have a greater impact on their area of 
operations) by increasing deployment lengths to 15 months, the Air Force continued to 
rotate personnel on a three- to six-month cycle.  This significantly limited the ability of 
AF personnel to become familiar with their operating environment. 
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Additionally, while each Army unit was responsible for a specific 
geographic region in which they could become experts, the Air Force, initially, made no 
effort to replicate this assignment of focus.  Instead, geographic assignment for assets 
(and their supporting crews) could change from one day to the next.  Although to some 
degree a symptom of the limited number of assets available, the greater impact was on 
the analytic crews who were treated as interchangeable assets.  Even with regards to 
assets such as the Predator, which due to its limited range were confined to the same 
regional areas, the analytical crews who monitored the video feed from the United States 
were often switched between Predator missions.  The same was true for imagery analysts 
as well, limiting their understanding of the battlespace they were supporting and what 
might appear in the images as “normal” or “unusual” activity.   
The Air Force DCGS community, which includes the geographically 
dispersed mission elements of the different DGS, developed an effective remedy for this 
problem.  Initially, missions were assigned to DGS crews based on workload estimates.  
Using this construct, an imagery analyst might spend four hours of his shift monitoring 
video feed from Afghanistan and then the next four hours watching a feed from Iraq.  
This division of attention would alternate night after night, so that there was no continuity 
of operation and little opportunity to gain familiarity with the supported unit or the 
battlespace in which the feeds were originating.  An example of this would be a DGS 
imagery analyst observing fires on a video feed and reporting this as unusual activity.   
The sensor operator for the Predator involved (being limited  
geographically to the same battlespace) contradicts this report, explaining that such 
activity is normal for the region.206 (See Figure 22, Air Force Distributed Common 
Ground Station Architecture.)  
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Figure 22. Air Force Distributed Common Ground Station Architecture 
 
This problem was replicated in other platforms as well.  Army collection 
managers were often frustrated by the fact that they would submit feedback on a mission 
only to have the exact same problems on the following mission because the crew they 
critiqued on the first mission was not involved in the next.  One U.S. Army collection 
manager explained that he took the time to identify 200 potholes in a road that had been 
filled by the Army and directed the Air Force imagery analysts not to identify these as 
potential improved explosive device (IED) emplacement areas.  The first mission to 
occur after this guidance was given did exactly as told, ignoring the potholes and only 
identifying other suspicious locations.   The very next mission after that, however, 
identified over 200 targets, most of them being the potholes that had been previously 
identified.  This had a significant impact on the trust relationship between the Army and 
the Air Force and soon the Army stopped providing any feedback at all.  From their point 
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of view, and quite correctly, they could see no point in providing feedback to a crew who 
would be unable to benefit from it on the next mission.207 
Intelligence and operations must be carefully integrated, particularly 
during COIN operations, and this demands that collection units be linked directly to the 
supported analysts and operators.208  In March 2007, the Air Force response was to 
geographically designate DGS-1, located at Langley AFB, VA, as being focused on Iraq 
and DGS-2, at Beale AFB, CA, as being focused on Afghanistan.  Furthermore, each 
DGS also created a DART designed to focus on those specific geographic areas and to 
work directly with the ISRLOs and the collection managers from those areas.209  Though 
specific organization varied, the DARTs further divided their teams into Division specific 
elements so that the same all-source analysts were responsible for working with the same 
Division and ISRLO on a regular basis.  These habitual relationships significantly 
improved the feedback process, ensured area familiarity for Air Force crews that were 
geographically separated from their areas of operation, and improved overall mission 
results.210 (See Figure 23, AF DCGS Re-organization for Regional Orientation). 
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Figure 23. AF DCGS Re-organization for Regional Orientation 
 
i. Creating Synergistic Effects  
These efforts by the U.S. Air Force, the deployment of ISRLOs and the 
creation of regionally oriented/division-aligned DARTS, provide the foundation for Air 
Force participation/representation in any ad hoc structure.   These capabilities will allow 
the Air Force to move seamlessly from an efficient machine bureaucracy structure to a 
highly integrated and flexible adhocracy capable of dealing with dynamic, short-term 
problems within an instable environment.211  Physically locating ISRLOs in the BCT 
planning room and tactical operations center (TOC) and tying the DART virtually to the 
supported ground units, helps to overcome the difficulties of lack of communication, 
ensuring that all stakeholders are aware of the problem to be addressed, the agreed-upon 
solution, and the development of that solution in execution.212 
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(1)  Building a JOINT Team.  Physical presence cannot be over 
valued.   Though less effective, virtual coordination can be significantly improved upon 
through consistent relationships and shared successes.  In this fashion, having ISRLOs 
forward deployed and ground liaison officers (GLOs) representing the CFLCC in the 
various DCGS locations, permits planning and execution to occur jointly.   The EWG 
serves as the focal point for bringing together kinetic and non-kinetic planners with Army 
(or Marine Corps) and Air Force planners in the form of ALOs, JTACs, ISRLOs, and 
DARTs.  This infusion of Joint expertise increases the potential for problem solving 
success by linking together adaptive stakeholders into an organic flux for overcoming 
problems for which no one person or agency has a depth of knowledge or relevant 
experience.213 
(2)  Overcoming geography.  Improvements in virtual technology, 
to include video teleconference, voice over secure internet protocol (VOSIP), and remote 
computer operations, allow interface between geographically separated units to occur 
naturally.  Increasingly, technology is allowing personnel from reach back organizations 
to observe, in real time, the data feeds, computer desktops, and TOC operations of their 
supported units.  By remotely linking computer systems, it is possible for Army ISR 
Operations soldiers in Baghdad to observe the feeds and imagery being analyzed by Air 
Force personnel located at a State-side DGS.  Similarly, by using video cameras and 
VOSIP systems, Air Force DART analysts can observe activity in a TOC and provide 
input to operations based on what they are observing.214 
Such technology not only minimizes the “forward footprint” of 
deploying additional personnel into theater, thus increasing the drain on logistics and 
elevating the security requirements, but it also enhances flexibility.  Distributed agencies 
within the United States are then able to provide support to multiple agencies during lag 
times or to be more effectively integrated with different agencies when missions or 
theaters change.  Again, the intent of Air Force reorganization should not be to improve 
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interaction with the U.S. Army BCT, but to improve the capability to interact with any 
adhocracy regardless of the echelon or the agency, permitting seamless interaction with 
joint, coalition or interagency components whether conducting COIN in Iraq or 
Afghanistan or supporting relief efforts for domestic disaster response. 
3. ISR Mission Planning—5 Steps 
Traditionally, the BCT began its planning when it received a warning order from 
higher headquarters.215  This order typically provided the Division and the Corps 
objectives and intent with a generic concept of operations.  This gave the BCT enough 
information to begin developing a scheme of maneuver.  As the Division and Corps plans 
became more detailed and specific, the BCT refined its plans and developed its own 
requests for information and additional assets.    The new COIN campaign, centered on 
the BCT, drives planning from the bottom-up.  Therefore, planning procedures must be 
updated to reflect this more dispersed and compressed planning process.  Regardless of 
how planning is initiated, the planning phase ends with the issuing of orders to 
subordinate units.216 
The CAS decision-making process outlined in Joint Publication 3–09.3 is an 
essential tool for the development of a fire support plan.  By modifying this process to 
account for ISR specific concerns and the changing dynamic of counterinsurgency 
operations, ISR planning, tasking and execution can be significantly improved.  The 
following guidance has been developed from JP 3–09.3 and should provide clear 
guidance to all ISR planners for optimizing ISR integration. 
Step 1: Receipt of Mission 
Although conventional operations for the BCT are typically focused on 
seizing key terrain or defeating a designated enemy force in the next 24–48 hours, the 
BCT COIN campaign is a much longer focus that must integrate a host of civil, political 
and military efforts to accomplish the overall goal of defeating the insurgency and 
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restoring order and capacity to the local population.  Regardless, whether the mission is 
to seize a hill or restore electrical power, planners must understand the commander’s 
objectives and the utilization of all available capabilities to best support the overall 
mission.217  Therefore, before planning can begin, all members of the EWG must 
understand how the BCT commander defines success.218 
(1)  “Generating” the Mission–Logical Lines of Operation.  
Conventional operations are typically “enemy centric,” focused on defeating the enemy’s 
ability to conduct operations either through annihilation of the enemy force or simply by 
outmaneuvering it and acquiring dominant positions that prevent effective employment of 
enemy capabilities.  In the COIN campaign, the BCT commander is focused on 
influencing the Human Terrain of his area of operations with the intent of creating 
positive reactions from the local populace with regards to the coalition and Government 
of Iraq (GOI) forces.219 
(2)  Intelligence Requirements.  In conventional operations, as 
observed in the 21–25 March  2003 race to Baghdad, higher headquarters will have 
access to more intelligence assets, and in developing the top-down plan, will be able to 
better predict what information subordinate units will require to be successful.  COIN 
intelligence operations, however, are driven from the bottom-up, and the BCTs personnel 
(through direct interaction with the local populace) will have the best access to the 
necessary plan.  Chasing the Black Market agents in June 2007 was based largely on 
daily patrol reporting and interaction with the local populace.  In fact, 80–90 percent of 
all information requirements will likely be answered by the BCT itself through the fusion 
of information generated by organic capabilities.220  ISR integration requires at least a 
general understanding of the available ISR order of battle to include the apportionment, 
allocation, and distribution of higher headquarters assets.  Based on this sketch of 
available assets, the ISRLO and other ISR planners can begin to provide input to the BCT 
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commander’s initial guidance to include recommending the best assets for supporting 
BCT objectives and realignment of personnel to support ISR coordination.  The ISRLO 
and the ISR Ops team will be responsible for providing planners with the capabilities and 
limitations of assigned ISR assets and personnel. 
Throughout the mission planning process, ISR planners will focus 
on developing intelligence requirements.  Planners must take a proactive and predictive 
approach to identifying critical information relevant to the BCT commander’s decision 
making.221  Understanding that every BCT sector is unique, intelligence requirements are 
likely to vary greatly from one sector to the next.  This will significantly complicate the 
ability of higher headquarters to classify requirements in easy to template problems and 
emphasizes the importance of developing accurate intelligence requirements from the 
beginning.  As the name implies, the Priority Intelligence Requirement (PIR) is the most 
important intelligence requirement to be developed by the intelligence planning team as it 
will enable the BCT Commander to initiate actions based upon the information provided.  
For this reason, the PIRs must align with the decisions to be made by the BCT 
Commander, and if the majority of his decisions are population centric, then the PIRs 
should not be focused on the enemy.222 (See Figure 24, The Relationship Between 
Decisions, Intelligence Requirements, and Information Requirements.) 
 
                                                 
221 Guvendiren and Downey, “PIR Development,” 1. 
222 Downey and Guvendiren, “Collection Management,” 4. 
 107
 
Figure 24. The Relationship Between Decisions, Intelligence Requirements, and 
Information Requirements223 
 
Answering the PIRs is a matter of finding answers to the specific 
intelligence requirements (SIR) identified by the LOE Chiefs.  Each PIR is likely to have 
more than one SIR associated with it.224  Answering an SIR should allow the LOE chiefs 
to make decisions impacting their own mini-campaigns.  Therefore, ISR planning at the 
BCT level is about building the overall campaign plan by answering subsequent 
questions that promote integration between the lines of effort.225  (See Figure 25, 
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Matching Lines of Effort (LOEs) to Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) to 
Decisions.)  Finding the right questions to ask is balanced with avoiding seeking too 
much information (the common tendency among requestors).  Planners who request 
information beyond what is necessary to influence the commander’s decisions risk 
saturating the intelligence infrastructure, and in particular the limited number of 
intelligence analysts, and needlessly complicating the decision making process by adding 
“noise,” information that doesn’t directly contribute to the commander’s needs.226 The 
ISR Synchronization Plan developed during EWG planning sessions defines the manner 
in which the intelligence section will strive to fulfill the information needs required to 
successfully implement the BCT’s campaign.227  This plan must be carefully integrated 
with the BCT’s overall COIN campaign, which will likely focus on providing security for 
the area of operations as its first phase, developing electricity, water and sewer capacity 
in the second phase, and then working to assist the local community in developing a self-
sustaining economy, a representative government, and improving basic services.228 
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Figure 25. Matching Lines of Effort (LOEs) to Priority Intelligence 
Requirements (PIRs) to Decisions229 
 
Step 2: Mission Analysis 
Mission analysis includes determining the specified, implied, and mission 
essential tasks for all supporting assets.  Traditionally, ISR has been tasked largely with 
supporting “specified” requirements, that is detailed essential elements of information 
(EEIs) that expressly direct what was to be collected and analyzed.   In many cases, 
however, this has reduced the effectiveness of ISR support to BCT missions as ISR 
agencies have been unable to provide broader, situation dependent support.   By 
including implied tasks as part of mission analysis, ISR planners both within the BCT  
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and in supporting agencies can predict areas in which assets may better serve the overall 
mission or where analyst observations and comments may be appropriate despite 
deviating from specific EEIs. 
Based on this mission analysis, planners can begin developing the mission 
statement for ISR support and anticipate what ISR assets will be required to support the 
mission objectives.  Based on an understanding of the key elements of the target for 
collection, planners can begin comparing these target characteristics against the 
capabilities of available ISR assets in order to determine the best ISR sensor for the 
collection requirement.  Key elements should be fully developed for each target to 
determine what characteristics of the target can be observed and/or collected.230   In 
designating “Every Soldier a Sensor,” the Army has begun training its personnel to use 
their five senses in evaluating their environment to include sight, sounds, distinctive 
smells, touch (such as the warmth of a fire pit to indicate how recently it was used), and 
even taste.  ISR planners must take this same approach to evaluating target 
characteristics, not limiting themselves simply to those features that can be observed on 
imagery or collected via SIGINT.  Rather, planners should investigate what kind of 
residual evidence may be left by the target in the form of moving target indications, 
specific chemical, vibration, or auditory signatures that can be detected by special 
sensors, or second tier impacts that might be observed (such as the absence of traffic 
along a road that locals know has been mined.)  A useful mnemonic for ISR planning 
may include “FM SIGH” which is an abbreviation of full motion video (FMV), 
measurements and signatures intelligence (MASINT), SIGINT, imagery intelligence 
(IMINT), ground moving target intelligence (GMTI), and HUMINT.  Technically, FMV 
and GMTI are both forms of IMINT, however, based on the prevalence of their use and 
the colloquial usage, they are differentiated here.  Similarly, certain specialized imagery 
products are classified as Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) or Advanced Geospatial 
Intelligence (AGI) but are still colloquially referred to as MASINT.  Naturally, each 
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intelligence discipline can be broken down into several subcategories and therefore 
requires extensive training but this heuristic model should serve to inspire more detailed 
ISR planning. 
Additionally, planners must not limit their concerns to simply collecting 
information.  If the collected information is expected to trigger a kinetic response against 
the target,231 planners should consider using a NTISR asset such as fighter aircraft.  
Fighters using their targeting pods can produce an effect similar to FMV (though with 
less analytical capability) that could identify a particular vehicle or suspicious activities.  
Upon confirmation of the vehicle or activity, the fighter is then able to employ munitions 
against the target immediately if so desired by the land owning commander.  The EWG 
provides the best forum in which all assets, not just ISR assets, can be considered for 
their potential in meeting collection requirements. 
Other key elements to be considered with regards to matching ISR effects 
against a specific target include the range capabilities of the ISR sensor and the timeliness 
of the intelligence discipline.  Range is typically an issue when considered with regards 
to compromise of the collection mission.  For example, certain low altitude UAVs have 
distinct auditory signatures that can be masked by flying higher or by moving the asset’s 
orbit further from the target.  But in both cases, resolution will be significantly degraded 
for the sensor.  Therefore, planners must consider whether compromise of the mission is 
a concern and if so, if the degraded resolution will still fulfill the requirement (such as 
tracking a large vehicle vs. identifying a specific individual).  If the sensor will not meet 
the needs, a different asset or intelligence discipline must be requested.  Similarly, the 
speed of the asset to get to the target area, how long it takes for the asset to collect its 
information, and how long it will take to process and then disseminate the information to 
decision makers must also be evaluated.232   Some high quality and specially developed 
imaging techniques can reveal quite a bit about a target.  Unfortunately, such techniques 
usually require days or more to acquire.  ISR planning timelines must explicitly consider 
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when intelligence is needed and then work back from that time to establish when 
collection must be reasonably made to meet that timeline.  In many cases, pushing the 
collection time back too far will make it useless as the activity to be observed will not be 
present that early.  Table 2, Target and Asset Considerations, presents additional target 
and asset considerations. 
Table 2. Target and Asset Considerations233 
 
 
At the end of this step, ISR planners should be able to provide a list of 
available ISR assets (to include organic assets and those assets that have been aligned by 
                                                 
233 JP 2–01, III-18. 
 113
higher headquarters).  Collection management agencies at higher echelons will be 
responsible for matching specific assets against collection requirements.  By providing 
such managers with the key elements and considerations for the target, a better match can 
be made by those individuals distanced from BCT planning.  Planners should also 
estimate the risks associated with the various ISR assets to include the possibility of 
compromising the mission based on asset detection by the enemy, potential areas for 
delay in receiving and exploiting ISR information, and known limitations to ISR 
capabilities given a specific environment (for example, difficulties suffered by JSTARS 
when tracking targets within an urban environment).  A warning order should be 
forwarded to supporting ISR agencies to allow them to begin planning and organizing for 
future missions.  Lastly, ISR planners must ensure that subordinate ISR Ops and ISR 
Liaison Teams understand the plan and are able to provide the necessary support to the 
mission. 
(1)  Principles of Collection Management.  Collection Managers 
(with the support of the Air Force ISRLO) should be involved in every phase of mission 
planning, working directly with LOE Chiefs in order to anticipate intelligence 
requirements early.  As such requirements are identified, the CM must prioritize 
requirements in accordance with the BCT Commander’s intent, making trade-offs as 
necessary with the full consultation of the EWG to ensure that a logical progression of 
intelligence support matches the progression of the COIN campaign.  This prioritization 
will help CMs to determine which taskings should be fulfilled by organic assets, which 
the BCT has the most control over, and which ones can be pushed to higher headquarters 
assets with the understanding that the limited number of assets will likely result in many 
collection requests going unfulfilled.  Furthermore, the CM (again with the advice of the 
ISRLO) must avoid the temptation of spreading ISR around to fulfill as many 
requirements as possible, and instead use a multidisciplinary approach to overcome 
system limitations in collecting against higher priority collection requirements.234  
Layering ISR in this fashion is far more effective but less efficient. (See Figure 26, 
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Layered ISR.)  It is tempting to task one asset against one requirement and another asset 
against a different requirement in order to maximize collection but such a tactic is usually 
less effective and fails to meet the commander’s needs on both targets.  CMs must use 
their understanding of the commander’s intent and decision-making needs to provide the 
full-spectrum of effective ISR to cover the most important requirements. 
 
Figure 26. Layered ISR235 
 
(2)  METT-T considerations.  ISR planners can benefit from the 
use of checklists and decision-making tools, one of the most common of which is the 
Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops and Support, and Time (METT-T) model. 
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Careful consideration of each of these elements will help ensure that ISR is effectively 
integrated with all other aspects of the BCT operations and predict potential obstacles to 
successful implementation of the ISR plan. 
ISR can execute a number of missions, among these surveillance, 
reconnaissance, finding, fixing, tracking, support to maneuver, and support to movement.    
Surveillance deals with passive observation over a long dwell time, emphasizing 
persistent collection typically to provide situational awareness and to highlight changes in 
the environment over time.236   Reconnaissance focuses on collecting information on a 
specific target during a short duration, specified timeline.237  In both of these cases, the 
intelligence mission is implied to be a prologue to operations.  ISR overflies the target 
area, collects the desired information which is processed and distributed to operations and 
then maneuver units execute their mission based on this intelligence.  This is a very 
common division of operations in a conventional setting in which intelligence “prepares 
the battlespace” for maneuver forces to conduct operations. 
An increased focus on highly mobile, fleeting targets, typically of 
small size (individuals or small groups), has dictated a much greater partnership between 
intelligence and operations personnel.  ISR will no longer end their mission prior to 
operations executing but rather will become an integral part of mission execution, 
providing real time updates to operations personnel as they conduct their mission.  To 
reflect this interdependent nature of ISR and operations, ISR missions have become more 
refined.  Finding a target involves detecting and initially classifying targets for further 
prosecution.238  Fixing a target provides a location for the target and 
identification/confirmation.239  Tracking focuses on observing an identified target and 
monitoring its movement and activity.240  Targeting (from a strictly ISR perspective) 
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involves establishing a target’s location to a sufficient degree to permit further actions 
(striking the target may require more refined coordinates than simply monitoring its 
activity.)241  Support to maneuver involves the coordination of operations, integrating 
with fire support and maneuver elements in accomplishing an objective.  Support to 
movement, on the other hand, focuses on the movement of friendly forces between 
positions,242 during which ISR can warn of impending attacks, identify future obstacles, 
and coordinate changes in route. 
Although counterinsurgency is typically “population centric,” the 
enemy continues to represent a significant obstacle to executing effective COIN 
strategies.  ISR can support COIN efforts by monitoring enemy forces and provide early 
warning of enemy intentions.  As COIN strategies are effectively implemented, ISR can 
help determine enemy reactions to these efforts, providing a metric by which to measure 
success or failure of the strategy.  Planners, however, must be careful not to focus too 
much attention on the enemy at the expense of meeting local population needs.  The 
“effects” to be created by the BCT in its operations must be carefully worded to focus on 
“offensive” operations that focus on building host nation capabilities over the long term 
versus a defensive effort designed primarily to hunt down and kill the enemy.243 
Terrain and weather, of course, can significantly impact ISR 
efforts.  Not only can terrain features or weather impede the collection of information, it 
can prevent the effective communication between ISR assets and the supported unit.  
Therefore, planners must consider the best orbit placement for ISR assets to improve their 
ability to execute their mission and to transmit their findings.  If necessary, consideration 
should be made of using some form of communications relay to mitigate any unnecessary 
delays in getting information to decision makers. 
Troops and support planning focuses on ensuring that the 
appropriate ISR assets are available to meet mission requirements and are integrated into 
operations.  Most important among these considerations is command and control (C2), 
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which should be flexible and redundant and included in planning with sufficient detail to 
prevent confusion.  Potential C2 structures can include combinations of radio, Internet 
relay chat, and secure phone systems.  This can generate specific requirements that may 
need to be forwarded to higher headquarters for support.  For example, most ISR assets 
can communicate via radio but few ISR Operations teams have access to a radio, which 
may require coordinating via the JTAC.  Even with regards to secure telephone systems, 
not all systems are interoperable and Air Force ISR units may not be able to call Army 
units because of different types of encryption or firewall restrictions.  Lastly, care must 
be taken in evaluating the capabilities of the available ISR Operations and Liaison teams, 
ensuring that whatever plan is developed can be executed.  Plans that are too task 
intensive or require experience not present in organic personnel may require the transfer 
of personnel from other echelons.244 
Lastly, time considerations should not be overlooked.  In some 
cases, an ISR asset can directly observe a target and provide that information to the 
decision maker as in the case of FMV provided by a UAV.   Other intelligence 
disciplines, however, require extensive processing to provide decision makers with a 
useable product.  When using such assets, planners must account for the time to collect 
information, to process that information, and to transmit it to decision makers.  If other 
assets will require such information for cross-cue, they must be appropriately scheduled 
to provide sufficient lead time to execute the plan.  In addition, tasking such assets 
requires adhering to the air tasking order timeline to guarantee that assets can be tasked 
and planned for in an appropriate amount of time.245 (See Table 3,  Calculating Asset 
Timeliness.) 
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Table 3. Calculating Asset Timeliness246 
 
 
(3)  Key Considerations.  Key considerations for mission analysis 
include understanding and disseminating the commander’s intent to all involved 
personnel.  This should be fleshed out with a concept for ISR support that includes an 
indication of how ISR will contribute to the overall mission and ensuring that all ISR 
assets have been properly integrated with BCT operations.  ISR planners should work 
closely with CAS planners to determine if non-traditional ISR assets (fighters with 
targeting pods) can be effectively used to augment ISR capabilities.  Care must be taken 
to ensure that CAS assets are not tasked to accomplish a mission already being covered 
by ISR assets and vice versa.   
Finally, ISR planners must develop a detailed communications 
plan that will specify how maneuver elements, fire support, and ISR personnel will 
coordinate.  Communications must be reliable and redundant as much as possible and 
every effort must be made to ensure that those decision makers who need ISR 
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information will have access to it in a timely fashion.  One of the most frustrating 
debriefs from ground personnel is the realization that those under fire were not given 
access to key, real time ISR that was often available at the Tactical Operations Center. 
Mission analysis will end with the production of a preplanned ISR 
support request, such as collection request submitted via the Planning tool for Integration, 
Synchronization, and Management (PRISM) system or an ISR coordination request using 
a form such as the DD Form 1972.1.   The DD Form 1972.1 was developed in January 
2006 by Air Force Central Command in an effort to better integrate ISR and Operations 
asset.    Initial requests for assets, to include as much of a concept of operation as 
possible, should be submitted to higher headquarters for tasking.  As detailed planning is 
completed, further refinement can be forwarded to the appropriate tasking authority or to 
the supporting unit, however, due to the demands of the air tasking order process, 
timelines should be adhered to as much as possible.  The request and tasking process will 
be discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV. 
Step 3: COA Development 
After a general concept of operations has been developed during the 
mission analysis step, planners can begin developing a more specific course of action.  
The plan that results should be comprehensive yet flexible and while creativity should be 
encouraged, planners must remain focused on the commander’s intent and in meeting 
established timelines. (See Figure 27, Example ISR Synchronization Matrix.) 
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Figure 27. Example ISR Synchronization Matrix247 
 
(1)  Generating the Plan.  ISR capabilities should be matched 
against desired effects, considering the best possible intelligence discipline for each type 
of target and leveraging the benefits of ISR layering.  The different combinations of ISR 
assets, capabilities, and layering should provide a number of different courses of action 
(COA).  These COA must be feasible, distinguishable and complete ensuring that anyone 
of these COAs could be selected for final execution and that variations in the situation 
can be easily dealt with during execution.  Through integration with the DART, the 
ISRLO, and available ISR unit mission planners, detailed plans should be coordinated.248  
It is understood that assets planned for in this stage have yet to be tasked through the 
formal process and it is very possible that the units with which planning was coordinated 
may not in fact be available for mission execution.  Fortunately, the planning that they 
assisted with should be able to support other assets and capabilities with only minor 
refinements made after tasking has occurred.  This process will allow ISR planning to 
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become a parallel function once more, rather than a time compressed sequential process 
in which coordination has to be conducted just prior to mission execution.   
One concern with conducting mission planning in this fashion, 
however, is that personnel needed for planning may in fact already be involved in 
coordinating missions that have been tasked and are about to be executed.  For this 
reason, it may be necessary to stand up mission planning cells outside of the theater of 
operations in which crews that are not deployed provide initial planning guidance to be 
refined once in theater crews have been tasked.  It could therefore be possible for 
JSTARS mission planners based at Warner-Robbins Air National Guard Base in Georgia 
to assist BCT planners in Baghdad in order to sketch plans prior to tasking.  This is, of 
course, not an ideal situation as units in garrison are often focused on re-training and 
decompressing after recent deployments.  An alternative would be to deploy more 
experienced mission planners into theater to deal with such long range planning without 
impacting the flying crews themselves. 
For each COA, an ISR scheme of maneuver must be developed 
that supports the BCT operation.  This scheme of maneuver must anticipate timing 
considerations (the amount of time to collect intelligence, process it, analyze the 
information, and disseminate it to the appropriate users) as well as requirements for ISR 
Ops/Liaison teams to execute the plan.  This should include designating specific targets 
to be collected against, named areas of interest, and even airspace considerations (to be 
worked out with the Air Liaison Officer to ensure deconfliction of all airborne assets).  
How ISR assets enter and exit the battlespace and any necessary air coordination 
measures must be identified at this time.  Similarly, the communications plan identified 
in Step 2 should also be carefully reviewed with regards to various ISR COAs.  Lastly, a 
clear priority of support must be established to identify which units will require ISR 
support before other units.  This identification should also guarantee that the unit has the 
necessary communications or liaison support to receive available ISR support when 
needed.  In the end, each COA should represent a fully integrated product that combines 
ISR support with maneuver unit schemes of maneuver, fire support plans, and 
deconfliction from the electronic warfare plan.   
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(2)  ISR Integration—Layering, Massing, and Swarming.  ISR 
support is not limited to traditional assets such as UAVs or manned aircraft and collection 
managers/ISR planners must avoid favoring or becoming too reliant on any one sensor.    
ISR is most effective when a multidisciplinary approach is taken, allowing sensors and 
capabilities to complement one another. 249  While HUMINT has proven to be vital in 
COIN operations, such intelligence is not limited simply to trained HUMINT teams.  
Rather, the Army has adopted the concept of “Every Soldier is a Sensor” (ES2) and 
valuable information will be derived from patrols, key leadership engagements between 
BCT leaders and local governance, reconciliation meetings, tip lines developed to gather 
information anonymously from the local population, and reports generated by the 
observation of logistics convoys that pass through the battlespace.250   ISR planners must 
account for these various sources of information as they develop their integration for 
more traditional assets. 
ISR assets will typically be able to collect against multiple targets 
within a single mission.  On other occasions, it may be necessary for multiple ISR assets 
to be tasked against a single high priority requirement to ensure that it is satisfied.  In 
some cases, this may be a matter of using one type of sensor to cue another sensor to a 
collection requirement.251  For example, most FMV systems have a very narrow field of 
view and fly slowly in order to sufficiently evaluate the target area.  This prevents them 
from covering a very large area.  GMTI systems can cover very large areas, detecting 
movement anywhere within an area of the size of Baghdad.   GMTI systems tend to have 
poor fidelity (actual locations could be several meters off) and they have no ability to 
identify a target as anything more than a moving vehicle (so they are unable to track or 
identify a specific vehicle).  When combined, GMTI provides an excellent ability to 
direct FMV assets to targets throughout the battlespace, allowing the FMV system to 
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provide confirmation of the target’s identity and to refine its location to targetable 
coordinates.252 (See Table 4, Intelligence Disciplines and Cross-cueing Requirements.) 
Table 4. Intelligence Disciplines and Cross-cueing Requirements 
 
 
When one asset alone is insufficient to providing all of the 
necessary data regarding a high priority target, a mixture of sensors and/or assets may be 
required to meet collection requirement demands.  Tracking a high value individual may 
begin with the use of SIGINT to determine his location.  While certain SIGINT systems 
may be able to provide highly accurate coordinates, they may not be sufficient for 
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identifying the individual communicating.  In that case, it may be necessary to coordinate 
FMV or HUMINT coverage to positively ID the target or to confirm the absence of 
unintended targets in the vicinity.  Additionally, more than one sensor of the same type 
maybe necessary to ensure redundancy or to allow for multiple targets.  For example, 
when targeting a compound, one FMV asset may be sufficient for providing situational 
awareness for the commander but if multiple targets escape the compound (“squirt”), 
multiple FMV assets will be required to follow all of the “squirters.”  Naturally, mixing 
assets in such cases can be highly taxing on the limited number of ISR assets 
available.253  But again, CMs must ensure that their ISR plan accounts for the 
commander’s priorities and meets those requirements and does not simply spread ISR 
ineffectively over several different targets simply to satisfy more “customers.” 
Step 4: COA Analysis/Wargaming 
During wargaming, ISR planners will be responsible for tracking the 
effectiveness of the ISR COAs and determining which COA provides the best support to 
BCT operations.  Among the considerations for ISR planners is the refinement of asset 
operating altitudes to ensure safety of flight for all airborne ISR assets as well as to 
promote sensor effectiveness.  Planners should also highlight any specific ISR tactics to 
be considered as well as procedures that must be followed for the coordination of ISR 
effects.  Terrain and weather effects that may impact ISR support should also be 
highlighted and coordinated with the staff weather officer to pre-empt any potential 
problems before requesting specific assets. 
The wargaming process will highlight critical events and decisions points 
which the ISR planners should use as key focus points for their plan.  As other assets 
execute their plan, ISR planners should take note of any additional deconfliction 
measures necessary both in terms of airspace and communications.  Signals intelligence 
assets in particular must be deconflicted with electronic warfare efforts to ensure that 
communications to be collected are not deliberately or accidently jammed.  Criteria for 
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selecting the best COA will likely involve timeliness of support, flexibility of the plan, 
the ability to mass assets as necessary, and the accomplishment of desired effects.  By the 
end of the wargaming process, it should be apparent whether the ISR plan supported the 
commander’s intent, was effectively integrated with other assets, and if coordination 
during execution can be successfully accomplished.   The COA that provides the best 
option for meeting the commander’s intent should then be developed into a 
reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan.   
Step 5: Orders Production 
Having identified the preferred course of action for ISR employment, 
planners will formalize the plan in an OPORD with the appropriate R&S annex.  This 
order should be clear and concise, providing subordinate and supporting elements with all 
necessary information required for execution.  Unnecessary restraints should be excluded 
from the plan, allowing element leaders to execute the mission with creativity and 
initiative. 
(1)  ISR Mission Type Orders.  Mission Type Orders (MTOs) use 
narratives to focus subordinate and supporting unit efforts for effective operations while 
providing lower-level commanders with the flexibility to execute initiative in 
accomplishing the commander’s intent.254  MTOs are very common with the Army and 
particularly with maneuver units but are not used with regards to ISR support, though 
organic Army ISR operators typically receive copies of the supported MTO to enhance 
their awareness.255  Such explicit and implicit guidance, combined with an understanding 
of what other elements of the mission will be accomplishing, will significantly improve 
the ISR support provided to the BCT.  MTOs typically consist of the commander’s intent, 
the task to be accomplished and the purpose of that task in accomplishing the overall 
mission but leaves the details of planning and mission execution to tactical commanders 
and crews.256  Ultimately, the MTO documents the coordination and agreements made 
                                                 
254 Theater ISR CONOPS, 18. 
255 Cheater, “The War Over Warrior,” 15. 
256 Theater ISR CONOPS, 18. 
 126
between the supported BCT and the supporting assets and serves as a “contract” for 
mission execution.257  To ensure that all elements are aware of the available capabilities 
on the mission and that sufficient coordination has been made to disseminate information 
to all those who may require it, ISR MTOs should not be separate from the overall plan.  
Recognizing that ISR assets may support multiple operations in a single sortie, it may be 
necessary for the Combined Air and Space Operations Center to issue a broader MTO to 
establish ISR effects and synchronization across the theater.258 (See Appendix C for an 
example of a graphical MTO.) 
(2)  Standardized EEIs.  In an effort to improve ISR support to unit 
operations, collection managers began producing “novel-length” narratives for their EEIs.  
These highly detailed explanations of what was required for ISR support were 
necessitated by a lack of TTPs within the ISR community for dealing with 
counterinsurgency problems.  A JSTARS crew understood the tactical formations of an 
Iraqi tank battalion and could recognize patterns of movement that would indicate 
flanking maneuvers or road marches.  While this information was very useful in the dust 
storm of March 2003, it proved of little value when attempting to identify the locations of 
IEDs along the roads within Baghdad.  Instead, military intelligence analysts assigned to 
the BCTs began to develop their own guidance for the JSTARS crews (and other ISR 
agencies) explaining how they believed IED emplacements would appear to the JSTARS. 
Based on experience and previous training, some collection 
managers understood the capabilities and limitations of the systems better than others.  
This created significant imbalance in the level of ISR support provided to one BCT over 
another.  With the addition of the ISRLOs at the Division level, such asymmetry was 
overcome as EEIs could be more carefully refined before submission to CFACC ISR.   
The length of the EEIs continued to be counterproductive as they limited the flexibility of 
ISR assets and even which ISR assets could be assigned to meet that requirement.  If an 
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EEI was written specifically for imagery support provided by the U-2, but there were 
insufficient collection opportunities on the next U-2 mission, that request had to be 
denied. 
In an effort to alleviate this problem, ISRLOs in 2007, working 
with a draft product developed by the Air Force Special Operations Command for their 
own ISR assets, developed a series of standardized EEIs intended to free collection 
managers from the task of “novel writing” and to spare ISR assets from reading through 
extensive directions on how to accomplish their missions.  The vision was for CMs to 
simply reference a particular collection requirement (“identify IEDS along route Red”) 
and for the ISR assets/crews to be able to reference their own specific EEIs for meeting 
that requirement.  In this fashion, as ISR crews became more accomplished at certain 
missions, they would develop better TTPs (beyond the understanding of the supported 
CM) or would acquire new technologies that would enable them to answer the question in 
different manners than what the CM may have been previously trained. 
Unfortunately, the use of standardized EEIs was only effective for 
recurrent missions such as searching for IEDs or monitoring a target house during a high 
value individual capture.  Less common missions, particularly those associated with non-
kinetic COIN efforts, were harder to standardize and often left the analysts with 
insufficient guidance on how to fulfill the requests.  What was required was a 
combination of the flexibility to use their systems and expertise to the fullest extent while 
having a sufficient understanding of the supported unit’s needs. 
(3)  ISR Tasks.  Instead of focusing on individual collection 
requests, submitted without context, ISR units needed access to the reconnaissance and 
surveillance plan developed by the ISR planners in coordination with the rest of the 
EWG.  This R&S plan will refine ISR tasks, indicating specific purposes and desired 
effects for ISR support.  (See Figure 28, Building ISR Tasks.)  ISR tasks describe the 
objectives that ISR must achieve against a specific target.259  A COIN task can be 
complicated explanations compared to conventional ISR taskings.  Previously, an 
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imagery analyst may only have been tasked with reporting the number of enemy vehicles 
in a collected image.  In a population centric COIN strategy, that analyst may now be 
required to report on details for which their technical training did not prepare them.  In 
that case, it may be necessary to provide very specific guidance developed by the BCT 
subject matter expert (SME) that will allow the SME to use the information provided by 
the analyst to determine the advancement of a certain LOE.260 
 
Figure 28. Building ISR Tasks 
 
Purpose explains how ISR will contribute to the success of the 
BCT operation, usually formatted as “in order to…”  More importantly, purpose provides 
the ISR asset with an understanding of how their information fits into the big picture.  
Most assets, whether they are HUMINT teams or UAV pilots, believe that they 
understand better than the requestor what intelligence is required.  While the assets do 
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tend to have a more refined understanding of their capabilities and what they can provide, 
they often have a very narrow field of view with regards to their integration with other 
assets and the operations of the BCT.  Purposes provide the larger view that individual 
assets require.261  While tasks may then identify specific requirements for mission 
accomplishment, the purpose statement helps the ISR asset to understand how they can 
contribute to the mission and therefore provides the flexibility required to take the 
initiative and solve additional problems if able.  The desired effects of ISR should 
provide a quantifiable assessment to determine if ISR was successful in the 
accomplishment of its assigned task. 
Using this Task/Purpose construct helps to alleviate one of the 
enduring problems of ISR support, the question of “why didn’t you tell me that?”  For 
example, an ISR unit may be tasked with identifying potential IED locations along a 
series of routes.  In identifying the potential IEDs, the imagery analysts also observes that 
one of the routes has been blocked by the rubble of a building previously struck by close 
air support.   This information is not included in the report, however, because it was not 
one of the “essential elements of information.”  The customer receiving the IED report 
reroutes the convoy to the route that has been blocked by rubble and wastes crucial 
minutes in finding yet another way around, potentially risking lives in an ambush.  When 
the feedback for the ISR support is submitted it is noted that the rubble strewn road was 
not annotated on imagery.  The Imagery Analyst complains that they were not instructed 
to provide such information and the trust between the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force 
deteriorates further. 
In contrast, the request for ISR support could have been crafted as 
follows: 
 TASK:  Identify any potential IED emplacement areas along routes 
Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie. 
 PURPOSE:  In order to facilitate movement of 2–1 AD convoy 
from Camp Liberty to Al Mansour. 
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 DESIRED EFFECTS:  Successful movement of 2–1 AD convoy 
without unnecessary delays. 
With such guidance in hand, imagery analysts are now able to 
focus on reporting potential IED locations but now understand that such reports are not 
being used solely to guide explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) clearance teams to the 
location but rather, to permit the movement of the convoy.  Now, if an analyst observes 
rubble blocking the route or even indications of a possible ambush, the analyst 
understands the importance of reporting this information as well.  In this fashion, the ISR 
units now become part of the team and can better support the solution to dynamic, wicked 
problems faced by the supported unit. 
D.  CONCLUSION 
1. ISR Planning for the 21 June 2007—Chasing Black Marketers 
As discussed in Chapter I, 2–82 ABN attempted to employ ISR in support of 
tactical operations.  Unfortunately, planning was limited to requesting an FMV asset and 
then identifying the target location that the asset would be tasked with observing in the 
traditional collection management process.  As the collection manager for 2–82 was also 
the imagery analyst for the BCT and the ISR Operations representative on the TOC floor, 
it is understandable that she had limited opportunity to develop a more robust ISR plan or 
be in possession of the training and experience necessary for understanding how to better 
integrate ISR into the overall plan.  Even if detailed planning had been conducted for the 
Shadow, the information developed (following the process outlined in this chapter) would 
have significantly improved the Predator’s ability to support the mission.  The fact that 
the tasking process resulted in pulling of the asset may only have pre-empted an 
unsuccessful demonstration of ISR support to the BCT’s operations. 
This example was symptomatic of ISR planning in general, though there were 
some more capable CMs (based on manning, experience, or training) who did develop 
more robust plans.  In most cases, ISR planning was limited to requesting one type of 
collection against a specific target with the expectation that the BCT S2 analysts would 
receive the products and integrate it with other products.  ISR was rarely used to cue 
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other assets or to provide direct support to on-going operations.  For example, imagery 
might be tasked to identify potential IED locations along a route.  CAS aircraft may also 
be tasked to search along the same route for suspicious activity or infrared signatures that 
might indicate IED locations.  Unfortunately, the CAS pilots were not provided with 
locations identified on imagery and rarely were IED locations highlighted by CAS 
forwarded to the analysis section for inclusion in their all-source products.  Common 
Ground Station (CGS) operators who could view the GMTI from JSTARS might build 
“pattern of life” products indicating trends in traffic over time but they did not typically 
cue organic FMV assets to suspicious activity occurring after curfew.  ISR planning at 
this time was largely focused on formalizing collection requests rather than developing an 
actual ISR strategy integrated with BCT operations. 
Had ISR planning been conducted in coordination with a fully represented EWG 
(to include ISRLO, ALO, and DART virtual presence), the lack of such integration could 
have been identified.  Furthermore, the additions of these planners may have highlighted 
alternative options for solving the problems or provided the experience necessary for 
better integration of the selected options.  Not all ISR operations were planned in such 
piecemeal fashions. 
2. ISR Planning for Operation BK FAMINE (June–July 2007)262 
In contrast, a comprehensive ISR plan was developed by the EWG of 2–1 AD 
BCT with support from the Division ISRLO and Collection Manager.  In developing their 
COIN campaign for the Al Mansour neighborhood in western Baghdad (see Figure 29, 
Red Circle Indicates 2–1AD BCT's Area of Operations in June–July 2007), LOE Chiefs 
identified the difficulties in working in the area.  Due to the fact that their units were 
based on Camp Liberty on the Victory Base Complex (VBC), they had to “commute” to 
their neighborhoods in order to conduct various construction projects or to interact with 
community leaders.  (Combat Out Posts in the area maintained a U.S. military presence 
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but BCT enablers typically resided on the Forward Operating Base until needed.)  During 
these commutes, their units often suffered casualties or at the very least delays in 
reaching their objective areas due to the improvised explosive device (IED) threat.  
Although the focus of their COIN campaign was improving the local capacity for the 




Figure 29. Red Circle Indicates 2–1AD BCT's Area of Operations in June–July 
2007263 
 
Considered an obstacle to maneuver, the BCT had learned over the past 10 
months that attempts to eliminate the IED cells were futile.  Even when a networked 
approach to IEDs was taken and cell leaders, bomb makers, and financiers were captured 
or eliminated, the IED cell (or a rival cell) eventually recovered and continued 
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operations.  The best case scenario, from the point of view of 2–1 AD, was that they 
could incur a two to four week hiatus in effective IED attacks as the cell recovered and 
inexperienced bomb makers or emplacement teams learned their trade.   The freedom of 
maneuver created by that delay, however, may be sufficient for the BCT to accomplish 
many of its COIN objectives and develop invaluable access to the community which in 
turn would deny the neighborhood to the IED emplacers.  Once the local population 
recognized that the American forces were not going to leave and that they were intent on 
improving the average Iraqi’s life, it was believed, the insurgents would begin to lose 
ground in that area and would be forced to conduct operations elsewhere. 
Since the 2–1 AD TOC was in close proximity to the Division headquarters on 
Camp Liberty, the 2–1 AD EWG was able to coordinate face-to-face with Division ISR 
personnel to include the CFACC provided ISRLO.  This gave the BCT access to 
personnel experienced in ISR planning and simply more bodies with which to conduct 
planning while the 2–1 AD CM continued to support other operations.  The result of this 
planning was codenamed Operation BK FAMINE and was designed to be a long term, 
counter IED (CIED) campaign designed to assure BCT mobility in the Al Mansour 
neighborhood. 
The most immediate threats, of course, were those IEDs that had already been 
emplaced along the route of travel from VBC to the neighborhood.   It would therefore be 
necessary to locate and clear (or avoid) suspected IED locations along the route.  This, of 
course, would be only a very short solution as many insurgent groups had developed the 
tactic of “re-seeding” the route after clearance teams had passed through the area.  For 
this reason, ISR would need to provide overwatch support to the route clearance team 
during their operations and along the route immediately after it had been cleared.  Long 
duration ISR would provide cues to potential IED locations in advance of route clearance 




Figure 30. Layered ISR in the Counter-IED Fight264 
 
The target signatures of an emplaced IED were considered and then aligned with 
various ISR capabilities.  To begin with, an emplaced IED can be observed “visually” 
either by identifying the device itself or certain associated activities.  The device itself 
was often camouflaged to blend with the complicated clutter of the urban environment 
(trash, construction materials, animal carcasses, etc.).  For this reason, using FMV or 
imagery to simply identify the IED itself was likely to be of little utility.   It might be 
possible, however, to image either the trigger man or the observer as they awaited the 
approach of a convoy.  Due to the barriers constructed around the various Baghdad 
neighborhoods, the ability of the IED triggerman to detonate his device at the appropriate 
time was severely limited either because he could not see the approaching convoy or 
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could not extend his detonating wires/signals far enough from the device.  This made the 
triggerman and his observer vulnerable to detection, though during non-curfew hours this 
was of little value. 
The infrared signature of most IEDs is indistinguishable from the surrounding 
clutter.  Though the device was made from military ordnance (old artillery shells, 
recovered aerial bombs that had failed to detonate, modified mines, etc.), their infrared 
(IR) signature was a factor of the environment (weather, direct sunlight, etc.) and 
therefore replicated the effects of other urban materials.  Therefore, surface laid IEDs 
were difficult for most ISR assets to detect and relied on the keen eyes of soldiers moving 
through the area.  IEDs that had been buried under the street or nearby, however, were 
vulnerable to detection based on the fact that such “disturbed earth” often had a different 
IR signature than the ground around it.  For this reason, IR assets (either imagery or 
FMV) could be used to identify potential IED locations based on the disturbed earth.  
(Potholes that had been recently filled in or other similar forms of construction would of 
course be mistaken for IED locations). 
Since IEDs were typically made of dense metal munitions, radar signatures could 
be useful in highlighting “radar significant objects” in close proximity to road.  Again, by 
itself, this signature may not be particularly useful, but if combined with the IR signature 
indicating that there was a radar significant device within disturbed earth, the potential 
for that being an IED increased.  It may also have been possible to identify the wires used 
to detonate the device if they were laid atop the ground although this was likely a low 
probability of success, particularly in an urban environment.   
As noted with the IR signature, disturbed earth was important because it 
represented a change from its surroundings.  Therefore, it might be possible to use radar 
imagery to detect changes from one image to the next (assuming the two images were 
taken over a matter of hours or days), known as coherent change detection.265  Ideally, 
the first image would be taken prior to when the S2 estimated that insurgents were 
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implanting their devices and the second image prior to when the route clearance team or 
the convoy left VBC.  Due to the strict flight requirements and the limited number of 
imaging opportunities each day, it was unlikely that both images would be taken on the 
same day.  Instead, images would need to be separated by days and in the hectic 
environment of a city, such changes might go unnoticed because of so many other 
changes in the scene. 
“Acoustically,” the IED itself does not emit any detectable signals.  Although, it 
may be possible to detect signals associated with the IED to include radio frequencies 
used to arm the device prior to detonation (sometimes used by the insurgents to prevent 
early detonation of victim triggered devices by innocent civilians) or the communications 
between the target spotter and the triggerman.  In both cases, the signal would be detected 
only moments before the device was detonated but it was still a valid target signature to 
be considered. 
A growing effort was focused on detecting the material signature of the devices 
such as the explosive materials involved.  Unfortunately, based on the ISRLO’s 
experience such capabilities were either unavailable for tasking or were analytically 
intensive and would therefore limit their utility with regards to early warning of convoys 
moving through a specific area in a given time frame.   
Lastly, ISR planners looked at the potential to identify movement associated with 
the IED.  Obviously, the device itself would not move and the triggerman or observer 
was likely to be operating on foot.  But when the device was emplaced, it may have been 
dropped off from a vehicle or been emplaced by someone walking to and from a nearby 
“get away car.”  During curfew hours, this could be useful information.  During the day, 
in a congested urban area, it was going to be lost among the “noise” of legitimate day-to-
day activities. 
Regardless, the ISRLO, the Division Collection Manager, the BCT S2, and the 
ALO were able to develop an ISR plan to support movement from VBC to Al Mansour.  
To begin with, a radar imagery pass was planned for the start of each target window 
(when insurgents were believed to be burying IEDs along the route of travel).  The first 
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night, the image would simply be analyzed for radar significant objects and correlated to 
any other ISR findings.  On subsequent nights, the images would be compared to one 
another to detect changes that might indicate the emplacement of an explosive device. 
The CGS operators were directed to provide notifications of any suspicious 
vehicle activity that occurred along the route of travel.  In particular, they were to 
highlight vehicles that stopped along the route of travel and then made circuitous routes 
back to their point of origin, vehicles that stopped within a given distance to the route and 
then again returned to a point of origin, or vehicles that followed or drove on an 
“intercept course” toward the route clearance team during its operations. 
The ALO worked to get CAS assets made available to support the mission in the 
event that there were insufficient FMV assets available.  CAS assets had the advantage of 
moving more rapidly around the battlespace, and could therefore check out more 
suspicious locations, could talk directly to the convoys via radio, and if necessary, could 
employ weapons against suspected triggermen, observers, or emplacement teams (though 
this was highly unlikely).  In comparison, the slower flying UAVs typically lacked direct 
radio communications with ground personnel nor did they have the ability to employ 
weapons (in most cases) but they did have a longer loiter time which would allow them to 
spend more time searching the roads at a slower rate of travel with the potential for better 
fidelity.   While pilots in fighter aircraft had to focus on flying the aircraft and only 
delegate a portion of their time to watching the video feed from their targeting pod, there 
was both a pilot and a sensor operator controlling a UAV, allowing for a more consistent 
observation of the video feed.   
In both cases, the fighter pilot and the sensor operators were encouraged to focus 
first and foremost on suspicious activity such as personnel digging alongside roads, 
vehicles stopped on the shoulder of the road for no apparent reason, or individuals 
loitering after curfew.  IR significant areas along roads were to be reported to include a 
verbal description of the location relative to observable landmarks (to ease the guidance 
of clearance teams to the potential device). 
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Signals intelligence assets were requested to provide earlier warning of potential 
device employment during route clearance operations and during convoy movements.  
Such information would be fed rapidly to the ground unit to halt or modify their 
movements and to the JTAC to ensure that CAS could be rapidly brought to bear either to 
provide an IR search for the device or to support a troops in contact situation should they 
come under fire from a supporting ambush. 
Coordination was carefully worked out to ensure that imagery products were 
quickly provided to the ISR Ops soldier and the JTAC in the BCT TOC.  The CGS 
Operators were similarly directed to contact the ISR Ops soldier and the JTAC with any 
suspicious activity.  In this fashion, the UAV or CAS aircraft would not simply be 
looking up and down roads but would be cued to other suspicious activity.  Although all 
ISR indications of a possible IED would be considered carefully with regards to the 
safety of the convoy, actioning such targets would largely depend on a correlation of the 
various signatures to ensure that EOD soldiers were not needlessly put into a potential 
ambush situation for something that turned out to be a false alarm. 
To have a longer term effect (measured in weeks vice hours), EWG planners 
needed to eliminate the IED cell and its available munitions.  Though some insurgent 
groups had begun to use homemade explosives, military munitions were still the 
preferred base for IEDs in this area of operations.  It would therefore be necessary to 
identify cache sites within the neighborhood from which the weapons were quickly taken 
and then emplaced as well as to cut-off the “ratlines” used by the insurgents to smuggle 
the weapons into Baghdad. 
The S2 provided ISR planners with an all source product highlighting suspected 
cache locations based on previous engagements, HUMIT reporting, and tip line results.   
Often, such locations were narrowed down to a particular block of houses but were not 
sufficient for targeting a specific house.  This level of fidelity, however, was sufficient 
for the needs of the ISR planners.  GMTI could be cued to watch for activity originating 
from that location and then to report any incidents in which activity terminated along a 
known route of travel for coalition forces, in an area where coalition forces were known 
to be operating (such as where a school was being built), in open fields (which could be a 
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longer term, larger cache locations) or that highlighted breeches in the Baghdad security 
belt and indicated where smugglers were able to bring weapons in and out. 
Locations that indicated a potential weapon emplacement (along the route or near 
an operating area) were handled with the same systems involved in the short term route 
clearance (primarily FMV and CAS assets).  Locations that indicated other cache sites or 
smuggling routes were then used to cue other ISR assets to more precisely locate the 
activity.  Coherent change detection could be very useful in identifying disturbed earth in 
a field that could represent a cache location, foot tracks leading to such areas, or vehicle 
tracks through the Baghdad security belt.  Additional imagery assets could then be tasked 
to take more easily interpretable imagery of the area to provide targeting options for the 
BCT commander.  More advanced ISR capabilities could be used to identify the specific 
location of IED storage or manufacture within the block of houses.  Though such 
capabilities have extended analytical timelines that preclude their utility to support 
movement, they are sufficient to provide more precise “fixing” of the target location. 
In the end, all intelligence information is fused in the S2 shop and then provided 
to the EWG.  Targeting of the IED cell, cutting off its access to IEDs, and rounding up 
smugglers eased the problems for 2–1 AD to move to the neighborhoods that required 
coalition help.  But it would be those COIN efforts in support of the Iraqi people that 
ultimately defeated the IED problem, not the targeting of the IED cells.  In the end, the 
ISR operation met with mixed results. 
Efforts to find IEDs prior to their detonation were largely of marginal 
effectiveness.  The soldiers who spent the previous 12 months travelling over those same 
routes were far more effective in identifying potential IEDs, particularly those that 
complicated ISR use (surface laid, victim triggered, emplaced during the day).  Efforts to 
eliminate the IED cell were more effective but again resulted in only temporary respites 
from IED attacks while the soldiers of 2–1AD accomplished their COIN tasks.  Despite 
the effectiveness of ISR sensors and capabilities (or lack thereof) the biggest learning 
curve turned out to be the coordination of the information.  Getting the right cues to the 
other sensors, ensuring the right personnel were in the loop, all proved to be vital to the 
success of the mission.  Misspelled names in e-mail lists, phones that were unable to 
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communicate with outside agencies, and simply the scheduling of duty shifts all impacted 
the flow of information adversely.  Again, these are areas of particular concern that need 
to be addressed during ISR planning. 
3. Integration of Joint Planning 
Integration between CFACC ISR planning, tasking, and execution elements can 
only be improved through the development of habitual relationships.  The assignment of 
ISRLOs to the Division level was an important first step but their presence is required at 
the level of planning which demands delegation down to the BCT level.  Formalizing and 
establishing re-current interactions with reach back organizations via the DART also 
improved coordination during planning.  By therefore developing a shared understanding 
of the problems encountered, assets and personnel could be better managed to meet the 
unique needs of each of the land owning commanders. 
Having examined the importance of CFACC representation at the level of ISR 
planning and integration, Chapter IV provides recommendations for the necessary 
changes to the tasking of ISR capabilities.  Ultimately, planning is merely a frustrating 
exercise when it is not supported by a tasking process that supplies the assets necessary to 
execute the plan. 
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IV. REQUESTING ISR—COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter III addressed the problems of Army re-organization discussed in Chapter 
I and the need to approach Counterinsurgency (COIN) Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) as a “wicked problem” based on the criteria provided in Chapter II.  
The deployment of ISR liaison officers (ISRLOs) into Army planning teams and the 
conduct of more detailed planning will require a tasking process that meets the needs of 
the supported commander.  This chapter details the tasking process, the changes that are 
required, and makes recommendations for improving that process.  
Improving the Combined Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) ISR 
support to a COIN campaign will require not just an influx of additional ISR assets but a 
means by which to improve the utilization of those assets.  This process must integrate 
not only organic assets of the supported unit and the CFACC, but must also leverage both 
ISR and non-traditional ISR assets that may prove useful substitutes.  By continuing to 
focus on the shared understanding developed during mission planning, a carefully 
integrated process can appropriately prioritize units or missions versus “servicing” 
problem sets that may not be applicable.  Finally, understanding throughout the chain-of-
command enables decisions to be made at much lower, decentralized command nodes 
thus reacting more effectively to developing recognition of wicked problems. 
B. MORE ISR, MORE PROBLEMS? 
In the six years since the start of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), the CFACC 
increased the number of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) patrols by seven-fold,266 U-2 
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missions by 30%,267 doubled the number of Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar 
System (JSTARS) and RC-135 aircrew in theater,268 and increased the number of targets 
to be collected by other ISR platforms.  Additionally, the ISR Division (ISRD) of the 
Combined Air and Space Operations Center (CAOC, the senior command and control 
node of the CFACC) has developed new processes that allow for more direct interaction 
of ISR platforms with supported ground units.  These improvements include the 
deployment of ISR Liaison Officers and the assignment of “direct support” missions in 
which an ISR asset flies under the direct guidance of the supported unit rather than on a 
pre-determined collection mission with a set of specific targets.  Lastly, working with the 
collection management team at the Multi-National Forces Iraq headquarters, the CFACC 
has employed a strategy of directly assigning specific UAVs to each Division, increasing 
their responsiveness and allowing for more detailed pre-planning of missions. 
While these improvements have increased the reliability of CFACC ISR assets 
being available to the ground units and have significantly improved the ground 
commander’s trust in the CFACC, they have not had a significant impact on the 
effectiveness of ISR.  In reviewing the number of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
detected by CFACC ISR in the course of OIF, the commander of the U.S. Air Force’s Air 
Combat Command described the employment of CFACC assets as “a waste.”269  
Consistently, the CFACC, despite the increased number of available ISR assets in theater, 
is unable to meet the insatiable demand for ISR as reflected by the collection requests 
submitted by the land component command (LCC).  The problem does not lie in the 
number of ISR assets available or in the capabilities (or lack thereof) with regards to 
finding IEDs or other targets in the COIN fight.  Instead, the problem stems from the fact 
that the ISR problems that are challenging both land and air planners are wicked 
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problems, problems for which such planners have little experience and ones that can only 
be resolved through a shared understanding of the problem and a commitment to its 
resolution.270 
C. WICKED SOLUTIONS REQUIRE BETTER INTEGRATION 
As discussed in Chapter III, solutions to wicked problems require organizing 
teams of stakeholders in such a manner that they can develop a shared understanding of 
the problem and can commit to the proposed solution.  The intent is not to replace the 
bureaucracies of the military establishment as such organizational structures allow for 
economy of force and unity of effort which have permitted the U.S. military and its 
coalition partners to dominate all foreign militaries.  Rather, networks as an 
organizational form will provide the optimal capability for managing people and ideas 
that are incompatible with the hierarchies of the bureaucracy.271  Establishing these 
networks of stakeholders must be done both formally and informally to ensure success.  
Currently, such networks already exist to some extent at most levels of the military 
bureaucracy but they often lack the full participation of the stakeholders.  To develop a 
shared understanding of the ISR problem, both customers and collectors must be a part of 
the network.  The focus of the network will differ at each echelon but the requirement for 
integration does not lessen. 
The collection management (CM) process is the formal structure through which 
stakeholders manage “high demand, low density” assets.  Despite concerns for 
overemphasizing “efficiency” over “effectiveness,”272 an effective CM process allows 
the Joint Forces Commander to provide limited assets to priority operations and units 
while maintaining pressure on insurgent networks and supporting non-kinetic 
counterinsurgency operations throughout the theater.  To do so, however, requires the 
cultivation of a shared understanding and collaboration in solving COIN associated ISR 
problems through better integration of the overall CM process. 
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D. JFC ROLE IN ISR PRIORITIZATION 
The Joint Forces Commander (JFC) drives the collection management process by 
providing a vision for campaign success. The CM process strives to realize the JFC’s 
vision by balancing the effectiveness of limited collection resources within operationally 
constrained timelines against the insatiable ISR requirements of operational commanders.  
This is a process that occurs at all levels and works to convert intelligence/information 
requirements into validated collection requirements.  The process also includes the 
tasking or coordinating of actions with appropriate collection agencies.273 
1. Allocation vs. Apportionment 
Currently, the terms “allocation” and “apportionment” are misused in the Iraqi 
theater of operations.  The collection management team at the Corps level developed the 
terminology to explain how it “allocated” and “apportioned” limited numbers of ISR 
assets/sorties/collection targets.  By the Corps CM team definition, allocating an asset is 
to take a Corps ISR asset and fill an emerging high priority requirement.  Units that 
receive allocated assets do so only for a limited amount of time and with the 
understanding that the asset could be pulled to fulfill a higher priority tasking.  
Apportioned assets on the other hand, as the Corps CM defined it, are tasked to the 
Divisions themselves for use on a regular basis.  This allows the Division to then fill 
requirements submitted by subordinate BCTs with more confidence in the asset’s 
availability.  While the Division may choose to re-task the asset to another BCT, the 
ability to request Corps apportioned assets often eliminates this requirement and nearly 
guarantees a BCT that Division-level apportioned assets can be counted on to be 
available as requested.274   For the purposes of this paper, those assets that are reserved 
for filling an emerging high priority requirement will be referred to as “non-aligned ISR.”  
Assets that are tasked specifically to a unit on a regular basis will be referred to as 
“aligned ISR.” 
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Doctrinally, the term “apportionment,” specifically as it relates to air power, 
refers to “the determination and assignment of the total expected effort by percentage 
and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various…operations for a given period of 
time.”275  “Allocation” is the translation of this apportionment decision into the number 
of limited assets and resources to be distributed for employment among competing 
requirements.  For air power, this is typically calculated as the number of specific sorties 
by type of aircraft to be made available for a particular operation or task.276  For ISR, 
however, this may be better envisioned as the number of collection opportunities 
(measured in terms of images, time, or other appropriate metric) made available for a 
particular unit or tasking. 
According to doctrine, “the Joint Forces Commander (JFC) apportions the ISR 
effort based on campaign objectives.”  Traditionally, this is managed by a set of 
commander’s critical information requirements that establish the priority of information 
based on the commander’s overall view of the campaign.277  In a counterinsurgency 
operation, however, the JFC will have less appreciation for the information requirements 
necessary for defeating the insurgency in any one location.  By designating the Brigade 
Combat Team (BCT) commander as the responsible authority for defeating the 
insurgency in that area of operations, the JFC has effectively delegated his authority to 
establish critical information requirements to the BCT commander in each area of 
operations (AO).   The JFC still retains the authority and responsibility for determining 
how ISR Operations will support the accomplishment of his overall campaign plan by 
providing apportionment guidance for the use of ISR assets in theater.278  While this has 
typically been an issue of designating which targets or which information requirements 
are of highest priority, the JFC is, in fact, free to apportion ISR efforts by unit, much as is 
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done with Close Air Support (CAS) operations.  In such a fashion, the JFC may designate 
a particular brigade, division, or area of operations as his main effort and assign a 
percentage of ISR support to that effort. 
2. Collection Management Authority 
The combatant commander exercises collection management authority (CMA) 
through two interrelated functions.  The first, Collection Requirements Management 
(CRM), identifies what information is necessary for collection in order to support the 
commander’s operations.  The second, Collection Operations Management (COM), 
evaluates what systems are best suited for collecting against a specific target in order to 
fulfill the collection request.  (See Figure 31, Interaction Between CRM and COM 
Authorities.) While the combatant commander will normally retain CRM, COM is 
usually delegated to the component commander who is designated the supported 
commander for theater ISR.279  A different COM may be required for each collection 
medium to best ensure unity of effort in the execution of ISR operations.  The designated 
COM for each medium, therefore, should be that functional component with the 
preponderance of ISR capabilities in that medium and the ability to plan, task, and 
control joint ISR operations throughout the theater.280 This will typically be the CFACC 
with regards to airborne ISR capabilities.  There should be constant dialogue between the 
CRM and the COM to ensure requirements are in fact being satisfied by collection 
operations.281 
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Figure 31. Interaction Between CRM and COM Authorities282 
 
As ISR operations have become more distributed and the Army and Marine Corps 
have begun to develop their own ISR assets, however, COM has become more fractured 
over time.  Though Joint doctrine suggests that all theater ISR assets, to include those 
assets organic to the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, should be allocated under the CFACC 
for tactical control (TACON), current operations have allowed the Army and Marines to 
retain control over their own assets.283  In that fashion, there is separate COM for those 
assets, usually at their highest echelons, with the CFACC focused on COM for all other 
air and space borne ISR platforms. 
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E. COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS MANAGEMENT AND THE CORPS 
COLLECTION MANAGER 
Understanding how to effectively distribute ISR assets requires a thorough 
understanding of the commander’s priorities, the developing battlespace, and the needs of 
subordinate commanders.  In the Iraqi theater of operations, CRM is the responsibility of 
a combined staff of the Multi-National Corps Iraq and Multi-National Force Iraq 
collections management personnel, working to achieve the balance required for meeting 
higher, adjacent, and lower headquarters requirements.284  
The CRM has the responsibility of modifying the JFC’s prioritization of effort by 
monitoring the progression of the campaign.  In a conventional conflict, this would 
require changing the priority of intelligence problem sets or adding problem sets to the 
list of priorities.  With each BCT commander dealing with his own unique set of 
problems, with varying degrees of success in each, the CRM is less concerned about the 
specific problems than with each BCT’s success as a whole.  Understanding that a 
counterinsurgency campaign must carefully balance the successes in each area of 
operations in order to prevent insurgents from simply shifting from one AO to the next, 
the CM team at the Corps must ensure that the weight of effort given to each BCT 
maintains the constant pressure on the insurgent in all areas while allowing the BCT 
commanders to acquire the information necessary for their own efforts.285 
Although Baghdad may represent the highest priority for the JFC’s campaign 
plan, in order to provide a stable environment for the Government of Iraq to work and to 
influence information operations that are focused on the capitol area, all ISR efforts 
cannot simply be focused on Baghdad alone.  In such a case, insurgent operations would 
simply move to a different location and continue to function there instead.  Rather, the 
Corps must balance efforts to suppress the insurgency in Baghdad while simultaneously 
preventing its spread into other areas.    In this fashion, it becomes necessary for the 
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Corps CM team to regularly modify the apportionment of ISR efforts among the various 
areas of operation, staying abreast of the needs of the local commanders to maintain 
control of their AOs. 
1. Requirements Receipt and Prioritization 
In a conventional fight, the importance of intelligence requirements cannot be 
over-estimated with regards to focusing ISR efforts on the most critical information needs 
of the commander.  Due to the demand for ISR and its limited availability,286 
prioritization helps to alleviate efforts to over task, mis-task, or excessively use ISR 
assets for lesser functions.  In turn, ISR effectiveness can be evaluated by tying essential 
element of information (EEI) answers back to specific priorities.287  Complications arise, 
however, with regards to the establishment of those priorities. 
When evaluating the validity of a collection request, collection managers will 
often use a number of criteria to include impact on the commander’s concept of 
operation, the availability of the necessary information within archived data, or the 
potential for other validated requests to fulfill this need as well.  Only when it is 
determined that the collection requirement does support the commander’s concept of 
operations, cannot already be answered, and has not already been tasked in another 
format will the request continue through the collection management process.288 
Of these criteria, however, the most important is whether the request adheres to 
the commander’s concept of operations.  How this is determined can greatly impact the 
collection management process as certain criteria are more appropriate to a counter 
insurgency effort than others. 
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a. The Joint Collection Management Board 
A Joint Collection Management Board (JCMB) is typically formed at the 
JFC’s discretion to serve as a joint forum for managing collection requirements and 
coordinating collection operations.289  Each component develops its own collection target 
nominations list which it prioritizes based upon that component’s specific needs.  The 
components then forward their prioritized lists to the JCMB which validates all of the 
targets, combines them into a single integrated list and then prioritizes all of the targets 
against the JFC’s campaign objectives.  The JCMB then releases a Joint Integrated 
Prioritized Collection List (JIPCL) and provides apportionment recommendations for ISR 
assets to fulfill those requirements.290 
b. Target-centric vs. Unit-centric Prioritization 
As practiced traditionally, and further formalized in the U.S. Air Force’s 
Theater ISR CONOPS, priorities are assigned to specific targets or target sets.  Such 
target sets are identified during the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating 
Environment (JIPOE) when several categories of adversary capabilities and/or targets 
systems are identified.291  This concept is extremely well-suited to a machine 
bureaucracy dealing with a stable and simple environment.  In this fashion, it is possible 
for centralized planners to clearly delineate the theater-wide intelligence problems with 
which to be dealt and to then prioritize collection against those specific targets.  Although 
it is acknowledged that such target sets may change or additional ones may be added 
during the course of the conflict, this concept ignores the highly unstable and complex 
nature of a counterinsurgency environment in which a machine bureaucracy must be 
replaced by a highly decentralized network of adhocracies in order to operate effectively.  
The Theater ISR CONOPS explains, “the more dynamic the operating, the less 
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mechanical and more fluid ISR processes should be…which means human judgment and 
leadership must prevail over strict adherence to a mechanical process.”292 
For example, an ISR request that supports the capture of a high value 
individual associated with Al Qaeda ranks higher than an ISR request that supports 
looking for improvised explosive devices.  Unfortunately, as has been noted previously, 
not every BCT commander is dealing with the same problem sets.  A BCT commander 
operating in south-eastern Iraq in vicinity of Basra is unlikely to be making many (if any) 
collection requests for Al Qaeda targets.  Therefore, all of his collection requests will 
automatically be lower than those of other units that are dealing with a local Al Qaeda 
problem. 
Using such a strategy for prioritizing collection requests can lead to 
subordinate units attempting to “game the system”293 by modifying the collection 
requirements to match the JFC priority targets.  A BCT collection manager may claim to 
want ISR to search for insurgents with direct ties to Al Qaeda, when in fact, they are 
simply oil smugglers who are reducing Government of Iraq (GOI) capability and 
providing monetary support to the local Shi’a insurgents.  In Iraq in 2007, many 
collection managers used liberal interpretations of collection prioritization to justify 
taskings, usually associating any collection request with improvised explosive devices.  
(The same often occurred with regards to CAS requests.) 
By 2008, the Joint Forces Commander acknowledged that each BCT was 
dealing with a unique set of obstacles to defeating the insurgency within their area of 
operations and restoring government capacity in that region.  Rather than designate a 
specific target as a priority to be used across the board, whether it impacted the BCT 
commanders or not, the JFC instead prioritized which BCTs or operations should receive 
priority in support.294  This allows BCT commanders to tackle their local problems as 
necessary to meet the JFC’s overall objective which is the quelling of the insurgency and 
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the restoration of state services.   As the fight becomes less intense in one area or more 
critical in another, the JFC can shift his priority of effort among those units rather than 
attempt to identify every potential ISR problem set they might encounter.  (See Figure 32, 
ISR Prioritization Options.) 
 
 
Figure 32. ISR Prioritization Options 
 
In the spring of 2008, when Iraqi forces began to engage anti-government 
insurgent groups in the Basra region, the priority of ISR “targets” did not change.  The 
fighting was focused on Shi’ite insurgent groups not Al Qaeda forces.   The success of 
the Iraqi government forces was critical to the overall success of the counterinsurgency 
campaign.  Not only would it defeat a key opponent of the GOI, but it would demonstrate 
the capability of Iraqi forces to conduct major operations on their own (with coalition 
support) and therefore, should rightly have become a focus of ISR collection efforts.  
Without a specific target set including Al Qaeda high value individuals (HVIs), IEDs, or 
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indirect fire, the priority of their targets did not formally match that established within the 
collection management community.  Instead, by designating the Basra operation itself as 
a priority in reference to other units or operations, collection requests were more 
accurately prioritized to support the COIN campaign. 
2. Collection Planning 
a. Effects Synchronization at the CRM-Level 
At present, effects synchronization is not conducted at the CRM-level.  
Rather, planning for ISR missions is conducted at the BCT level and modified/clarified at 
the Division level.  Corps CM team members evaluate each collection request 
individually, ensuring that it matches the JFC’s intent for operations.  If there is no clear 
tie between the collection requirement and the JFC’s vision for success (as illustrated 
through the prioritization of units/operations), the collection requirement is returned to 
the originator to be modified to meet JFC requirements or to be satisfied via the 
requestor’s organic ISR capabilities. 
As collection management is largely conducted through a “stove piped” 
process, the requirements for integrated ISR or deliberate cross-cuing are not often taken 
into consideration.  Rather, a validated collection requirement is filled based on priority 
and available resources.  The fact that the asset is essential to an operation or requires 
cross-cue by another asset or is used to cross-cue another asset is not factored into the 
decision making.  This can result in an ISR asset being approved for use without the 
required cross-cue platform also being approved because it is being handled by a 
different CM.  This in turn results in a wasted asset as without the planned for cross-cue, 
the received asset is of little utility. 
b. ISR Asset Alignment for Planning Purposes 
Until the summer of 2007, ISR assets were centrally managed by the CRM 
and COM functions.  Units would submit requests for ISR support, typically two to three 
days in advance, and the CM process would parse the requests, prioritize them based on 
the JFC dictated priorities and then assign ISR assets to collect on the specific targets 
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identified by each unit.  The complicated nature of balancing limited assets against a 
significant collection deck often left units unaware of their ISR support until 6 to 12 
hours prior to the desired date of support.  In many cases, this prevented requesting units 
from developing detailed plans with expected ISR asset and relying extensively on 
organic assets, despite their much more limited capabilities, in order to guarantee 
availability. 
As the most requested ISR capability, FMV assets provided the most 
visible evidence of this process’s failings.  Supported units often found that their targets 
changed in the time from requesting support to when the asset arrived on station but they 
had no ability to change the asset’s targets.  Attempts to do so required drawn out ad hoc 
requests that resulted in a re-evaluation of centrally dictated priorities and the needs of 
other units.  Assets that had been assigned to support one unit could suddenly be pulled 
away to support another unit with little to no warning because higher priority taskings 
could pop-up with little notice.  When planning had required such assets to be available, 
the mission often had to be aborted due to the absence of the FMV asset. 
In other cases, it was difficult if not impossible to specify target locations 
or required timelines beyond a block of several hours.295  Waiting for a high value target 
to be detected by HUMINT or SIGINT could result in an FMV asset “burning holes in 
the sky” aimlessly or tasked to collect on a much lower priority target.  When this 
occurred, higher headquarters would often pull the asset and assign it to another unit only 
to learn later that the HVI had been detected but since the FMV asset had been 
transferred the tasking unit could not pursue their HVI. 
Finally, in June 2007, the deputy collection manager for MNC-I and the 
chief of FMV collections developed a plan for dividing FMV assets up amongst the 
various Major Subordinate Commands (MSC).296  Maligned as “peanut butter spreading” 
ISR assets, it was feared that doing so would disrupt the concepts of “unity of command” 
and “economy of force” necessary to shift assets when and where necessary to meet the 
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greatest needs.  In reality, this process gave more FMV assets and better capable assets to 
those units designated as priority efforts by the JFC which in turn allowed commanders 
better predictability in asset availability.  This “apportionment and allocation” of FMV 
assets significantly improved LCC trust of ACC assets.297  (See Figure 33, ISR “Bucket” 
vs. ISR "Peanut Butter Spread" Approaches to FMV Asset Management.) 
 
Figure 33. ISR “Bucket” vs. ISR “Peanut Butter Spread” Approaches to FMV 
Asset Management 
 
(1)  Requesting assets vs. effects.  Subordinate collection managers 
are directed to request an ISR “effect” rather than a particular ISR asset.  This, however, 
generally ignores the associated systems capabilities that may make an ISR asset more 
appropriate to a unit’s needs.   For example, some ISR assets have different connectivity 
capabilities than others to include voice communications that may be necessary to 
support ground personnel in the field, or the ability to directly downlink information to 
organic analytic personnel.  At present, collection managers are simply directed to 
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include all of these considerations into their requests but then are chastised when their 
requests become so specific as to indicate a specific asset. 
While it is valid to discourage CMs from requesting a specific 
asset and to allow CMs at higher echelons to align assets based on availability and ability 
to satisfy the request, genuine requirements for specific assets should be permitted when 
properly justified.  Furthermore, subordinate planners are likely to have a better 
understanding of the decisions to be made by their commanders and thus, what assets will 
or will not be of value to their operations.  In the summer of 2007, when the Corps CM 
began to align FMV capabilities with units, the MQ-1 Predator was originally aligned 
with Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B).   The collections team for MND-B, 
however, recognized that this was an ineffectual pairing as the MND-B commander had 
demonstrated reluctance in employing UAV launched weapons into his urban 
battlespace.  For this reason, the MND-B CM team requested that the Corps swap the 
MQ-1 for the Warrior Alpha which largely had the same capabilities with the exception 
of the ability to carry Hellfire missiles.  Within days of providing the Predator to MND-
North (MND-N), it was authorized to employ Hellfire missiles against insurgents 
planting an IED.  The Warrior Alpha, meanwhile, was effectively used by MND-B to 
meet their collection requirements.  In the end, subordinate ISR planners must be trusted 
to understand their requirements and not confined by strict adherence to rules or standard 
operating procedures. 
(2)  Tactical Control vs. Direct Support.  A solution the collection 
managers at the CAOC ISRD developed and coordinated with the Division ISR Liaison 
Officers (ISRLOs) was the development of “direct support” ISR missions, particularly in 
the usage of the Global Hawk but later extended, in a limited fashion, to fighters 
employing reconnaissance pods.  (See Figure 34, F-16 with Tactical Reconnaissance 
[TACRECCE] Pod on Center-line Mount [Circled in Red].)  During “direct support” 
missions, the ISR asset is tasked to work directly with a particular unit.  The supported 
Army unit would action a target, for example, and as insurgents fled the scene the Army 
would provide the latest information available.  The ISRLO, working in conjunction with 
the JSTARS, the Warrior Alpha, and the Global Hawk (GH) would then coordinate the 
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tracking and locating of the insurgents as they sought cover.  The JSTARS would provide 
updates to the Army ISR Operations officer directing the Warrior Alpha and to the  
ISRLO who was in contact with the GH.  Each would then provide feedback on what 
they found or did not find, and the search would continue with information fed to the 
Army unit for capturing the insurgents. 
 
Figure 34. F-16 with Tactical Reconnaissance (TACRECCE) Pod on Center-line 
Mount (Circled in Red)298 
 
The ability to re-task the GH, vice providing it a list of targets to 
be imaged prior to mission launch was a significant improvement in the responsiveness 
of ISR.  Commanders were no longer forced to develop exact target locations and 
descriptions 72 hours in advance of when they required ISR support.  Recognizing that 
ISR must now be integrated with operations to provide real-time, dynamic support to 
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missions underway, the DS mission allowed supported commanders to change, drop, or 
add targets as necessary to effectively develop their missions. 
An important concept to understand with the use of direct support 
missions, however, was the fact that Tactical Control (TACON) was not transferred from 
the CFACC to the CFLCC.299  Designating an asset as being in a “direct support” role 
indicates that the asset is authorized to directly answer the supported force’s request for 
assistance.  Alternately, TACON involves the command authority over an assigned asset 
that includes the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers to accomplish 
missions.300  The Global Hawk, or fighters, still operated based on the tasking of the 
CFACC and could not be transferred to other units without the express consent of the 
CFACC.  Direct support missions allowed ISR units to coordinate and communicate 
directly with a designated point of contact within the supported unit.301  While the 
supported unit was expected to provide new targets and/or intent for the operation, they 
were discouraged from providing specific directions for ISR employment, attempting to 
“steer” the sensor, which would lead to unnecessary delays and less effective 
employment of the asset.302   There are cases, however, in which the supported unit, 
through a JTAC, ISRLO, or similar point of contact (POC), is able to more efficiently 
guide sensors to a new target because of their greater situational awareness than would be 
possible simply through providing exact coordinates.303 
Similarly, the alignment of specific full-motion video (FMV) 
assets with particular Divisions replicated this Direct Support vs. TACON concept.  (See 
Table 5, Commanding and Supporting Relationships and their Responsibilities.)  The 
FMV asset was able to answer directly to the needs of the Division to which it was 
aligned, changing targets or working with different subordinate units as the Division 
directed.  Each of the aligned FMV assets, however, was scheduled to fly at specific 
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times of the day.  Should the Division need an asset available at a different time or an 
asset with different capabilities (such as an armed Predator to prosecute targets 
immediately after confirmation), the Divisions would have to coordinate with one another 
and with the Corps in order to trade FMV assets.  Divisions did not have the ability to 
change the load out of the FMV that was aligned with them nor were they able to change 
their schedule (options that would have been possible with TACON authority). 




F. COLLECTION OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT AND THE CAOC 
The COM organizes, directs, and monitors the assets, agencies, and personnel that 
collect the information necessary to satisfy the validated collection requirements.305  In 
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the current contingency operations, the CFACC executes COM for operations in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa.306  The CFACC tasks all airborne and space borne 
ISR assets for which he has TACON or OPCON via the air tasking order (ATO).  The 
ATO generally directs times, locations and targets for assets while the reconnaissance, 
surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) annex to the ATO provides specific 
collection taskings.  The RSTA and the ISR strategy that guide it are developed during 
the Joint Air Operations Planning process by ISR managers working at the CAOC in the 
ISRD.307 
As the COM, the CFACC executes the final authority with regards to balancing 
the benefits of successful collection versus the risk involved to the ISR assets and 
supporting units.  Such risks may include threats to the assets themselves (such as surface 
to air missiles) or synchronization factors such as insuring an ISR unit has sufficient time 
to accomplish a mission before its next tasking.  Additionally, the CFACC (via his ISR 
planners) establishes the parameters under which dynamic re-tasking can occur as part of 
the ISR strategy.  Such guidance is included in the RSTA to ensure that all ISR customers 
understand the limits of changing an ISR asset’s track or mission.308  Beyond such 
standard operating procedures, the collection operations manager should take care not to 
inhibit the coordination between ISR units and their supported customers which may be 
necessary to tailor ISR actions.309  Dynamic ISR operations will be covered in greater 
detail in Chapter V. 
1. Collaborative Management of Limited Resources 
Mintzberg, using James Thompson’s model of analyzing task interdependence, 
defines pooled interdependence as “the sharing of resources;” sequential interdependence 
as a requirement for tasks to be completed in order (that is one is finished before the next 
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can begin); and reciprocal interdependence as the passing of work “back and forth 
between tasks” (1993, p. 54).  (See Figure 35, Thompson's Interdependence Model.) 
 
Figure 35. Thompson's Interdependence Model310 
 
For USAF ISR, pooled interdependence was a fact of life.  Limited ISR assets 
demanded that all ISRLOs worked together to make the best of the finite capabilities.  
This often resulted in trading assets when one recognized the need in another.  Such 
exchanges were not uncommon and relied upon the ISRLOs and the collection managers 
they supported to be “honest agents.”  That is, to resist the urge to “hoard” ISR assets in 
the fear that once they were given up they would not be available when needed. 
                                                 
310 After: Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory and Design, 2001, p. 91. 
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a. Sequential Request Processing 
The process of requesting ISR support was very much in the vein of 
sequential interdependence.  The S-3 had to determine what target his units would be 
going after and then provide this information to the S-2.  When the S-2 had completed a 
review of the available intelligence and identified gaps in their coverage, they tasked their 
collection manager with requesting ISR support.  This request was sequentially processed 
by each higher headquarters that would either fill the request with available assets or pass 
the request on to the next higher element in the chain-of-command.  Furthermore, what 
we see in this transition from conventional operations to COIN operations was a move 
from Thompson’s reciprocal model to a sequential model.  As noted in the introduction, 
originally, the Air Force planned its missions in support of the Army in parallel with the 
Army’s planning, providing feedback and receiving further details as they became 
available.   When the Army pushed responsibility for planning down to the BCTs, Air 
Force planning activities largely became dependent on the BCTs completing their 
planning first. (See Figure 36, Sequential ISR Tasking Process.)   
 
Figure 36. Sequential ISR Tasking Process 
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b. Reciprocal Request Processing 
With the addition of the ISRLOs and the geographically oriented 
Distributed Ground Station (DGS) and DGS Analysis and Reporting Teams (DARTs), 
this has begun to transition back to a reciprocal model as the ISRLOs and Brigade S2s are 
able to begin coordination with the CAOC and supporting ISR units even before the BCT 
plans are completed. (See Figure 37, Reciprocal ISR Coordination Process.)  While the 
sequential form of tasking is conducted through “stove pipe” type communications means 
(most notably PRISM and e-mail), reciprocal coordination is conducted through chat.  
Although e-mail allows senders to communicate with multiple recipients, this form of 
communication lends itself only to reply and response.311  Chat allows real time 
interaction between multiple nodes simultaneously so that discussions can be carried out, 
problems and solutions can be derived, and decisions (when authorized) can be agreed 
upon by the community as a whole versus directed downward from a hierarchal structure. 
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Figure 37. Reciprocal ISR Coordination Process 
 
2. Collection Mission Planning 
When dealing with a conventional conflict, the collection management team at the 
CAOC takes the JIPCL and simply begins to task assets against the highest priority 
targets within each list.   As explained in this chapter, however, such prioritization is 
incompatible with the unstable, complex nature of a counterinsurgency campaign.  In 
order to deal with the different problems encountered by BCT commanders in each AO, 
prioritization will be based upon the weight of effort assigned to each BCT and their 
operations.  This will likely lead to different priorities of targets for each BCT and a 
requirement for the CAOC CM to constantly juggle collection requirements among assets 
to ensure that the greatest number of targets can be collected while still integrating those 
assets with the supported BCT’s operations. 
Such a management of ISR assets becomes significantly more difficult than 
simply matching priority targets against collection assets.  Unfortunately, the level of 
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difficulty experienced by collection managers is not a factor in determining the 
appropriateness of COM planning.  Rather, CMs must be able to match asset capabilities 
not only with target requirements but with operational integration requirements.  
Furthermore, using the traditional, target-centric approach to prioritizing collection 
requirements allowed for greater predictability in the number of collection opportunities 
each asset would have in the course of its mission.  By focusing more on integration of 
the asset and support to prioritized units, the CM will need to adjust targets again and 
again to ensure that the greatest numbers of targets are being serviced in order to match 
the weight of effort assigned to each unit. 
The small geographic area encompassed by the BCTs operating in the Baghdad 
area will likely allow for a greater number of collection opportunities for each BCT.   The 
manner in which BCTs are spread out over large areas in Multi-National Division North, 
however, will limit the number of collection opportunities each BCT will be able to 
receive.  Should MND-N be prioritized higher than MND-B because of a particular 
operation, CMs will need to provide an asset for longer periods of time to ensure that it 
collects a number of targets commensurate with the higher priority.  With no fixed 
number of targets possible per collection asset, this will require modifying decks 
repeatedly to meet the needs of the supported units. 
The COM conducts ISR planning by identifying the appropriate assets and 
resources necessary to satisfy a particular collection request.  The asset and its supporting 
analysts and links are then scheduled and coordinated via the ATO and the RSTA annex.  
During execution of the ISR plan, the COM will also monitor the completion of ISR 
taskings, controlling the ISR plan through the addition of ad hoc requests, adjustments to 
the schedule, and the launch of additional resources as necessary. Such changes may 
become necessary based upon shifts in operations, changes in weather, maintenance or 
logistics problems, or communications issues.  While all of these factors must be 
considered in developing the ISR plan, flexibility in dealing with unexpected 
developments is essential to successful ISR employment. 312 
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During ISR mission planning, planners will consider all of the available ISR 
assets available for planning purposes.  Beyond the capabilities or limitations of the asset, 
however, planners must also consider the systems, agencies, and personnel involved in 
the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of the gathered intelligence.313  For 
example, in the debate raging over providing additional FMV capable assets into theater, 
the number of assets alone is not the driving factor.  Rather, it is a combination of the 
limited available airspace over certain parts of Iraq and, more importantly, the limited 
amount of bandwidth/frequencies with which to control the FMV assets and to downlink 
the video feed.314  Pushing more FMV assets into the air will simply saturate the airspace 
and the number of available frequencies, leading to mid-air collisions and “electronic 
fratricide” as unintentional jamming occurs between assets.  Additionally, it is possible 
for collectors to produce more data than can be reasonably analyzed if the exploitation 
piece of the process is not properly managed.  Dealing with this aspect of ISR planning 
falls to the Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED) management cell.315 
Furthermore, planners will need to consider operational factors related to the 
“health” of the ISR fleet to include aircraft maintenance requirements, crew availability 
(to include both the crew of the asset itself and those analysts exploiting the information), 
and crew duty day length.  Combined with weather factors and the time of day that may 
limit when an aircraft can be launched or when its sensors can effectively collect 
information, these can all have significant impacts on which ISR assets are employed and 
whether they can actually achieve their objectives.316 
a. Massing ISR for Effects 
While ISR planners will certainly plan for unit requirements for multiple 
ISR capabilities at one time, they should also predict non-tasked cross-cuing 
opportunities as well.  Force packaging ISR serves to provide ISR coverage across 
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disciplines for operations and entails detailed integration between the ISR assets and their 
mission planning teams. 317 Non-tasked cross-cuing, however, simply ensures that assets 
of complimentary capabilities are available to support one another as dynamic 
opportunities arise.  While they will rely on formally established tactics, techniques, and 
procedures, crews may not necessarily coordinate operations prior to execution. 
b. Scheduling ISR for Reaction 
Scheduling ISR should be done with two specific goals: 1) to provide 
forces when required to requestors and 2) to provide stable, continuous coverage.  It may 
not be possible to fulfill both goals simultaneously; however, when requests come in for 
assets at a particular time, that requirement should be met.  With appropriate management 
of the diverse number of assets available, it should be possible to stagger asset times to 
provide for the greatest amount of coverage throughout the day. 
By off-setting imagery collecting assets such as the U-2, Global Hawk, 
and fighters with tactical reconnaissance pods, it may be possible to provide sufficient 
imagery coverage throughout a 24 hour period to improve the ability to dynamically meet 
short-notice imagery requirements.  The U-2 and Global Hawk in particular have many 
overlapping capabilities.   Fighters with tactical reconnaissance pods provide a similar 
level of flexibility to that of the Global Hawk, though with a smaller collection deck.  
Planners should consider scheduling the Global Hawk primarily at times not covered by 
the U-2 and should schedule fighters with tactical reconnaissance pods at the same time 
as the U-2 to make up for the lack of flexibility provided by the Global Hawk. 
3. ISR Mission Tasking 
According to the Theater ISR CONOPS, the organization conducting COM will 
direct ISR actions and articulate the ways and means by which ISR will achieve the 
desired effects based upon its “inherent understanding of ways and means.”318  It is 
foolish to believe, however, that individuals located at the CAOC will have sufficient 
                                                 
317 Theater ISR CONOPS, 18. 
318 Theater ISR CONOPS, 7. 
 170
understanding of the needs of the customer because of the highly integrated manner by 
which ISR is now used in conjunction with organic ISR capabilities as well as with 
operations.  For this reason, specific ISR tasks should be developed as close to the level 
of the executing decision maker as possible with clarification or additional in-puts 
supplied by ISR planners higher in the chain of command.  At the CAOC level, ISR 
planners will be responsible for matching the most appropriate ISR asset with the 
capabilities required by the ISR tasking provided by the supported unit’s planners. 
G. ISR REQUEST PROCESSES 
1. Maintaining Synergy throughout Planning/Tasking 
The Effects Working Group (EWG) at the BCT plans the operations to be 
conducted at the BCT level and below, integrating kinetic and non-kinetic effects with 
operations and ISR assets.  In many cases, these missions will require detailed 
coordination between airborne crews and their supported ground units as well as between 
geographically separated analytical elements and their counterparts within the BCT.  
Developing an ad hoc structure to which the CFACC can integrate Air Liaison Officer 
(ALO), electronic warfare officer (EWO), and ISRLO planners to represent CFACC 
concerns and to best manage airborne assets ensures the best possible implementation of 
capabilities.  Unfortunately, this plan does not always survive the tasking process in tact, 
leaving the BCT under-resourced because of poor coordination/integration of the 
operations and intelligence elements at higher echelons. 
At the Division level, networking occurs in the more formally aligned Effects 
Synchronization Meeting (ESM), where representatives for the various assets meet to 
determine priority of support for each of the subordinate BCTs.  Though many organic 
capabilities were provided directly to the BCTs, more “high demand, low density” 
capabilities such as Army attack aviation assets (AH-64 Apaches), Close Air Support 
(CAS) sorties, and CFACC UAV assets were only aligned down to the Division level 
which must then determine the priority of each BCT request to ensure it received the 
support necessary to accomplish its missions.  A representative from each BCT 
coordinates the requests for assets, providing explanations as required on subordinate 
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operations, and bridging the gap between BCT planners and division asset managers to 
allow for seamless continuity of planning should assets be denied or substituted.  At this 
level, an ISRLO is still required, but is now focused specifically on the tasking process to 
ensure that BCT needs are accurately reflected in their formal requests in order to make 
the “best case” for their support to higher headquarters.  The DART should also be 
involved at this level in order to manage the personnel necessary to meet the BCT’s 
analytical and production needs, a process that may require realigning shifts of personnel 
or shifting analysis to another organization. 
The Corps level (the Multi-National Corps/Force Iraq) does not currently have 
any such networks developed.319  Instead, when the ESM at the Division identifies its 
priorities for support, it then submits its requests up two different channels, one for 
operations support (to include CAS) and one for ISR support.  Those responsible for 
approving support for each of those two channels do not speak to each other in any 
formal or regular fashion, allowing for missions to be under supported in one area or the 
other.   
For example, in countering the indirect rocket fire that is rained down upon 
coalition bases by insurgents, a BCT may request that the JSTARS provide tracking of 
any vehicles that depart the rocket fire launch point.  Unfortunately, because of the traffic 
and radar shadowing caused by buildings in the urban environment, the JSTARS is often 
unable to track fleeing vehicles for very long, so they need to be able to “hand off” the 
target to another asset quickly.  UAVs fly too slow and too low to be able to move 
quickly around the battlespace to fulfill this role.   Manned fighter aircraft (such as the 
U.S. Air Force A-10 or F-16), however, have a number of advantages over the UAV.  
The pilot, using peripheral vision, can in fact detect a rocket launch based on the smoke 
trail of the rocket, the motion of the rocket itself, or the flame at launch and immediately 
slew the on-board targeting pod to the general launch location.  More importantly, the 
JSTARS can send a digital message directly to the fighter that the pilot can then select 
and automatically cue the targeting pod to the moving vehicle the JSTARS has begun to 
                                                 
319 MNC/F-I Collection Manager, e-mail message to author, April 28,  2009. 
 172
track.320  By flying higher, the fighter has better line of sight to more areas of the 
battlespace than a UAV and higher speeds allow the fighter to move from one location to 
another to more rapidly acquire the fleeing target.321  Unfortunately, the pilot in a fighter 
is often dealing with multiple issues at once, not the least of which is watching out for 
other aircraft in the compressed airspace over certain Iraqi cities, and flying is difficult to 
do while also keeping the targeting pod focused on a speeding vehicle among traffic.  
Therefore, it is often necessary to pass the target off again, this time to the UAV which 
has now had sufficient time to move to the right location and has the loiter time necessary 
to remain over the target for as long as necessary.  Since the pilot on the UAV is not 
responsible for also steering the camera, a function performed by a sensor operator, the 
pilot is not as task saturated as their fighter counterpart.  Unfortunately, most UAVs in 
theater lack the ability to employ weapons and even those that do are less likely to 
receive permission to fire than a manned asset (in order to better manage concerns 
regarding collateral damage).  So when it is time to engage the rocket firing insurgents, 
the UAV must hand the target off again to U.S. Army attack aviation assets. 
From this example, we see a mix of both ISR assets (UAVs and JSTARS) and 
operations assets (CAS fighters and attack aviation), which are requested through 
different channels by the Division on behalf of the BCT.  At the BCT EWG, the plan is 
hashed out by all concerned parties.  At the Division ESM, ISR and operations 
representatives coordinate together to ensure that the BCT with the most pressing issues 
receives the assets necessary.  But the Corps has no means to ensure that those 
requirements are met.  If the Corps C2 (intelligence division) decides to provide JSTARS 
support but has no UAVs to spare, it does not relay this short coming to the C3 
(operations division) before they assign CAS to the mission.  Therefore, without the 
UAVs, the CAS assets may not get used at all because they will have no one to whom to 
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hand their target off.  Without knowing this, C3 assigns CAS to a BCT that will not use 
them while depriving another BCT of the assets that may be required for a mission to be 
executed.  
What is required is a form of Asset Coordination Meeting (ACM) that like the 
ESM at the Division will be a formally organized network of asset representatives and 
liaisons from each of the divisions to explain Division and BCT operations and priorities.   
The ASM would then be able to highlight missions that cannot be supported in total and 
which may require shifting assets to the next highest priority because they have fewer 
integrated requirements.  The ISRLO would be present at this level, primarily to ensure 
that all integration has been properly planned for and that assets are not wasted on 
missions that have not been fully integrated.  The DART will not have a role at this level 
but representatives for each of the assets (the U-2, Global Hawk, Predator, etc.) will need 
to be available to ensure that they can provide the interoperability required by the plan.   
This problem is replicated at the CAOC where a Master Air Attack Plan is 
developed separately by the A2 (intel) and A3 (operations) staffs.  Though both are 
present at the final briefing each day to the CFACC explaining where various assets are 
assigned, they do not coordinate habitually prior to that briefing.  Unless specific 
reference is made in a CAS request to an ISR tasking or an ISR tasking references a 
specific CAS request, ISR and CAS planners do not ensure that assets which were 
planned for and coordinated at lower echelons are in fact available.322  Therefore, a 
request for CAS aircraft could be submitted including notes that the aircraft will be cued 
by FMV to targets but without identifying the ISR request being submitted for the FMV 
assets, CAS planners do not seek out ISR planners to confirm that FMV assets are 
actually being tasked.  By simply ensuring that a single MAAP is developed jointly by 
the A2 and A3 staffs, this concern can be largely eliminated.  Since the Master Air Attack 
Plan (MAAP) is developed at the CAOC, there is no need for an ISRLO, however, asset 
liaison officers will need to be present to ensure all planning considerations have been 
achieved.  Additionally, the Army will likely rely on its Battlefield Coordination 
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Detachment, their representative element to the CAOC, to be a part of the MAAP to 
ensure land component concerns are understood.  (See Figure 38, Proposed Pre-planned 
Effects Request Channel.) 
 
Figure 38. Proposed Pre-planned Effects Request Channel 
 
a. Single Tasking Process 
Unfortunately, there are two distinct tasking processes currently in place.  
The ISR tasking process which is largely conducted through PRISM and the CAS tasking 
process that is conducted through the Air Support Request process.   As systems develop 
both ISR and kinetic strike capabilities (as in the case of the MQ-1, MQ-9, and newly 
armed Warrior Alphas), the confusion between tasking the ISR portion of the asset and 
tasking the kinetic portion of the asset is becoming urgent.  An inability to reconcile these 
differences can lead to over tasking the asset, because neither tasking process has 
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visibility on the other, or misusing the asset when its capabilities could be more 
effectively accomplished by a different asset.323  At present, CAS fighters are often 
tasked with reconnaissance missions despite the fact that ISR assets are more capable in 
that role.  Similarly, the Predator’s Hellfire missiles are requested in situations that are 
actually better suited for larger weapons systems or fighters with a greater array of 
weaponry options.  In both cases, the tasking of the wrong asset for a role deprives that 
asset from other users who may need its more appropriate capabilities. 
Furthermore, because of the lack of visibility between the two processes, 
there is often a certain amount of “fratricide” in capabilities.  For example, units have 
requested through the ASR process an electronic jamming capability to deny an insurgent 
leader from rallying forces to his defense during a raid by ground forces.  Unfortunately, 
intelligence personnel requested signals intelligence (SIGINT) support in order to find 
that insurgent leader based upon the frequency to be jammed.  SIGINT was unable to 
locate the leader (because his communications were being jammed) which meant that 
ground forces were unable to conduct their raid, for which the jamming was necessary in 
the first place.  Both the SIGINT asset and the jamming asset were then tasked futilely on 
a mission when they could have been used separately on different missions effectively, or 
could have been planned for and integrated more appropriately on a single mission.  (See 
Figure 39, Stove-piped Request Process.) 
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Figure 39. Stove-piped Request Process 
 
The use of the Effects Working Group to pull the involved planners 
together has greatly reduced such problems.  Still, the inability to task assets together has 
limited the confidence that both assets, each contributing significantly to the mission, will 
be made available to the mission.  No SIGINT mission, and the presence of the jammer is 
wasted.  No jammer, and the ground force may be unduly threatened despite their ability 
to find their target (and may thus cancel the mission before execution). 
b. Requirement for 2/3 Integration 
The lack of integration between the intelligence side of the house and the 
operations side of the house create inefficiencies in the employment of all assets (ISR, 
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kinetic, and non-kinetic), hinders the flow of information, and provides opportunities for 
the enemy to exploit the seams in intelligence-operations activities.324  One integrated 
process should incorporate both kinetic and non-kinetic (to include electronic warfare and 
ISR) taskings325 to provide better visibility throughout the process on integration of 
assets and potential for duplication of effort. 
The DD Form 1972.1 Joint Integrated Air Support Request (JIASR), 
briefly discussed in Chapter III, may provide the integration required for COIN operation 
planning.  Though based on the Air Support Request used to task Close Air Support 
missions, the DD Form 1972.1 also serves as a formal means for integrating assets with 
supported units.  Not only does the form provide sections for requesting specific 
“effects,” it also details how assets will communicate with the supported unit, who the 
point of contact within the unit will be, and provides the overall concept of operations for 
all assets.  Rather than submitting separate forms for each asset or type of asset (CAS vs. 
electronic warfare vs. ISR), all requests for support of one operation are submitted via a 
single form.  This form, in turn, provides guidance to supporting units on who to contact 
within the supported unit for further guidance and a vision for how their effects will be 
integrated with other supporting and supported elements.  (See Appendix D.) 
The EWG would produce the DD Form 1972.1 via the ALO, EWO, and 
CM/ISRLO who would submit the request to the ESM at the Division.  The Division 
would collate all JIASRs from the various BCTs and would develop a schedule of effects 
requirements, highlighting where the same asset would be able to flow from one BCT to 
the next or where overlaps would necessitate additional asset support.  This schedule of 
effects would be forwarded to the ACM at the Corps level to request additional asset 
support at the appropriate times.  The JIASR would be forwarded as well to support 
integration requirements and to answer questions about specific effects required.  The 
ACM would prioritize all effects requests and fulfill as many as possible with organic 
assets before forwarding the JIASR and the schedule of unfulfilled requests to the CAOC  
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for asset scheduling and planning.  By including the JIASR with all scheduling and 
tasking products, integration of assets and the integrity of the plans developed at the BCT 
level will be maintained.   
It is important to note that actual tasking of assets would be conducted via 
the appropriate authorities.  While there has been some push to begin tasking the MQ-1 
and MQ-9 systems via the same process as CAS assets, this overlooks the inherent 
differences between these types of assets.  Tasking a CAS asset is limited to ensuring that 
the right aircraft armed with the correct ordnance is available at the time and place of the 
requesting unit’s choosing.  ISR assets, however, must deal with additional 
considerations.  ISR asset tasking must account not only for the asset carrying the sensors 
and for ensuring that the right sensor is loaded on the aircraft, but must also ensure that 
the right operators (linguists, special imagery analyst, etc.) are made available for those 
sensors (as in many cases, the sensor operators are not part of the flying crew), that the 
communications networks (which must be shared by multiple platforms and theaters) are 
tasked to support the operation, and that the reach-back exploitation nodes are not over 
tasked and are properly manned for the required exploitation.  The standard Air Support 
Request (ASR) process is only designed to manage the platform itself, whereas ISR 
tasking is much more concerned with the supporting infrastructure that is even more 
limited than the number of flying assets.326  (See Figure 40, "Agnostic" Tasking Process 
Combining ISR and CAS Planning and Tasking.) 
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Figure 40. "Agnostic" Tasking Process Combining ISR and CAS Planning and 
Tasking 
 
2. Pre-planned ISR (Scheduled ISR Assets) 
Generally, there are two types of ISR tasking requests:  pre-planned and 
immediate.  Immediate ISR tasking requests, usually referred to as dynamic re-taskings, 
will be addressed in Chapter V.  Pre-planned ISR requests are filled with scheduled 
missions.327  Due to the limited number of ISR assets and the volume of ISR requests, 
there is little to no potential for “on-call” ISR assets in which assets are placed in orbit 
near potential target areas or are prepared to launch from nearby bases on short notice.  
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“Direct support” missions, however, provide increasing flexibility in meeting ISR 
requirements that cannot be identified in sufficient detail prior to mission execution. 
a. Submission Process 
Pre-planned requests are submitted as soon as a collection requirement is 
identified during the planning process discussed in Chapter III.328  Due to the validation 
necessary for collection requests, there are strict timelines associated with such requests 
that demand timely submission.  Submission of requests should not be delayed to conduct 
detailed planning in order to meet cut-off times.329  As a minimum, the requesting unit 
should identify the type of target to be collected against, the time ISR is required (either 
the coverage time or the last time information is of value), and any other unique mission 
requirements (ability to communicate directly with ground units, the ability to engage 
targets kinetically, etc.)330 
Direct support missions represent those circumstances in which ISR 
support has been anticipated but specific targets, areas of operation, or times cannot be 
provided prior to submission deadlines or, in some cases, prior to mission execution.  
Instead, a block of time for ISR support may be requested331 in which an asset is made 
available for direct coordination with the supported unit.  The ability of most ISR assets 
to provide such support is limited though current operations have proven the successful 
use of the RQ-4 Global Hawk and fighter aircraft equipped with reconnaissance pods 
(imagery pods not to be confused with FMV targeting pods) in the direct support mission.  
Direct Support missions do not represent the ideal mission profile, despite their 
flexibility, due to the inefficiencies in meeting many ISR requests and should be used as 
the exception rather than the rule. 
(1)  PRISM as a difficulty in coordination.  Technology is the 
process used by an organization to turn inputs into outputs.    This can include the 
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techniques as well as the machinery, although Mintzberg makes the point of 
differentiating “technical systems” as the “the instruments used in the operating core to 
transform the inputs into output.”332  This differentiation is important in helping to 
alleviate the common association of technology simply with the machinery, rather than 
the ideas or knowledge that employ those systems.  To understand the difficulties that the 
Air Force has in adapting itself to the COIN environment, however, it is necessary to 
speak directly to the systems employed by the ISR community. 
The Planning tool for Integration, Synchronization, and 
Management (PRISM) is the “system of record” used by collection managers to submit 
“production requirements” (that is, requests for ISR collection) to higher headquarters.  
Despite its name, PRISM was designed specifically to be a tracking mechanism of such 
requirements, ensuring that each requirement had associated “essential elements of 
information” that were to be collected, that they were properly prioritized from an 
approved priority list provided by the joint force commander, and that as collections 
occurred their success, failure, or inability to collect was sufficiently tracked.333  PRISM 
has gone beyond simply being the higher headquarters tool for tracking requirements to 
being the means by which subordinate organizations submit their requirements.  The 
importance of this can not be understated. 
PRISM provides a number of very useful capabilities for the 
automation of the collection management process.  The system tracks the timing of each 
target to include when it was last collected and when the next collection will be required 
for targets that are collected again over a period of time.  The system is designed to 
collect the details of the collection, though this function is largely impacted by the 
incompatibility of other ISR systems.  Lastly, PRISM provides automated prioritization 
of submitted collections requests by incorporating theater collection priorities, producing 
the JIPCL automatically.334  Combining these capabilities, PRISM provides the 
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collection managers at the CAOC with a prioritized list of targets to be collected each 
day, automatically.  For the customer, PRISM provides transparency in the ISR process, 
by allowing the originator of a collection request to track their nomination through the 
validation, approval, collection, exploitation, and dissemination phases.335 
With regards to tracking ISR taskings and automating the 
prioritization of the targets, PRISM is very effective.  It begins to suffer with regards to 
the actual process of making a collection request.  PRISM is a very structured format for 
making ISR requests based on entering data into a number of carefully crafted data tabs.  
The first tab, for collection requirement, defines the collection effect desired from a 
particular target.  The second tab, which covers the exploitation requirement, provides 
detailed directions to the exploiting agency on what information is needed from each 
target in the form of essential elements of information and specific reporting 
requirements to include dissemination format and means of communication.336  
Unfortunately, despite all of the details that go into PRISM, none of the 
collection/exploitation units tasked by the CAOC use PRISM, requiring collection 
managers at the CAOC to export the PRISM data into an excel document.  The document 
is then formatted to meet the needs of the collection and exploitation units and then 
emailed out.337 
Not only does this detract from the automated utility of PRISM, 
the conversion of data from one format to another is detrimental to the needs of the 
collectors.  Notably, there are sixty-plus fields of data that must be entered by a requestor 
in order to create a new collection request nomination.  Of those 60 fields, the collection 
manager who is responsible for building the collection deck at the CAOC only has access 
to 24 fields.  Missing from the CM’s visibility are directions on look angle, EEIs, 
exploitation priority, and any synchronization requirements.   When the data is then 
exported to excel, the new format is reduced to less than ten data fields, excluding such 
information as time of earliest imaging, latest imaging, instructions for collection, and 
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any operations that the collection is supporting.338  All of this information is available 
again by going into PRISM and viewing each target individually but for the purposes of 
planning missions, PRISM fails to provide sufficient coordination of effort. 
The very structured nature of PRISM demands a very structured 
request format.  For example, most collection managers and their intelligence analysts are 
trained to simply request an “ISR effect.”  They are admonished not to request a specific 
system or sensor but rather to provide their requirement in as specific a description as 
possible so that higher headquarters collection managers working with platform liaison 
officers can match the best system/sensor to the requirement.  (For example, instead of 
asking for a Predator, collection managers should request “real time tracking and 
monitoring of individuals” which allows not only the tasking of a Predator but also of the 
Army’s equivalent Warrior Alpha, I-Gnat, and Shadow UAVs along with the manned 
Navy P-3 or the C-130 Scathe View).  PRISM does not work that way.  Instead of being 
able to enter a requirement for “imagery along route Jackson” a collection manager must 
provide a specific geographic location (in latitude and longitude or military grid reference 
system) and a radius around that point for which they require imagery.  For a point target, 
this is not a significant problem, for a route reconnaissance mission (such as to look for 
improvised explosives or to prepare a convoy mission), this requires that the collection 
manager request imagery of multiple points along the route.  To know how far apart to 
request points (to prevent excessive overlapping or gaps in coverage), the collection 
manager must know the field of view of a particular sensor.  Therefore, rather than 
request an “ISR effect” in the form of “imagery along route Jackson,” the collection 
manager must request imagery from a specific sensor (such as the U-2) at points of a 
given distance from one another based on the anticipated sensor to take those images. 
Further complicating matters is the manner in which collection 
requests are processed by intelligence discipline.  PRISM organizes collection requests as 
“imagery,” “signals intelligence,” “full motion video,” etc.  This in turn drives an 
organizational structure that is established in the same format so that higher headquarters 
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collection managers are divided into “IMINT,” “SIGINT,” and “FMV” collection 
managers (respectively).  On first look, this organization makes sense.  If the subordinate 
analyst was truly able to request “imagery along route Jackson,” then the IMINT 
collection manager would be able to focus just on imagery platforms capable of 
providing that imagery.  ISR, however, is best used when “layered” with a specific intent 
to provide “cross-cue.”  That is, a signals intelligence asset detects communications 
suggesting that an attack is going to occur in a particular geographic area.  JSTARS is 
then able to narrow down that area by detecting ground moving target indicators (GMTI) 
towards friendly forces.  This information is then passed to a Predator UAV which is then 
able to provide full-motion video coverage of the identified “movers” to confirm their 
identities as hostile forces moving to engage friendly forces. 
If a request for layered SIGINT, GMTI, and FMV support is 
submitted, it is done so in a piecemeal fashion because PRISM divides up the manner in 
which requests are submitted based on intelligence disciplines and the higher 
headquarters collection managers are similarly divided.  Therefore, the SIGINT 
collection manager reviews the request and agrees to provide the requested support.  The 
GMTI collection manager reviews the request but compared to other priorities on their 
list, denies the request.  The FMV collection manager reviews the request and approves 
it.  This leaves the requesting unit with a capability to initially detect the threat and an 
ability to confirm its identity once found but no ability to actually find the activity in the 
necessary time frame.  If the subordinate collection manager or S2 recognizes this gap in 
capability, they may willingly give up the SIGINT and FMV coverage with the 
understanding they won’t be able to use it effectively and someone else might be better 
supported.  More likely, however, they do not recognize the gap in coverage, choose to 
“take whatever they can get,” and end up misusing ISR assets because they are not 
sufficiently coordinated. 
(2)  JIASR as a means of coordinating effects.  ISR enables 
operations and this is particularly true within a counterinsurgency campaign.  As such, 
ISR efforts and assets must be closely coordinated and their operations integrated with 
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the operations of the supported unit to ensure collection requirements are fulfilled.339  
Ideally, a new tasking system needs to be developed to be employed by all elements of 
the ISR process.340  At a minimum, however, a process must be established in which 
operations personnel, collections agencies, and exploitation units are able to share an 
understanding of the effects desired and the taskings assigned.  This should include 
providing the collection planners and the analysts the contact information for the 
supported unit to allow for clarification of the tasking and coordination with organic ISR 
capabilities or operations.341  All participants in an operation, to include the ISR 
supporting players, must have access to the same planning documents, desired effects, 
and context for explaining their role in the successful operation.  While it may be possible 
to provide a link to such documents within the details window of PRISM which should 
also address the nature of the operation, the pertinent timelines, and the desired effects for 
ISR,342 it is likely to require a departure from the current format which is exclusive to 
ISR.  The previously discussed DD Form 1972.1 Joint Integrated Air Support Request 
(JIASR) is likely one of the best examples of the direction this process should be heading. 
b. Ad hoc Processes 
A flexible ISR tasking process is required because deliberate operations 
could be executed based upon information less than 12 hours old.343  Unfortunately, the 
ad hoc process currently employed for short notice tasking of ISR assets tends to be over-
centralized which creates unnecessary delays in collection.344  As designed, requestors 
must submit their requests through the same channels required for a pre-approved 
request.  The process is currently done sequentially via e-mail rather than by broadcasting 
the request through a medium such as chat, which would allow multiple echelons to 
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review the request at the same time.  Furthermore, ad hoc request are all considered 
additions to the collection deck with no consideration for the ability to swap out targets. 
 In this fashion, a BCT collection manager may recognize that one 
of their scheduled collections is now obsolete (possibly having been overcome by events) 
and is no longer of value to the unit.  In submitting a request for a new target, that does 
have value, there is not currently a method by which the new target can be swapped for 
the old target.  By allowing supporting ISR units to communicate directly with supported 
units to coordinate swapping of old targets for new ones, the ad hoc process can be made 
considerably more responsive.345  All requests for such additions must be sent to the ISR 
unit because collection managers throughout the chain-of-command lack the ability to 
evaluate an asset’s potential to add a new target to its collection deck.  Again, 
coordination directly between the supported unit and the ISR unit would allow such 
requests to happen much faster and do not require that the CRM or COM approve every 
ad hoc request.346 
 Should the requestor want a target added that will impact the 
collection deck (the ISR unit determines that it cannot be added without dropping another 
target and the supported unit does not want to swap targets), higher headquarters will 
need to be involved to determine the appropriate prioritization of the collection.  Simply 
bumping targets from other units will require the approval of the highest affected CM.  If 
both BCTs belong to the same division, the Division CM should be authorized to decide 
which BCT is higher priority and whether the new target can be added and the old one 
dropped.  If the BCTs are from different Divisions, the decision will have to be made at 
the Corps level.  In circumstances in which the asset will be required to significantly 
change its flight path or must extend its flying day, the CAOC must be involved in the 
decision to ensure that future missions will not be unjustly impacted.347 
                                                 





1. Operation BK FAMINE Revisited 
a. Inability to Plan for Optimal Assets 
By the end of June 2007, the Corps’s misnamed process of “apportioning 
and allocating” FMV assets had begun to grow in acceptance.  BCT CMs were still 
reluctant to trust that CFACC assets would be present and still tended to assign organic 
FMV assets, despite lesser capabilities, to their highest priority targets.  The Division 
ISRLOs, having been part of the decision to align assets in this way, were more in tuned 
to Corps considerations and pushed CMs to assign higher priority missions to CFACC 
assets.  In planning for Operation BK FAMINE, the ability to predict which FMV assets 
would be available for mission execution was a considerable benefit that allowed for 
better integration of capabilities and coordination with the supporting crews. 
Unfortunately, the DART concept had not yet been fully developed and 
the ability to coordinate with geographically separated analysts was complicated to the 
point of being impractical.  This drove the need to use very detailed EEIs and explicit 
instructions to collectors and analysts to ensure that all required information was 
collected, analyzed according to very precise needs, and distributed in a timely fashion to 
specific customers.  The more detailed that such directions became, the more chances 
developed that miscommunications would occur, required actions would be missed, and 
intelligence would go unactioned. 
Preventing CMs and ISRLOs from specifying specific asset requirements, 
rather than requesting effects, crippled the successful execution of the mission.  Corps 
collection management team members regularly refused requests for specific assets 
despite expressed requirements that could only be fulfilled by that asset due to timing, 
communications, or flight parameter issues.  Instead, subordinate CMs had to request the 
effects required, with such explicit direction that the asset was all but assumed.  Still, 
different assets would be assigned that tasking and because of their inability to fly at the 
times necessary or to communicate in the fashion required, the mission failed on more 
days than it succeeded. 
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b. Lack of Coordination at Higher Levels 
With the exception of the FMV assets, subordinate BCTs could not 
accurately predict when their requests would be fulfilled based upon priorities.  Despite 
labeling collection (and CAS) requests with the key words of high prioritized targets 
(specifically IEDs), other requests achieved higher priorities.  More importantly, because 
targets were prioritized individually versus as a package or a mission, even when some 
assets were made available, others were not. 
Several nights over the total BK FAMINE, operations were wasted when 
CAS requirements were fulfilled but ISR assets were not (or only partially fulfilled).  On 
other nights, ISR assets were available but no CAS assets were prioritized for the mission 
and therefore overall execution suffered considerably.  On such occasions, assets were re-
rolled by the BCT or sometimes the Division to other operations.   As these were not the 
taskings to which they had originally been designated, the assets were often pulled from 
the supported unit and sent to other “higher priority” targets and a “stern warning” was 
issued to the offending CMs and ISRLOs for abusing the system. 
2. Operation MARNE HUSKY (August – September 2007)348 
On August 15, 2007, Multi-National Division-Central, created by the Surge of 
forces in the spring of 2007, initiated Operation MARNE HUSKY to capitalize on the 
successes of Operation MARNE TORCH I and Operation MARNE AVALANCE.   
Having displaced Sunni insurgents from safe havens located in Arab Jabour and Salman 
Pak, Multi-National Division Central (MND-C), commanded by the 3rd Infantry Division, 
sought to conduct a series of air assaults throughout the Tigris River valley in order to 
keep insurgents operationally off-balanced.  (See Figure 41, Red Oval Indicates 
Approximate Area of Operation MARNE HUSKY.)  The terrain of the region was 
naturally imposing, divided by several canals and irrigation networks that limited ground 
mobility.  These types of natural obstacles enhanced the insurgents’ ability to conduct 
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ambushes against ground mobile forces through effective early warning.  By coordinating 
ISR with air assault tactics, MND-C intended to counter-act these regional advantages 
and surprise insurgent forces before they could react.349   This operation was unique in 
that it was actually led by an aviation unit as opposed to an infantry unit which would 
normally coordinate the air, ground, and artillery efforts.350 
 
Figure 41. Red Oval Indicates Approximate Area of Operation MARNE 
HUSKY351 
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a. Developing Trust 
In June of 2007, MND-C received its first ISRLO, forward deployed from 
the CAOC’s ISRD collection management team.  The new ISRLO worked to educate 
MND-C’s newly arrived collection managers on the processes necessary to receive ISR 
support from the Corps and CFACC and to train ALOs and JTACs on how to interact 
with and best employ ISR assets in support of C-IED and other operations.  As their 
experiences with the ISRLO improved, the MND-C CM team began to integrate him 
more into their ISR planning.  By the beginning of August 2007, the ISRLO for MND-C 
was a fully functioning member of the ISR collection management team. 
In anticipation of Operation MARNE HUSKY, the ISRLO, the MND-C 
collection management team, and an unusually ISR-savvy JTAC began to develop a 
highly integrated ISR plan to support the proposed air assault tactics.  The mission would 
require real time updates of insurgent activities to overcome the advantages the 
insurgents would have from their environment.  The intent was to locate insurgent safe 
houses, use aviation assets to envelop the area, and then to monitor the situation with ISR 
to identify other targets for follow-on air assaults or to warn of potential ambushes or 
counter-attacks. 
By August 2007, trust in the alignment of FMV assets with specific 
Divisions had taken hold and BCT CMs were prepared to plan high priority missions 
using CFACC assets.  Furthermore, the CAOC’s development of the Global Hawk Direct 
Support mission had been approved for use and the MND-C ISRLO would be the first to 
test the concept in a major operation.  To do so, however, would require forward 
deploying to the Tactical Operations Center of the lead element, in this case, the 3rd 
Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB).  Working with the intelligence sections of both the 3rd 
CAB and the 3rd Battalion of the 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment (3–509 PIR) that 
would be conducting the ground based portion of the operation, the ISRLO and the 
MND-C CM/ISR Ops teams developed a plan for the control of the ISR assets and the 
dissemination of critical information to the operations personnel. 
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b. Working the System 
Although collection requirements were still prioritized based on target sets 
in August 2007, the Corps recognized that Operation MARNE HUSKY was of 
significant impact as to rate its own prioritization.  Corps CM planners worked directly 
with their MND-C counterparts to understand the scheme of ISR operations and the 
requirements for higher headquarters support.  The MND-C ISRLO maintained regular 
contact via phone, e-mail, and chat with both the Multi-National Corps Iraq (MNC-I) 
collections management shop and the CAOC ISRD (with whom he had very good 
relations based on his recent assignment there).  In this fashion, all requests for support 
could be “walked” from the BCT and Division ISR planners to the Corps and on to the 
CAOC to ensure continuity. 
This helped to ensure that required CAS and ISR requirements were not 
separated and that all echelons understood the delicate nature of integrating such efforts 
with the highly mobile air assaults to be supported.  Despite the significant amount of 
time invested by the MND-C ISRLO to maintain mission integrity, there were regular 
disconnects between the intelligence and operations sides of the house at the Corps and 
CAOC levels.  Prioritizing the mission over other target specific requests, helped to 
garner the best level of support but problems in coordination continued to be an obstacle. 
By the end of Operation MARNE HUSKY in mid-September 2007, the 
collection management process had developed several improved techniques for managing 
direct support missions and for integrating intelligence and operations elements.  The 
majority of this work benefitted from the personal attention of a few select individuals.  
So long as such techniques were “personality-based” and not part of formal doctrine, 
future operations would be imperiled by a system that mis-prioritized targets over units 
and failed to integrate planning and tasking at all echelons. 
3. Integration of Planning and Tasking 
Only through a carefully structured CM process can plans developed to be 
executed at the BCT level and below receive the full support of integrated kinetic and 
non-kinetic capabilities.  By dividing the process from the beginning into operations (3) 
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and ISR (2) functions, integration suffers considerably.  When ISR tasking requests are 
further divided into intelligence disciplines, the chance for seamless employment of all 
assets into successful mission accomplishment diminishes.  Operations and Intelligence 
must be integrated not only in execution but throughout the planning, requesting, and 
tasking process. 
Eliminating stove piped request processes through the use of working groups 
(such as the EWG, ESM and the ACM) that combine ISR, Operations, and supporting 
functions is paramount to the successful management of limited assets.  Developing tools, 
such as the DD Form 1972.1, which promotes a common understanding of the mission 
and problems, encourages the appropriate allocation of assets both during planning and 
execution.  Chapter V focuses on the execution of the detailed ISR plan and the 
employment of allocated ISR assets, with an emphasis on the need to react to dynamic 
situations and emerging targets. 
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V. EXECUTING ISR MISSIONS—LEARNING DURING 
EXECUTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Helmuth von Molke the Elder’s admonition,352 (paraphrased as) “no plan survives 
first contact,” is taken for granted within the military.  Therefore, for this paper to make 
the case to improve the manner in which intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR) is planned and tasked, as discussed in Chapters III and IV, must naturally lead to a 
discussion about the execution of ISR as well.  ISR planners must take into consideration 
the need for plans to flex to a developing situation, but more importantly ISR in support 
of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, particularly as it provides real time inputs to 
operations in progress, must be responsive.  No plan, regardless of how carefully 
integrated it is among all stakeholders or how well it is resourced by the tasking process, 
should be considered a “final product.”   Rather, the need to modify the plan in execution 
must be accounted for both in planning and the delegation of authority. 
Unfortunately, building flexibility into a plan or acknowledging that Global Hawk 
Direct Support missions are required to support on-going operations is insufficient for 
meeting the needs of ISR employment.  Rather, a process for controlling ISR execution 
from the lowest level of decision making and effectively integrating all-source 
intelligence inputs demands personnel who are trained and experienced in the fusion of 
ISR capabilities.  Such individuals will be required both at the tactical level for what is 
being referred to as “terminal coordination” as well as at higher echelons to enable the 
smoothest modification of target decks and sensor allocation. 
The airstrike that targeted and successfully engaged Al Qaeda in Iraq’s leader 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi highlights the importance of fusing airborne ISR capabilities with 
a directed all-source intelligence network that included organic human intelligence 
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(HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) components.353  This operation was 
successful largely because it unified airborne and organic ISR collection efforts with 
operations under a single commander.354  Though the special operations community 
benefits from the ability to directly control the majority of its assets, making even 
airborne ISR an “organic” element of the task force, the fusion of intelligence and the 
process by which dynamic ISR is re-tasked provide lessons of significant value to 
conventional units as well.  
Lastly, the need for flexibility in ISR execution recognizes the “wickedness” of 
COIN-associated ISR problems, described in Chapter II.  Due to the fact that such 
problems may not be fully understood even into the implementation of the plan, the 
problems may appear to be changing or growing.355  Therefore, this chapter identifies the 
need for responsive ISR to further develop the commander’s understanding of the 
problem and to implement the appropriate solutions or actions. 
B. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
At the tactical level, where the majority of the COIN fight is focused, airborne 
ISR requires a decentralized command and control system that gives supported units 
immediate access to information collected by airborne assets.356  To provide the 
necessary level of situational awareness and flexibility required for rapidly evolving 
operations, the Combined Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) must delegate 
some aspects of planning and decision making to subordinate Airmen within the lower 
echelons of the theater air control system (TACS).   Subordinate Airmen with an 
increased role and authority will be best positioned to provide innovative and effective 
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CFACC support to the ground commander.357  Timely decisions and situational 
responsiveness are keys to exploiting fleeting opportunities and countering the 
resourcefulness of an adaptive adversary.358 
1. ISR Collection Operations Management Forward 
For assets such as the Global Hawk, U-2, or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 
assets, the ability to work directly with the supported units via chat or secure telephone 
permits customers to continuously update their collection decks as targets become 
“overcome by events” or higher priority targets present themselves.  By coordinating 
directly with the collection assets, customers can receive coverage of their most current 
and important targets.359  Throughout the mission planning process, the ISR unit can 
work directly with the supported unit to coordinate ISR integration with operational 
actions.  Prior to the departure of the aircraft, the ISR unit could once more contact the 
supported ground unit to receive updates on the planned operations. Such updates would 
need to ensure that no new operations had been added, that operations had not been 
cancelled, for example due to the absence of a trigger event, or that operations had not 
been significantly modified requiring different product support or in-flight 
coordination.360  Finally, prior to entering the Brigade Combat Team (BCT)’s area of 
operation, assuming that the asset is also flying in support of other units, the ISR mission 
crew could check in with the BCT for a final tasking update, understanding that the 
dynamic nature of operations demands continual revision of plans and actions.361 
Unfortunately, not all ISR assets have this same capability with regards to 
connectivity and horizontal linkages.  Airborne ISR crews, such as those on the Joint 
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Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), RC-135V/W Rivet Joint (RJ), 
P-3, and C-130 Scathe View, may be limited to secure radio communications.  Since 
most BCT collection management teams lack radio communications themselves, this 
limits the ability to change targets to when coordinating during mission planning and 
during last minute updates prior to aircraft departure.  Ad hoc target requests or dynamic 
re-taskings must be accomplished via the established chain of command, most notably 
through the Corps to the Combined Air and Space Operations Center (CAOC) where the 
ISR liaison personnel located in the Intelligence, Surveillance And Reconnaissance Cell 
(ISARC) coordinate with the Senior intelligence Duty Officer (SIDO) to update tasking 
requirements once the mission has been initiated.  Unfortunately, as has been noted 
previously, the CAOC is responsible for three theaters of operations simultaneously, is 
not adequately positioned to judge the ground commander’s priorities,362 and lacks the 
granularity required to understand the developing operational and ISR situation in any 
one particular theater. 
For this reason, it is necessary to forward deploy the ISARC and its personnel to 
each theater, to the Joint Task Force level or its equivalent, which in Iraq would be the 
Multi-National Corps/Force Iraq (MNC/F-I).  In so doing, the ISARC would gain 
invaluable insight into the operational concept of the theater commander, the progress of 
operations across the battlespace, and the delicate coordination of ISR and operations 
assets.   Similar to the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) in the Close Air Support 
(CAS) realm, a forward deployed ISARC will likely have more insight and situational 
awareness with regards to ground operations conducted at the corps level and below.363 
The ASOC is the primary control node for the execution of immediate CAS 
requests.  The ASOC coordinates with senior Army decision makers, particularly within 
the Corps Fire Support Element (FSE) to task on-call missions or to divert previously 
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tasked CAS missions.  In the event that additional CAS sorties are required beyond what 
has already been allocated by the CFACC, the ASOC interacts with the CAOC to 
scramble additional CAS sorties or to dynamically re-role other sorties into a CAS 
mission.  The ASOC achieves effectiveness by being collocated with the Army’s senior 
FSE (typically the Corps but may be delegated lower for independent Division or Field 
Army operations).364  Furthermore, the ASOC serves as the initial coordination for on-
coming CAS aircraft, providing updates regarding operations progress, threat warnings, 
or likely target areas.  By providing this early situational awareness briefing, the ASOC 
prepares CAS assets for a more seamless integration with the ALO and JTAC plan in 
support of Army operations.365  The Direct Air Support Center provides this same 
function for the U.S. Marine Corps.366 
With a forward ISARC, co-located with the Collection Requirements Manager 
(CRM), the BCTs would achieve faster responses in their requests to modify target decks 
for those assets with which they are unable to coordinate directly.  This is achieved by 
eliminating the additional layer of bureaucracy and the associated communications 
required by coordinating with the CAOC for theater ISR support.367   When the ISR asset 
checks in with the ISARC at the beginning of their mission, the ISARC can then provide 
updated information regarding targets, operations, and the enemy situation, better 
preparing the ISR crew for their mission.  Once the ISR crew enters the BCT area of 
operations, coordination will likely be conducted through the JTAC who retains a secure 
radio communications capability. 
The ISARC, as a forward representative of the CAOC, would be responsible for 
keeping the CAOC informed of any changes that may impact crew or aircraft availability 
for future operations.  This allows the CFACC to intervene in order to conduct effective 
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“airmanship” and manage the health of the airborne constellation.368  Similar to the 
ASOC, the ISARC should be delegated the authority to re-task ISR assets or to task on-
call ISR assets as necessary to meet supported commander requirements.369 
A key element in the successful employment of the ISARC will be its integration 
with operations.  For this reason, the ISARC should not be moved forward to the Corps 
intelligence sections, limiting its interactions to only intelligence staff and assets.  Rather, 
the ISARC should be co-located with the ASOC and the FSE within the Corps operations 
center.  Currently, the Corps collection management team in Iraq has the best visibility on 
the ISR battlespace, with an understanding of ISR priorities and available assets.370   The 
Corps CM, however, is geographically separated from the Joint Operations Center (JOC) 
that monitors ground operations, air support, electronic warfare, and fire support 
integration.  It is with the JOC that the ASOC is located and should be the future site of 
the ISARC as well, to provide the best integration of ISR with operations.  This will 
largely help to alleviate the duplicate tasking of ISR assets and CAS assets in an over 
watch role.  Careful integration must be conducted between the JOC located ISARC and 
the Corps CM with the understanding that for ISR to be effectively integrated with 
operations, ISR must be managed as close to the decision maker as possible. 
Although there has been some discussion of moving ISARC capabilities even 
further down the chain-of-command, to the Division level, this is likely to be too 
decentralized to effectively manage theater ISR requirements.371  ISR operations at the 
Division level certainly need to be integrated but this need is largely resolved by the 
coordination between the Division ISR Liaison Officer (ISRLO), Division Air Liaison 
Officer (ALO) and Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC), and the Army Airspace 
Command and Control (A2C2) elements including the Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) 
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representatives.  ISARC functionality, which is required for coordinating the sharing of 
limited ISR assets across the entire theater, can only realistically be performed at the 
Corps level. 
Furthermore, the CAOC will require continued ISARC capabilities to manage 
those theaters with a less robust land component presence (as in the Horn of Africa) and 
to coordinate ISR support among theaters.  While the JSTARS, RJ, U-2, and Global 
Hawk can all be transferred between theaters to support ISR requirements, the 
management of UAV bandwidth is often overlooked.  While it is unlikely that Predator or 
Reaper aircraft themselves will be transitioned between theaters on a regular basis, the 
datalinks that control them and provide downlink of their information are equally as 
limited and can be delegated from one theater to the next as necessary.  This may be due 
to a surge in ISR requirements or due to poor weather in one area of operations which 
prevents the flight of aircraft.  Rather than allow a reach back control unit at Creech AFB 
to go unused, their datalink is simply fed to assets in another theater.372  The ISARC at 
the CAOC is therefore best situated to coordinate such movements of assets or bandwidth 
as necessary to ensure maximum utility among all theaters. 
2. ISR Effects Coordinator 
Even with the forward deployment of the ISARC, it is not clear that ISR 
employment would be significantly improved.  The ISARC provides the ability to re-task 
assets in response to fleeting targets and to update target decks based on mission 
developments, but the integration of ISR assets into operations remains a more tactical 
issue.  Based on current employment, the ISARC does not appear to be able to 
sufficiently correlate intelligence information among the various ISR platforms.  Rather, 
this task has been undertaken by either ISR crews in the execution of their mission or the 
supported ground units, which may or may not be continuously monitoring the necessary 
chat rooms in which intelligence information is reported.  Therefore, a requirement exists 
for a single, designated coordinating authority to correlate intelligence data from CFACC 
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and organic assets and to compare it to the developing ground situation for effective  
ISR-operations integration.373  The ISR Effects Coordinator (ISREC) would be tasked 
with executing ISR operations with assets allocated via the formal ISR tasking process to 
support a specific tactical operation. 374   
Many within the ISR community have argued that this position should be held by 
a member of the ISR crew, either the ISR mission commander at a Distributed Ground 
Station (DGS), the air intelligence officer (AIO) on the JSTARS, or the information 
integration officer (IIO) on the RJ as their current duties already demand a working 
knowledge of various ISR sensors and experience in correlating intelligence information 
from multiple sources. 375   This concept fails to acknowledge that the purpose of the 
ISREC is not simply to coordinate ISR effects but to coordinate ISR operations with the 
ground commander’s operations.  This requires not only an understanding of the 
supported commander’s intent and planned operations, but also the ability to observe, in 
real time, the commander’s decisions and the requirements generated for ISR support.  
For this reason, the ISREC should in fact be an individual already integrated into the 
Army tactical operations center (TOC). 
The Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) pioneered the employment 
of the ISR liaison officer.  Unlike the conventional ISRLO who is often employed within 
the collection management section of the Army’s special compartment information 
facility (SCIF),376 the AFSOC ISRLO is employed in the TOC where he or she 
coordinates ISR efforts with the on-going operations of the maneuver forces and reports 
directly to the decision makers in the TOC.377 
In addition to the ISRLO, AFSOC employs two to four additional enlisted 
“Predator Drivers” tasked with monitoring real-time full motion video feeds and 
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providing guidance to the sensor operators.  These enlisted members also coordinate 
exploitation at the reach back sites, optimizing ISR products and providing seamless 
integration of analytical support to operational decision makers.378  A similar ISR Liaison 
Team (ILT), consisting of an ISRLO and an appropriate number of ISR Liaison 
Technicians (ISLTs) should be implemented within the conventional force structure at 
the BCT level and authorized to serve as the ISREC.379  Through the use of such teams, 
efforts can be fully coordinated using effective interpersonal relationships by airpower 
functional experts working directly with supported forces leveraging the full range of 
CFACC ISR capabilities.380 
The ISRLO would continue to function primarily in a planning and advisement 
role, providing the CFACC ISR expertise to integrate ISR assets and capabilities into the 
ground commander’s scheme of operations.  The ISLTs, however, would take on a larger 
role in the execution of ISR operations, potentially taking on the responsibilities of the 
Army’s ISR Operations personnel with regards to the monitoring of various organic 
video feeds to alleviate the Soldiers’ task overload and to leverage the full capabilities of 
both organic Army ISR assets and the CFACC fleet.  Unlike the AFSOC model, ISLTs 
would focus not only FMV capabilities but would also provide the point of contact for 
integrating with Global Hawk (GH) and Tactical Reconnaissance (TACRECCE) Direct 
Support missions, interacting in real time with the DGS Analysis and Reporting Team 
(DART), and working with the JTAC for non-traditional ISR (NTISR) support. 
To increase the effectiveness of real time ISR coordination and execution, the 
Common Ground Station (CGS) operators organic to the BCT who monitor the JSTARS 
GMTI feed and coordinate via chat with the JSTARS crew should also be moved to the 
TOC floor.  The ISR Operations Soldier, typically being a trained imagery analyst, 
provides the best source for short notice imagery exploitation of raw imagery from the 
GH, U-2, and other imagery sources.  The ISR Operations Soldier would also be the 
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conduit into the TOC for other organic BCT capabilities to include HUMINT and 
SIGINT products, as well as finished analytical products from the collection management 
team.  The ISRLO, having contributed to the development of the ISR plan, can then 
provide oversight of the ISR execution, ensuring that the plan is proceeding smoothly and 
improvising solutions to snags encountered along the way.  ISRLO direct oversight of 
such operations would likely be limited to those missions requiring intensive ISR support 
and integration.  Day-to-day ISR support, typically limited to a few ISR assets at time, 
would be fully executable by the ISLTs and Army ISR Operations Soldiers. 
As a matter of organizational design, it may be necessary to consider the physical 
interaction of key personnel with regards to the flow of information and the efficient 
execution of operations.381  For example, Figure 42, BCT ISR Team in the TOC, 
provides a notional seating arrangement for the joint BCT ISR team located on the TOC 
floor.  This arrangement is predicated on the likely flow of information as face-to-face 
interaction, despite technological advancements, still provides the best means for 
developing mutual understandings of a tactical problem.382  Placing the JTAC next to the 
ISLT allows the JTAC to provide terminal attack guidance to fighter aircraft based upon 
the UAV full-motion video feed.  Or it allows the ISLT to provide the same type of FMV 
analysis to a fighter’s targeting pod video as that done for UAV feeds.  Similarly, when 
needing to direct an FMV asset to a suspicious GMTI track, having the ISLT sitting 
beside the CGS operator facilitates such discussions.  On many occasions, GMTI forensic 
backtracking highlighted potential cache sites or improvised explosive device (IED) 
emplacement areas which could then be better analyzed by the ISR Operations Soldier (a 
trained imagery analyst) based upon this more focused search. 
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Figure 42. BCT ISR Team in the TOC 
 
Additional considerations would likely place the Fire Support Element (FSE) next 
to the JTAC to assist in deconfliction in surface-based and airborne fires or to use the 
FSE’s access to counter-battery radars for determining the location of rocket and mortar 
points of origin to which CAS aircraft could be sent in response.  Naturally, different 
situations will require concerned parties to interact in different fashions but based upon 
personal observation and consistent executions, the arrangement depicted in Figure 42 
seems most conducive to day-to-day operations. 
Although the ILT will coordinate with sensor operators and ISR aircrews to 
optimize collection and support to ground operations, the ILT will need to take care in 
not “steering” ISR sensors through specific direction.  ISR sensor operators and pilots 
will have the best insight into the latest tactics, techniques, and procedures for optimizing 
ISR asset employment and must be trusted to execute the commander’s intent based on 
guidance provided by the ILT.  Through constant communication of commander’s intent 
and analysis of the provided products, the ILT and ISR crew can work together to move 
the sensor to the appropriate location or through the necessary actions to provide the 
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desired product.383  Similarly, higher headquarters elements should avoid “second-
guessing” tactical decisions made with regards to the employment of ISR, acknowledging 
that they lack the situational awareness available to the tactical decision maker.  So long 
as such decisions are being made in accordance with commander’s intent, the rules of 
engagement, and any additional “special instructions” (SPINS), supported customers and 
the ISR crews should be permitted to communicate horizontally and execute as 
necessary.384 
3. Joint Certification Requirements 
The duties of the ISR Effects Coordinator largely reflect those of the IIO aboard 
the RJ and the Airborne Intelligence Officer (AIO) or Technician (AIT) on board the 
JSTARS.  In the case of the RJ, the IIO serves as the real-time coordination of 
intelligence between key nodes on and off the battlefield to include other airborne ISR 
platforms.  By keeping all tactical intelligence platforms (to include DCGS and space-
borne assets) on the “same sheet of ISR music,” the IIO focuses collection and reporting 
efforts, synchronizing ISR effects with the supported commander’s operations.385  
Likewise, the AIO/AIT on JSTARS correlates, analyzes, and fuses intelligence 
information from external intelligence platforms and leverages this information to 
support JSTARS operations and threat counter-tactics.386, 387  At the DGS, the ISR 
Mission Commander (ISRMC), formerly the Mission Operations Commander (MOC), 
performs a similar role, coordinating intelligence sharing both among the DGS elements 
to include imagery (including full-motion video) and signals intelligence analysts, as well 
as with external intelligence agencies with such unique capabilities as conducting ground 
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moving target indicator (GMTI) forensic backtracking to link suspicious GMTI 
movements with other intelligence signatures.388 
As will be discussed in Chapter VI, it is therefore highly beneficial to have 
personnel trained in AIO/AIT, IIO, or ISRMC duty positions to execute ILT duties.  
Furthermore, while AIO/AIT, IIO and ISRMC personnel are primarily responsible for 
coordinating air and space borne intelligence information, the ILT will also require the 
ability to interact with Army organic ISR capabilities and the non-traditional ISR 
(NTISR) capabilities provided by the JTAC.   The level of experience required to conduct 
such operations, however, is exceptional and the skills are easily lost.  This requires not 
only regular maintenance via standards and evaluation programs but will also demand 
regular employment with a number of ISR assets.  Keeping ILT members certified to 
perform these duties will likely be a significant complication. 
C. DYNAMIC RE-TASKING 
Dynamic re-tasking refers to the requirement to change the air tasking order 
during execution.  In the case of ISR, this includes adding targets to the collection deck or 
moving an ISR orbit to a different location to achieve better visibility on a particular 
target.  At present, such decisions are the “sole” responsibility of the CAOC.389  Dynamic 
re-taskings may also involve higher priority collection requirements that may be 
accessible to an active ISR asset.  The reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition 
(RSTA) annex to the Air Tasking Order (ATO), as developed through the ISR strategy 
development process, should detail the parameters of a dynamic re-tasking and the 
necessary process for executing such a tasking.390  Simply moving the sensor focus in 
support of the original tasking, to include moving UAV asset locations, does not 
constitute “re-tasking” the asset but simply “re-directing” it in accordance with the ATO 
and the RSTA annex that assigns missions to ISR assets and units.  In the case of 
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“redirecting” an asset, CAOC approval is not required and supported units or even the 
ISR unit/asset itself may make such a decision when operating in a direct support role. 391 
Unfortunately, even with the ability to redirect sensors during direct support 
missions, the overall ad hoc/dynamic re-tasking process is excessively over-centralized 
and unnecessarily slow in responding.392  The problem stems from the fact that such 
decisions are the responsibility of the Senior Intelligence Duty Officer (SIDO) who 
makes recommendations to the Chief of Combat Operations at the CAOC for ISR asset 
employment.  Due to the level of detailed planning and target vetting that is required to 
build the initial collection decks, the SIDO is often reluctant to shift ISR during 
execution.393  The SIDO typically lacks the intimate familiarization required to 
understand the day’s collection requirements and the operations to be conducted because 
there is only one SIDO at the CAOC who is responsible for managing the ISR 
constellation for Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. 394   
Lacking the ability to observe all three theaters to the requisite level of detail 
demands that authority for managing ISR execution decisions be delegated down to a 
more appropriate level.  In particular, ISR units and their supported customers should 
have the ability to make common-sense decisions requiring collection deck modifications 
and the movement of assets to improve collection capabilities.395  While this ability 
should be limited to modifying targets within the intent of the designated mission 
(allowing units to replace old targets with new targets), the CAOC (via the SIDO) will 
still need to retain visibility over the employment of ISR in order to pre-empt potential 
ATO changes.396 
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Of particular concern are any new requirements that are developed by units not 
already supported by the ATO.  In such a case, the requirement will need to proceed 
through the standard approval channels but in a manner much more aligned with the 
short-notice nature of ad hoc requirements.  Additionally, the SIDO must be made aware 
of any change that will impact the collection of a higher priority tasking, deny support to 
another unit, or extend the ISR mission in such a way that it threatens crew duty days, 
maintenance timelines, or the next ATO day’s missions.397 
1. Maintaining Synergy During Execution 
Providing experienced ISR planners down to the BCT level, the level at which 
most operations will be planned and supported during COIN operations, and developing 
consistency within the asset tasking process through the “peanut butter spread” of FMV 
assets and the layering of other ISR platforms will permit detailed and well-integrated 
ISR planning.  Prioritizing ISR support based upon unit or operation further elicits trust 
in the ability of the CFACC to meet supported commander needs.  Careful pre-planning 
and allocation of resources, however, cannot substitute for the ability to bring the 
necessary assets to bear at the place and time they are required, to include those short 
notice, fleeting target situations that dominate the COIN fight. 
High value individuals are often targeted over a period days, weeks, or months in 
which the case against them is developed, positive identification is determined, and a 
“trigger” is established for precisely locating them in the mass of urban population (such 
as the use of a monitored cell phone, identification by a HUMINT asset, or possibly 
observation by a coalition scout/sniper team).  Unfortunately, coalition forces rarely 
control when the “trigger” will be activated and thus must maintain the ability to react 
momentarily to any number of triggers that could be activated for numerous high value 
individuals (HVIs) being tracked at the same time.  To dedicate ISR assets to each of 
these potential trigger events with no clear predictive ability as to when they will become 
a factor would rapidly drain resources and leave assets underutilized.  Similarly, the 
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ability to mass ISR in support of a troops-in-contact (TIC) situation cannot be 
realistically accomplished with “on-call” ISR assets.  Instead, the execution of these and 
other such fleeting opportunities demands the ability to pull assets when necessary. 
Such authority should be delegated to the lowest, reasonable level which can be 
held accountable for the impact such decisions are likely to create.  If a commander is not 
responsible for one of the units to be impacted by a decision, this commander is too low 
to be delegated such authorities.  Higher headquarters concerns for the misuse, or rather 
underutilization, of assets is valid and the limited number of such resources requires that 
theater level assets be managed by a control element with theater-wide awareness.  Given 
this understanding, the requesting process should be made no more complicated than 
necessary. 
2. Immediate Request Priorities 
For immediate requests, each request should be assigned a priority based on a 
very limited evaluation of the requirement based upon the tactical situation.398  In many 
cases, the presence of an ISR asset may determine whether a mission can be launched or 
not.  For example, lacking the ability to confirm the identity of an HVI and the absence of 
innocent bystanders has terminated many missions before they could be fully considered.  
On the other hand, the ability to provide additional over watch support or to allow 
commanders located at rear TOCs to observe actions on the objective are nice to have 
additions but do not impact the execution of the mission.  ISR personnel must be realistic 
and honest about what their requirements are and appreciate the impact such requests will 
have on ISR support theater-wide.  Such considerations will be used to determine the 
priority of any immediate ISR requests.  For the purposes of this discussion, immediate 
ISR requests are those requests that must be fulfilled within the next one to two hours and 
therefore require the re-tasking of ISR assets that are already on-station or within a few 
minutes of launch.  The specific timelines associated with “immediate” requirements will 
vary from event to event.  (For comparison, an ad hoc request is simply one that occurs 
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inside the 72 hour air tasking order cycle and could therefore be planned and executed by 
assets that will not launch for another 24 hours.  Ad hoc taskings are simply changes that 
occurred after ATO publication, approximately six hours prior to the start of the ATO 
day, and do not imply a specific urgency.)  An immediate tasking may be prioritized as 
Alpha, Bravo, or Charlie but may also include the caveat “no exploitation required” 
which may improve the likelihood of the request being improved.  These terms are 
proposed based upon JP 3–09.3 procedures. 
a. Alpha—Impact to Plan of Action 
Collection of the requested target is required for mission execution.  
Failure to collect the information will result in the mission being aborted and/or a threat 
to coalition lives.  The Alpha designation supersedes all other categories of mission 
priority.399  Such a request is common with regards to the need for full-motion video 
support during a TIC in order to locate enemy force positions and activities and to 
provide over watch of friendly forces as they either pursue their attackers or disengage to 
evacuate casualties.  In the event of a short notice raid, imagery support may be required 
to identify defensive fighting positions at the objective, obstacles along the route of 
travel, and entry points for the assault team. 
b. Bravo—Support to Plan of Action 
Collection of the requested target is necessary to support mission 
objectives.400  Bravo designations will likely include “over watch” type missions that 
provide force protection to engaged forces but may not directly impact the mission target 
itself.  Such requests represent beneficial support to the mission but are not “mission 
critical.”401  These requests often arise when there may already be alternatives to 
collection such as the presence of targeting pod equipped fighters that can provide the 
same over watch capability as an FMV asset. 
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Requests for updated imagery once a mission has already been planned 
using previously collected (and therefore “dated”) imagery may also be considered Bravo 
level support.  Although more current imagery can certainly have impacts on mission 
execution, since prior planning was already made possible by earlier or archived data, 
alternate courses of action have likely also been drawn up.  Therefore, imagery support 
would help to alleviate tactical decisions on the objective but the absence of such imagery 
would not prevent the execution of the mission. 
c. Charlie—Preparation for Near-term Action 
Collection of targets in this category may be necessary for near term 
action but lack of sufficient detail precludes committing operational forces against such 
targets.  Generally, targets with Charlie designations will have no impact on coalition 
operations and only serve to prepare for future operations.   The collection of these 
targets could prove invaluable in the preparation of the future mission, however, because 
such operations may be triggered on short notice.  Should this target not be collected, it 
could become a short notice priority Alpha or Bravo target when the mission is triggered.  
Such targets likely supersede requirements for targets to be collected in support of 
operations with known start dates that can be collected at a later time.  Often, these 
requests will be made with the caveat “non-interference basis” (NIB) indicating that the 
collection would be useful but should not be tasked if it will interfere with other targets.  
As ISR sorties are often planned in such a way as to provide some flexibility, there are 
often a number of unused collection opportunities that can still be achieved without 
adversely affecting the collection deck.  A Charlie priority, NIB request would very 
likely then be collected.  (Presently, little effort is made to fill these available collection 
opportunities because the ISARC, which would be the most likely tasking organization in 
this case, is simply overwhelmed with monitoring all three theaters.  A forward deployed 
ISARC, therefore, could then begin prioritizing additional collection requests among 
those that did not make the “cut line” to be included in the original collection deck, to 
maximize the available collection opportunities.) 
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As an example, as an HVI is developed for targeting, a number of safe 
houses or places of known occupancy are identified (place of business, family homes, 
mosques, etc.)  Requesting imagery of these locations will allow for pre-planning of 
actions against those objectives should the HVI trigger occur at those locations.   If there 
is no indication that the trigger event will occur in the near term, such imagery may be 
collected through standard or ad hoc requests.  Denying a request for immediate tasking 
may result in an Alpha requirement being submitted to allow for quick planning by team 
leaders when the trigger event occurs at a previously identified location. 
d. No Exploitation Required—(NER) 
Tasking ISR collection is not limited solely by the capabilities of the 
sensor or the platform carrying the sensor.  In fact, much of what limits the collection of 
targets is the ability of analysts to exploit the collected information.  The U.S. 
intelligence community has a far great capability to collect raw information than its 
capacity to exploit that data.  For this reason, a collection deck on a highly capable asset, 
such as the Global Hawk, may be intentionally limited well below its advertised deck in 
order to allow imagery analysts located at the DGS to process all of the data in a timely 
fashion.   If the imagery analysts at the supported unit are willing to take on the workload 
themselves, more images can be added to the collection deck, significantly increasing its 
capabilities. 
For this reason, all collection requirements should be annotated with 
whether or not the requesting unit can provide exploitation of the data.  As the request is 
forwarded through the chain of command, higher echelons may also determine that they 
can process the data for their subordinates if the requesting unit is unable to do so for 
themselves.  Some data, such as highly complex imagery products or rare dialects must 
be exploited by reach back agencies.  For immediate taskings, the ability of the supported 
unit to analyze their own products can be an important consideration when approving 
Bravo or Charlie prioritized requests. 
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3. Level of Approval 
When determining whether immediate requests should be fulfilled or not, care 
should be taken in elevating the decision only as high as necessary.  Horizontal 
communications should be emphasized to allow decisions to be fully informed and to 
prevent redundant communications.   In the case of the oil smugglers described in 
Chapter I, the requesting BCT was already in contact with the ISRMC and had been 
informed of the U-2’s ability to support the mission.  Unfortunately, vertical 
communications all the way up to the CAOC eventually resulted in the CAOC contacting 
the ISRMC again to determine U-2 support for the BCT.  Rather than using e-mail, which 
is optimized for the transfer of discrete packets of information and therefore favors 
vertical communication, chat rooms, optimized for “discussions,” should be leveraged to 
provide a more comprehensive awareness of ISR requirements and capabilities. 
The means by which ISR gain and loss assessments are conducted may vary from 
organization to organization but Figure 43, Sample ISR Gain/Lost Assessment Tree 
provides a generic example of how such decisions should be considered.  Once a conflict 
has been identified with regards to the approved collection deck (illustrated by the bottom 
right container in Figure 43), the decision must be made at the next level above the point 




Figure 43. Sample ISR Gain/Lost Assessment Tree402 
 
a. Same BCT, BCT Makes the Call 
In the event that an ISR platform determines that it can fulfill a collection 
request but only at the expense of another target on the requesting BCT’s collection deck, 
the BCT collection manager should be able to make this decision without forwarding the 
request up channel.  This allows for the easiest transition between targets that have been 
overcome by events and new targets that have been developed since the publication of the 
ATO.  Furthermore, in dynamic situations in which actions are occurring or will begin 
shortly, this process allows the BCT to take responsibility for their ISR decisions by 
dropping lesser prioritized targets.  This requires that the joint BCT ISR team on the TOC 
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floor has a clear understanding of the collection priorities and interact with the Chief of 
Operations (CHOPS) who monitors the TOC activity and makes decisions based upon the 
BCT commander’s guidance. 
b. Between BCTs, Division Makes the Call 
When it has been determined that a new collection request can only be 
satisfied if collections for another BCT, belonging to the same Division, are modified or 
dropped, the Division that commands both BCTs will be the senior decision maker.  
Again, this will require a careful understanding of the Division commander’s priorities 
for supporting the BCT operations and the ability to determine the specific priority of 
each of the collection requests submitted based upon the associated justification 
statements and supported operations. 
c. Between Divisions, Corps Makes the Call 
Collection requests that will impact targets belonging to another Division 
or BCTs within a separate Division will demand the attention of the Corps collection 
management team.  At this level, the Corps commander’s priorities will be considered 
and the availability of “non-aligned” ISR (which may have already been held in reserve 
to meet such challenges) to fulfill the need will be determined.   With a forward ISARC, 
this decision should be made by the ISR Operations Duty Officer in the ISARC based on 
clear guidance provided by the Corps collection management team and the Corps 
CHOPS’s understanding of the current situation. 
d. Impacts Crew Rest or Aircraft Maintenance, CAOC Makes the 
Call 
Regardless of what supported units may be impacted, consideration of 
aircraft and crew limitations must also be monitored.  Even in the event in which a BCT 
will only be impacting its own collection deck, if the request will force the asset to extend 
its flight time, delay its landing, and/or strain the crew duty day, the CAOC must be 
involved in the decision.  For example, a GH may support several different BCTs in a 
single mission.  If the last BCT to be supported in the mission makes a request for an 
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immediate collection that will force the GH to change course and extend its flight time 
beyond what was planned for in the ATO, the request will obviously not impact any other 
BCT collection but it may delay necessary maintenance for the GH, preventing it from 
being used on the next ATO day.  Such situations may require that the ATO for the next 
day be resourced with different assets or go unsupported altogether.  This of course will 
have implications far beyond the simple swapping of targets on the BCT collection deck.  
It is important to note, however, that the CAOC should only monitor all requests and not 
be consulted on all requests.  This will serve to limit the delay in supporting new 
collections by not requiring that requests be forwarded completely up the chain of 
command. 
4. Processes 
When attempting to change targets on a collection deck that is already being 
supported, the request should be made directly to the supporting unit.  The request, 
however, must be coordinated so that all other elements have the ability to monitor, and 
complications can be quickly resolved without additional back briefs or repeated 
requests.  It may be necessary, however, to cut and paste chat conversations from rooms 
in which the collector was working directly with the supported unit into a chat room that 
has more universal visibility. 
Requests for dynamic re-tasking such that require assets not already supporting 
the requesting unit should be forwarded to the ISARC via the fastest means available.  
Ideally, this transmission means should provide visibility to all intermediate headquarters 
elements as well as to the CAOC to ensure the availability of other assets is considered.  
This process would replicate the Joint Air Request Net (JARN) used by the CAS 
community.  In such a process, the collection manager and/or the ISRLO at each level 
considers the commander’s intent for the employment of ISR and priority operations and 
evaluates the availability of organic or other aligned assets (to include non-traditional 
ISR) to fulfill the request.  In the event that intermediate headquarters are unable to fulfill 
the request but acknowledge that the request is in line with the commander’s intent for 
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ISR and priority of operations, they do not need to provide further input to the process.  
“Silence by intermediate headquarters implies consent to the request.”403 
a. Request Formats 
Making requests for ad hoc and immediate requests demands the ability to 
transmit information to all interested parties simultaneously.  Not only must horizontal 
coordination be permitted between the requestor and the supporting ISR element, but 
decision makers higher in the chain of command may also need visibility.   Such 
oversight is required to ensure that requests are being filled by the best available asset, 
are not violating the commander’s intent, and that the request will not impact the 
availability of the asset in the future to support other requirements.  In the CAS 
community, such requests are transmitted via radio (See Figure 44, Close Air Support 
[CAS] Immediate Request Process); however, in the ISR community, internet relay chat 
is likely to be a better conduit. 
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Figure 44. Close Air Support (CAS) Immediate Request Process404 
 
(1) Chat.  Chat represents the ideal function for submitting and 
coordinating ISR support as it provides horizontal linkages between all key nodes as well 
as universal visibility for all command elements with regards to changes in the collection 
requests.   “Private” windows can be used for direct communication between supporting 
and supported units and should any discussions in that window require the attention of 
other elements, can easily be copied and pasted into the appropriate window. 
Most importantly, there needs to be one chat window dedicated to 
ad hoc/immediate requests.  This will minimize the number of chat rooms that must be 
monitored by all interested parties and allow for communal problem solving in the event 
that collection is unavailable or would create unnecessary complications for other units.    
For example, should a unit request an FMV asset but be denied the request due to a lack 
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of available assets or high priority requirements, the ISRMC supporting a GH mission 
may suggest using the “rapid revisit” capability of the GH to meet their needs based on 
the description of their requirement.  It may not be an ideal substitution but it may still 
provide the necessary information.  Similarly, collection managers may request support 
but not be aware of a specific capability to fulfill that request.  A single chat room for 
such requests may allow ISR experts at different echelons or organizations to offer new 
capabilities or to request clarification of the need to determine the possibility of fulfilling 
the request by other, unconsidered assets. 
(2)  ISR Coordination Net.  Less ideally, requests can be submitted 
over a radio channel that replicates the CAS Joint Air Request Net (JARN).  Within the 
CAS realm, JARN is an effective means of transmission because all nodes of command 
within the CAS network are able to monitor and transmit via radio.405  Collection 
management nodes, however, typically do not have radio operations capabilities.  In 
many instances, the collection manager would have to pass the request through the 
supporting JTAC to transmit via radio.  The request would then likely be received by an 
airborne asset possessing chat capabilities (such as the RJ or JSTARS) or by way of the 
pilot back to an ISR node that does have chat (as in the case of the U-2 and DCGS).  
This, of course, is an unnecessary delay in most cases when chat is more likely to be 
available. 
The exceptions that make the use of an ISR Coordination Net 
(ICN) appealing are those situations in which ISR support is required for personnel 
geographically separated from their collection management support and lack secure 
Internet access.   A platoon located at a forward outpost may request JSTARS monitoring 
of the surrounding roads or rely upon RJ SIGINT support to provide warning of a 
potential attack.  Unable to submit their requests via a collection manager, they may be 
able to use their supporting JTAC to make their request for them.  In such a case, the 
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delays incurred by repeating the request via chat may be unavoidable to ensure such 
support is provided. (See Figure 45, Proposed ISR Immediate Request Process [Including 
Both ISR Chat and ICN].) 
 
Figure 45. Proposed ISR Immediate Request Process (Including Both ISR Chat 
and ICN)406 
 
b. JTAC-ILT Interaction and “Terminal Control” 
(1)  Roles and Responsibilities.  The ILT would provide invaluable 
situational awareness and continuity of operations by being forward located with the 
supported customer.  While reach back nodes can provide unmatched analytical 
processing and capability, their geographic separation from the supported unit naturally 
inhibits their ability to understand the flow of operations and the context for the decisions 
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being made.  The ILT will provide the bridge between these efforts, the efficiency of the 
reach back units and the effectiveness of the forward elements, by orchestrating and 
integrating the overall processing, exploitation, and dissemination effort.407 
In the proposed concept of operations, the ILT provides the 
capability for tactical decision makers to review ISR inputs and assess situational 
developments to determine if “trigger events” had occurred necessitating a response, or if 
different tactics or actions were required to deal with the changing situation.  ILT 
personnel can confer with operations personnel, rewinding full motion video or ground 
moving target indications to track movements of potential targets, to evaluate the 
development of a situation, or simply to gain clarity of events.  Simultaneously, reach 
back elements could continue to monitor the ISR feeds and notify forward personnel of 
any significant updates.408 
The ability to maintain decentralized control of airborne ISR assets 
requires not only operations-intelligence synergy to point the sensors at targets for which 
the unit is prepared to action, but the ability to do so safely.  A balance must be struck 
between preventing mid-air collisions with providing all supporting assets with freedom 
of movement.  A common Army practice of establishing unnecessarily restrictive 
operating areas that force other support elements to “stand-off” from the target area 
should be avoided whenever possible.409  This can only be accomplished through careful 
coordination with air planners and airspace control elements.410 
The ALO and the JTAC in the BCT provide the best capability for 
planning and deconflicting all airborne assets operating in support of the BCT.  
Furthermore, the ALO/JTAC may have access to additional resources that may be useful 
in the conduct of ISR operations.  Fighters with targeting pods are often substituted for 
full motion video assets yet have limited connectivity with ISR personnel who are often 
restricted to secure phone or chat capabilities.  The JTAC, however, is able to 
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communicate with all airborne assets (to include ISR assets) via radio which may be the  
only connectivity to certain assets (fighters in particular).  Coordination between the ILT 
and the JTAC is necessary to eliminate the redundant employment of ISR and CAS assets 
with regards to similar target effects.411 
(2)  Kinetic Effects and hand-off.  An increasing number of ISR 
platforms are being armed to conduct kinetic operations in order to minimize the “sensor 
to shooter” timeline.  This duality of employment requires that ISR personnel work 
closely with joint terminal attack controllers to identify decision points at which the asset 
will proceed from an ISR tasking to a kinetic employment role.  At such time, the asset 
must be “positively” handed off to the JTAC for terminal control of the kinetic 
employment.412  Positive hand off indicates that all players are aware of who is 
responsible for redirecting sensors, authorizing the employment of weapons, and 
providing specific mission details.  When using chat, for example, typing, “DS to 
JTAC”413 indicates for the ILT, the JTAC, and the UAV operator, the UAV is now in 
direct support (DS) to the JTAC who will provide further directions for employment.  
This typed message should be acknowledged by the JTAC and the UAV operator to 
ensure there are no miscommunications.  Simply typing “UAV aff” and “JTAC aff” 
provides this understanding through the common abbreviation for “affirmative.”  The 
same process should be used when the UAV is returned to the ILT for coordination to 
prevent inadvertent redirection of the sensor by the JTAC or a failure to respond to 
requests for the UAV. 
D. GETTING INTELLIGENCE TO THE CUSTOMER 
Information must be available to the supported unit when the decision is to be 
made or it is of no value.  Additionally, information that is requested by one agency may 
be of value or provide invaluable context to another agency and therefore must not be 
unnecessarily contained.  This need to move information through the force along specific 
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transmission paths or channels to enhance speed of dissemination while simultaneously 
making the information available to a wide spectrum of customers represents a key 
challenge to ISR planners and all elements of the ISR constellation.414  Intelligence data 
must be timely, accurate and relevant and provided to analysts at the lowest possible level 
for immediate implementation.   Furthermore, ISR data should be disseminated 
throughout the force to allow coordination of efforts among other elements or 
echelons.415 
1. Short Term Analysis (Mission Execution in Progress) 
During execution, ISR support to operations is often limited to a “confirm or deny 
presence of” type mentality in which raw, unexploited imagery or video feed may suffice.  
Such “products,” require little more than a decision maker’s ability to observe a limited 
number of key indicators that are likely to be easily interpretable.  This has been the key 
to the popularity of FMV feeds.   Systems such as the One System Remote Video 
Terminal (OSRVT) or Remote Optical Video Enhanced Receiver (ROVER)416 can 
receive FMV feeds from manned and unmanned ISR platforms and fighter aircraft 
equipped with targeting pods and can display the video on laptops or screens throughout 
the TOC. 
Similarly, the Global Hawk community has developed the capability to transmit 
unexploited imagery to a SIPRnet website called the Joint Targeting Attack and 
Assessment Capability (JTAAC) within three to six minutes of the image being taken by 
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minutes or more required for processing, exploitation and dissemination, ground 
commanders can execute their next tactical decision and maintain operational 
momentum.417 
2. Long Term Analysis (Joint Intelligence Preparation of the 
Battlespace) 
Although ISR will be used more extensively than in conventional operations to 
support COIN endeavors in real time, ISR products will still require analytical processing 
as well.  Even products that are provided directly to decision makers, such as raw 
imagery from Global Hawk or full motion video feeds from the Predator may 
simultaneously be transferred to reach-back analytical shops for more detailed processing 
and integration into comprehensive analytical products.  For this reason, all intelligence 
should be disseminated to the appropriate databases as soon as possible to leverage the 
greater analytical capacity of dedicated analysis shops both organic to the supported unit 
and geographically separated.418 
Reach-back assistance provides unique advantages compared to organic analytical 
capabilities.  Most notably, time-intensive and systems intensive products may be 
difficult to produce locally when more time sensitive issues draw away analyst attentions 
or when limited bandwidth or computer processing prevent using technologically 
demanding processes.  Additionally, reach back agencies may have more experience in 
dealing with certain ISR capabilities and systems than can be reasonably provided by 
training or temporary liaison to forward elements.419   Lastly, with regards to presence of 
an “occupying force,” the use of reach back nodes can reduce the forward footprint of 
coalition forces, thereby reducing the “intrusiveness” of foreign personnel into the 
counter insurgency environment.420 
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Naturally, organic analysts provide necessary understanding of current operations 
and the local environment along with analytical continuity.  Given that it can take several 
months to develop a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment, the 
organic analysis section must be leveraged for their on-site focus.421  Horizontal linkages 
and habitual relationships over time will optimize the employment of both organic and 
reach back analytical capacity. 
3. Archival and Retrieval of ISR Reports 
In counterinsurgency campaigns, changes over time represent key indicators of 
success.  Furthermore, changes in patterns of life can indicate the presence of hostile 
forces or threats to coalition forces.  Therefore, while ISR plays an important role in the 
real time coordination of operations, the ability to study a target or area of operations 
over time represents an equally important aspect of ISR.  Detailed target studies are often 
augmented with archived data to provide historical context, to highlight otherwise 
unexceptional changes, and to develop familiarity with local activity. 
Databases must be easily navigated and provide the ability to search in a 
multitude of ways.  It is often difficult to predict what exactly will be important when 
information is initially collected and resources may be used again and again for different 
products.  The Air Force has developed a number of such databases for storing and easily 
retrieving imagery and full motion video based upon date of collection, location (given in 
either geocoordinates or military grid reference system) and key word searches.  
Furthermore, imagery has been made available via low-band width portals such as the 
Imagery Access Solutions (IAS) specifically designed for those units whose forward 
locations inhibit downloading large file sizes.422  The ability to stream FMV footage over 
SIPRnet and to pull-up archived FMV footage has also improved analyst understanding 
of the supported area of operation. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Returning to the case of the black market oil sales, this coherent, COIN-focused 
ISR structure can be demonstrated to more effectively deal with the tactical problems of 
2–82 BCT.  This is, of course, a hypothetical evaluation used to highlight the capabilities 
of the process, not to provide “proof” of its superiority over other potential changes to the 
process. 
1. 12 June 2007—Chasing Black Marketers 
The effects working group determines that the illicit sale of oil by black market 
groups within 2–82 BCT’s Area of Operation represents  a significant threat to the 
counterinsurgency campaign for a number of reasons.   The local population is 
understandably reluctant to provide information on the oil smugglers and sellers as they 
represent the only access to a highly valuable product.  The Government of Iraq, 
however, lacks the capacity to provide this resource largely because its pipelines are 
being sabotaged and siphoned off to support insurgent operations.  Therefore, to improve 
government capacity to support the local citizens of the AO, the black market groups 
need to be eliminated while Government of Iraq (GOI) access points are improved. 
Black market groups signify the GOI’s inability to enforce law and order because 
they are able to operate freely within the population.  This in turn promotes additional 
challenges to GOI rule of law and encourages support for the insurgency, even if only 
passively.  Once innocent civilians allow illegal activities to occur within their 
neighborhood, they are more easily influenced by threats of government persecution in 
the event that they choose to turn against the insurgents.  This allows them to be extorted 
into more active support of the insurgency.  For this reason, shutting down the black 
market oil sales is essential to providing security for the local populace. 
Though intelligence has yet to confirm the direct tie between black market oil 
sales and the financing of insurgent activity, there are sufficient indicators to suggest such 
a relationship.  Since most criminal activity in the area of operations (AO) is managed by 
the local militia in order to ensure the militia’s role in governing the population, any  
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illicit activity can be assumed to be in some way related to the activities of the insurgents.   
To this end, disrupting the illegal sale of oil in the AO contributes directly to the 
offensive COIN strategy. 
The collection manager and the BCT ISRLO begin to work directly with the 
EWG members to establish a collection plan for finding the oil black marketers, tracking 
them back to their safe house, and supporting a raid to capture the black marketers and to 
secure their oil surplus.   To begin with, the ISRLO works with the BCT to determine the 
nature of a black market oil operation and provides these descriptions to the MND-B 
DART element at Distributed Ground Station One (DGS-1).   Next, the ISRLO and 
collection manager (CM) begin constructing long range ISR plans and formulating a 
template for use in support of an immediate raid on the safe house. 
The DART analysts review the BCT description of illegal oil sales events and 
then begin to review imagery and FMV archives for the area in question.  Previously, 
imagery and FMV had been tasked with searching for IEDs or other insurgent activities 
but never specifically tasked with searching for oil smugglers or sales stations.  
Additionally, because none of the young Airmen who analyzed the imagery or video 
footage knew what such an operation looked like, they would not have been able to report 
it even if they had been tasked with the requirement.  After a detailed review of the 
archived data, the DART is able to produce a series of “story boards” using both images 
and video clips to identify likely illicit sales operations.  In so doing, the DART analysts 
working in conjunction with BCT analysts are able to identify common themes among 
the operations to include favored operating locations and a particular white pick-up truck 
that consistently appears in many of the scenes. 
Based on collection requests submitted by the 2–82 collection manager, a multi-
spectral imagery pass is made of the pipelines in vicinity of 2–82’s AO.  Specialized 
analysis by the DART located at the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) 
which provides longer-term analysis of highly specialized intelligence products, reveals 
several likely points along the pipeline where smugglers may be tapping into the pipeline 
to disrupt GOI operations and to secure their own sources of oil.  While 2–82 BCT plans 
to dispatch patrols to watch over these areas and support elements to repair the damage to 
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the pipelines, NASIC conducts “forensic analysis” of archived GMTI data to identify a 
number of “rat lines” leading from the suspect points along the pipeline to a limited 
number of neighborhoods within 2–82’s AO.  Although the precise locations of where 
this oil is smuggled remains undetermined, it provides 2–82 with a more focused region 
for increased patrolling and the potential allocation of FMV assets. 
Patrols subordinate to 2–82 BCT now begin aggressive patrolling of both the 
common sales points with a description of the commonly associated pick-up truck and of 
the neighborhoods where the “rat lines” terminated.  Additional imagery requests were 
submitted searching for the likely storage tanks in the suspect neighborhoods in order to 
further narrow the search area.  The identification of the black marketers and their safe 
house, however, was determined by HUMINT, augmented by the more specific questions 
asked based on the previously provided intelligence.  Once a known location for the 
black marketers had been established, the collection manager and the ISRLO transitioned 
to providing immediate support for the raid which was scheduled to occur in the next 12 
hours. 
Due to the shortened time line, an ad hoc request was submitted for ISR support 
using the DD Form 1972.1 with the graphical mission type order (MTO) slides embedded 
in the request.  Specifically, 2–82 CM requested imagery of the target house to include 
360 degree coverage highlighting entry points in the compound’s external wall and into 
the buildings themselves.  Imagery was also requested for the immediate area to search 
for potential ambush points, obstacles to the approach, and indications of defensive IED 
emplacements.  Division SIGINT support was requested to provide early warning of 
communications between spotters and either the targeted black marketers or potential 
ambushers along the assault team’s route of travel.  Although 2–82 had its organic FMV 
capability, a request was issued for a higher headquarters UAV based on improved 
capabilities and the requirements for a low signature surveillance capability. 
The Division CM was able to pull archived imagery and provide the 360 degree 
evaluation of the compound to include the annotation of potential obstacles and all entry 
points.  Though some of the images were months old, the overall evaluation appeared to 
be sufficient to meet the assault team’s needs.  An ad hoc request was forwarded for the 
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night’s U-2 mission to provide radar imagery with the provision that the imagery would 
be exploited by the Division’s analysts, thus eliminating the need for the DGS to add the 
image to their exploitation deck.   SIGINT support was approved and coordinated to 
communicate directly with the assault team leader rather than be funneled through the 
BCT.  The Division determined that its own aligned UAVs were already tasked against 
higher priorities (given that 2–82’s organic UAV was available) but suggested that CAS 
that was also being requested to support the operation could be used to provide FMV 
coverage as well.  The FMV request was still forwarded to Corps, however, to see if any 
non-aligned FMV assets could be made available. 
The Corps CM determined that additional CAS sorties were not required for this 
operation based on 2–82’s assessment of the threat.  Since the compound was located 
outside of a known insurgent stronghold (such as Sadr City until 2008), there was little 
potential for a sustained troops in contact situation requiring CAS.   Should the need 
arise, however, MND-B had a number of CAS sorties already supporting other operations 
that could be redirected to provide immediate CAS support.  Additionally, there were no 
non-aligned FMV assets available so 2–82 would have to proceed with their organic 
support.  The radar imagery request was approved based on coordination with DGS-1 
which determined that based on the “no exploitation required” caveat, the aircraft could 
easily image the target area without impacting any other collection requirement.   
As tasked by the MTO, the BCT CGS operator began to conduct his own forensic 
analysis of the night’s GMTI mission to determine how many vehicles may have arrived 
at and/or departed from the HVI location.  He also established a brief “pattern of life” 
regarding the amount of traffic on the streets and any indications of road blocks in the 
area.  Traffic after curfew was actually observed travelling from one of the suspected 
illicit oil sales points back to the targeted neighborhood and after that, no other vehicles 
were observed entering or leaving the immediate area.  The CGS operator also 
coordinated with the JSTARS crew, indicating the location of the target house and 
requesting their support in monitoring the situation for “squirters.”  The mission had 
already been approved and because of the DD Form 1972.1 and the MTO, the mission 
crew was prepared to support the mission.   
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As in the June 2007 example, the raid on the black marketers’ safe house results 
in the identification of the financier to whom all funds were transferred.  Since this 
particular individual was already on the BCT’s HVI list, CHOPS decides that he should 
be “rolled up” that night to prevent him from being alerted to the capture of his 
subordinates.  Unfortunately, while the black marketers had been to the financier’s house 
several times, they did not know the specific address.  They could only provide a 
description of the house and its property and a general location, within a neighborhood on 
the periphery of an insurgent stronghold. 
To more precisely identify the HVI’s location, the BCT CM requests immediate 
support in the form of SIGINT location and FMV coverage.  Identifying that the HVI 
lives in a neighborhood that is heavily aligned with the insurgents, the organic UAV 
coverage is determined to be a risk for compromise and therefore bolsters the request for 
more capable assets.  The Division CM determines that current UAV taskings will allow 
a Division aligned UAV to be temporarily redirected to support the mission.  
Additionally, a SIGINT asset tasked to support another BCT is made available when the 
BCT has to stand down its quick reaction force due to a lack of mission essential 
equipment.    Lastly, the BCT and Division ALO coordinate to transfer one CAS sortie 
from support to a BCT’s whose mission has already successfully been accomplished to 
2–82’s requirement. 
Using the same MTO template developed by the Effects Working Group (EWG) 
to manage the initial raid, the BCT ISRLO contacts the ISARC and requests an 
immediate imagery pass to look for additional obstacles, potential ambush sites, or IED 
activity in the vicinity of the new target house.  The ISARC determines that the U-2 that 
provided the earlier imagery would still be the best option for support and works with the 
DGS to determine impacts to the collection deck.  As it turns out, a BCT in another 
Division would be impacted if the U-2 is required to divert to take the image.  The 
ISARC, coordinating with the Corps CHOPS and Corps Intelligence Division (C2), 
reviews the MTO of the BCT to be impacted by 2–82’s request.  Coordinating with the 
affected BCT CM, it is determined that the image is not of immediate need and can be 
slipped to a later mission.  The diversion of the U-2, however, will extend the flight of the 
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U-2 by 30 minutes and so the MNC-I ISARC contacts the ISARC at the CAOC to receive 
final approval.  Despite the extended flight time, the CAOC approves the request and the 
U-2 immediately begins re-routing to the target area. 
With the SIGINT asset and UAV in place, the on-scene commander at the black 
marketers’ safe house has them call the HVI’s cell phone.  The SIGINT asset is able to 
refine the location of the HVI’s residence to within a few buildings at which point, the 
Division aligned UAV begins searching the area for a building matching the description 
provided by the captured black marketers.   The CAS fighters also arrive on station and 
use their targeting pods to watch for “squirter” vehicles in the event that the HVI 
becomes spooked and decides to flee the area.  The pilots are also able to begin 
familiarizing themselves with the area and coordinate with the JTAC to establish 
common reference points should the need to employ weapons arise.  The Division 
imagery analysts use the refined target location to better focus their exploitation of the 
radar imagery and are able to identify a number of roads that appear to have had recent 
construction activity, potentially indicating IED locations.  The assault team begins to 
plan their route, avoiding those specific roads. 
Also continuing operations from the MTO template, the BCT CGS operator 
conducts a second round of forensic analysis of the night’s GMTI mission focused on the 
new target location. Resulting from his brief “pattern of life” analysis, one such road 
block is identified based upon the slowing of traffic in the area.  Although the road block 
is determined to belong to an Iraqi Police (IP) unit (based on coordination between the 
BCT CHOPS and the IP liaison), the decision is made to plan a route around the road 
block to expedite their travel and to limit the potential for someone (including the IP) to 
alert the HVI to the mission’s approach.  The CGS operator coordinates again with the 
JSTARS crew, indicating the location of the new target house and requesting their 
support in monitoring the situation for “squirters.”  The ISARC, able to observe all such 
requests via chat, confirms that the JSTARS mission crew is cleared to support 2–82 
based on tasking priorities. 
As the assault team traveled from the safe house to the HVI residence, Division 
SIGINT support monitored known communications used by the insurgents.  The 
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JSTARS, chatting with the CGS operator and speaking directly with the assault team via 
radio, maintained watch for any vehicles moving toward the assault team or toward an 
intercept point along their route of travel.  CAS aircraft split their focus between 
watching the target house and providing a visual sweep ahead of the convoy for 
suspicious individuals along the route or any indications of a potential IED.    Upon 
arrival at the house, one of the captured black marketers was able to confirm the location 
and the assault team dismounted to begin the assault. 
Whether by observing the arrival of the assault team or through some other form 
of warning, the HVI attempted to flee from the back of the residence.  The UAV was able 
to maintain “eyes on” the individual and the ISLT in the BCT TOC provided continuous 
updates to the assault team commander via radio communications.   Despite entering 
another residence two streets from his own, the HVI was captured by the assault team 
who were able to identify the appropriate house due to a laser marker shining from the 
circling CAS fighters who themselves had been cued by the JTAC observing the UAV 
feed monitored by the ISLT. 
2. Learning During Execution  
This vignette provides an example of how thorough ISR planning can support 
COIN operations including the development of templates for supporting specific 
operations and real-time integration for the coordination of ISR and operations assets.  
Despite initial lack of taskings, the BCT ISR Operations team, led by a designated ISR 
Mission Effects Coordinator (ISRMEC), was able to adapt to the situation with available 
resources.  Additionally, the ISRMEC was able to leverage a responsive request process 
including a forward deployed ISARC that could quickly evaluate ISR priorities and 
provide support on an as needed basis.  Having a single element in charge of ISR 
execution ensures that cross-cue opportunities are recognized, that mission focus is 
maintained, and that there are no unnecessary delays in decision making due to a 
requirement to explain a developing situation to someone at a higher echelon responsible 
for managing multiple other fights.  Planning and tasking are essential to success but no 
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plan survives unencumbered by the realities of the environment, weather, or enemy 
actions and therefore requires an inherent capability to be modified as necessary. 
Changes to planning ISR, tasking ISR assets, and executing ISR operations in 
coordination with on-going operations as discussed in the past three chapters have to date 
been made in many instances because of the hard work of select individuals.  
Unfortunately, lessons need to be re-learned and prior, beneficial decisions are 
overturned because there is no formalized doctrine to support and guide such efforts.  For 
this reason, the changes described in this thesis should be encapsulated in a joint doctrine 
publication as discussed in the next chapter. 
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VI. THE FUTURE OF CLOSE ISR SUPPORT—WHY DOCTRINE 
IS IMPORTANT 
A. INTRODUCTION—THE PERILS OF A “MISSING DOCTRINE” 
Counterinsurgency (COIN) is not a new realm for the U.S. military.  In fact, the 
majority of the U.S. military’s combat history has been focused on conducting 
counterinsurgency operations from conquering the native peoples of North America, to 
defeating the insurgency in the Philippines (both in the aftermath of the Spanish-
American War and as part of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM), to the most notorious 
example, in fighting the communist guerrillas of Vietnam.   The U.S. Air Force, however, 
has largely ignored the pressing need for a COIN doctrine, downplaying the use of air 
power in small wars in its professional military education.423  
The most pressing reason for developing such doctrine is the simple fact that 
without a coherent doctrine, a military force lacks guidance on how to train, equip, and 
organize for the effective execution of operations in such conflicts.424  With an 
understanding that the U.S. military is likely to encounter further insurgencies in the 
future425 and that intentions of avoiding such fights are unrealistic, the U.S. Air Force 
must embrace its role in COIN operations and develop a coherent, fully developed 
doctrine for employing in “small wars.”  Most notably, the U.S. Air Force should not 
approach the development of a COIN doctrine as a shift away from its preferred role in 
air dominance during a conventional fight but simply an inclusion of the roles and 
responsibilities of air power in COIN operations into its overall concept of air 
doctrine.426  Without a specific written reference, manpower, money, and training are 
unlikely to be sufficiently provided for this ongoing requirement. 
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A driving factor in the Air Force’s resistance to developing such doctrine is the 
very nature of air power in COIN, as support to ground forces and other government 
agencies. 427  The premier missions of the Air Force, counter-air, air interdiction, and 
strategic attack hold little value in a COIN campaign, driving the Air Force to focus only 
on air lift, Close Air Support (CAS), and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(ISR) operations.428  The Air Force largely neglects situations where it serves only in a 
supporting role429 a term that, despite its doctrinal validity, has angered many senior U.S. 
Air Force officers.  As has been overheard in the Combined Air and Space Operations 
Center (CAOC) on many occasions, “the Air Force does not support operations, we 
integrate our operations with those of the land component commander.”430  This is, of 
course, foolish and not supported by the doctrinally established roles of the Combined 
Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) in relation to the Combined Forces Land 
Component Command (CFLCC) in the different theaters of COIN operations. 
A COIN doctrine that does not simply attempt to force “major theater warfare” 
concepts to fit into a smaller size will highlight the effects air and space power can bring 
to the fight.  Understanding these capabilities will in turn clarify the types of people and 
training needed for air power employment within COIN.431  It is not enough to simply 
parrot Army/Marine Corps doctrine and attempt to fill land component short falls with 
surplus Airmen.  Airpower advocates in a COIN environment have specific roles and 
they require detailed knowledge on those roles to be effective.  The Air Force has 
important contributions to make to the fight beyond being a pool of bodies for Army 
taskings. 
An appreciation for the types of weapons systems required to support COIN 
operations will influence the procurement process.432  This will likely require responsive 
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and low observable assets, to include ISR platforms that will provide high persistence and 
granularity as well as munitions better suited to the low collateral damage demands of a 
population-centric COIN strategy.  But without a doctrine to serve as the “touch stone” of 
validity, such requests for resources will largely be ignored in favor of applying 
conventional forces already in existence to problems for which they were not designed. 
Lastly, doctrine influences organizational design, particularly as it regards the 
close support dictated by COIN.  In such an environment, centralized control of assets is 
unlikely to provide the responsiveness required by supported ground commanders.433  A 
carefully constructed doctrine, as it relates to COIN, will be less about dictating a strict 
organizational construct but rather embrace the flexibility required to evaluate each 
theater for the appropriate echelons to which liaison officers are assigned, planners are 
delegated, and where command and control nodes will be most effective.  This structure, 
by its nature, will de-emphasize assigning air power advocates to units based on size but 
rather focus on the mission requirements of the unit.434 
Ideally, this thesis should serve as a starting point for understanding the required 
doctrine and provide a foundation upon which more detailed doctrine can be built.   
While the Air Force has certainly come a long way in developing Air Force Doctrine 
Document 2–3, “Irregular Warfare,” its broad scope and generalities prohibit a sufficient 
understanding of air power operations in small wars to influence manning, training, and 
budgeting as required.  Again, instead of replacing U.S. Air Force conventional doctrine 
with that suited only to COIN, the Air Force and its joint partners must replicate the 
duality of the air tasking process as reflected in the air tasking order process and its 
companion close air support process.  One is not a substitute for the other and, in many 
cases, both processes will be used simultaneously.  There already exists an extensive ISR 
doctrine for managing and employing CFACC ISR assets in a major theater war, and this 
has been significantly improved upon by the Theater ISR CONOPS developed by Lt Col 
Jason Brown and Major Max Pearson.  What is now required is a complimentary 
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document to Joint Publication 3–09.3 “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 
Close Air Support,” which provides the same level of guidance for Close ISR Support. 
B. ORGANIZATION, MANNING, AND EQUIPPING 
1. Dynamic Organizational Design 
Although the U.S. Army reorganized to prioritize the Brigade Combat Team as its 
basic fighting unit in 2005 based upon the necessities of counterinsurgency and the small, 
decentralized adversary forces it was facing in Iraq, there is no reason to assume that this 
organizational structure will continue to be effective in Iraq in 2010 or in Afghanistan or 
other theaters of operation.   As Les Vadasz, senior vice president of Intel argues, “there’s 
absolutely no reason why an organization that you created two years ago has any 
relevance to the organization that you need two years from now…the organization, the 
interfaces…are always going to change.”435 
Much of organizational design theory revolves around the construction of only 
two types of organizations: the machine bureaucracy with a formal structure and the 
adhocracy which tends to spring in to being around social and task requirements.436  As 
such, a belief in organization design persists that an organization can either be structured 
for efficiency (the forte of the machine bureaucracy) or for flexibility (the raison d’être of 
the adhocracy).  Unfortunately, most real world situations, particularly as they apply to 
military operations, demand that organizations be both flexible and efficient.   This 
introduces the notion of “dynamic tension” with regards to an organization needing to be 
simultaneously well-structured for efficiency while adapting to changes in their 
environment and mission.437  This is the condition under which CFACC ISR must be 
operated. 
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The focus of such designs should not be to simply allow personnel to randomly 
organize themselves as they see fit.  Given the high demand and low availability of most 
ISR assets, this is simply not possible if any hope of accomplishing the mission is to be 
realized.  Instead, the organizational design must retain some semblance of the machine 
bureaucratic structure in which personnel have a clear understanding of their reporting 
and hierarchical structures, who their bosses are, who their subordinates are and who 
their counterparts are in other, equivalent organizations.438  As the mission is executed, 
however, responsibilities and reporting relationships (direct liaison authority vice tasking 
control or administrative control authorities) must change to meet mission and 
environmental circumstances.439 
It can be argued that this has been less effectively managed within the Brigade 
Combat Team (BCT) structure as the Army has attempted to adapt to the COIN 
requirements.  Within the Effects Working Group, it is likely that personnel will shift into 
roles based on availability rather than on specific capabilities.  For example, although it is 
very likely that the Provost Marshall will serves as the Security Line of Effort (LOE) 
chief, it is just as possible for the Air Force Electronic Warfare Officer to serve as the 
Reconciliation Officer.440  Certainly somebody has to fulfill this role but if the 
organization develops into an organic, amorphous structure, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to operate in an efficient manner,441 interacting with similar counter parts, and 
maximizing asset employment. 
Rather, organization change should be expected and planned for with processes in 
place by which new reporting relationships are established and clarified and refined 
responsibilities are worked out.442  Structure of an organization is designed to meet an 
explicit purpose, not to encourage random change by targeting and adapting to major 
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changes in the environment and mission.443  The development of committees, task forces, 
and teams is done in conjunction with the formal structure, not as a replacement for it, 
and must be formally sanctioned by the organization.  Such teams/groups become 
relevance-based and problem focused, allowing them to transcend boundaries that might 
inhibit problem solving.444 
Knowing how and when to reorganize, requires leaders and personnel with highly 
developed cooperation and team skills445 as well as the ability to be highly self-critical as 
an organization.  This allows members of the organization to recognize their 
effectiveness within the current structure and if it is not functioning adequately, to 
develop alternative organizational designs.446  But again, this demands an organization 
that has the potential for such re-design, developed not around a specific construct but 
emphasizing key nodes to be moved or adapted as necessary.  The Air Force must 
develop such a construct if it is to be relevant in future conflicts. 
There is an old saying that “we don’t man equipment, we equip men.”  This must 
be the philosophy for dynamic organizational design, that we are not establishing an 
organization by which to man a weapon system but rather that we are providing a weapon 
system to enable our tactics, techniques, and procedures.   Adopting such a view with 
regards to our organizational and systems architecture focuses on the fundamental 
interactions of the process versus emphasizing the means by which such interactions 
occur.  (See Figure 46, Fundamental Nodes of the ISR Enterprise.) 
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Figure 46. Fundamental Nodes of the ISR Enterprise 
 
For example, in reviewing the interactions that occurred during the March 25–27, 
2003 sand storm, we see many of the same linkages that occur in our final vignette.   In 
2003, a supported decision maker, the 3rd Infantry Division (3 ID) commander, needed to 
know where the 2nd Medina Division was located and if it was advancing on his soldiers.  
Through the established tasking process, his Division Collection Manager submitted a 
request for information through the Corps Collection Manager.  The Corps collection 
manager (CM) validated the request and submitted it to the ISR Division (ISRD) of the 
CAOC where the collection requests were transformed into ISR plans.   The ISRD 
collection managers tasked the ISR units and then handed off the ISR plan to the 
Intelligence Surveillance And Reconnaissance Cell (ISARC) to monitor and modify in 
real-time.  In the case of the March 25 missions, the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack 
Radar System (JSTARS) was given a new mission and the Global Hawk (GH) was 
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redirected to new targets.  The decision to make such changes was coordinated with the 
Senior Intelligence Duty Officer (SIDO) who worked with the Chief of Combat 
Operations (CCO) to ensure that such changes would not adversely impact other 
supported units or the next day’s air tasking order (ATO).  As the ISR units began 
reporting, Multi-Int Exploitation Cell (MEC), consisting of the Imagery Support Element 
(ISE), provided the ISARC with additional requirements for increased coverage and 
pushed the intelligence data to the Combat Operations Division where the CCO was able 
to redirect combat aircraft to target the Medina Division.   The ISRD also forwarded the 
information via the Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) to the 3 ID commander, 
allowing him to employ artillery and to redeploy his forces against the Medina Division.  
(See Figure 47, Conventional CFACC ISR Nodes [Blue Container Highlights Nodes 
Contained within the CAOC].) 
 
Figure 47. Conventional CFACC ISR Nodes (Blue Container Highlights Nodes 
Contained within the CAOC) 
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The Air Force has the capability to conduct “dynamic targeting” and to execute 
ISR operations with flexibility.  These were tenets developed over years of focusing on 
mobile surface-to-surface missile launchers like the SCUDs of Iraq and the surface-to-air 
missiles like the SA-6 batteries of Serbia.  In response, the Air Force developed tactics, 
techniques, and procedures along with training and exercise events to hone such skills.  
Now, the Air Force needs to learn to export these capabilities into the joint and 
interagency realms to support unconventional operations, such as COIN or disaster 
recovery operations.  
As can be seen in Figure 47, many of the nodes existed within the CAOC, 
essentially a geographic co-location for essential nodes that the U.S. Air Force designated 
a Weapons System.   The reason for this designation was based largely on the concerns of 
a machine bureaucracy, notably standardization of skill sets among personnel, improved 
interaction of systems, and the need to achieve efficiency with limited resources.  Prior to 
this designation, each of the five Air Operations Centers (AOCs) developed its own 
tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) as required for their theater of operations.  
Each AOC sought out and acquired the systems necessary to execute these TTPs, often 
with consideration for allies in the region who may also need to interact with the AOC.  
Unfortunately, this construct resulted in a situation where personnel could no longer be 
transferred among the AOCs without considerable (and time intensive) training to orient 
them to how each AOC functioned.  Systems interoperability suffered greatly as a 
mixture of software and hardware was introduced, often without any prior design for 
interaction which further complicated the training of new personnel and the employment 
of information technology (IT) experts.  Finally, there was no coherent means for judging 
the effectiveness of an AOC because no standardization function could be established 
based on the wide variety of TTPs and systems.447 
To counter this problem, the Air Force turned to the best example of systems and 
personnel management it had established, the employment of aircraft.  Each aircraft 
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mission design series (MDS) is a designated weapons system, for example the F-16 
Fighting Falcon.  As such, no new equipment can be added to the MDS without a 
thorough test and evaluation process such as “SEEK EAGLE” in which all new additions 
(specifically weapons, pods, and fuel tanks) must be evaluated for interoperability, 
impacts to flight performance, and hazards to other systems employment.448   
Furthermore, the aircrew for each MDS are trained to the same exacting standards, 
guided by a standards and evaluation (STANEVAL) system that will rate the aircrew 
regardless of their duty location.  This ensures that pilots from one base can fly the MDS 
located at another base and utilize the same TTPs.   Managing the systems and training 
becomes much more efficient and units are more effective in combat because they can 
expect a defined level of capability in their counterparts from other bases. 
For this reason, in September 2000, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force designated 
the Air and Space Operations Center a weapon system with the nomenclature AN/USQ-
163 FALCONER.449  This had the unintentional effect of reversing the focus on TTPs 
and instead emphasized the physical and systems architecture that enabled these 
capabilities.  By designating the AOC a weapon system, the Air Force was able to better 
manage the introduction of new systems ensuring interoperability with the existing 
architecture, standardization among the AOCs, and improved training for its IT 
professionals.  The designation also improved training across the board, establishing a 
standard by which all initial AOC assigned personnel could be trained and then providing 
the guidelines for STANEVAL shops to measure AOC performance.   But the 
formalization of this bureaucratic structure has largely hobbled the Air Force’s ability to 
operate beyond the physical and geographic confines of the AOC. 
With the expansion of the military operations from Afghanistan to Iraq and the 
Horn of Africa (HoA), the CAOC suffered in its ability to effectively and responsively 
manage operations within each theater.  The need to manage a finite number of air assets 
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dictated a centralized command structure, but the result distanced air planners from 
decision makers for the ground units with whom they would be expected to support or 
integrate.  Kinetic air operations were able to meet this challenge by relying upon the 
command and control structure already dictated by the Theater Air Control System 
(TACS) which is designed to interact with the Army’s Air Ground System (AGS).  In this 
fashion, much of the planning and tasking of close air support sorties was carried out in 
each theater by the Air Liaison Officers (ALOs) and Joint Terminal Attack Controllers 
(JTACs) assigned down to the battalion level and coordinated through the Air Support 
Operations Center at the Corps level.  This structure was replicated in each theater, 
minimizing the CAOC’s responsibility beyond that of managing those assets that could 
be transferred to any theater from one day to the next (primarily bombers and air 
refueling aircraft) and to ensuring that aircraft and aircrew were not pushed beyond their 
limits.  This allowed for better interaction between ground and air planners and made the 
overall process much more responsive to theater requirements. 
By 2006, the senior intelligence officer (A2) of the CAOC had recognized the 
need to replicate this process for the ISR enterprise.  To this end, the first ISR Liaison 
Officer (ISRLO) was forward deployed from the CAOC to Multi-National Division 
North (MND-N) with the specific objective of coordinating CFACC ISR planning with 
the collection managers of the 25th Infantry Division responsible at that time for MND-N.  
The ISRLO was also tasked with training the ALO/JTAC teams throughout his area of 
operation to better integrate ISR assets with other airborne platforms to reduce 
redundancy between their taskings (as many fighters with targeting pods were being used 
as substitutes for full-motion video assets) and to alleviate airspace concerns.450  By 
Spring 2007, two more ISRLOs had been deployed to Iraq with another ISRLO sent to 
Afghanistan.  By the end of the summer of 2007, every Major Subordinate Command 
(MSC) in Iraq, including the U.S. Army Divisions and the U.S. Marine Expeditionary 
Force (located in Multi-National Force-West) as well as the British Army responsible for 
MND-South East, had their own ISRLOs.  Among the MSCs, the ISRLOs provided 
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training for collection managers, ALO/JTACs, and supported decision makers as well as 
assisted in planning and increasingly, coordinated the employment of ISR assets in 
support of ground force operations.451 
The dispersion of theater level full-motion video (FMV) assets to include Air 
Force, Navy, and Army manned and unmanned aircraft among the MSCs and managed 
by the Corps intelligence staff largely mimicked the nature of the Air Support Operations 
Center (ASOC).  Unfortunately, the control and coordination of other ISR assets was still 
managed by the CAOC, which added an additional level of bureaucracy to the tasking of 
such assets, made them more difficult to plan and coordinate actions with, and ultimately 
made them less responsive, and in turn less valuable, to the needs of the supported 
ground units.  By relying upon the ISARC at the CAOC to manage the dynamic ISR 
requirements of three disparate theaters of operations, the CFACC essentially made his 
non-FMV ISR irrelevant to the fight at hand.  Tasking for such capabilities would 
continue to be forwarded but largely without any expectation for such capabilities to 
impact the operations they were supposed to be supporting. 452 
What is required is a full acceptance of the dispersed node construct (see Figure 
48, COIN ISR Nodes).  Having successfully demonstrated the capability to a limited 
degree with the ISRLOs and FMV management, the CFACC should not only execute 
decentralization in the current fight but must plan for such operations in the future.  For 
the CAS community it makes sense to establish ALOs down to the BCT level and JTACs 
as low as the battalion level with an ASOC typically aligned at the Corps.  In so doing, 
U.S. Air Force personnel are assigned to U.S. Army posts and train on a regular basis 
with their Army counterparts.  But CAS is a kinetic mission suited only for combat 
operations (regardless of their place along the “spectrum of warfare.”) 
 
                                                 
451 Personal observations from May through November 2007. 
452 Michael L. Downs, “Rethinking the CFACC Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
Approach to Counterinsurgency,”   (Naval War College, May 10, 2007), 11. 
 245
 
Figure 48. COIN ISR Nodes 
 
ISR, on the other hand, is not inherently limited to combat operations.  In fact, the 
U-2 and Global Hawk have a long history of supporting efforts to suppress wildfires 
within the United States.453  During the rescue and recovery operations following 
Hurricane Katrina, U.S. Air Force ISR, to include planning, tasking, and coordination 
elements, were heavily involved in attempts to find survivors and identify the next likely 
flood areas.454  It is not unreasonable to expect such operations to occur again in the 
future, either within the United States or in support of other countries.  For this reason, 
decentralization of CFACC ISR must not focus solely on integrating with the U.S. Army 
but on the ability to integrate with any joint, coalition, or interagency task force.   
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This can only be done by identifying those key nodes that must exist with regards 
to the ISR planning, tasking, and coordination of ISR efforts and where those nodes must 
exist in relation to supported units/agencies.  Planners must be aligned with the lowest 
designated level of decision makers for a particular area of operations.  In the case of the 
Army, this was the BCT commander who was given responsibility for a particular 
battlespace.  In disaster response operations, this could be a county emergency services 
command post or a Coast Guard station depending on how such operations are being 
coordinated and directed. The nature of the contingency will largely dictate if efforts can 
be centrally managed (as in the case of waging war against a machine bureaucracy) or 
when decisions must be made at lower levels due to the diverse environment and threats 
being faced (as in a COIN campaign).  A key that may help in identifying the appropriate 
level of decision making is the movement of key resources.  If during a recovery 
operation, helicopters are “owned” by a particular organization and meted out based on 
that organization’s understanding of priorities, this is probably the appropriate level at 
which to assign ISR planners.  This becomes increasingly apparent as that organization 
becomes responsible for more and more assets.  As in the case of the BCT, the Corps and 
Division had pushed many of their “enabling” capabilities (to include UAVs, human and 
signals intelligence analytic support, and reconstruction teams) down to the BCT level 
where that commander was responsible for deciding which subordinate units would 
receive those assets when requested.  If there are multiple agencies that own different 
types of assets, for example one agency controls all the helicopters while another controls 
the boats, it is very likely that the next higher echelon is providing them direction on 
whom to support so that helicopters and boats can both be pushed to the same element 
requiring support.  In such a case, ISR planners belong at that higher echelon. 
Senior tasking elements, those responsible for deciding what requests are 
appropriate and to which sub-elements to give priority of support, should be located at 
the senior “task force” level.  Though not specifically designated as such, the Multi-
National Force in Iraq is the equivalent “joint task force” in theater (having replaced 
Combined Joint Task Force 7, on May 15, 2004).  On August 30, 2005, North Command 
(NORCOM) established Joint Task Force-Katrina to coordinate Department of Defense 
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support to Hurricane Katrina relief operations;455 this would likely have been the 
appropriate level for senior tasking elements.  It is at this level that decisions of how to 
prioritize resources will be made.  In many cases, as in COIN, the decision may be based 
on the importance of a particular unit or region.  Therefore, regardless of what they are 
specifically requesting, the unit will receive assets based on their relative priority 
compared to other units.  In a relief effort, however, a more traditional prioritization may 
be appropriate in which the specific mission is more important than the requesting unit.  
Typically, efforts to save lives will rank higher than efforts to begin clearing debris, 
regardless of whether the requestor is in a small town in Mississippi or in New Orleans.   
Similarly, an ISARC should be deployed to this level in order to provide 
command and control of ISR assets in real time in order to adapt to the dynamic 
requirements of the supported agencies.  Another consideration for where to deploy the 
ISARC will be based on from where assets are actually controlled, just as the ISARC 
should be collocated with the ASOC to improve deconfliction of assets.  Aircraft may be 
based out of particular airstrip but if their flights are controlled by a more centralized air 
traffic control facility, that is where the ISARC will need to be located to minimize the 
potential for airspace problems. 
Understanding that civilian agencies, particularly local law enforcement, are 
likely to be highly inexperienced with regards to the requesting, tasking, and even 
capabilities of ISR assets, the need for the ISRLO and supporting ISR Liaison Team 
(ILT) will be significantly greater.  The ILT will again need to be deployed to the lowest 
responsible decision maker to ensure that intelligence is not limited to just Joint Task 
Force (JTF) level “situational awareness” but is actually made available to on-scene 
providers and first-responders.456   
By developing a dynamic organization design, the CFACC can be best prepared 
to support ISR operations in a multitude of events.  During major theater war, the nodes 
collapse back to the geographic centrality of the CAOC, utilizing the ISRLOs as planners 
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in the Master Air Attack Plan (MAAP) team or in the collection management cell and the 
Airmen of the ILT as members of the MEC.  The ISARC is simply not deployed forward 
but retains its same functionality.  As the war transitions to later stages, or should the 
need arise to differentiate the theater by Joint Task Forces, then the CAOC begins to 
decentralize, forward deploying an ISARC to each JTF and responding to the 
decentralization of decision making by forward deploying ISRLOs and ILTs as 
necessary.457  In response to a natural disaster, the ISR nodes “fly away” to the supported 
elements throughout the responding agency’s organization, aligning as best possible with 
the appropriate echelon. 
2. Selecting and Training COIN Airpower Experts 
Since the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the U.S. military (and certain “other 
governmental agencies”) has acquired a vast array of ISR platforms capable of feats 
previously unimagined and those numbers of assets and variations in capabilities 
continue to increase on a regular basis.  It is impossible to assume that a collection 
manager or ISR planner in the MAAP team or an ISRLO could be an expert in the 
execution of all of those systems.  It is equally unlikely, however, that the experts in 
employing each of those systems have a sufficient understanding of other systems or the 
COIN campaign to recognize their ability to contribute effectively.  Therefore, what is 
required is someone with just enough knowledge about each of the ISR platforms and 
about the COIN campaign itself to recognize opportunities to put systems together to 
solve a problem.  This largely reflects the fact that “experts have no role other than non-
expert participants” in the resolution of a wicked problem.  It is not that wicked problems 
do not require “experts” but rather that the disparity between an “expert” and a “lay 
person” is significantly reduced with regards to wicked problems as each person becomes 
an expert with regards to their own problem.458  CFACC ISR experts must therefore be 
trained not to focus on specific systems requirements (such as how to post a collection 
request within PRISM) or merely on memorizing the full capabilities of all CFACC ISR 
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assets in use.  Rather, ISR experts must be focused on the employment of ISR 
emphasizing cross-cuing and layering of ISR capabilities, integration of ISR into 
operations, and the ability to coordinate ISR capabilities in real time. 
ISR experts will be those who have the ability to understand the supported unit or 
decision maker’s needs, a sufficient understanding of asset capabilities to ask the right 
questions of that asset’s experts, and the ability to develop a thorough ISR plan 
integrated with the operations plan to include command and control concerns and 
necessary communications applicability.  Fortunately, the Air Force has acknowledged 
such requirements, reducing the emphasis upon PRISM employment and the 
management of collection requests at such training as the Intelligence, surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance Operators Course (IROC), and training personnel to be ISR planners 
with a fuller appreciation for all that entails.  The Air Force has also employed graduates 
of the U.S. Air Force Weapons School’s459 Intelligence Sensor Weapons Instructor 
Course to lead/advise key ISR nodes throughout the enterprise to include being the 
deputy collection manager at the CAOC and Corps level, serving as ISRLOs when 
available, and training/guiding ISR units. 
Having demonstrated a capability to plan ISR and to integrate it with supported 
unit operations and organic capabilities, ISR experts should then be elevated to real-time 
coordination of ISR effects as members of the ILT, intelligence duty officers/technicians 
(IDO/IDT) leading the ISARC, or as Senior Intelligence Duty Officers.  A thorough 
understanding of how an ISR plan is developed, the intricacies of balancing limited assets 
against high priority requirements or integrating compatible systems, is essential to being 
prepared to modify such plans “on the fly” during dynamic operations.  Too often, 
personnel with no prior ISR planning experience are put in charge of executing ISR plans 
and adapting them as necessary.  As can be expected, such situations rapidly  
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deteriorate when a carefully constructed plan is unnecessarily modified, disrupting key 
interactions and inefficiently wasting assets on efforts that could have been better 
supported in other ways.460 
In turn, the ISRLOs will need a greater ability not to plan ISR so much as to 
interpret their supported decision maker’s needs but to also leverage the organic 
resources of the unit or to best integrate CFACC assets.  ISR planning expertise will be 
an excellent foundation, but the ISRLO will require well-honed interpersonal skills to 
optimize their forward deployments with other services or agencies.  Not only will they 
need to deal with personnel with different jargons, career backgrounds, and perspectives 
but each organization will have a greater or lesser understanding of what ISR can 
provide.  Therefore, the attributes that an ISRLO should possess should largely mirror 
those attributes common to social entrepreneurs:  Creativity, Entrepreneurial Quality, the 
ability to Plan for the Enduring Nature of their Change after their departure, and an 
Ethical Fiber.461   
The majority of ISR assets (though this balance is tipping as the Long War 
continues) were designed to be employed against a conventional military force (a 
machine bureaucracy) within a conventional warfare setting.  For these reasons, ISRLOs 
will require a significant amount of creativity in order to piece together seemingly 
incompatible capabilities, leveraging the long duration, extended analytical capabilities of 
the CFACC ISR enterprise in support of the tactical expertise and on the ground 
familiarity of the U.S. Army customer.  Such creativity will often rely on looking for 
experts in a host of different platform communities, reviewing unpublished papers and 
studies that may reveal yet untapped capabilities, and formulating questions in such a 
way as to garner interest and support by CFACC ISR crews and analysts.  While Army 
collection managers are often prompted to ask for “an ISR effect” and not a capability, 
many are unable to sufficiently explain their desired effect while many more ISR 
“experts” within the CFACC ISR community are unable to match such desired effects to 
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the capabilities of their assets.  The ISRLO will likely not have the answer but should be 
able to ask the question in such away as to generate the answer from the right people. 
Entrepreneurial quality is explained as “the toughest” criteria to evaluate.462  At 
best, it is simply someone who is not only capable of “getting things done” but can in fact 
change the entire way in which a particular system deals with a problem.  People 
possessing such a quality have a “vision of how society will be different…not only at 
work in one place, but at work across the whole society.”463  This may sound like a lofty 
goal for the ISRLO, but in an environment with little precedent for ISR employment and 
when dealing with a machine bureaucracy—prone to inertia—the ISRLO may be the lone 
champion for new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).  Furthermore, the ISRLO 
must be prepared to “tilt at windmills,” doing battle with peers and superiors who are 
locked in traditional, conventional, or unyielding paradigms that fail to acknowledge the 
realities of the COIN campaign. 
The “social impact of the idea” dictates that the ISRLO cannot simply make a 
change, but must do so in a manner that will endure even after that individual has moved 
on.   This has been one of the largest obstacles for the ISR enterprise, that it is largely 
personality dependent.  Once an ISRLO or collection manager rotates out and a new 
ISRLO or collection manger moves in, changes that were successfully implemented often 
fall by the wayside, lacking their champion to further the cause.  The ISRLO must be able 
to not only make changes in the way things are done but must be able to articulate the 
reasons for those changes in such a way as to garner lasting support for the idea, to the 
point that it becomes detailed in joint and service doctrine.  Failing that, the inherent 
rotation system will prevent any lasting change in CFACC ISR support to COIN 
campaigns. 
Finally, the ISRLO must have sufficient “ethical fiber” to act as an honest agent 
both for the CFACC for whom he or she represents as well as for the supported decision 
maker to whom he or she is assigned.  The Army is understandably distrustful of an 
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outsider over whom they have no doctrinal control.  It can take significant amounts of 
time and effort to generate the trust necessary to be an effective liaison.  Similarly, the 
CFACC is likely to suspect that the ISRLO has gone native if the ISRLO is proposing 
changes or requesting capabilities that are incompatible with the CFACC’s established 
doctrine.  There must be an understanding by all parties that the ISRLO, as a 
representative of the CFACC and as the spokesperson for the land component, will act in 
the best possible interest of all involved.  This may require making decisions that will 
negatively influence some stakeholders at various times but their actions must never been 
seen as parochial or disingenuous.  
Such an individual must be carefully selected from among those with ISR 
planning expertise and likely a background in the Air Intelligence Officer (AIO), 
Information Integration Officer (IIO), or ISR Mission Commander (ISRMC) billets 
onboard the JSTARS, Rivet Joint, and the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS), 
respectively.  It is likely that the necessary training for an ISRLO will largely reflect that 
of the CAS community’s forward air controllers who are volunteers to “upgrade” from a 
basic fighter pilot role to one focused on finding the enemy and directing attacks against 
them.  The ISRLO candidate will have already demonstrated high capability in their day-
to-day ISR job but will volunteer for this additional duty, undergoing training to 
understand a wider array of ISR capabilities and how to integrate such capabilities with 
supported units.  Finding someone with these criteria is not sufficient for ensuring they 
will be successful in the field.  Rather, the program can again benefit by understanding 
the six successful qualities of the social entrepreneur.464 
The ISRLO must be willing to self-correct.  “The formulation of a wicked 
problem is the problem!”465  Therefore, the ability of the ISRLO to generate a solution to 
a problem (by piecing together good ideas provided by other experts) requires an on-
going process of solution development, problem understanding, and new solution 
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development.466  If the ISRLO ignores this principle of “wicked problems,” he or she is 
likely to commit to a solution that will be less than optimal or will generate problems that 
outpace the benefits derived from the solution.  Therefore, an ISRLO must always be 
prepared to change the course of action, to seek out new solutions, and to back away from 
bad ideas. 
As noted above, the ISRLO is not going to be the problem solver.  They will be 
the mechanism by which various capabilities are brought together to effectively resolve 
the problem.  Therefore, to be effective (and to be honest about their own contributions), 
they must be wiling to share credit.  Not only can a failure to do so discourage future 
assistance from others, but it fails to allow natural networks to build between various 
entities if the belief persists that all solutions must go through the ISRLO.  As noted 
above, part of what makes a good ISRLO is if the solutions are able to endure in the 
absence of the ISRLO.  By giving credit to those who contributed to the problem’s 
resolution, the absence of the ISRLO will not prevent others from knowing the right 
people to contact with similar problems in the future. 
Given that the CFACC is mired in a conventional war fighting paradigm, largely 
dependent on assets and force structures designed for dealing with a machine 
bureaucracy, it largely goes without saying that the ISRLO must be willing to break free 
of established structures.  This is not limited simply to a “rebellious spirit” but 
acknowledges a breath of knowledge and a willingness to research other paradigms in 
order to make such a break effective.  Simply defying established processes is neither 
effective nor career enhancing. 
The ISRLO is by definition an individual who crosses inter-disciplinary 
boundaries.  Typically possessed of a background within the CFACC ISR community, 
the ISRLO is embedded in the world of the land component and expected to develop a 
thorough understanding of how the Army operates, their needs from ISR, and even how 
their ISR assets and structures operate in order to best integrate the capabilities of the 
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CFACC.  An inability to acknowledge the uniqueness of the Army’s perspective or to 
incorporate the successful capabilities of either component will typically lead to an 
unsuccessful career as an ISRLO.  Only by working from the ground-up, interacting with 
the soldiers who are going to be executing missions based upon the intelligence derived 
from CFACC ISR assets, can the ISRLO fully appreciate the problems that need to be 
resolved and therefore implement the necessary change.467 
Unlike the social entrepreneur who may work for decades before achieving 
“success” in their social advances,468 the ISRLO will have at most months, but more 
likely only weeks to achieve the changes necessary to advance ISR support in COIN 
operations.  Such changes will only come from a daily fight against established 
procedures and a willingness to continue pushing forward ideas that may be repeatedly 
crushed.  What an ISRLO is attempting to do is change attitudes regarding the CFACC’s 
roles and capabilities in the support of COIN, influencing behaviors in support of new 
TTPs, and attempting to overcome service prejudices and institutional fears generated 
from years of budgetary fights and inter-service rivalries.469  An ISRLO must be 
possessed of a determination that will help them seek out those able to further their ideas 
despite recurrent obstacles in their path.  Often the successes that become tangible and 
establish precedence only occur after frequent failures to achieve traction and from days 
upon days of working quietly towards that success. 
Along with this quality goes the need for the ISRLO to not simply trumpet a good 
idea but the ability to build the steps to enacting that idea.  The ISRLO must provide not 
just the idea but a series of “how-to’s” in order to execute that idea.470  This requires the 
ability to “close the loop” on every action, ensuring all involved know their roles and 
responsibilities and holding them to task.  It also requires that the ISRLO do much of the 
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“grunt work” to get the solution implemented by ensuring that all players are effectively 
linked and that each part of the problem resolution is effectively integrated with all other 
elements. 
Lastly, the ISRLO must have a clear motivation for their actions.471  There are 
certainly easier jobs within the CFACC and ISR in particular.  Assignments that are 
likely to involve less travel through dangerous areas and sleeping arrangements that don’t 
require a sleeping bag and sidearm.  The ISRLO must therefore be an individual who 
chooses to endure such hardships in the interest of improving the effectiveness of the 
joint team, of furthering the capabilities of the CFACC, and of saving the lives of the 
young soldiers called upon to do harrowing acts. 
Not every Air Force intelligence officer is suited to be an ISRLO.  With this in 
mind, the Air Force must avoid the mechanistic temptation to view its personnel as 
interchangeable, particularly with regards to these highly visible and critically important 
duty positions.  Within the ALO community, the Air Force has settled for finding bodies 
to fill slots, putting pilots who normally fly air-to-air fighters into jobs in which they are 
expected to be the “experts” on Close Air Support.  While these ALOs have training in 
the fundamentals of such operations and enlisted personnel who have matured in the 
community to provide more immediate expertise, the ISRLO program does not yet have 
such support structures.  War is not the time to learn fundamentals; it is the time to 
implement excellence. 
Considerable discussion has focused on where this new team of ISR experts 
should reside.  Many consider the need to develop trust between the Air Force and the 
Army to be of paramount concern and therefore recommend that the ISRLO in particular 
but the forward deploying ISARC elements should be assigned to Army posts where they 
can conduct daily training and participate in Army exercise events.472  Others have 
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countered that the lack of access to ISR assets and the perishability of unique ISR skills 
demands that ISR professionals remain with Air Force ISR units until they are needed.473 
The compromise for these two positions would be to permanently assign the 
Division level ISRLO to the Air Support Operations Squadron that contains the Air 
Liaison Officers and Joint Terminal Attack Controllers aligned with each Army Division.  
As the ASOS is assigned to the supported Division’s post, this would allow the ISRLO to 
conduct daily training with the Army collection managers and the Air Support Operations 
Squadron (ASOS) ALOs/JTACs, build trust in the ISRLO concept and the Air Force’s 
ability to provide ISR support, and to integrate additional Air Force ISR personnel as 
necessary. 
The remainder of the ILT contingents would in fact remain with their ISR units to 
ensure they are knowledgeable on the latest tactics, techniques, and procedures and that 
they build the interpersonal relationships that may be necessary to coordinate support 
with reach back organizations.  The ILT would deploy with the Army for any major 
exercises and would routinely travel to their supported units to make face-to-face contact 
with their Army counterparts.  In this fashion, the ILT program would largely reflect the 
old Battalion Air Liaison Officer program where pilots (typically A-10 pilots) remained 
with their flying squadrons for day-to-day operations but deployed with their supported 
Army units for exercises and real world operations.474  The ILT members would then be 
able to augment their ISR unit manning when the Army was not deployed, helping to 
shore up the personnel gap within the Air Force intelligence community. 
3. Equipping for COIN ISR 
Developers of ISR equipment (to include both assets and the hardware used to 
provide connectivity for ISR enterprise nodes) must begin with two assumptions: that all 
contingencies requiring ISR support cannot be anticipated and that technology will 
continue to advance at a pace far outstripping the budgeting and procurement process 
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currently used by the U.S. military.  With this understanding, developers should focus on 
“open source” platforms and “plug and play” assets that will allow for rapid modification 
as necessary to meet the needs of the particular situation. 
The development of future ISR platforms should take a cue from the Chinese 
motorcycle manufacturer Lifan which has focused on a modular architecture.  
Standardized interfaces, much like the ubiquitous universal serial bus (USB) port on all 
contemporary computers, allows for the attachment of component subsystems such as 
new sensors or communications relay gear.475  Although the RC-135V/W Rivet Joint has 
long benefitted from the use of Quick Reaction Capabilities (QRC) first as hardware 
additions and now largely as software interfaces,476 most U.S. Air Force ISR platforms 
lack this capability, relying instead on permanently affixed sensors that receive only 
minor updates through the original manufacturer.  The U-2 has he capability to swap out 
its radar imaging sensor with its electro-optical/infrared sensor or with its optical bar 
(film-based) camera but these are only options in the established hardware.  There is no 
capability to add a new sensor all together.  The same holds true largely for the Global 
Hawk, Predator, and Reaper. 
The U.S. Air Force has made two significant changes to its ISR procurement 
strategy that reflect this new understanding of the dynamic ISR requirements of COIN.  
The first was the development of “Gorgon Stare,” a wide area, persistence surveillance 
camera which was initially envisioned to be an addition to the MQ-9 Reaper.  The Air 
Force has since decided to implement the Gorgon Stare on a wide range of platforms, 
designing it to be “platform agnostic” with the ability to feed into a common system, 
namely the DCGS enterprise.477  This use of podded sensors to be incorporated on any 
manned or unmanned system represents a tremendous step forward in the procurement of 
future capabilities.  Rather than building an ISR platform as one complete project, the 
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focus can be just on the performance characteristics of the aircraft (high, medium, or low 
altitude or high speed versus long dwell times, etc.) while sensors can be developed, 
added, and replaced separately. 
The second development for the U.S. Air Force is the recent design, production, 
and deployment of the MC-12W Liberty manned surveillance platform.  Though there 
have been some criticisms about the adoption of a platform already largely in use by the 
Army478 or the waste of money and effort on a manned platform versus an unmanned 
platform,479 the MC-12W is remarkable both for it is quick adoption and for its ability to 
“roll-on, roll-off” sensors as necessary.  Admittedly, the MC-12W is a response to the 
Army’s success in using the C-12 platform (one with which it has decades of prior 
experience with such as the RC-12 Signals Intelligence aircraft) in its Task Force ODIN 
(Observe, Detect, Identify, and Neutralize).480  Many felt this was a capability that should 
have been available from the CFACC and pioneered by the Air Force.  While the MC-
12W does have considerably shorter persistence, the piloted aircraft does not have to 
share time on the highly limited bandwidth required to remotely control the MQ-1 and 
MQ-9 unmanned assets.  Similarly, imagery and signals intelligence are exploited on-
board the aircraft, reducing the need to transmit large volumes of information off the 
aircraft to another exploitation cell.  Again, a concern regarding the amount of available 
bandwidth in each theater and the potential for unintentional interference with other 
broadcasts.  Regardless, the MC-12W represents a move toward the “plug and play” of 
commercial and government off-the-shelf (COTS/GOTS) technologies that will allow 
new capabilities to be more rapidly introduced to the fight at a much lower cost.481 
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The draw back to such designs is largely related to unused space.  In order to 
provide sufficient area for the introduction of new sensors or communications suites, the 
aircraft must naturally be designed larger than necessary for a single 
sensor/communications capability.  The addition of various mounting brackets adds 
weight to the aircraft and the potential for “non-permanent” mounting increases the 
potential for such payloads to shift in flight, damaging the suite itself or potentially 
creating unsafe flying conditions for the aircraft.  Still, the technology must be embraced 
and improved upon in order to provide ISR customers with the needed capabilities. 
With regards to ISR management software, it too needs to focus on an ability to 
leverage the latest technology.  Highly structured and “stove piped” technologies such as 
PRISM impact the ability of organizations to adapt to changes in ISR management and 
prioritization.  While PRISM served as the official means of submitting collection 
requests, many collection managers developed their initial requirements on Microsoft 
Excel spreadsheets, adding or removing columns as necessary to provide the level of 
detail or to format the data in a means appropriate to the tasking agency.  Sharepoint 
software was leveraged to manage requests in such a manner that anyone could access the 
request and get an understanding of what information was requested and how it was 
intended to support operations.  Microsoft PowerPoint was employed to produce mission 
concepts of operations (CONOPS) in a mission type order format that provided the 
necessary mission graphics (usually the latest available imagery) along with the common 
reference points to be used on the mission.  Such technology is simple to use, easily 
accessible, and typically designed to be modified.  Rather than focus on the specific 
systems required, ISR planners, taskers, and coordinators must be able to identify the 
requirements for the mission and adapt the available systems to the process.   An ISRLO 
may deploy to an Army unit and find that their basic situational tool is the Command Post 
of the Future (CPOF) or may join up with an interagency relief organization that uses 
Google Earth to track events.  By understanding the requirements, capable ISR 
professionals will be able to adapt the available systems to their needs. 
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C. TRAINING FOR COIN 
Training for ISR professionals is woefully inadequate.  Due to the highly limited 
number of ISR platforms available, few in the ISR constellation are able to train with the 
necessary platforms prior to deployment.  Large military exercises often emphasize 
operations over the ISR support that fuels them, ignoring the requirements for obtaining 
the intelligence that enables the actions.482  In many cases, exercise participants are 
simply handed the intelligence necessary to begin planning without tasking, or more 
importantly, training the ISR specialists who would actually need to acquire the 
information. 
Common Ground Station (CGS) operators in Iraq who analyzed JSTARS Ground 
Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) feeds, often deployed to Iraq without ever turning their 
systems on for the simple fact that no JSTARS was available with which to train.483  
Once in theater, their ability to successfully contribute to operations was dependent on 
their ability to learn quickly, during real world execution.  This is, of course, 
unsatisfactory.  Even when one ISR system is available for training, as in the case of 
organic unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the nature of ISR requiring cross-cuing and 
layering is impossible to demonstrate.  Planners, and leaders, therefore become dependant 
upon the systems with which they are most familiar and fail to appreciate the capabilities 
provided by other systems. 
Exercises have recently begun simulating an increasing number of ISR 
capabilities to include the use of virtual UAVs and JSTARS feeds which use the 
instrumentation used to manage an exercise to feed the ISR structure.  For example, to 
track vehicles moving around a training range, exercise vehicles mount a special 
transponder device.  This allows the vehicle to be “killed” during attacks and to prevent 
mishaps at night or adverse weather.  This same transponder, however, can be used to 
mark “contact” locations on a GMTI feed or to indicate where a computer modeled 
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vehicle should be added to a virtual UAV feed.484  Though not 100% accurate or 
realistic, this type of technology can vastly improve the training of ISR professionals and 
permit better planning and real time coordination during exercises. 
The Theater ISR CONOPS explains: 
Training and education for ISR personnel must focus as much on 
operations-related issues as it does on intelligence…ISR [planners] must 
have a firm grasp on military doctrine and theory in order to fully integrate 
ISR into the campaign….The realities of modern warfare require a change 
to the training philosophy of ISR personnel… [who] must be a main 
training audience during major exercises.485 
As suggested earlier, ISR is not conflict limited.  With this understanding, ISR 
leaders must look beyond military training exercises to opportunities in which their 
capabilities can be exercised and demonstrated.  In anticipation of future recovery 
operations, CFACC ISR planners and liaisons should be involved in Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) exercises.  
Though these exercises may require employing the same virtual environments currently 
employed in military exercises, ISR must not be overlooked and should be integrated into 
initial planning considerations. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Counterinsurgency operations have highlighted the limitations of the U.S. Air 
Force’s strict adherence to a major theater war doctrine.  By limiting its structure to the 
confines of the CAOC, the CFACC is unprepared for the distributive nature of COIN 
campaigns or non-combat related operations.  To alleviate these problems, the ISR 
constellation must adapt a construct that encourages dynamic design, incorporating 
technologies that allow for rapid innovation and deployment, and train personnel for the 
complex planning and interactive nature of their work.  The Air Force has already 
demonstrated the capability to execute this type of employment standard in limited ways.  
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The ISRLOs, the very nature of dynamic targeting, and the distribution of FMV 
capabilities to the division level all suggest that the CFACC can replicate this form of 
employment on a larger, more permanent scale. 
But to do any of this requires a formal doctrine acknowledging the dynamic 
nature of COIN and ISR in particular.  Only when Air Force leadership takes such 
concerns seriously will priority of funding go to the right systems, personnel, and 
training.  Failure to document the hard won lessons of the current fight will leave the 
CFACC ill-prepared to support future operations and will demand that ISR professionals 
relearn lost TTPs. 
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VII. CONCLUSION—PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The 2005 re-organization of the U.S. Army to better meet the needs of 
counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare did not create the problems with the Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) support provide by the Combined Forces Air 
Component Commander (CFACC).  Rather, it simply highlighted the limitations of the 
U.S. Air Force’s strict adherence to a major theater war doctrine and its poor fit of the 
ISR structure with the demands of COIN.  As our military continues to foresee 
“intelligence driving operations,” the need for timely, applicable ISR support will 
continue to grow.  Unfortunately, as CFACC ISR assets continue to be added to the Iraqi 
and Afghan Theaters of Operation at an increasing rate, their utility is hampered by the 
requirements of a planning/tasking/execution process largely developed for a 
conventional force-on-force engagement.     
Fortunately, many of the problems highlighted in this thesis have already been 
addressed.  The CFACC has significantly increased the number of available ISR 
collection opportunities, deploying an ever increasing number of unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) and airborne ISR crews, as well as increasing the number of missions 
flown and targets collected by each asset.  Additionally, the ISR Division (ISRD) of the 
Combined Air and Space Operations Center (CAOC) has developed new processes that 
allow for more direct interaction of ISR platforms with supported ground units through 
the deployment of ISR Liaison Officers and the assignment of “direct support” missions 
in which an ISR asset flies under the direct guidance of the supported unit rather than on 
a pre-determined collection mission with a set of specific targets.  These solutions are a 
credit to the hard work by junior officers in all services as they attempt to overcome the 
inertia of their organizations and the restrictions of their doctrine.  But these current 
endeavors are largely piece-meal affairs that lack formalization and are susceptible to 
personality-based disruptions, providing little more than “temporary fixes” to an 
institutional problem that requires re-inventing the process in whole to make genuine, 
lasting improvements. 
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The Air Force has yet to take the significant steps necessary to develop an 
adaptive organizational structure and a doctrine designed for dynamic problem sets.  To 
mature into a capable organization suited to the fluid nature of modern military 
operations, the CFACC must guide the ISR enterprise to enact structural changes that 
encourage dynamic design, decentralize planning and decision making, and focus on 
developing integrated solutions to the unique problem sets of supported commanders.   
B. ORGANIZATION RE-DESIGN TO IMPROVE RESPONSIVENESS 
The U.S. Army transformation to the modified Brigade Combat Team (BCT) 
structure made the Army more agile with regards to its decentralized adversary and better 
resourced to address the unique problems associated with the larger context of counter 
insurgency.   This transformation also desynchronized the joint planning process, 
focusing on the necessities of grass-roots planning and small unit employment.  The 
conventional planning process was designed such that U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force 
planning were conducted in parallel, driven from the top down with guidance, resources, 
and requests directed by the Joint Force Commander’s explicit priorities of effort.  This 
proven sequence of reciprocal planning, tasking, and execution ensured that both the land 
and air components were sufficiently prepared to execute operations simultaneously and 
in coordination with one another.  By failing to follow the Army’s lead in decentralizing 
not only the execution but the planning of operations to the appropriate level, the U.S. Air 
Force allowed this parallel process to devolve into a sequential order of events that 
significantly hampered coordination between the two components. 
1. Creating Joint Adhocracies to Improve Coordination 
To develop the Air Force organizational counterpart to the U.S. Army’s Brigade 
Combat Team will require restructuring the machine bureaucracy of the CFACC into one 
better suited to the adhocracy represented by the BCT.  The resulting structure should 
allow the Air Force to rapidly and effectively integrate Air Force personnel and 
capabilities into joint, coalition, and interagency task forces.   Unlike the Army’s focus 
on a permanent adhocracy in the form of its BCTs, the Air Force must view its 
participation in any adhocracy as a temporary measure specific to that environment and 
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problem, and be prepared to adapt to and support other joint/coalition/interagency task 
forces or processes.  In short, there may not be one ideal solution that works across the 
board to support various “customers.”  The resulting Air Force structure must be focused 
on creating capabilities that are more easily tailorable to a host of different needs as 
opposed to finding the “ideal” solution for its current Machine Bureaucracy or the 
“perfect” match for the current U.S. Army adhocracy. 
The Air Force should focus on developing a capability to “export” the key 
components of its CAOC to join with the supported command structures, assigning 
personnel and coordinating planning at the most appropriate level given the 
circumstances.  Establishing an organization focused on the key nodes of ISR planning, 
management and control, will allow the CFACC to provide the necessary adaptability 
required by the supported units while retaining the ability to supervise the welfare of the 
constrained ISR fleet. 
Planning and execution functions have been significantly improved by deploying 
ISR Liaison Officers (ISRLOs) to represent the concerns of the CFACC while providing 
the ISR background necessary to enable planning at the BCT level.  ISR Liaison Teams 
(ILTs) consisting of enlisted ISR experts trained to coordinate ISR effects in real time, 
should be attached to BCTs to coordinate CFACC and Combined Forces Land 
Component Commander (CFLCC) effects.  While the U.S. military has a long history of 
joint integration, it may be necessary in some events to integrate ISR planning and 
execution with inter-agency task forces as well, many of which lack the formal structures 
of the U.S. military.  Air Force personnel must therefore be prepared to support agencies 
with a very poor understanding of the limitations and capabilities of ISR and must be 
enabled by a structure that is flexible enough to adapt to transforming hierarchies.  When 
identifying the appropriate agencies or echelon for integrating Air Force efforts, CFACC 
leaders should identify the location of the designated “decision-maker” who possesses the 
most organic capabilities for executing their decisions.  In 2005, the CFLCC focused 




the BCT the appropriate level to which U.S. Air Force planners and liaisons should be 
assigned.  In other theaters or as the campaign develops, it may be necessary to shift 
integration higher or lower.   
Maximizing ISR asset employment and reacting to changes in the weather, the 
supported unit’s plan, or maintenance issues that eliminate ISR support or drastically 
reduce its availability, requires constant real time management.  For this purpose, it is 
necessary to forward deploy the Intelligence, Surveillance And Reconnaissance Cell 
(ISARC) and its personnel to each theater to the Joint Task Force level.  Currently, there 
exists only one ISRARC, located at the CAOC, which is responsible for three separate 
theaters of operations.  This naturally reduces the effectiveness of ISARC personnel in 
administrating the ISR fleet, who are unable to understand the developing situation in 
each theater to the necessary level of fidelity.  By forward deploying an ISARC to each 
theater, the ISARC would gain invaluable insight into the operational concept of the 
theater commander, the progress of operations across the battlespace, and the delicate 
coordination of ISR and operations assets.  The ISARC serves as a key component in the 
command and control of ISR assets, ensuring that all are used to their fullest potential in 
meeting developing needs across the battlespace.   This can only be effectively conducted 
with significant interaction with the supported theater commander. 
Additionally, reach back agencies that provide invaluable long term support and 
analytical expertise were reorganized to promote habitual relationships.  The Air Force 
Distributed Common Ground Station (DCGS) enterprise, which provides the control, 
processing and exploitation for the majority of CFACC ISR, geographically designated 
DGS-1 to focus on Iraq and DGS-2 to focus on Afghanistan.  Furthermore, within each 
DGS, Distributed Ground Station (DGS) Analysis and Reporting Teams (DARTs) were 
aligned with specific Land Component Command Divisions in theater.  Each DART 
could therefore participate in Division ISR planning, could coordinate in real time with 
Army organic ISR capabilities, and could develop a better understanding of the 
requirements and expectations of their supported decision makers.  
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2. Integrating the Planning and Request Processes 
The de-synchronization of the CFLCC and CFACC planning processes has 
resulted in an excessive emphasis on ad hoc re-tasking of ISR assets to meet short-notice 
Army requirements.  While this has generated frustration within the air component from 
not being able to develop effective and efficient plans, it has also generated friction 
within the land component as previously requested and planned for ISR enablers were re-
directed with little notice to “higher priority” missions.  This in turn led to a lack of trust 
in the air component and a clamoring among ground commanders for either increased 
organic ISR capabilities or tactical control (TACON) of air component assets when 
assigned.  Overcoming this desynchronization will require improved intermixing of 
planning and tasking processes to acknowledge supported commander requirements and 
recognition of the flexibility of CFACC assets to meet a wide range of needs. 
Despite the effectiveness of ISR sensors and capabilities, the biggest challenge for 
Air Force ISR planners and operators will be the coordination of information.  Getting 
the right cues to other sensors, ensuring intelligence information is made available to the 
right people at the right time, and creating effective communications plans will all prove 
vital to the success of any mission.  The focus of such planning will be on integration, 
avoiding the treatment of ISR as a separate event but rather as one that feeds into and 
reacts to the operations plan.  Such planning will also be critical in the deconfliction of 
airspace, the management of effects, and the coordination of “trigger events” in which 
ISR plays a chief role in informing leadership’s decisions to execute or abort the mission.  
All participants, all stakeholders, must be available and prepared to work in a single 
combined planning cell for such operations to be successful.  During execution, 
command centers must contain representatives with the authority to adapt effects “on the 
fly” and capable enough to recognize new opportunities as they present themselves. 
Detailed ISR planning, leveraging ISR expertise at the BCT level and drawing 
upon “reach back” organizations for further support, is essential for the effective and 
efficient employment of “high demand, low density” ISR assets.  ISR planning must 
anticipate timing considerations (the amount of time to collect intelligence, process it, 
analyze the information, and disseminate it to the appropriate users) as well as 
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requirements for ISR Ops/Liaison teams to execute the plan.  Planning should, whenever 
possible, identify specific targets to be collected against and, when not possible, provide 
named areas of interest to focus collection efforts.   Coordination between ISR assets and 
between ISR and operations will require a carefully constructed communications plan to 
allow for real time execution of the ISR operation in support of the BCT mission.  Lastly, 
a clear priority of support must be established to identify which units will require ISR 
support before other units.  This identification should also guarantee that the unit has the 
necessary communications or liaison support to receive available ISR products when 
needed.  The resultant plan should represent a fully integrated product that combines ISR 
support with maneuver unit schemes of maneuver, fire support plans, and deconfliction 
from the electronic warfare plan.   
In filling collection requests, the collection manager (CM) (with the advice of the 
ISRLO) must avoid the temptation of spreading ISR across several units to fulfill as 
many requirements as possible, and instead use a multidisciplinary approach to overcome 
system limitations and maximize asset utilization.  Tasking one asset against one 
requirement and another asset against a different requirement may be viewed as a means 
by which to maximize collection, but such a tactic is usually less effective and fails to 
meet the commander’s needs on both targets.  CMs must use their understanding of the 
commander’s intent and decision making needs to provide the full-spectrum of effective 
ISR to cover the highest priority requirements. 
The CM process is the formal structure through which stakeholders manage “high 
demand, low density” assets.  An effective COIN CM process allows the Joint Forces 
Commander to provide limited assets to priority operations and units while maintaining 
pressure on insurgent networks and supporting non-kinetic counterinsurgency operations 
throughout the theater.  Only through a carefully structured CM process can plans 
focused on execution at the BCT level or below receive the full support of integrated 
kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities.   
By dividing the process into operations and ISR functions, integration suffers 
considerably.  This has been highlighted by the difficulties in coordinating the different 
effects available from assets such as the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper, both of which 
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have dedicated ISR sensors along with the ability to employ weapons for kinetic effects.  
Similarly, fighter aircraft equipped with targeting pods have often been used as 
substitutes for full-motion video (FMV) ISR platforms.  The separate tasking processes 
for close air support (CAS) and ISR has been inefficient, providing little to no oversight 
over both processes resulting in gaps in coverage or redundancy in effects.  When ISR 
tasking requests are further divided into intelligence disciplines, the chance for seamless 
employment of all assets into successful mission accomplishment diminishes.  Operations 
and Intelligence must be integrated not only in execution but throughout the planning, 
requesting, and tasking process. 
Recognizing the ability of ISR and operations assets to provide effects within 
each realm, a new requesting process must be established that ignores the traditional 
labeling of assets as “strike” or “ISR.”  The DD Form 1972.1 Joint Integrated Air 
Support Request (JIASR) provides the coordination required for COIN operation 
planning.  Though based on the Air Support Request used to task Close Air Support 
missions, the DD Form 1972.1 also serves as a formal means for integrating assets with 
supported units.  Not only does the form provide sections for requesting specific 
“effects,” it also details how assets will communicate with the supported unit, who the 
point of contact within the unit will be, and it provides the overall concept of operations 
for all assets.486  Rather than submitting separate forms for each asset or type of asset 
(CAS vs. electronic warfare vs. ISR), all requests for support of one operation are 
submitted via a single form.  This form, in turn, provides guidance to supporting units on 
who to contact within the supported unit for further clarification and a vision for how 
their effects will be integrated with other supporting and supported elements.  Of course, 
there must be a tasking structure in place that can accept requests that extend beyond the 
ISR community or outside the CAS community. 
The Effects Working Group (EWG) at the BCT level encourages such 
collaboration.  Integrating officers responsible with the different lines of effort (LOE) 
with their enabling support to include Air Liaison Officers (ALO) and the ISR Liaison 
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Officer allows for problem solving to be conducted through discussion and feedback.   
Furthermore, having the ISRLO present during EWG planning sessions ensures that ISR 
requirements do not go overlooked and helps to identify ISR opportunities that may not 
have otherwise been identified by the group.  ISR planners must not be sequestered 
behind the “green door” of secrecy in the special compartmented information facility 
(SCIF) but must mingle with those decision makers who will draw upon intelligence to 
inform their choices.487 
Similarly, the Effects Synchronization Meeting (ESM) at the Division level also 
strives to best integrate and deconflict ISR and operations needs.  By bringing together 
representatives from each of the BCTs along with the asset managers for CAS, ISR, 
attack aviation and other “enablers,” the ESM is able to eliminate redundancies or 
conflicts in requests, distribute assets among units, and develop solutions for gaps in 
coverage using all available capabilities.  Unfortunately, such coordination is largely 
absent in the current Corps asset management construct.  An integrated operations-ISR 
synchronization meeting, an Asset Coordination Meeting (ACM), is required that like the 
ESM at the Division will be a formally organized network of asset representatives and 
liaisons from each of the divisions to explain Division and BCT operations and priorities.   
The ACM would be ideally positioned to mix ISR and operations assets and to ensure 
effective planning had been conducted to coordinate the employment of these assets by 
the supported unit.  The ACM would also be able to highlight missions that cannot be 
supported in total and that may require shifting assets to the next highest priority because 
they have fewer integrated requirements.   
3. Shortening the Chain of Approval 
Careful planning can produce an executable mission that is not reliant on the 
ability of select individuals to adapt rapidly in the face of change.   Planning, however, 
cannot predict all obstacles to be encountered, nor can it anticipate the opportunities that 
may become available during the course of mission execution.  Therefore, to make the 
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case to improve the manner in which ISR is planned and tasked is insufficient to truly 
meet the demands for responsive ISR.  ISR planners must take into consideration the 
need for plans to flex to a developing situation and must ensure that those monitoring the 
execution of the ISR plan not only have the expertise sufficient to recognize and adapt to 
that situation but also the authority to direct such actions as necessary.  Such individuals 
will be required both at the tactical level for “terminal coordination” as well as at higher 
echelons to enable the smoothest modification of target decks and sensor allocation.   
A forward deployed ISARC will be essential in the mitigation of conflicts 
between organizations with regard to adding new targets to the ISR collection deck.  
While each echelon of decision makers should be responsible for determining the priority 
of support for their subordinate units, the ISARC will be required to monitor all changes 
to the ISR plan to ensure that it will not adversely impact the health and welfare of the 
CFACC enterprise nor will it be detrimental to the next day’s flying schedule and that 
day’s supported units.  Delegating decision making down to the lowest level and utilizing 
horizontal rather than vertical coordination links will encourage the most responsive 
execution of ISR. 
Even with the command and control advantages imparted by the forward 
deployment of the ISARC, it is not clear that ISR employment would be significantly 
improved.  The ISARC provides the ability to re-task assets in response to fleeting targets 
and to update target decks based on mission developments, but the coordination of ISR 
assets with operations remains a more tactical issue.  Based on current employment, the 
ISARC does not appear to be able to sufficiently correlate intelligence information 
among the various ISR platforms.  Rather, this task has been undertaken by either ISR 
crews in the execution of their mission or the supported ground units, which may or may 
not be continuously monitoring the necessary chat rooms in which intelligence 
information is reported.   
A requirement exists for a single coordinating authority to correlate intelligence 
data from CFACC and organic assets and to compare it to the developing ground 
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situation for effective ISR-operations integration.488  The ISR Effects Coordinator 
(ISREC) would be tasked with executing ISR operations with assets allocated via the 
formal ISR tasking process to support a specific tactical operation.489  This designation, 
rather than a specific individual, could be transferred among Joint partners as necessary 
so long as the requirements of being able to communicate with available ISR platforms, 
interact directly with the supported decision maker, and draw upon a thorough 
understanding of ISR capabilities and limitations are met.  The ISRLO or the senior 
member of the ILT are the most likely CFACC candidates to serve as the ISREC, 
particularly because of their location within the supported command post. 
The ISRLO functions primarily in a planning and advisement role, providing the 
CFACC ISR expertise to integrate ISR assets and capabilities into the ground 
commander’s scheme of operations.  The ILTs execute the ISR mission in direct 
coordination with the supported unit and the assigned ISR assets.  ILTs would focus not 
only FMV capabilities but would also provide the point of contact for integrating with 
Global Hawk and Tactical Reconnaissance (TACRECCE) Direct Support missions, 
interacting in real time with the divisionally aligned DART, and working with the joint 
terminal attack controller (JTAC) for non-traditional ISR (NTISR) support from targeting 
pod equipped fighter aircraft. 
The ISRLO, having contributed to the development of the ISR plan, can then 
provide oversight of the ISR execution, ensuring that the plan is proceeding smoothly and 
improvising solutions to snags encountered along the way.  ISRLO direct oversight of 
such operations would likely be limited to those missions requiring intensive ISR 
support.  Day-to-day ISR support, typically limited to a few ISR assets at time, would be 
fully executable by the ILTs and Army ISR Operations Soldiers.  In either case, the 
ISRLO or the senior ILT member could effectively serve as the ISREC, representing the 
needs of the supported ground commander. 
                                                 
488 Captain Amanda R. Figueroa, e-mail message to author, September 29, 2009. 
489 Ibid. 
 273
C. RE-ORIENTATION ON “WICKED” PROBLEMS TO IMPROVE 
EFFECTIVENESS 
Simply delegating planning and command functions of air component assets to 
subordinate levels to improve timeliness fails to address the greater problems of ISR 
within a COIN campaign.  Organizational re-structuring is a necessary component of 
meeting the needs of COIN ISR planning, tasking, and execution, but it is not sufficient 
for alleviating many of the current problems.  In fact, while it may be possible to reduce 
the planning timelines by changing the level of planning and tasking authority, it is 
unlikely to significantly increase the effectiveness of the limited number of available ISR 
assets.  Making decisions faster improves the responsiveness of ISR, but making the right 
decisions makes ISR effective.  Re-organizing alone could simply lead to making the 
wrong decisions faster and with frequent, incorrect, course changes.  To be both 
responsive and effective, organizational redesign must be accompanied by a willingness 
to work with other stakeholders to identify the problem to be resolved and the steps most 
likely to be successful. 
Getting the stakeholders to achieve this shared understanding of the problem and 
a commitment to its resolution, however, is one of the foremost obstacles to be overcome.  
This requires allowing the stakeholders to interact directly with one another, to develop 
an understanding for another’s perspectives with regard to the wicked problem, and to 
work together to find an optimal if not perfect solution.   Collaboration and knowledge 
management should be integrated with “flat” architectures that allow stakeholders access 
to one another’s work.  The quality of what could become information overload generally 
improves as representatives of different stakeholders are able to validate information and 
resolve discrepancies. 
The required dialogue between ISR planners and crews and their supported 
decision makers must continue into the execution phase of ISR operations.  Leveraging 
technology such as chat and virtual teleconferences, members of the ISR enterprise must 
remain in constant contact with their joint force partners to understand new developments 
in the situation, changes to operational objectives, and to deal with unexpected problems.  
Formal tasking processes that rely on strictly structured request formats and e-mail, 
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which was designed for the transmitting of data and not for interactive communications, 
are ill-suited to the needs of wicked problems and the COIN environment. 
1. Prioritization Based on Unit Needs vs. Dictated Problem Sets 
A change in mindset is necessary to employ ISR effectively in a COIN campaign.  
ISR can no longer be viewed solely as the domain of the intelligence community but 
must represent an extension of the ops-intel fusion paradigm.  Though the Air Force has 
long promoted the notion of “effects” over targets, this philosophy must achieve full-
functionality by employing ISR assets in a manner that support BCT commanders and 
operations and does not simply “service targets.”   To do so, however, requires the 
cultivation of a shared understanding and collaboration in solving COIN associated ISR 
problems and recognition that such problems and solutions will be unique to the units 
encountering them and may not be applicable across the battlespace. 
By 2008, the Joint Forces Commander acknowledged that each BCT was dealing 
with a unique set of obstacles to defeating the insurgency within their area of operations 
and restoring government capacity in that region.  Rather than designate a specific target 
as a priority to be used across the board, whether it impacted the BCT commanders or 
not, the JFC instead prioritized which BCTs or operations should receive priority in 
support.490  This allows BCT commanders to tackle their local problems as necessary to 
meet the JFC’s overall objective, which is the quelling of the insurgency and the 
restoration of state services.   As the fight becomes less intense in one area or more 
critical in another, the JFC can shift his priority of effort among those units rather than 
attempt to identify every potential ISR problem set they might encounter. 
As early as 2007, the Corps Collections Management team, made up of joint 
representatives, developed a solution to the need to prioritize by unit versus target.  
Originally, FMV assets were treated like any other ISR asset, assigned specific targets to 
collect against and times during which to do so.  When the time was up, the FMV asset 
moved onto another target, sometimes in the middle of an operation, leaving the 
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supported unit without necessary coverage.  Recognizing the inflexibility of this process, 
the Corps CM began to align FMV assets with each Division.  Aligned assets are tasked 
to the Divisions themselves for use on a recurring basis.  This allows the Division to then 
fill requirements submitted by subordinate BCTs with more confidence in the asset’s 
availability.  While the Division may choose to re-task the asset to another BCT, the 
ability to request Corps non-aligned assets often eliminates this requirement and nearly 
guarantees a BCT that Division-level aligned assets can be counted on to be available as 
requested.   Non-aligned assets are Corps ISR assets used to fill an emerging high priority 
requirement.  Units that receive non-aligned assets do so only for a limited amount of 
time and with the understanding that the asset could be pulled to fulfill a higher priority 
tasking.491   
Another solution, developed by the collection managers at the CAOC ISRD and 
coordinated with the Division ISRLOs, was the development of “direct support” ISR 
missions, particularly in the usage of the Global Hawk but later extended, in a limited 
fashion, to fighters employing TACRECCE pods.  During “direct support” missions, the 
ISR asset is tasked to work directly with a particular unit for a given time.  Rather than 
assigning the ISR asset a deck of targets to be collected, the asset’s crew coordinates in 
real time with the supported unit’s ISR team to identify targets as they are required. The 
supported Army unit would action a target, for example, and as insurgents fled the scene 
the Army would provide the latest information available.  The ISRLO, working in 
conjunction with the JSTARS, the Warrior Alpha, and the Global Hawk would then 
coordinate the tracking and locating of the insurgents as they sought cover.  The JSTARS 
would provide updates to the Army ISR Operations officer directing the Warrior Alpha 
and to the ISRLO who was in contact with the Global Hawk.  Each would then provide 
feedback on what they found or did not find, and the search would continue with 
information fed to the Army unit for capturing the insurgents. 
The alignment of FMV assets with Divisions and the employment of Direct 
Support missions both assumed a dynamic, changing problem and provided the supported 
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commander with the ability to shift ISR collection as necessary.  Though the potential 
exists for ISR assets to be underutilized during such missions, the flexibility and 
responsiveness accorded is far more in line with the requirements of COIN operations. 
2. Shared Understanding of the Mission 
Reorganizing the CFACC ISR enterprise will help to align the right people with 
one another at the best echelons for control and execution, but simply putting 
organizations together is not enough.  ISR personnel must understand the importance of 
constant dialogue to the successful resolution of the wicked problems encountered in 
COIN campaigns.  Only through such dynamic interactions can ISR truly drive 
operations, adapt to the changing environment, and effectively shape the battlespace.  
Decentralization of authority and seamless integration of ISR-operations effects requires 
a shared understanding of the problem. 
Placing CFACC planners at the BCT level to include ISRLOs maintains the 
CFACC’s vision of ISR employment while also managing the interaction of CFACC ISR 
asset employment with BCT operations.492  By placing the ISRLO at the BCT level and 
by integrating the DART into the EWG’s planning process, the CFACC can begin 
planning ISR missions in parallel with, rather than sequentially to, the BCT process while 
also helping to create shared understandings of the problems with which to be dealt.  
Furthermore, such direct interaction encourages transparency in the planning and tasking 
process and gives each component direct insight into the others’ decision making 
processes.493 
Mission Type Orders (MTOs) use narratives to focus subordinate and supporting 
unit efforts for effective operations while providing lower-level commanders with the 
flexibility to execute initiative in accomplishing the commander’s intent.494  Such 
explicit and implicit guidance, combined with an understanding of what other elements of 
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the mission will be accomplishing, will significantly improve the ISR support provided to 
the BCT.  MTOs typically consist of the commander’s intent, the task to be accomplished 
and the purpose of that task in accomplishing the overall mission but leaves the details of 
planning and mission execution to tactical commanders and crews.495  ISR MTOs should 
be a part of the overall plan to ensure that all elements are aware of the available 
capabilities on the mission and that sufficient coordination has been made to disseminate 
information to all those who may require it.   
D. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. military is likely to continue encountering insurgencies in the future and 
the U.S. Air Force must embrace its role in COIN operations, developing a coherent, 
fully developed doctrine for employing dynamic, responsive ISR.  The U.S. Air Force 
should approach the development of a COIN-focused ISR doctrine as a complimentary 
effort to its traditional role in air dominance during a conventional fight.496  Without such 
a doctrine, the Air Force, and its ISR enterprise in particular, will lack the necessary 
guidance on how to train, equip, and organize for the effective execution of operations in 
the future.497  Without a specific written reference, manpower, money, and training will 
never be sufficiently provided and integrated for this ongoing requirement. 
A COIN-focused ISR doctrine will highlight the effects air and space power can 
bring to the fight.  Understanding these capabilities will in turn clarify the types of people 
and training needed for ISR operations within COIN.498  A carefully constructed ISR 
doctrine, as it relates to COIN, will be less about dictating a strict organizational 
construct and more about embracing the flexibility required to evaluate each theater for 
the appropriate echelons to which liaison officers are assigned, planners are delegated, 
and where command and control nodes will be most effective. 
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Ideally, this thesis will serve as a starting point for understanding and developing 
the required doctrine.  In providing an initial foundation by tying together the many 
combat proven solutions already enacted into a formalized, supportable process that 
benefits from the synergistic effects of these many efforts, future doctrine writes can 
further expand this concept.  Instead of replacing U.S. Air Force conventional doctrine 
with that suited only to COIN, the Air Force and its joint partners must replicate the 
duality of the air tasking methodology as reflected in the air tasking order process and its 
companion close air support process.  A complimentary document to Joint Publication 3–
09.3 “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support” is required to 
provide the same level of guidance for “Close ISR Support.”  Failure to document the 
hard won lessons of the current fight will leave the CFACC ill-prepared to support future 
operations and will demand that ISR professionals rediscover lost knowledge. 
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APPENDIX A. INTELLIGENCE DISCIPLINES 
Joint Publication 2–0 Joint Intelligence (22 June 2007), provides the following 
definitions of intelligence disciplines.  Additional comments, particularly with regards to 
intelligence support to counterinsurgency operations have been added and are referenced 
as appropriate.  Unless otherwise specified, all definitions are direct quotes from their 
sources to prevent contradictions with official doctrine. 
A. GEOSPATIAL INTELLIGENCE (GEOINT) 
GEOINT is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to 
describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced 
activities on the Earth. GEOINT consists of imagery, IMINT, and geospatial information. 
GEOINT encompasses a range of products from simple IMINT reports to complex sets of 
layered foundation and intelligence/mission-specific data. GEOINT products are often 
developed through a “value added” process, in which both the producer and the user of 
GEOINT update a database or product with current information. Advanced geospatial 
intelligence (AGI), formerly known as imagery-derived MASINT, includes all types of 
information technically derived from the processing, exploitation, and non-literal 
analysis. AGI does not include the MASINT sub-elements of radio-frequency, materials, 
nuclear radiation, geophysical, or radar not related to synthetic aperture radar. The three 
components of GEOINT (imagery, IMINT and geospatial information) are discussed 
below.  
The Army implementation of GEOINT is a result of the Army’s organization, 
manning, and training. There are multiple types of data and information that various 
Army units and organizations collect, provide, and analyze in order to support the 
GEOINT enterprise. The two primary GEOINT service providers in the Army are MI 
units and organizations and Engineer (topographic) units and organizations. MI units and 
organizations provide imagery and IMINT to the enterprise. Engineer (topographic) units 
and organizations provide geospatial data and information to the enterprise. Therefore, 
while some of the collection, analysis, and exploitation of imagery and geospatial 
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information occur within the intelligence warfighting function; some of the collection, 
analysis, and exploitation of imagery and geospatial information occur outside 
intelligence.499   
(NOTE:  An argument can be made that “geospatial intelligence is an all-source 
technique for synthesizing [intelligence information], not a collection INT.”500  For this 
reason, this thesis uses the term IMINT vs. GEOINT when discussing the collection 
discipline.) 
a. Imagery is a likeness or presentation of any natural or man-made feature or 
related object or activity and the positional data acquired at the same time the likeness or 
representation was acquired, including products produced by space-based national 
intelligence reconnaissance systems, and likenesses or presentations produced by 
satellites, airborne platforms, unmanned aerial vehicles, or other similar means (except 
that such term does not include handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on 
behalf of HUMINT collection organizations). It is used extensively to update GEOINT 
foundation data and serves as GEOINT’s primary source of information when exploited 
through IMINT. Imagery comes in two formats: conventional (film-based, hardcopy, 
sometimes transferred to electronic format) or electronic (digital, softcopy) as either still 
or motion. Electronic offers many advantages over conventional including improved 
timeliness, greater dissemination options, and additional imagery enhancement and 
exploitation capabilities. 
b. IMINT is the technical, geographic, and intelligence information derived 
through the interpretation or analysis of imagery and collateral materials. It includes 
exploitation of imagery data derived from electro-optical (EO), radar, infrared (IR), 
multi-spectral, and laser sensors. These sensors produce images of objects optically,  
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electronically, or digitally on film, electronic display devices, or other media. The joint 
force is able to draw support from a number of platforms and sensors with differing 
capabilities. 
(1) EO sensors provide digital imagery data in the IR, visible, and/or 
ultraviolet regions of the electromagnetic spectrum. EO sensors operating in the visible 
spectrum can provide a high level of detail or resolution but cannot successfully image a 
target in darkness or, as with EO sensors in general, bad weather. EO offers many 
advantages over non-digital (i.e., film-based) systems including improved timeliness, 
greater dissemination options, imagery enhancement, and additional exploitation 
methods. (See Figure 49, Example of an Electro-optical Image with Annotations.) 
 
Figure 49. Example of an Electro-optical Image with Annotations501 
                                                 
501 From: AFDD 2–9, 23. 
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 (2) Radar imaging sensors provide all weather imaging capabilities and 
the primary night capability. Radar imagery is formed from reflected energy in the radio 
frequency portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. Some radar sensors provide moving 
target indicator capability to detect and locate moving targets such as armor and other 
vehicles. (NOTE:  The ability to track moving targets via Radar is typically referred to 
and requested as Ground Moving Target Indicator or GMTI and is treated by this thesis 
as a unique intelligence discipline.) (See Figure 50, Example Synthetic Aperture Radar 
imagery.) 
 
Figure 50. Example Synthetic Aperture Radar imagery502 
 
                                                 
502 From: United States Air Force, “GOTChA, synthetic aperture radar sensor,”   (media associated 
with “Data Collection Supports Sensor Development”), 
http://www.wpafb.af.mil/news/story_media.asp?id=123033809 (accessed November 20, 2009). 
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(3) IR imaging sensors provide a pictorial representation of the contrasts 
in thermal IR emissions between objects and their surroundings, and are effective during 
periods of limited visibility such as at night or in inclement weather. A unique capability 
available with IR sensing is the ability to capture residual thermal effects.  (See Figure 
51, Example IR Image.) 
 
Figure 51. Example IR Image503 
 
(4) Spectral imagery sensors operate in discrete spectral bands, typically in 
the IR and visible regions of the electromagnetic spectrum. Spectral imagery is useful for 
characterizing the environment or detecting and locating objects with known material 
signatures. Some multispectral imagery (MSI) sensors provide low resolution, large area 
coverage that may reveal details not apparent in higher resolution EO imagery. Map-like 
products can be created from MSI data for improved area familiarization and orientation. 
                                                 
503 From:  United States Air Force, “Global Hawk, U-2 catches essential wildfires images,” 
(photograph),  http://www.af.mil/photos/mediagallery.asp?galleryID=47&page=6 (accessed November 20, 
2009).  An infrared image, taken by an RQ-4 Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle and analyzed for 
Southern California Firefighters, shows the Horno Fire progressing from left to right with hot areas and 
objects as white on a darker background.   
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Hyperspectral imagery (HSI) is derived from subdividing the electromagnetic spectrum 
into very narrow bandwidths which may be combined with, or subtracted from each other 
in various ways to form images useful in precise terrain or target analysis. For example, 
HSI can analyze electromagnetic propagation characteristics, detect industrial chemical 
emissions, identify atmospheric properties, improve detection of blowing sand and dust, 
and evaluate snow depths.  (See Figure 52, Example Multi-Spectral Image.) 
 
Figure 52. Example Multi-Spectral Image504 
 
(5)  Full-motion video is a new imagery capability that is shortening the 
sensor-to-shooter cycle by providing the warfighter imagery in real time. Use of full-
motion video provided by RQ-1/MQ-1 Predator unmanned aircraft assists commanders in 
maintaining situational awareness and identification and tracking of targets, and presents 
the opportunity for our forces to respond as required.505  (See Figure 53, Screen Capture 
of Example Full-Motion Video.) 
                                                 
504 From: United States Air Force, “Intel System Gains Warfighting Role,” (photograph), 
http://www.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/090323-F-5136B-450.jpg (accessed November 20, 2009).   
Taken during the 2008 wildfires in Santa Barbara, Calif shows active fires along with areas that have been 
burned.  Living vegetation is shown in  (false) red and burned vegetation is shown in (false) green. 
505 AFDD 2–9, 24. 
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Figure 53. Screen Capture of Example Full-Motion Video506 
 
(6)  Non-traditional ISR (NTISR) Resources.  With the increasing 
sophistication of airborne sensors, many, if not all, aircraft can conduct reconnaissance or 
surveillance to varying degrees, even if intelligence collection is not their primary 
mission. Some examples of non-traditional capabilities include F-16 tactical airborne 
reconnaissance systems, F-16CJs collecting SIGINT, F-15Es collecting imagery via their 
targeting pods, and AC-130s using video capabilities to monitor a particular building. 
Understanding how to integrate these capabilities into the collection plan is increasingly 
important, as traditional intelligence collection-only assets can rarely satisfy all collection 
requirements…collection managers should understand the broad range of collection 
capabilities associated with such aircraft and, based on this knowledge, articulate the 
intelligence these assets can provide. Depending on the operation, these assets can be 
called upon to provide a wide range of intelligence collection support, from providing 
GEOINT for IPOE, collecting post-strike intelligence for assessment to performing ad 
hoc collection for emerging threats. The availability of these assets may be haphazard, at 
                                                 
506 From: PEO Aviation, “Target Feed,” (photograph), http://www.army.mil/-
images/2007/10/02/8465/size2-army.mil-2007-10-02-101204.jpg (accessed November 20, 2009).  
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best, and collection managers should have knowledge of the current operational 
environment to take advantage of these capabilities when they become available.507  (The 
most common employment of NTISR assets is as a substitute for FMV capabilities and is 
therefore included under the GEOINT heading in this appendix.) 
c. Geospatial information identifies the geographic location and characteristics of 
natural or constructed features and boundaries on the Earth, including: statistical data; 
information derived from, among other things, remote sensing, mapping, and surveying 
technologies; and mapping, charting, geodetic data, and related products. This 
information is used for military planning, training, and operations including navigation, 
mission planning and rehearsal, modeling and simulation, and targeting. 
GEOINT is addressed in detail in JP 2–03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to 
Joint Operations. 
B. HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 
HUMINT is a category of intelligence derived from information collected and 
provided by human sources. This includes all forms of information gathered by humans, 
from direct reconnaissance and observation to the use of recruited sources and other 
indirect means. This discipline also makes extensive use of biometric data (e.g., 
fingerprints, iris scans, voice prints, facial/physical features) collected on persons of 
interest.  (See Figure 54, Biometric Analysis Tracking System.) 
                                                 
507 AFDD 2–9, 32–33. 
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Figure 54. Biometric Analysis Tracking System508 
 
a. Interrogation. Interrogation is the systematic effort to procure information to 
answer specific collection requirements by direct and indirect questioning techniques of a 
person who is in the custody of the forces conducting the questioning. Proper questioning 
of enemy combatants, enemy prisoners of war, or other detainees by trained and certified 
DoD interrogators may result in information provided either willingly or unwittingly. 
There are important legal restrictions on interrogation and source operations. Federal law 
and Department of Defense policy require that these operations be carried out only by 
specifically trained and certified personnel. Violators may be punished under the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice. 
b. Source Operations. Designated and fully trained military HUMINT collection 
personnel may develop information through the elicitation of sources, to include:  
                                                 
508 From: JP 2–0, p. I-5.  BATS uses thumbprints and facial and retinal scans to identify foreign 
persons of interest to human intelligence and counter-intelligence personnel. 
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(1) “Walk-in” sources, who without solicitation make the first contact with 
HUMINT personnel. 
(2) Developed sources that are met over a period of time and provide 
information based on operational requirements. 
(3) Unwitting persons, with access to sensitive information. 
c. Debriefing. Debriefing is the process of questioning cooperating human sources 
to satisfy intelligence requirements, consistent with applicable law. The source usually is 
not in custody and usually is willing to cooperate. Debriefing may be conducted at all 
echelons and in all operational environments. Through debriefing, face-to-face meetings, 
conversations, and elicitation, information may be obtained from a variety of human 
sources, such as: 
(1) Friendly forces personnel, who typically include high-risk mission 
personnel such as combat patrols, aircraft pilots and crew, long range surveillance teams, 
and SOF, but can include any personnel with information that can be used for intelligence 
analysis concerning the adversary or other relevant aspects of the operational 
environment. Combat intelligence, if reported immediately during an operational mission, 
can be used to redirect tactical assets to attack enemy forces on a time sensitive basis. 
(2) Refugees/displaced persons, particularly if they are from enemy 
controlled areas of operational interest, or if their former placement or employment gave 
them access to information of intelligence value. 
(3) Returnees, including (returned prisoners of war and defectors, freed 
hostages, and personnel reported as missing in action). 
 (4) Volunteers, who freely offer information of value to U.S. forces on 
their own initiative. 
d. Document and Media Exploitation. Captured documents and media, when 
properly processed and exploited, may provide valuable information such as adversary 
plans and intentions, force locations, equipment capabilities, and logistical status. The 
category of “captured documents and media” includes all media capable of storing fixed 
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information to include computer storage material. This operation is not a primary 
HUMINT function, but may be conducted by any intelligence personnel with appropriate 
language support.  (See Figure 55, Notional Example of HUMINT Information 
Combined with GEOINT Data.) 
 
Figure 55. Notional Example of HUMINT Information Combined with GEOINT 
Data509 
 
HUMINT is addressed in detail in JP 2–01.2, Counterintelligence and Human 
Intelligence Support to Joint Operations. 
                                                 
509 After: JP 3–24, V-9. 
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C. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE 
SIGINT is intelligence produced by exploiting foreign communications systems 
and non-communications emitters. SIGINT provides unique intelligence information, 
complements intelligence derived from other sources and is often used for cueing other 
sensors to potential targets of interest. For example, SIGINT which identifies activity of 
interest may be used to cue GEOINT to confirm that activity. Conversely, changes 
detected by GEOINT can cue SIGINT collection against new targets. The discipline is 
subdivided into three subcategories: communications intelligence (COMINT), ELINT, 
and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT).  (NOTE:  “SIGINT is in fact 
too general a term to use, when in most cases it means COMINT.”510 This comment 
holds true for current discussions in the field and for this reason, this thesis continues to 
use the term SIGINT when speaking almost exclusively of COMINT.) 
a. COMINT is intelligence and technical information derived from collecting and 
processing intercepted foreign communications passed by radio, wire, or other 
electromagnetic means. COMINT includes computer network exploitation, which is 
gathering data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks. 
COMINT also may include imagery, when pictures or diagrams are encoded by a 
computer network/radio frequency method for storage and/or transmission. The imagery 
can be static or streaming. 
b. ELINT is intelligence derived from the interception and analysis of non-
communications emitters (e.g., radar). ELINT consists of two subcategories; operational 
ELINT (OPELINT) and technical ELINT (TECHELINT). OPELINT is concerned with 
operationally relevant information such as the location, movement, employment, tactics, 
and activity of foreign non-communications emitters and their associated weapon 
systems. TECHELINT is concerned with the technical aspects of foreign non-
communications emitters such as signal characteristics, modes, functions, associations, 
capabilities, limitations, vulnerabilities, and technology levels. 
                                                 
510 Clarke, Intelligence Analysis, 85. 
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c. FISINT involves the technical analysis of data intercepted from foreign 
equipment and control systems such as telemetry, electronic interrogators, 
tracking/fusing/arming/firing command systems, and video data links. 
D. MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURE INTELLIGENCE 
MASINT is scientific and technical intelligence obtained by quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, 
modulation, plasma, and hydro-magnetic) derived from specific technical sensors for the 
purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the target, source, emitter, 
or sender. The measurement aspect of MASINT refers to actual measurements of 
parameters of an event or object such as the demonstrated flight profile and range of a 
cruise missile. Signatures are typically the products of multiple measurements collected 
over time and under varying circumstances. These signatures are used to develop target 
classification profiles and discrimination and reporting algorithms for operational 
surveillance and weapon systems. The technical data sources related to MASINT include: 
a. EO data–emitted or reflected energy across the visible/IR portion of the 
electromagnetic spectrum (ultraviolet, visible, near IR, and IR). 
b.  Radar data–radar energy reflected (reradiated) from a target or objective. 
c. Radio frequency data–radio frequency/electromagnetic pulse emissions 
associated with nuclear testing, or other high energy events for the purpose of 
determining power levels, operating characteristics, and signatures of advanced 
technology weapons, power, and propulsion systems. 
d. Geophysical data–phenomena transmitted through the Earth (ground, water, 
atmosphere) and man-made structures including emitted or reflected sounds, pressure 
waves, vibrations, and magnetic field or ionosphere disturbances. Subcategories include 
seismic intelligence, acoustic intelligence, and magnetic intelligence. 
e. Materials data–gas, liquid, or solid samples, collected both by automatic 
equipment, such as air samplers, and directly by humans. 
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f. Nuclear radiation data–nuclear radiation and physical phenomena associated 
with nuclear weapons, processes, materials, devices, or facilities. 
E. OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE 
OSINT is based on publicly available information (i.e., any member of the public 
could lawfully obtain the information by request or observation), as well as other 
unclassified information that has limited public distribution or access. Examples of 
OSINT include on-line official and draft documents, published and unpublished reference 
materiel, academic research, databases, commercial and noncommercial websites, “chat 
rooms,” and web logs (“blogs”). OSINT complements the other intelligence disciplines 
and can be used to fill gaps and provide accuracy and fidelity in classified information 
databases. However, caution should be exercised when using OSINT in that open sources 
may be susceptible to adversary use as a mode of deception (e.g., incorrect information 
may be planted in public information). All-source intelligence should combine, compare, 
and analyze classified and open source materiel to provide the full context and scope of 
the information needed to support U.S. forces. 
a. Routine needs for OSINT may be satisfied by querying organization and 
intelligence community resources to retrieve available information. These resources 
include commercial on-line information databases and products such as Jane’s 
Yearbooks, Library of Congress country studies, and the NSA telecommunication 
database, libraries, organization databases containing unclassified information, Internet 
searches, and the DNI Open Source Center (including the former Foreign Broadcast 
Information System) products and services. 
b. OSINT is very useful during interagency collaboration and in multinational 
operations where intelligence information based on OSINT sources can be easily shared.  
However, caution must be exercised to ensure that intelligence sharing arrangements, to 
include the sharing of OSINT source products, have been approved through the JFC’s 
foreign disclosure office. OSINT can be particularly important during peace operations 
that place a premium on human factors analysis and data derived from sociological, 
demographic, cultural, and ethnological studies. By using OSINT to supply basic 
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information, controlled assets and/or resources and technical systems are freed to be 
directed against priority intelligence gaps. Open source material is useful in support of all 
kinds of military operations, and is particularly useful where the U.S. government has 
minimal or no official presence. For example, DoD intelligence production analysts use 
open source information on bridge loads, railroad schedules, electric power sources, and 
other logistics related topics to support U.S. troop transport operations and noncombatant 
evacuation operations. Understanding the use of deception or misinformation in certain 
open source media are also key to productive employment of OSINT information. 
F. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE 
TECHINT is derived from the exploitation of foreign materiel and scientific 
information. TECHINT begins with the acquisition of a foreign piece of equipment or 
foreign scientific/ technological information. The item or information is then exploited by 
specialized, multi-Service collection and analysis teams. These TECHINT teams assess 
the capabilities and vulnerabilities of captured military materiel and provide detailed 
assessments of foreign technological threat capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities.  
a. TECHINT products are used by U.S. weapons developers, countermeasure 
designers, tacticians, and operational forces to prevent technological surprise, neutralize 
an adversary’s technological advantages, enhance force protection, and support the 
development and employment of effective countermeasures to newly identified adversary 
equipment. At the strategic level, the exploitation and interpretation of foreign weapon 
systems, materiel, and technologies is referred to as scientific and technical intelligence 
(S&TI). 
b. The DIA provides enhanced S&TI to CCDRs and their subordinates through 
the Technical Operational Intelligence (TOPINT) program. TOPINT uses a closed loop 
system that integrates all Service and DIA S&T centers in a common effort. The TOPINT 
program provides timely collection, analysis, and dissemination of theater specific S&TI 
to CCDRs and their subordinates for planning, training, and executing joint operations. 
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Table 6. Summary of Intelligence Discipline Strengths and Weaknesses 
SENSORS ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 
• Can identify smuggling routes 
and safe havens as well as 
structures of interest or as an aid to 
urban terrain navigation  
• EO imagery is unable to 
penetrate clouds, haze, fog, 
precipitation, vegetation or 
structures and functions only 
during daylight hours                    
• Most effective when cross-cued 
by another source; able to provide 
visualization of a situation to 
include deployment of forces, 
physical obstacles/defenses, and 
terrain features of an area of 
interest 
• The better the resolution 
required, the longer it is likely to 
take to receive such imagery 
based on the planning constraints 
demanded of getting an asset 
into the right place for the best 
angle 
• Can be used to cross-cue other 
sources for continuing coverage       
 
• Can be effective in detecting 
changes in patterns or unusual 
personnel/supply movements 
 
EO Imagery:  Best 
tool for day, clear 
weather detailed 
analysis 
• EO imagery can be useful in 
providing a count of the number of 
vehicles or personnel in an area of 
interest or to identify obstacles 
along the route of travel 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
• Can identify smuggling routes and 
safe havens as well as structures of 
interest or as an aid to urban terrain 
navigation 
• IR imagery can be impacted by 
changing temperatures which 
occur at certain times of the day 
or be “blinded” by particularly 
IR significant objects            
• Most effective when cross-cued 
by another source; able to provide 
visualization of a situation to 
include deployment of forces, 
physical obstacles/defenses, and 
terrain features of an area of 
interest 
• The better the resolution 
required, the longer it is likely to 
take to receive such imagery 
based on the planning constraints 
demanded of getting an asset 
into the right place for the best 
angle 
• Can be used to cross-cue other 
sources for continuing coverage         
  
• Can be effective in detecting 
changes in patterns or unusual 
personnel/supply movements 
  
Infrared Imagery:  
Best tool for night, 
clear weather 
detailed analysis 
• IR imagery can be useful in 
providing a count of the number of 
vehicles or personnel in an area of 
interest or to identify obstacles 




Table 6 (Continued) 
• Radar imagery is difficult to 
interpret and requires trained 
analysts (may not be particularly 
useful for providing 
visualizations to leadership) 
• Radar imagery is unable to 
detect personnel, animals, or 
tents 
• Radar shadowing can prevent 
Radar imagery from detecting 
objects within the shadow              
Radar Imagery:  
Can detect objects at 
night/in bad weather. 
• Radar imagery can typically 
search large areas and is not 
susceptible to most weather effects 
or the time of day; can penetrate 
some vegetation, camouflage 
netting, and sometimes the top 
layer of soil and nonmetallic walls 
and roofs 
• The better the resolution 
required, the longer it is likely to 
take to receive such imagery 
based on the planning constraints 
demanded of getting an asset 
into the right place for the best 
angle 
• FMV has a small field of view 
which prevents the effective 
search of large areas 
Full Motion Video 
(FMV):  Ideal for 
monitoring activity, 
maintaining 
coverage on mobile 
targets 
• FMV can both be critical in 
tracking insurgent movements, 
providing over watch of raids for 
identifying reinforcement arriving 
on the objective or for pursuit of 
“squirters,” and to develop pattern 
of life regarding insurgent 
movement and activity within a 
given area  
• FMV can provide surveillance in 
areas where it is difficult or 
impossible, due to terrain or 
insurgent dominance, to use 
observation posts 
• FMV should be focused on 
activities (pattern of life 
analysis, surveillance of an 
objective area, or to sanitize 
routes of travel); collection 
requests that are focused on 
static events (such as 
determining the number of 
doors/windows into a target 
compound) are better tasked 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
• GMTI is able to track only 
radar significant objects and 
therefore can not track people, 
animals, and in some cases small 
vehicles (to include motorcycles)
• As GMTI only tracks “radar 
contacts” it cannot differentiate 
one contact from another and 
therefore may lose track of a 
particular contact when it merges 




(GMTI):  Best used 
for tracking moving 
vehicles in non-urban 
environments 
• GMTI can both be critical in 
tracking insurgent movements, 
providing over watch of raids for 
identifying reinforcement arriving 
on the objective or for pursuit of 
“squirters,” and to develop 
pattern of life regarding insurgent 
movement and activity within a 
given area  
• GMTI can provide surveillance 
in areas where it is difficult or 
impossible, due to terrain or 
insurgent dominance, to use 
observation posts • Radar shadowing can cause a 
break in tracking for GMTI 
• Product not easily interpretable   
• Requires skilled analysts             
Multi-Spectral 
Imagery (MSI):  
Provides unique 
mapping and terrain 
analysis capabilities 
• Spectrum bands can be 
combined/manipulated to display 
desired requirements  
• Images can be merged with 
other digital imagery to provide 
higher resolution 
• Requires large amounts of 




Table 6 (Continued) 
• Document and media 
exploitation can provide critical 
information regading insurgent 
organizations, capabilities, and 
intentions  
• Takes significant amounts of 
time to collect, requiring source 
recruitment/infiltration and 
contact with source  
• Source training may limit 
accuracy of information (ability 
to understand information 
collected, to provide accurate 
location data, or to explain 
complex concepts) 
• Document and media 
exploitation can be a useful cross-
cue for HUMINT collectors in 
substantiating what detainees 
know and whether they are telling 
the truth  
• Care must be taken in 
evaluating source motivation for 
reporting as it may be used to 
leverage coalition actions to settle 
personal vendettas or to 
embarrass coalition forces 
Human Intelligence 
(HUMINT):  




on network links 
  • Sources do not always have 
direct access to required 
information and may therefore be 
only to provide incidental 
information or second-/third-hand 
accounts  
• SIGINT is useful in confirming 
or denying HUMINT reports  
• Requires trained linguists in 
most circumstances  
• Only effective when adversary 
is using a means of 
communication that can be 
monitored (for example, in 
effective against couriers or 
written communications) 
Signals Intelligence 
(SIGINT):  Can 





• May be the primary source of 
intelligence in denied areas (those 
areas under insurgent control)  
• Can be countered by encryption 
of the communications method  
(though this will not reduce the 
effectiveness of signal 
characteristics or direction 
finding) 




Table 6 (Continued) 
• Can provide remote 
monitoring of avenues of 
approach or border regions 
for smugglers or insurgents
• Product not easily 
interpretable                             
• Can be effective in 
locating insurgent safe 
havens and cache sites as 
well as determining 
insurgent activities 
• Requires skilled analysts       
• Specialized imagery 
products, using MASINT 
processing, can highlight 
obstacles to movement 
• Requires large amounts of 
memory, storage, and 
processing capabilities 
Measurement and Signals 
Intelligence (MASINT):   
• Can be used to detect 
changes over time and to 




• Can often be falsely 
discredited simply because it 
was not collected via 
classified or controlled 
channels 
Open Source Intelligence 
(OSINT) 
• Can be more useful than 
any other discipline in 
understanding public 
attitudes or allegiances 
• Sheer volume of available 
material can overwhelm 
analysts or provide too many 
contradicting views to be of 
utility  
• Requires highly trained and 




• Insurgents are a 
“thinking” threat, adapting 
their tactics, techniques, 
and procedures to coalition 
force actions and 
countermeasures; technical 
intelligence is vital in 
understanding the latest 
technology employed by 
the insurgents and allows 
for rapid fielding of new 
counter-measures 
• May require time intensive 
collection of sensitive 
materials in dangerous areas 
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APPENDIX B. ISR ASSETS 
The following fact sheets have been assembled from official U.S. Air Force, 
Army and Navy sources to provide familiarity for the ISR assets discussed throughout 
this thesis.  Fact sheets are quoted directly and have only been formatted for continuity.  
No information has been added or deleted and should therefore not be considered as 
“confirmation” or “denial” of any capability or lack of capability.  Furthermore, this is 
not an exhaustive list of ISR assets but simply a sampling of those assets referenced 
within this thesis or common to the theaters of operation. 
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A. AIR FORCE DISTRIBUTED COMMON GROUND SYSTEM (AF 
DCGS)511 
 
Figure 56. Intelligence Analysts of the AF DCGS512 
1. MISSION  
The Air Force Distributed Common Ground System, or AF DCGS, weapon 
system is the service's premier globally networked intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance weapon system. The DCGS produces intelligence information collected 
by the U-2, RQ-4 Global Hawk, MQ-9 Reaper and MQ-1 Predator. 
2. FEATURES  
The AF DCGS is currently composed of 20 geographically separated, networked 
sites. The distributed ground and mission sites are a mixture of active-duty, Air National 
Guard and Air Force Reserve units working as an integrated combat capability.  
The individual weapon system nodes are regionally focused and paired with their 
corresponding Air Force component numbered air force to provide critical processing, 
analysis and dissemination of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, or ISR, data 
collected within the numbered air force's area of responsibility.  
                                                 
511 “Factsheets: Air Force Distributed Common Ground System,” AF.mil Factsheets, August 2009, 
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet_print.asp?fsID=15433&page=1, (accessed 17 Sep 
2009). 
512 From: “Factsheets: Air Force Distributed Common Ground System”, image on page.. 
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However, globally networked capabilities enable the weapon system to execute 
missions beyond their area of responsibility. Each weapon system is able to accept data 
from any U-2, RQ-4 Global Hawk, MQ-9 Reaper or MQ-1 Predator operating anywhere 
in the world and analyze and disseminate accurate and timely intelligence globally.  
The weapon system employs global communications architecture to connect 
multiple intelligence platforms to the Distributed Common Ground System weapon 
system. The 480th ISR Wing's Operations Center ensures global synchronization for all 
the sites.  
In daily coordination with weapon system liaison officers embedded in the 
theaters' command and control elements, the 480th ISR wing operations center relies on 
detailed knowledge of dynamic PED capacities to operationally align regional AF DCGS 
expertise with specific theater collection priorities and assets. This ensures intelligence 
missions are executed in keeping with the joint force commander and the joint force 
component commander-ISR apportionment and allocation to fully satisfy joint and 
coalition intelligence needs.  
AF DCGS currently participates in operations throughout the world including 
those led by United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, U.S. Central Command, 
U.S. European Command, U.S. Forces Korea, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific 
Command and U.S. Southern Command operations throughout the world.  
3. BACKGROUND  
The current AF DCGS concept evolved from many Air Force ISR predecessor 
programs dating back to the 1960's. The first AF DCGS weapon system, called the 
Deployable Ground Station-1, or DGS-1, began operations in July 1994. A few short 
weeks later, the DGS-1 weapon system deployed to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in support 
of military operations in Haiti in August 1994.  
The DCGS has evolved from a deployable system into a true distributed ISR 
operations capability integrating platforms and crews to provide critical intelligence to 
combat forces down to the warfighters at the lowest level. Over the years, the AF DCGS 
 304
weapon system and its predecessor systems have engaged in ISR operations in every 
major conflict that has had U.S. involvement. 
Active-duty systems are assigned to Air Force ISR Agency, with Air National 
Guard units assigned to their respective states until activated by presidential order. 
Additional ANG sites are being developed and going into operation. The 480th ISR Wing 
at Langley AFB, Va., is responsible for executing AF DCGS operations worldwide, 
including many of the 50 states.  
4. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS  
Primary Function: Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance  
Major System Contractors: Raytheon, Lockheed-Martin, L-3 
Communications, Northrop Grumman, Hughes, Goodrich and Houston-
Fearless  
Major Support Contractors: Northrop Grumman, SAIC, Spectrum, 
Booz Allen Hamilton and General Dynamics  
Processing Capability: Approximately 700 gigabytes of information flow 
through the 480 IW Wing Operations Center daily--equivalent to more 
than 700 copies of the Encyclopedia Britannica  
Crew: 45 operational crewmembers (U-2 mission); 47 operational 
crewmembers (RQ-4 mission); seven operational crewmembers (MQ-
1/MQ-9 mission). All mission crews are tailored according to mission 
demands and supported by maintenance, communications and contractor 
personnel.  
Unit Cost: Approximately $750 million (includes facilities, equipment, 
communications fees, and costs associated with personnel) for a primary 
weapon system  
Initial Operating Capability: The first AF DGS weapon system node 
(DGS-1): July 1994; DGS-2, July 1995; DGS-3, November 1996; DGS-
NV, October 2001; DGS-4, February 2003; DGS-5, October 2004; DGS-
KS, July 2006; and DGS-AL and DGS-AR, November 2006.  
Inventory: Active force sites, 10; Air Force Reserve sites, 1; ANG sites, 
9. Active force sites in development, 4; Reserve sites in development, 1; 
ANG sites in development, 4.  
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B. C-130 SCATHE VIEW513 
 
Figure 57. C-130 Scathe View514 
1. MISSION  
Provide unobtrusive, long-range, long-loiter collection capability in a permissive 
environment. 
2. FEATURES  
Scathe View is composed of a high-endurance, adverse weather-operable, 
specially modified C-130H aircraft; a roll-on/roll-off sensor control and communications 
pallet operated by two on-board airborne imagery analysts; and the Wescam MX-15 
“pentasensor,” a day or night capable imagery sensor with a laser range finder and a laser 
illuminator. The Scathe View disseminates intelligence data and information directly to 
ground forces in real time via on-board voice and data communications suites. Employed 
with the Remote Operations Video Enhanced Receiver (ROVER) system, it can provide 
still-frame and full-motion video imagery downlink to receiver equipped ground units, 
complemented by real-time voice communications to the ground. Programmed Tactical 
Common Data Link and beyond line of sight data communication upgrades will allow for 
high-quality imagery transmission to ground exploitation units in theater and for 
worldwide dissemination, respectively. Scathe View and its National Guard crews have 
                                                 
513 “C-130H Scathe View,” The Air Force Handbook 2007 (Washington DC: U.S. Air Force, 2007), 
94. 
514 From: “C-130H Scathe View,” 94.  The full-motion video ball turret sensor is observable under the 
nose of the aircraft. 
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been an essential component of search and rescue, aerial mapping and Humanitarian 
Relief Operations (HUMRO) during post-Hurricane Katrina operations.  
3. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Primary Function: Global airlift 
Contractor: Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company 
Power Plant: Four Allison T56-A-15 turboprops; 4,591prop shaft 
horsepower 
Length: 97 feet, 9 inches (29.3 meters) 
Height: 38 feet, 10 inches (11. 9 meters) 
Wingspan: 132 feet, 7 inches (39.7 meters) 
Cargo Compartment: Length, 40 feet (12.31 meters); width, 119 inches 
(3.12 meters); height, 9 feet (2.74 meters). Rear ramp: length, 123 inches 
(3.12 meters); width, 119 inches (3.02 meters) 
Speed: 366 mph/318 ktas (Mach 0.52) at 20,000 feet (6,060 meters) 
Ceiling: 23,000 feet (7,077 meters) with 42,000 pounds (19,090 
kilograms) payload. 
Maximum Takeoff Weight: 155,000 pounds (69,750 kilograms) 
Maximum Allowable Payload: 42,000 pounds (19,090 kilograms) 
Maximum Normal Payload: 36,500 pounds (16,590 kilograms) 
Range at Maximum Normal Payload: 1,208 miles (1,050 nautical miles) 
Range with 35,000 pounds of Payload: 1,496 miles (1,300 nautical 
miles) 
Crew: Five (two pilots, navigator, flight engineer and loadmaster) 
Unit Cost: $30.1 
Date Deployed: Jun 1974 
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C. E-8C JOINT STARS515 
 
Figure 58. E-8C JSTARS516 
1. MISSION  
The E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System, or Joint STARS, is an 
airborne battle management, command and control, intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance platform. Its primary mission is to provide theater ground and air 
commanders with ground surveillance to support attack operations and targeting that 
contributes to the delay, disruption and destruction of enemy forces.  
2. FEATURES  
The E-8C is a modified Boeing 707-300 series commercial airframe extensively 
remanufactured and modified with the radar, communications, operations and control 
subsystems required to perform its operational mission. The most prominent external 
feature is the 27-foot (8 meters) long, canoe-shaped radome under the forward fuselage 
that houses the 24-foot (7.3 meters) long, side-looking phased array antenna.  
The radar and computer subsystems on the E-8C can gather and display detailed 
battlefield information on ground forces. The information is relayed in near-real time to 
                                                 
515 “Factsheets: E-8C Joint STARS,” AF.mil Factsheets, September 2007, 
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/index.asp, (accessed 29 May 2009). 
516 From: Ricky Best, “Sailing the Skies,” (photograph), 
http://www.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/061130-F-5420B-007.jpg (accessed November 20, 2009).  
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the Army and Marine Corps common ground stations and to other ground command, 
control, communications, computers and intelligence, or C4I, nodes.  
The antenna can be tilted to either side of the aircraft where it can develop a 120-
degree field of view covering nearly 19,305 square miles (50,000 square kilometers) and 
is capable of detecting targets at more than 250 kilometers (more than 820,000 feet). The 
radar also has some limited capability to detect helicopters, rotating antennas and low, 
slow-moving fixed wing aircraft.  
As a battle management and command and control asset, the E-8C can support the 
full spectrum of roles and missions from peacekeeping operations to major theater war.  
3. BACKGROUND  
Joint STARS evolved from Army and Air Force programs to develop, detect, 
locate and attack enemy armor at ranges beyond the forward area of troops. The first two 
developmental aircraft deployed in 1991 to Operation Desert Storm and also supported 
Operation Joint Endeavor in December 1995.  
Joint STARS supported NATO troops over Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996, 
Operation Allied Force from February to June 1999, and Operation Enduring Freedom 
and Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.  
The 116th Air Control Wing is America's first "Total Force" wing. The former 
93rd Air Control Wing, an active-duty Air Combat Command unit, and 116th Bomb 
Wing, a Georgia Air National Guard unit, were deactivated Oct.1, 2002. The 116th Air 
Control Wing was activated blending Guard and active-duty Airmen into a single unit.  
The 116th ACW is the only unit that operates the E-8C and the Joint STARS 
mission. The 17th and final E-8C aircraft was delivered on March 23, 2005.  
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4. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS  
Primary Function: Airborne battle management  
Contractor: Northrop Grumman Corp. (primary) 
Power Plant: Four Pratt and Whitney TF33–102C  
Thrust: 19,200 pounds each engine  
Wingspan: 145 feet, 9 inches (44.4 meters) 
Length: 152 feet, 11 inches (46.6 meters)  
Height: 42 feet 6 inches (13 meters)  
Weight: 171,000 pounds (77,564 kilograms) 
Maximum Takeoff Weight: 336,000 pounds (152,409 kilograms)  
Fuel Capacity: 155,000 (70,306 kilograms) 
Payload: electronic equipment and crew 
Speed: 449 –587 miles per hour (optimum orbit speed) or Mach 0.52 –
0.65 (390 –510 knots)  
Range: 9 hours  
Ceiling: 42,000 feet (12,802 meters)  
Crew: (flight crew),  four; (mission crew) normally 15 Air Force and 
three Army specialists (crew size varies according to mission)  
Unit Cost: $244.4 million (fiscal 98 constant dollars)  
Initial operating capability:  December 1997 
Inventory: Total Force wing, 17; Reserve, 0 
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D. EP-3E (ARIES II)517 
 
Figure 59. EP-3E  ARIES II518 
1. MISSION 
Four-engine turboprop signals intelligence (SIGINT) reconnaissance aircraft. 
2. FEATURES 
The EP-3E ARIES II (Airborne Reconnaissance Integrated Electronic System II) 
is the Navy's only land-based signals intelligence (SIGINT) reconnaissance aircraft. The 
11 aircraft in the Navy's inventory are based on the Orion P-3 airframe and provide fleet 
and theater commanders worldwide with near real-time tactical SIGINT. With sensitive 
receivers and high-gain dish antennas, the EP-3E exploits a wide range of electronic 
emissions from deep within targeted territory.  
3. BACKGROUND 
During the 1990s twelve P-3Cs were converted to EP3-E ARIES II to replace 
older versions of the aircraft. The original ARIES I aircraft were converted in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. The last EP-3E ARIES II aircraft was delivered in 1997. EP-3Es 
                                                 
517 “U.S. Navy Fact File: EP-3E,” The U.S. Navy Fact File, February 17, 2009, 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=1100&tid=1000&ct=1, (accessed September 17,, 
2009). 
518 From: United States Navy, “060329-N-9999X-001,” (photograph), 
http://www.navy.mil/management/photodb/photos/060329-N-9999X-001.jpg (accessed November 20, 
2009). 
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have been heavily engaged in reconnaissance in support of NATO forces in Bosnia, joint 
forces in Korea and in Operation Southern Watch, Northern Watch, and Allied Force. 
4. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Primary Function: Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) reconnaissance 
aircraft. 
Contractor: Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems Company. 
Propulsion: Four Allison T-56-A-14 turboprop engines (4,900 shaft 
horsepower each). 
Length: 116 feet 7 inches (35.57 meters). 
Height: 33 feet 7 inches (10.27 meters). 
Wingspan: 99 feet 6 inches (30.36 meters). 
Weight: Max gross take-off: 139,760 pounds (63,394.1 kg). 
Airspeed: 411 knots (466 mph, 745 kph); cruise –328 knots (403 mph, 
644 kph). 
Ceiling: 28,300 feet (8,625.84 meters). 
Range: Maximum mission range –2,380 nautical miles (2,738.9 miles); 
for three hours on station @1,500 feet –1,346 nautical miles (1,548.97 
miles). 
Crew: 22+ 
Unit Cost: $36 million. 
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E. I-GNAT / WARRIOR ALPHA519 
 
Figure 60. I-GNAT520 
1. MISSION  
The I-Gnat-ER system was deployed to Iraq to support CONOPS development for 
the Extended Range Multi Purpose program (the program of record). 
2. FEATURES  
The I-Gnat-ER/Warrior Alpha is slightly larger than the Gnat 750, has external 
hard points, an unencrypted air-to-air data link ability and updated avionics. In 
FY2005/2006, under direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Satellite 
Communications (SATCOM) capability for extended range and the 17-inch Raytheon 
Multi-spectral Targeting System (MTS) sensor/designator was added to the I-Gnat-ER 
system. This configuration is now referred to as “Warrior Alpha.” This system is a multi-
mission, multi-payload MTS EO/IR/LASER Range Detector, Designator (LRD) and a 
SAR UAS capable of operations at medium to high altitudes.  
The ER/MP Block 0 aircraft provide additional capabilities over its Block A 
predecessor to include an HFE that provides additional horsepower, dual surface flight 
controls, redundant avionics, additional electrical power and Digital Global Positioning 
System that facilitates an auto-land capability. 
                                                 
519 “Improved Gnat Extended Range (I-GNAT ER) ‘Warrior Alpha’ / Extended Range/Multi-Purpose 
(ER/MP) Block 0,” FY 2009–2034 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, (Washington DC: Department 
of Defense, April 6, 2009), 61.  
520 From: Ibid. 
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3. BACKGROUND  
The Army acquired three I-Gnat-ER unmanned aircraft and associated support 
equipment in FY2004 as a result of a Congressional plus up. The I-Gnat-ER system was 
deployed to Iraq to support CONOPS development for the Extended Range Multi 
Purpose program (the program of record).  In 2007, direction was provided to weaponize 
the Warrior Alpha which provided a significant combat multiplier and quick response in 
the field. 
To provide a more capable ER/MP variant and provide additional risk reduction 
for ER/MP, a ER/MP Block 0 production contract was awarded to General Atomics for 
six aircraft that were delivered in FY08. 
4. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Primary Function: Armed reconnaissance, airborne surveillance and 
target acquisition  
Contractor: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Incorporated  
Power Plant: Rotax 914 Turbo 
Thrust: 115 hp 
Wingspan: 55 ft 
Length: 27 ft 
Weight: 2300 lb 
Payload: 4500 lbs/300 lbs external 
Speed (Maximum/Loiter): 120+/70 kts 
Range (Direct Line of Sight / Satellite): 250/2500 km 
Ceiling: 25,000 ft 
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F. LITENING AT521 
 
Figure 61. LITENING AT Targeting Pod Mounted Under the Air Intake of an     
F-16522 
1. MISSION 
LITENING Advanced Targeting, or AT, is a precision targeting pod system 
operational with a wide variety of combat air forces aircraft (A-10A/C, B-52H, F-15E 
and F-16 Blocks 25-52) as well as aircraft operated by other services and allies (AV-8B, 
EA-6B, F-16 Block 15 and F/A-18). The system's advanced targeting and image 
processing technology significantly increases the combat effectiveness of the aircraft 
during day, night and under-the-weather conditions in the attack of ground targets with a 
variety of standoff weapons (i.e., laser-guided bombs, conventional bombs and GPS-
guided weapons). 
2. FEATURES 
Mounted externally,  LITENING AT is a targeting pod integrated with the 
aircraft. The targeting pod contains a high-resolution, mid-wave third generation, 
forward-looking infrared sensor, or FLIR, that displays an infrared image of the target to 
the aircrew.  It has a wide field of view search capability and a narrow field of view 
acquisition/targeting capability of battlefield-sized targets. The pod contains a charged 
                                                 
521 “Factsheets: LITENING AT,” AF.mil Factsheets, December 2007, 
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet_print.asp?fsID=114&page=1, (accessed September 17, 
2009). 
522 From: United States Air Force, “A LITENING pod,” (photograph accompanying story “Team tests 
pod at LITENING speed”), http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123019183 (accessed November 20, 
2009). 
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coupled device or CCD-TV, camera used to obtain target imagery in the visible portion 
of the electromagnetic spectrum. An on-gimbal inertial navigation sensor has established 
line-of-sight and automatic boresighting capability.  
The system incorporates a mult-spectral capability with a high resolution, mid-
wave, third-generation FLIR and CCD-TV.  The pod is equipped with a laser designator 
for precise delivery of laser-guided munitions and a laser rangefinder for precise target 
coordinates. For target coordination with ground and air forces, a laser spot tracker, a 
laser marker, and a fully operational remotely operated video enhanced receiver, or 
ROVER, compatible video down link improves rapid target detection/ identification. 
For ease of maintenance, LITENING AT's modularity, optimal hardware 
partitioning, and diagnostic capabilities permit true two-level maintenance, eliminating 
intermediate-level support. Automated built-in test permits a flightline maintainer to 
isolate and replace a line replaceable unit, or LRU, in under 20 minutes to get the pod 
back up to full mission capable status. Spares are ordered through a user-friendly website 
offering in-transit visibility to parts shipment.   
3. BACKGROUND 
LITENING I was developed for the Israeli air force at Rafael Corporation's 
Missiles Division in Haifa, Israel. In 1995 Northrop Grumman Corporation's teamed with 
the company for further development.  
LITENING II was initially fielded with Air National Guard and Air Force 
Reserve Command F-16s in 1999 and employed a "256" FLIR. This was subsequently 
enhanced to the LITENING Enhanced Range, or ER, configuration by the incorporation 
of a third-generation "512" FLIR. Subsequent image processing enhancements led to the 
AT configuration that is now the standard for U.S. forces which began fielding in 2003.  
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4. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Primary function:  Infrared/electro-optical targeting; non-traditional 
intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance 
Prime Contractor: Northrop Grumman Corporation  
Length: 87 inches (2.20 meters) 
Diameter: 16 inches (0.406 meters) 
Weight: 440 pounds (200 kilograms) 
Aircraft: A-10A/A+/C, B-52H, F-15E, F-16 Block 25/30/32/40/42/50/52 
Sensors: Infrared detector, CCD-TV camera, laser rangefinder and laser 
designator 
Date Deployed: February 2000 
Unit Cost: $1.4 million 
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G. MC-12  Liberty523 
 
Figure 62. MC-12W Liberty524 
1. MISSION 
The MC-12W is a medium–to low-altitude, twin-engine turboprop aircraft. The 
primary mission is providing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, or 
ISR, support directly to ground forces. The MC-12W is a joint forces air component 
commander asset in support of the joint force commander. 
2. FEATURES 
The MC-12W is not just an aircraft, but a complete collection, processing, 
analysis and dissemination system. The aircraft are military versions of the Hawker 
Beechcraft Super King Air 350 and Super King 350ER. A fully operational system 
consists of a modified aircraft with sensors, a ground exploitation cell, line-of-sight and 
satellite communications datalinks, along with a robust voice communications suite. 
The aircraft is equipped with an electro-optical infrared sensor and other sensors 
as the mission requires. The EO/IR sensor also includes a laser illuminator and designator 
in a single sensor package. The MC-12 system is capable of worldwide operations. 
 
                                                 
523 “Factsheets: MC-12,” AF.mil Factsheets, August 2009, 
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=15202, (accessed 03 October 2009). 
524 From: Elizabeth Rissmiller, “MC-12 flies first combat mission,” (photograph), 
http://www.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/090610-F-5193R-999.jpg (accessed November 20, 2009). 
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3. BACKGROUND 
The "M" is the Department of Defense designation for a multi-role version of the 
well known C-12 series. In April 2008, the Secretary of Defense established a DoD-wide 
ISR Task Force to identify and recommend solutions for increased ISR in the U.S. 
Central Command area of responsibility. On July 1, 2008, the Secretary of Defense 
tasked the Air Force to acquire 37 "C-12" class aircraft to augment unmanned systems. 
Of note, it was less than eight months from funding approval to delivery in the theater. 
The MC-12 capability supports all aspects of the Air Force Irregular Warfare 
mission (counter insurgency, foreign internal defense and building partnership capacity). 
Medium–to low-altitude ISR is a core mission for the Air Force.  
The first MC-12 arrived at Key Field in Meridian, Miss., April 28, 2009. The first 
MC-12W flew its first combat support sortie on June 12, 2009. 
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4. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Primary function:  Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
Contractor: Hawker Beechcraft Corporation 
Power plant: Pratt & Whitney PT6A-60A 
Wingspan: 57 feet, 11 inches ( 17.65 meters) 
Length: 46 feet, 8 inches (14.22 meters) 
Height: 14 feet, 4 inches (4.37 meters) 
Weight: 12,500 pounds empty (5,669 kilograms) 
Maximum Takeoff Weight: 350, 15,000 pounds; 350ER, 16,500 pounds 
Fuel capacity: 350, 3,611 pounds (1,638 kilograms); 350ER, 5,192 
pounds (2,355 kilograms) 
Speed: 312 knots 
Range: 350, 1,500 nautical miles; 350ER, approximately 2,400 nautical 
miles 
Ceiling: 35,000 feet (10,668 meters) 
Armament: none 
Crew: Two pilots and two sensor operators 
Initial operating capability: June 2009 
Unit cost: $17 million (aircraft and all communications equipment 
modifications) 
Inventory: Active force, 37 (planned); Reserve, 0; ANG, 0 
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H. MQ-1 PREDATOR525 
 
Figure 63. MQ-1 Predator Armed with an AGM-114 Hellfire Missile526 
1. MISSION  
The MQ-1 Predator is a medium-altitude, long-endurance, unmanned aircraft 
system  The MQ-1's primary mission is interdiction and conducting armed 
reconnaissance against critical, perishable targets. When the MQ-1 is not actively 
pursuing its primary mission, it acts as the Joint Forces Air Component Commander-
owned theater asset for reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition in support of 
the Joint Forces commander.  
2. FEATURES  
The MQ-1 Predator is a system, not just an aircraft. A fully operational system 
consists of four aircraft (with sensors), a ground control station, a Predator Primary 
Satellite Link, or PPSL, along with operations and maintenance crews for deployed 24-
hour operations.  
The basic crew for the Predator is one pilot and two sensor operators. They fly the 
aircraft from inside the ground control station via a line-of-sight data link or a satellite 
data link for beyond line-of-sight flight. The aircraft is equipped with a color nose camera 
 
                                                 
525 “Factsheets: MQ-1 Predator Unmanned Aircraft System,” AF.mil Factsheets, September 2008, 
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/index.asp, (accessed May 29, 2009). 
526 From:  Leslie Pratt, “MQ-1 Predator,” (photograph accompanying story “UAS beta program 
underway; officials seek more applicants”), http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123128348 (accessed 
November 20, 2009). 
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(generally used by the pilot for flight control), a day variable-aperture TV camera, a 
variable-aperture infrared camera (for low light/night), and other sensors as the mission 
requires.  The cameras produce full-motion video. 
The MQ-1 Predator carries the Multi-spectral Targeting System which integrates 
electro-optical, infrared, laser designator and laser illuminator into a single sensor 
package. The aircraft can employ two laser-guided AGM-114 Hellfire anti-tank missiles.  
The system is composed of four major components which can be deployed for 
worldwide operations. The Predator aircraft can be disassembled and loaded into a 
"coffin." The ground control system is transportable in a C-130 Hercules (or larger) 
transport aircraft or installed in a fixed facility. The Predator can operate on a 5,000 by 75 
feet (1,524 meters by 23 meters), hard surface runway with clear line-of-sight. The 
ground data terminal antenna provides line-of-sight communications for takeoff and 
landing. The PPSL provides over-the-horizon communications for the aircraft.  
An alternate method of employment, Remote Split Operations, employs a smaller 
version of the ground control system called the Launch and Recovery GCS, or LRGCS. 
This sytsem conducts takeoff and landing operations at the forward deployed location 
while the CONUS based ground control system conducts the mission via extended 
communication links.  
The aircraft includes an ARC-210 radio, an APX-100 IFF/SIF with Mode 4, an 
upgraded turbo-charged engine and glycol-weeping "wet wings" for ice mitigation. The 
latest upgrade, which enhances maintenance and performance, includes notched tails, 
split engine cowling, steel braided hoses and improved engine blocks.  
3. BACKGROUND  
The "M" is the Department of Defense designation for multi-role and "Q" means 
unmanned aircraft system. The "1" refers to the aircraft being the first of a series of 
purpose-built remotely piloted aircraft systems.  
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The Predator system was designed in response to a Department of Defense 
requirement to provide persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
information to the warfighter.  
In April 1996, the secretary of defense selected the U.S. Air Force as the 
operating service for the RQ-1 Predator system. A change in designation from "RQ-1" to 
"MQ-1" occurred in 2002 with the addition of the armed reconnaissance role.  
Operational squadrons are the 15th and 17th Reconnaissance Squadrons at  
Creech Air Force Base, Nev.  The 11th RS provides provides formal upgrade training 
also at Creech AFB.  
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4. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS  
Primary Function: Armed reconnaissance, airborne surveillance and 
target acquisition  
Contractor: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Incorporated  
Power Plant: Rotax 914F four cylinder engine  
Thrust: 115 horsepower 
Wingspan: 48.7 feet (14.8 meters)  
Length: 27 feet (8.22 meters)  
Height: 6.9 feet (2.1 meters)  
Weight: 1,130 pounds ( 512 kilograms) empty  
Maximum takeoff weight:  2,250 pounds (1,020 kilograms)  
Fuel Capacity: 665 pounds (100 gallons)  
Payload: 450 pounds (204 kilograms)  
Speed: Cruise speed around 84 mph (70 knots), up to 135 mph  
Range: up to 400 nautical miles (454 miles)  
Ceiling: up to 25,000 feet (7,620 meters)  
Armament: two laser-guided AGM-114 Hellfire missiles  
Crew (remote):  Two (pilot and sensor operator) 
Initial operational capability: March 2005  
Inventory: Active force, 110; ANG, 0; Reserve, 0 
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I. M/RQ-1C SKY WARRIOR527 
 
Figure 64. M/RQ-1C Sky Warrior528 
 
1. MISSION  
The MQ-1C Extended Range / Multi-Purpose (ER/MP) UAS will provide 
Division Commanders with a much improved real-time responsive capability to conduct 
long-dwell, wide-area reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, communications 
relay, and attack missions. 
2. FEATURES  
A difference between the ER/MP and preceding models of ER/MP A is its use of 
a diesel engine to simplify logistics and provide a common fuel on the battlefield. Other 
major differences from the ER/MP A are: the capability to carry multiple payloads and 
four Hellfire missiles, the use of a Tactical Common Data Link, Air Data Relay, 
Manned/Unmanned Teaming, redundant avionics, near all-weather capability, and a One 
System Ground Control Station that is common to the Hunter and Shadow UAS. The 
Milestone B decision was made on April 20, 2005, for entry into SDD, with contract 
award to General Atomics in August 2005 after a competitive down select process. 
Taking off from an airfield, the ER/MP is operated via the Army’s One System GCS and 
                                                 
527 “MQ-1C Extended Range/Multi-Purpose (ER/MP),” FY 2009–2034 Unmanned Systems Integrated 
Roadmap, (Washington DC: Department of Defense, April 6, 2009), 64.  
528 From: United States Army, “Unmanned aerial vehicles like the Warrior,” (photograph 
accompanying story “Training, UAVs, key to Army aviation in the field”), http://www.army.mil/-
images/2009/01/09/28130/army.mil-28130-2009-01-16-200102.jpg (accessed November 20, 2009). 
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lands via a dual redundant automatic takeoff and landing system. The ER/MP’s payload 
includes Electro-Optical/Infra-Red (EO/IR) and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) with 
moving target indicator (SAR/MTI) capabilities. Additionally, two 250-pound and two 
500-pound hard points under the main wings provide an attack capability.  
3. BACKGROUND  
Seventeen Single Development Design (SDD) aircraft are being fabricated. 
Milestone C and LRIP are expected in FY2010. ER/MP UAS will be fielded in the 
Combat Aviation Brigades in each Army division. Current Future Years Defense Plan 
(FYDP) funding supports the SDD phase of the UAS in order to progress through the 
critical design review, design readiness review, fabrication of SDD aircraft and 
components, Low Rate Initial Production, and Full Rate Production. 
4. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Primary Function: Armed reconnaissance, airborne surveillance and 
target acquisition  
Contractor: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Incorporated  
Power Plant: Thielert diesel 
Thrust: 135 hp 
Wingspan: 56 ft 
Length: 28 ft 
Weight: 3200 lb (Growth to 3,600 lb) 
Payload: 800 lb/500 lb external 
Speed (Maximum/Loiter): 150/70 kt 
Range (Direct Line of Sight / Satellite): 500/1200 km 
Ceiling: 25,000 ft 
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J. MQ-9 REAPER529 
 
Figure 65. MQ-9 Reaper530 
 
1. MISSION 
The MQ-9 Reaper is a medium-to-high altitude, long endurance unmanned 
aircraft system. The MQ-9's primary mission is as a persistent hunter-killer against 
emerging targets to achieve joint force commander objectives. The MQ-9's alternate 
mission is to act as an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance asset, employing 
sensors to provide real-time data to commanders and intelligence specialists at all levels.  
2. FEATURES  
The typical system consists of several air vehicles, a ground control station, or 
GCS,  communication equipment/links, spares and people who can be a mix of active-
duty and contractor personnel. The crew for the MQ-9 is a pilot and a sensor operator, 
who operate the aircraft from a remotely located GCS. To meet combatant commanders' 
requirements, the MQ-9 delivers tailored capabilities using mission kits that may contain 
various weapons and sensor payload combinations.  
                                                 
529 “Factsheets: MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System,” AF.mil Factsheets, September 2009, 
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet_print.asp?fsID=6405&page=1, (accessed 17 Sep 2009). 
530 From:  Robert W. Valenca, “Showing Off,” (photograph), 
http://www.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/071110-F-1789V-991.jpg (accessed November 20, 2009).  
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The MQ-9 baseline system has a robust sensor suite for targeting. Imagery is 
provided by an infrared sensor, a color/monochrome daylight TV and an image-
intensified TV. The video from each of the imaging sensors can be viewed as separate 
video streams or fused with the infrared sensor video. The laser rangefinder/designator 
provides the capability to precisely designate targets for laser-guided munitions. 
Synthetic aperture radar will enable Joint Direct Attack Munitions targeting. The aircraft 
is also equipped with a color nose camera, generally used by the pilot for flight control.  
Each MQ-9 aircraft can be disassembled into main components and loaded into a 
container for air deployment worldwide in Air Force airlift assets such as the C-130 
Hercules. The MQ-9 air vehicle operates from standard U.S. airfields.  
3. BACKGROUND  
The U.S. Air Force proposed the MQ-9 system in response to the Department of 
Defense request for Global War on Terrorism initiatives. It is larger and more powerful 
than the MQ-1 Predator and is designed to go after time-sensitive targets with persistence 
and precision, and destroy or disable those targets. The "M" is the Department of Defense 
designation for multi-role and "Q" means unmanned aircraft system. The "9" refers to the 
series of purpose-built remotely piloted aircraft systems.  
In July 2004, the Air Combat Command Commander approved the MQ-9 
Enabling Concept Document.  The MQ-9 is operated by the 42nd Attack Squadron 
and based at Creech Air Force Base, Nev.  
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4. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS  
Primary Function: Unmanned hunter/killer weapon system  
Contractor: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc.  
Power Plant: Honeywell TPE331–10GD turboprop engine 
Thrust: 900 shaft horsepower maximum 
Wingspan: 66 feet (20.1 meters) 
Length: 36 feet (11 meters)  
Height: 12.5 feet (3.8 meters)  
Weight: 4,900 pounds (2,223 kilograms) empty  
Maximum takeoff weight: 10,500 pounds (4,760 kilograms)  
Fuel Capacity: 4,000 pounds (602 gallons) 
Payload: 3,750 pounds (1,701 kilograms)  
Speed: cruise speed around 230 miles per hour, (200 knots) 
Range: 3,682 miles (3,200 nautical miles) 
Ceiling: up to 50,000 feet (15,240 meters)  
Armament: Combination of AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, GBU-12 
Paveway II and GBU-38 Joint Direct Attack Munitions.  
Crew (remote): Two (pilot and sensor operator)  
Unit Cost: $53.5 million (includes four aircraft with sensors) (fiscal 2006 
dollars)  
Initial operating capability:  October 2007 
Inventory: Active force, 10; ANG, 0; Reserve, 0 
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K. P-3C ORION531  
 
Figure 66. P-3C Orion532 
1. MISSION 
Four-engine turboprop anti-submarine and maritime surveillance aircraft. 
2. FEATURES 
Originally designed as a land-based, long-range, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 
patrol aircraft, the P-3C's mission has evolved in the late 1990s and early 21st century to 
include surveillance of the battlespace, either at sea or over land. Its long range and long 
loiter time have proved invaluable assets during Operation Iraqi Freedom as it can view 
the battlespace and instantaneously provide that information to ground troops, especially 
U.S. Marines.  
The P-3C has advanced submarine detection sensors such as directional frequency 
and ranging (DIFAR) sonobuoys and magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) equipment. 
The avionics system is integrated by a general purpose digital computer that supports all 
of the tactical displays, monitors and automatically launches ordnance and provides flight 
information to the pilots. In addition, the system coordinates navigation information and 
accepts sensor data inputs for tactical display and storage. The P-3C can carry a mixed 
payload of weapons internally and on wing pylons.   
                                                 
531 “U.S. Navy Fact File: P-3C Orion,” The U.S. Navy Fact File, February 18, 2009, 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=1100&tid=1400&ct=1 (accessed September 18, 2009). 
532 From: Richard J. Brunson, “040707-N-6932B-019,” (photograph),  




The P-3 Orion has been the Navy’s frontline, land-based maritime patrol aircraft 
since the 1960s. The most capable Orion version is the P-3C, first delivered to the Navy 
in 1969. The Navy implemented a number of major improvements to the P-3C (Updates 
I, II, II.5 and III) during its production run. P-3C aircraft communication, navigation, 
acoustic, non-acoustic and ordnance/weapon systems are still being modernized within 
several improvement programs to satisfy Navy and joint requirements through the early 
part of the 21st century. 
Current modernization programs include installation of a modernized 
communications suite, Protected Instrument Landing System, IFF Mode S and Required 
Navigation Performance Area Navigation, GPS, common avionics improvements and 
modernized cockpit instrumentation. The USQ-78(V) Upgrade Program is improving the 
USQ-78(V) Single Advanced Signal Processor system Display Control Unit, a 
programmable system control processor that provides post processing of acoustic data 
and is the main component of the Update III acoustic configuration. Up to 100 P-3C 
aircraft are being upgraded to USQ-78B configuration with System Controller (SC) and 
Acoustic Sub Unit (ASU) Tech Refreshes. In addition, all analog acoustic data recorders 
are being replaced with digital data recorders. 
 
Figure 67. Still Frame of Video from P-3C AIP533 
 
                                                 
533 From: United States Navy, “090409-N-0000X-032,” (photograph), 
http://www.navy.mil/management/photodb/photos/090409-N-0000X-032.jpg (accessed November 20, 
2009).  
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The Critical Obsolescence Program (COP) began in fiscal year 2004 to improve 
aircraft availability through replacement of obsolete and/or top degrader systems. COP 
systems include the ARC-230 HF as replacement for the ARC-161, the USQ-130 Data 
Link as replacement for the ACQ-5, the ASW-60 Autopilot as replacement for the ASW-
31, the ASX-6 Multi-Mode Imaging System (MMIS) as replacement for the AAS-36 
IRDS and the Telephonics Secure Digital Intercommunications System (SDI) as 
replacement for the AIC-22 ICS. The Navy has shifted the P-3C’s operational emphasis 
to the littoral regions and is improving the antisurface warfare (ASUW) capabilities of 
the P-3C. The antisurface warfare improvement program (AIP) incorporates 
enhancements in ASUW, over-the-horizon targeting (OTH-T) and command, control, 
communications and intelligence (C4I), and improves survivability. The AIP program 
presently includes 72 kits on contract; 69 aircraft have been delivered to the fleet as of 
September 2006. Upgrades to the armament system include the addition of the AGM-
84H/K SLAM-ER missile and Mk54 torpedo capabilities. 
P-3 mission systems sustainment, necessary to ensure the P-3 remains a viable 
warfighter until P-8A Poseidon achieves full operational capability (FOC), include 
acoustic processing upgrades through air acoustic rapid COTS insertion (ARCI) and tech  
refreshes, mission systems obsolescence management, and the upgrade of P-3 tactical 
communications and networking through over-the-horizon C4I international 
marine/maritime satellite (INMARSAT). 
The ongoing P-3C airframe sustainment program inspects and repairs center and 
outer wings while reducing Fleet inventory to the mandated 130 aircraft by 2010. The P-
3C fleet has experienced significant fatigue degradation over its operational life as 
quantified through the Service Life Assessment Program (SLAP). The Navy has 
instituted special structural inspections programs and replacement kits to refurbish 
aircraft structures to sustain airframe life. The 12 active patrol squadrons (down from 24 
in 1991) operate P-3C AIP and Update III configured aircraft. Other P-3 variants still in 
service include one VP-3A executive transport, four NP-3C and eight NP-3D research 
and development, testing and evaluation and oceanographic survey aircraft. Numerous 
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countries also fly the P-3 Orion, making it one of the more prevalent Navy aircraft 
available for foreign military sales and support.  
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4. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Primary Function: Antisubmarine warfare(ASW)/Antisurface warfare 
(ASUW). 
Contractor: Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems Company. 
Date Deployed: First flight, November 1959; Operational, P-3A August 
1962 and P-3C August 1969. 
Unit Cost: $36 million. 
Propulsion: Four Allison T-56-A-14 turboprop engines (4,600 hp each)  
Length: 116.7 feet. 
Height: 33.7 feet. 
Wingspan: 99.6 feet. 
Weight: Maximum takeoff, 139,760 pounds 
Airspeed: Maximum, 411 knots; cruise, 328 knots 
Ceiling: 28,300 feet. 
Range: Mission radius, 2,380 nautical miles; for three hours on-station at 
1,500 feet, 1,346 nautical miles. 
Crew: (P-3C) three pilots, two naval flight officers, two flight engineers, 
three sensor operators, one in-flight technician. 
Armament: 20,000 pounds of ordnance, including AGM-84 Harpoon, 
AGM-84E SLAM, AGM-84H/K and AGM-65F Maverick missiles, 
Mk46/50/54. 
 334
L. RC-135V/W RIVET JOINT534 
 
Figure 68. RC-135V/W Rivet Joint535 
1. MISSION  
The RC-135V/W Rivet Joint reconnaissance aircraft supports theater and national 
level consumers with near real time on-scene intelligence collection, analysis and 
dissemination capabilities.  
2. FEATURES  
The aircraft is an extensively modified C-135. The Rivet Joint's modifications are 
primarily related to its on-board sensor suite, which allows the mission crew to detect, 
identify and geolocate signals throughout the electromagnetic spectrum. The mission 
crew can then forward gathered information in a variety of formats to a wide range of 
consumers via Rivet Joint's extensive communications suite.  
The interior seats more than 30 people, including the cockpit crew, electronic 
warfare officers, intelligence operators and in-flight maintenance technicians.  
The Rivet Joint fleet was re-engined with CFM-56 engines with an upgraded 
flight deck instrumentation and navigational systems to FAA/ICAO standards. These 
standards include conversion from analog readouts to a digital "glass cockpit" 
configuration.  
                                                 
534 “Factsheets: RC-135V/W Rivet Joint,” AF.mil Factsheets, September 2008, 
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/index.asp, (accessed 29 March 2009). 
535 From: United States Air Force, “RC-135V/W,” (photograph accompanying RC-135 fact sheet), 
http://www.af.mil/shared/media/factsheet/rc135.jpg (accessed November 20, 2009). 
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All Rivet Joint airframe and mission systems modifications are overseen by L-3 
Communications (previously Raytheon), under the oversight of  Air Force Materiel 
Command.  
3. BACKGROUND  
The current RC-135 fleet is the latest iteration of modifications to this pool of -
135 aircraft going back to 1962. Initially employed by Strategic Air Command to satisfy 
nationally tasked intelligence collection requirements, the RC-135 fleet has also 
participated in every sizable armed conflict involving U.S. assets during its tenure.  
RC-135s were present supporting operations in Vietnam, the Mediterranean for 
Operation El Dorado Canyon, Grenada for Operation Urgent Fury, Panama for Operation 
Just Cause, and Southwest Asia for operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Enduring 
Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. RC-135s have maintained a constant presence in Southwest 
Asia since the early 1990s.  
All RC-135s are assigned to Air Combat Command. The RC-135 is permanently 
based at Offutt Air Force Base, Neb., and operated by the 55th Wing, using various 
forward deployment locations worldwide.  
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4. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS  
Primary Function: Reconnaissance  
Contractor: L-3 Communications  
Power Plant: Four CFM International F108-CF-201 high bypass turbofan 
engines 
Thrust: 21,600 pounds each engine  
Wingspan: 131 feet (39.9 meters)  
Length: 135 feet (41.1 meters)  
Height: 42 feet (12.8 meters)  
Weight: 173,000 pounds (78,743 kilograms) 
Maximum Takeoff Weight: 297,000 pounds (133,633 kilograms)  
Fuel Capacity: 130,000 pounds (58,967 kilograms) 
Speed: 500+ miles per hour (Mach.66)  
Range: 3,900 miles (6,500 kilometers)  
Ceiling:  50,000 feet (15,240 meters) 
Crew:  (flight crew) five (augmented) –three pilots, two navigators; 
(mission flight crew) 21-27, depending on mission requirements, 
minimum consisting of three electronic warfare officers, 14 intelligence 
operators and four inflight/airborne maintenance technicians  
Unit Cost: unavailable  
Initial operating capability:  January 1964 
Inventory: Active force, 17; Reserve, 0; Guard, 0 
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M. RQ-4 GLOBAL HAWK536 
 
Figure 69. RQ-4 Global Hawk537 
1. MISSION  
The RQ-4 Global Hawk is a high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aircraft 
system with an integrated sensor suite that provides intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance, or ISR, capability worldwide. Global Hawk's mission is to provide a 
broad spectrum of ISR collection capability to support joint combatant forces in 
worldwide peacetime, contingency and wartime operations. The Global Hawk 
complements manned and space reconnaissance systems by providing near-real-time 
coverage using imagery intelligence or IMINT, sensors.  
2. FEATURES  
The Global Hawk system consists of the RQ-4 aircraft, mission control element, 
or MCE, launch and recovery element, or LRE, sensors, communication links, support 
element and trained personnel. The IMINT sensors include synthetic aperture radar, 
electro-optical and medium-wave infrared sensors. The system offers a wide variety of 
employment options. The long range and endurance of this system allow tremendous 
flexibility in meeting mission requirements.  
                                                 
536 “Factsheets: RQ-4 Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System,” AF.mil Factsheets, October 2008, 
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/index.asp, (accessed 29 May 2009). 
537 From: Bobbi Zapka, “Global Hawk flying environmental mapping missions in Latin America, 
Caribbean,” (photograph), http://www.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/070301-F-9126Z-229.jpg 
(accessed November 20, 2009). 
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The Global Hawk will eventually carry the airborne signals intelligence payload. 
One version of Global Hawk will carry the Radar Technology Insertion Program active 
electronically scanned array radar.  
The MCE serves as the Global Hawk cockpit during the operational portion of the 
mission with a pilot and sensor operator crew. Command and control data links provide 
the Global Hawk crew complete dynamic control of the aircraft. The pilot workstations in 
the MCE and LRE act as the cockpit on the ground for the pilot to control and display 
platform status transmitted from the aircraft via the command and control link (health and 
status of the aircraft, sensors, navigational systems and communication links). From this 
station, the pilot communicates with outside entities to coordinate the mission (air traffic 
control, airborne controllers, ground controllers, other ISR assets, etc.). When necessary 
the pilot can land the aircraft at any location provided in the aircraft mission plan. The 
sensor operator workstation manually provides the capability to dynamically update the 
collection plan, monitor sensor status, initiate sensor calibration and process, distribute, 
and store data. The sensor operator provides quality control of images on selected targets 
of high interest (ad hoc, dynamic targets, etc.)  
The LRE, located at the aircraft base, launches the aircraft until handoff to the 
MCE contains functions required to launch, recover and operate an aircraft while en route 
to or from the target area. The LRE contains one pilot station providing the capability to 
operate one aircraft with no sensor operations.  
3. BACKGROUND  
Global Hawk began as an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration in 1995. 
The system was determined to have military utility and provide warfighters with a high-
altitude, long-endurance ISR capability. While still a developmental system, Global 
Hawk deployed operationally to support the global war on terrorism in November 2001.  
In the RQ-4 name, the "R" is the Department of Defense designation for 
reconnaissance and "Q" means unmanned aircraft system. The "4" refers to the series of 
purpose-built remotely piloted aircraft systems.  
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The Global Hawk UAS provides near-continuous all-weather, day/night, wide 
area surveillance and will eventually replace the U-2.  The Global Hawk is operated by 
the 12th Reconnaissance Squadron. The 1st RS provides formal training; both squadrons 
are located at Beale Air Force Base, Calif.  
4. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS  
Primary function: High-altitude, long-endurance intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance  
Contractor: Northrop Grumman (Prime), Raytheon, L3 Comm  
Power Plant: Rolls Royce-North American AE 3007H turbofan  
Thrust: 7,600 pounds  
Wingspan: (RQ-4A) 116 feet (35.3 meters); (RQ-4B) 130.9 feet (39.8 m)  
Length: (RQ-4A) 44 feet (13.4 meters); RQ-4B, 47.6 feet (14.5 meters)  
Height: RQ-4A 15.2 (4.6 meters); RQ-4B, 15.3 feet (4.7 meters)  
Weight: RQ-4A, 11,350 pounds (5,148 kilograms); RQ-4B, 14,950 
pounds (6,781 kilograms)  
Maximum takeoff weight: RQ-4A, 26,750 pounds (12,133 kilograms ); 
RQ-4B, 32,250 pounds (14628 kilograms)  
Fuel Capacity: RQ-4A, 15,400 pounds (6,985 kilograms); RQ-4B, 17,300 
pounds (7847 kilograms) 
Payload: RQ-4A, 2,000 pounds (907 kgs); RQ-4B, 3,000 lbs (1,360 kgs)  
Speed: RQ-4A, 340 knots (391 mph); RQ-4B, 310 knots (357 mph)  
Range: RQ-4A, 9,500 nautical miles; RQ-4B, 8,700 nautical miles  
Ceiling: 60,000 feet (18,288 meters)  
Crew (remote): Three (LRE pilot, MCE pilot and sensor operator)  
Unit Cost: RQ-4A, $37.6 million; RQ-4B, $55-$81 million  
Initial operating capability: fiscal 2012  
Inventory: Active force, RQ-4A: 7; RQ-4B: 3 
 340
N. RQ/MQ-5 HUNTER538 
 
Figure 70. MQ-5 Hunter with Under Wing Mounted Armament539 
1. MISSION  
Short-range Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance 
(ISTAR) UAV. 
2. FEATURES  
The MQ 5Bs are modified with integration of heavy fuel engines (HFE), 
upgraded avionics, and with the addition of an extended center wing, are capable of 
carrying munitions. An ARC-210 Communications Relay Payload package is also 
available to provide range extension for voice communications. The MQ-5B aircraft is 
operated and controlled by the One System Ground Control Station (OSGCS). 
3. BACKGROUND  
The RQ-5A Hunter originated as a Joint Army/Navy/Marine Corps UAS 
program. It was terminated in 1996, but through the procurement of a limited number of 
LRIP systems, Hunter continues to provide a valuable asset to the Warfighter today. It is 
currently fielded to INSCOM MI units (Alpha Co 15th MI, Alpha Co 224th Mi and 
Alpha Co 1st MI and the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) training base. 
Hunter deployed to Macedonia to support North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
Balkan operations in 1999 through 2002 and to Iraq in 2003 and to Afghanistan 2008 
where it continues to be used extensively to support combat operations. The 
                                                 
538 “MQ-5B Hunter,” FY 2009–2034 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, (Washington DC: 
Department of Defense, April 6, 2009), 65. 
539 From:  “MQ-5B Hunter,” 65. 
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modernization and retrofit of the original RQ-5A to the MQ-5B was initiated in FY2004. 
The RQ-5As and MQ-5As were phased out of service as units were fielded the MQ-5Bs.  
Hunter aircraft have accumulated over 62,000 flight hours. 
4. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS  
Primary Function: Short-range Intelligence, Surveillance, Target 
Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) UAV. 
Contractor: Northrop Grumman Corporation 
Power Plant: Two 50.7 kW (68 hp) Moto Guzzi two-cylinder four-stroke 
engines initially, one at front and one at rear of fuselage nacelle; two-blade 
wooden propellers (one tractor, one pusher). Fuel capacity 189 litres (50 
U.S. gallons; 41.6 Imp gallons). Mogas or heavy-fuel engines. Increased 
fuel capacity in larger wings. 
Wingspan: RQ-5A: 8.84m (29ft), MQ-5B: 10.44m (34ft 3.0in), MQ-5C: 
16.61m (54 ft 6.0in) 
Length: RQ-5A/MQ-5B: 7.01m (23ft), MQ-5C: 7.47m (24ft 6in) 
Height: 1.65 m (5 ft 5.0 in) 
Weight: 540 kg (1,190 lb) 
Maximum Takeoff Weight: 726 kg (1,600 lb) 
Fuel Capacity: 136 kg (300 lb) 
Payload: Internal: 113 kg (250 lb), external: 118 kg (260 lb) 
Speed: RQ-5A: 110kt, MQ-5B/C: 120kt 
Range: >108nm 
Ceiling: RQ-5A: 4,575m (15,000ft), MQ-5B: >6,100m (20,000ft), MQ-
5C: >7,620m (25,000ft) 
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O. RQ-7 SHADOW 200540 
 
Figure 71. RQ-7 Shadow 200541 
1. MISSION  
Surveillance and target acquisition UAV. 
2. FEATURES  
The Shadow is rail-launched via catapult system. It is operated via the Army’s 
One System GCS and lands via an automated takeoff and landing system (recovering 
with the aid of arresting gear) and net. Its gimbaled upgraded plug-in optical payload 
(POP) 300 EO/IR sensor relays video in real time via a C-band LOS data link and has the 
capability for IR illumination (laser pointing). 
3. BACKGROUND  
The Army selected the RQ-7 Shadow 200 (formerly a Tactical Unmanned Air 
Vehicle [TUAV]) in December 1999 to meet the Brigade-level unmanned aircraft 
requirement for support to ground maneuver commanders.  The first upgraded B model 
was delivered in August 2004 and the fleet conversion to the B model was completed the 
fall of 2006. The RQ-7B has an endurance of five to six hours on-station (greater fuel 
capacity), upgraded engine, and improved flight computer. Full-rate production and IOC 
                                                 
540 “RQ-7 Shadow 200,” FY 2009–2034 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, (Washington DC: 
Department of Defense, April 6, 2009), 75. 
541 From: Justing Naylor, “Spc. Stephen Heinz,” (photograph accompanying story “The ‘eye in the 
sky’ keeps Soldiers out of harm’s way”), http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/04/28/20294-the-eye-in-the-
sky-keeps-soldiers-out-of-harms-way/index.html (accessed November 20, 2009).  
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occurred in September 2002. Future upgrades include complete TCDL modernizations 
and laser designation technology. Shadow systems have been deployed to Iraq and 
Afghanistan in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and have accumulated 
more than 327,000 combat flight hours as of November 2008. The Marine Corps selected 
the Shadow to replace its Pioneer UAS in 2006. 
4. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS  
Primary Function: Surveillance and target acquisition UAV. 
Contractor: AAI 
Power Plant: One 28.3 kW UEL AR 741 rotary engine (RQ-7A and B); 
two-blade fixed-pitch wooden pusher propeller. 
Thrust: 38 hp 
Wingspan: RQ-7A: 3.89m (12ft 9in), RQ-7B: 4.29m (14ft 1in) 
Length: 3.40 m (11 ft 2.0 in) 
Height: 0.91 m (3 ft 0.0 in) 
Weight: 91.0 kg (200.6 lb) 
Maximum Takeoff Weight: RQ-7A: 154kg (340lb), RQ-7B: 170kg 
(375lb) 
Fuel Capacity: Fuel (40 litres; 10.5 U.S. gallons; 8.7 Imp gallons in RQ-
7A) in fire-retardant, explosion-proof wing cells; increased to 57 litres 
(15.0 U.S. gallons; 12.5 Imp gallons in RQ-7B). Growth option for 
eventual heavy fuel power plant. 
Payload: RQ-7A: 25.3 kg (55.7 lb), RQ-7B: 20.4-27.2 kg (45-60 lb) 
Speed: RQ-7A: 123 kt (228 km/h; 141 mph), RQ-7B: 118 kt (218 km/h; 
135 mph) 
Range: 43 n miles (80 km; 69 miles) 
Ceiling: 4,575 m (15,000 ft) 
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P. THEATRE AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEM (TARS)542 
 
Figure 72. TARS Mounted Under F-16543 
1. MISSION  
Provide warfighting theaters with organic, survivable, and responsive penetrating 
tactical reconnaissance that gathers timely, high-quality imagery intelligence data for use 
by commanders in the air-land battle. 
2. FEATURES  
The F16-TARS (Theater Airborne Reconnaissance System) consists of a 
removable pod uploaded to F-16C Block 25/30/32 aircraft. TARS is the Air Force’s only 
high-speed, penetrating, under-the-weather, theater-controlled, reconnaissance capability. 
In the span of a single engagement, it provides unique rapid strike and reconnaissance in 
a high-threat environment. Per the 2004 operational requirements document and as 
requested by CENTAF, TARS must provide near-real-time imagery transmission to 
forces on the ground, allowing immediate response to threats and battle damage 
assessment (BDA). Continuously deployed in Iraq since May 2005, TARS has 
significantly increased imagery available in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) by producing 
over 6,000 images for CENTCOM in support of infantry and special operations personnel  
 
 
                                                 
542 “F-16-TARS Theater Airborne Reconnaissance System,” The Air Force Handbook 2007, 
(Washington DC: U.S. Air Force, 2007), 144. 
543 From: ”F-16 TARS Theater Airborne Reconnaissance System,” 144.  TARS pod, circled in red, 
mounted under the F-16 between the rear landing gear. 
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engaged in counter-insurgent pre-raid planning, time-sensitive targeting, BDA, and 
counter-IED support. Data link capability will begin limited fielding in FY07common 




Figure 73. U-2S Dragon Lady545 
1. MISSION  
The U-2 provides high-altitude, all-weather surveillance and reconnaissance, day 
or night, in direct support of U.S. and allied forces. It delivers critical imagery and signals 
intelligence to decision makers throughout all phases of conflict, including peacetime 
indications and warnings, low-intensity conflict, and large-scale hostilities.  
2. FEATURES  
The U-2S is a single-seat, single-engine, high-altitude/near space reconnaissance 
and surveillance aircraft providing signals, imagery, and electronic measurements and 
signature intelligence. Long and narrow wings give the U-2 glider-like characteristics and 
allow it to quickly lift heavy sensor payloads to unmatched altitudes, keeping them there 
for extended periods of time. The U-2 is capable of gathering a variety of imagery, 
including multi-spectral electro-optic, infrared, and synthetic aperture radar products 
which can be stored or sent to ground exploitation centers. In addition, it also supports 
high-resolution, broad-area synoptic coverage provided by the optical bar camera 
producing traditional film products which are developed and analyzed after landing.  
The U-2 also carries a signals intelligence payload. All intelligence products 
except for wet film can be transmitted in near real-time anywhere in the world via air-to-
                                                 
544 “Factsheets: U2S/TU-2S,” AF.mil Factsheets, September 2007, 
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/index.asp, (accessed May 29, 2009). 
545 From: United States Air Force, “CENTAF Air Power Summary for April 3,2007,” (photograph), 
http://www.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/030411-F-0000J-222.jpg, (accessed November 20, 2009).  
 347
ground or air-to-satellite data links, rapidly providing critical information to combatant 
commanders. Measurement and signature intelligence provides indications of recent 
activity in areas of interest and reveals efforts to conceal the placement or true nature of 
man-made objects. 
Routinely flown at altitudes over 70,000 feet, the U-2 pilot must wear a full 
pressure suit similar to those worn by astronauts. The low-altitude handling 
characteristics of the aircraft and bicycle-type landing gear require precise control inputs 
during landing; forward visibility is also limited due to the extended aircraft nose and 
"taildragger" configuration. A second U-2 pilot normally "chases" each landing in a high-
performance vehicle, assisting the pilot by providing radio inputs for altitude and runway 
alignment. These characteristics combine to earn the U-2 a widely accepted title as the 
most difficult aircraft in the world to fly.  
The U-2 is powered by a General Electric F118-101 engine, fuel efficient and 
lightweight, which negates the need for air refueling on long duration missions. The U-2S 
Block 10 electrical system upgrade replaced legacy wiring with advanced fiber-optic 
technology and lowered the overall electronic noise signature to provide a quieter 
platform for the newest generation of sensors.  
The aircraft has these sensors: electro-optical infrared camera, optical bar camera, 
advanced synthetic aperture radar, signals intelligence, and network-centric 
communication. 
A U-2 Reliability and Maintainability Program provided a complete redesign of 
the cockpit with digital color multifunction displays and up-front avionics controls to 
replace the 1960s-vintage round dial gauges which were no longer supportable. 
3. BACKGROUND  
Built in complete secrecy by Kelly Johnson and the Lockheed Skunk Works, the 
original U-2A first flew in August 1955. Early flights over the Soviet Union in the late 
1950s provided the president and other U.S. decision makers with key intelligence on 
Soviet military capability. In October 1962, the U-2 photographed the buildup of Soviet 
 348
offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba, touching off the Cuban Missile Crisis. In more recent 
times, the U-2 has provided intelligence during operations in Korea, the Balkans, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq. When requested, the U-2 also provides peacetime reconnaissance 
in support of disaster relief from floods, earthquakes, and forest fires and supports search 
and rescue operations.  
The U-2R, first flown in 1967, was 40 percent larger and more capable than the 
original aircraft. A tactical reconnaissance version, the TR-1A, first flew in August 1981 
and was structurally identical to the U-2R. The last U-2 and TR-1 aircraft were delivered 
in October 1989; in 1992 all TR-1s and U-2s were designated as U-2Rs. Since 1994, $1.7 
billion has been invested to modernize the U-2 airframe and sensors. These  upgrades 
also included the transition to the GE F118-101 engine which resulted in the re-
designation of all Air Force U-2 aircraft to the U-2S. 
U-2s are home based at the 9th Reconnaissance Wing, Beale Air Force Base, 
California, but are rotated to operational detachments worldwide. U-2 pilots are trained at 
Beale using five two-seat aircraft designated as TU-2S before deploying for operational 
missions.  
 349
4. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Primary Function: High-altitude reconnaissance  
Contractor: Lockheed Martin Aeronautics  
Power Plant: One General Electric F118-101 engine  
Thrust: 17,000 pounds  
Wingspan: 105 feet (32 meters)  
Length: 63 feet (19.2 meters)  
Height: 16 feet (4.8 meters)  
Weight: 16,000 pounds 
Maximum Takeoff Weight: 40,000 pounds (18,000 kilograms)  
Fuel Capacity: 2,950 gallons 
Payload: 5,000 pounds 
Speed: 410+ miles per hour  
Range: 7,000+ miles (6,090+ nautical miles)  
Ceiling: Above 70,000 feet (21,212+ meters)  
Crew: One (two in trainer models)  
Unit Cost: Classified  
Initial operating capability: 1956  
Inventory: Active force, 33 (five two-seat trainers and two ER-2s 
operated by NASA); Reserve, 0; ANG, 0 
 
 350
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 351
APPENDIX C. MISSION TYPE ORDERS 
The following slides are examples of a graphical Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS) which uses a “mission type order” (MTO) format for conveying 
commander’s intent, mission objectives, and the tasks of units.  While specific guidance 
is provided for what assets should accomplish, taskings refrain from providing explicit 
instructions on how those missions should be carried out.  This allows the subordinate 
leaders and crew members the flexibility necessary to execute their tactics, techniques, 
and procedures (TTPs) as necessary to best accomplish their goals.  MTOs could very 
well be provided in a strictly textual format, however, this CONOP example is used 
because of the preferred method of including necessary supporting graphics for all 
involved participants, ensuring that all are “on the same sheet of music.”  Lastly, it is 
important to note that slides depicting maneuver element actions or ISR asset 
requirements are not separated but included in the same CONOPS to provide 
transparency of requirements, opportunities for improved support, and further review by 
all parties to ensure that essential tasks were not overlooked during planning. 
CONOPS generally include four slides, beginning with the commander’s intent 
and overview of the friendly situation.  The second slide reviews enemy activity over the 
past few days and an assessment of their most likely and most dangerous courses of 
action.  The most likely course of action is based on observed trends, established TTPs, 
and assessed objectives.  The most dangerous course of action is selected based upon 
those actions (within the capabilities of the adversary force) that pose the greatest threat 
to the friendly mission.  This allows commanders to begin developing contingency plans 
for enemy actions. 
The third slide details friendly actions in the objective area to include a general 
timeline of events.  The friendly scheme of maneuver is described both in the text and via 
the common graphics.  Mitigation of threats is also detailed to include the employment of 
a quick reaction force (QRF).  The fourth and final slide (which may not be in use by all 
units at this time), details the ISR concept of operations using the same graphics from the  
 
 352
previous slide.  It provides general guidance for asset employment to include task (T) and 
purpose (P) descriptions, a timeline for ISR coordination, and a general overview of how 









APPENDIX D. JOINT INTEGRATED AIR SUPPORT REQUEST 
FORM 
The DD Form 1972 is the means by which Air Support Requests are submitted 
through the Close Air Support (CAS) channels.  Airborne electronic warfare (EW) 
requests are also submitted via the DD Form 1972, formally known as the Joint Air 
Support Request (JASR), though with additional worksheets explaining the parameters 
and requirements specific to the EW mission.  In 2006, the staff at Central Air Force 
(CENTAF) attempted to develop a method by which intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) missions, normally submitted via PRISM or similar collection 
management specific software, can also be submitted via the same channels.  The reason 
for this change in process was intended to improve coordination between ISR and non-
ISR airborne operations, to provide a greater sense of transparency in the ISR tasking 
process, and to provide a method by which dual role assets (specifically the MQ-1 
Predator and MQ-9 Reaper but also targeting pod equipped fighters) could be tasked to 
conduct both ISR and strike missions within the same sortie. 
The attached DD Form 1972.1 Joint Integrated Air Support Request (JIASR) was 
the result of this effort.  The form included here, however, has been modified by this 
author to better represent the needs of ISR planners and to emphasize the “effects based” 
approach to requests (rather than requesting specific sensors or weapon systems).  The 
first page demonstrates the detailed integration required to coordinate airborne assets 
conducting CAS, EW, and ISR in the support of the same mission.  There is also ample 
room (and instructions) for including additional graphics, forms, or instructions as 
necessary.  The second page provides for the necessary coordination for organic assets 
and commander’s controlled air and battlespace deconfliction.  The third page is used to 
provide feedback following the mission.  Ideally, this feedback should be specific by 
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